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The topics of double non-taxation (hereinafter, “DNT”) and the use of 
hybrid entities have been in the agenda of the international tax community 
for a long time.
1
  Nevertheless, their analysis acquires a particular 
importance in our days when transformations within the tax world have 
achieved a speed, and perhaps also an international commitment not 




The international tax community, or the majority of it, has been generally 
skeptic as regards to both the DNT outcome and the use of hybrid entities. 
                                                          
1  In 1999, e.g. the OECD launched the Partnership Report, which subsequently inspired 
the inclusion of Article 23(4) in the 2000 OECD Model. See OECD (1999), The 
Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, Issues in International 
Taxation No. 6, OECD Publishing, Paris. During 2010, the OECD also launched the 
OECD Report on Addressing Task Risks Involving Bank Losses, which paid special 
attention in the situations when the same tax loss is relieved in more than one country as 
a result of the differences in tax treatment between jurisdictions. Subsequently, in 2011, 
the OECD launched the Report on Corporate Loss Utilization through Aggressive Tax 
Planning, which recommended countries to consider introducing restrictions on the 
multiple uses of the same loss to the extent they are concerned with the results of DNT 
and tax deferral. See OECD (2011), Corporate Loss Utilization through Aggressive Tax 
Planning, OECD Publishing, Paris. Likewise, DNT was the central point of discussion 
in the International Fiscal Association (IFA) Congress in 2004 and hybrid entities was 
recently discussed in the version of the year 2014 of the same forum. See in this regard: 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international— Vol. 89a, Double Non-Taxation, (IFA 2004) and 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax 
Treaty Protection (IFA 2014). 
2  See OECD (2013) Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris 






The DNT outcome, on one hand, supposes the complete absence of taxation, 
and as such it seems to be as unfair or undesirable as its counterpart: double 
taxation. This idea has been largely reinforced under the academic postulate 
that income should be taxed at least once in any cross-border transaction.
3
 
Hybrid entities, on the other hand, have been criticized to be an open door 
for creating advantages with differences among country tax systems, which 
might be exploited in order to duplicate tax benefits and to minimize overall 
tax burdens.
4
  Nonetheless, neither the international need of taxing every 
                                                          
3  A further analysis at infra Chapter I, Section 3. 
4  For some authors this is a problem called “cross-border tax arbitrage” or 
“international tax arbitrage” and occurs when a taxpayer is involved in a transaction or 
set up a business structure in order to take advantage of differences among country tax 
systems with the goal of exploiting such differences in order to duplicate tax benefits 
and to minimize his overall tax burden. Therefore, inconsistent characterization of 
income or entities among the countries might, e.g. give rise to tax arbitrage 
opportunities. Supporting the academic concept of tax arbitrage see, e.g. L. Dell’Anese, 
Tax Arbitrage and the Changing Structure of International Tax Law, Egea, Milan, 2006. 
See also R. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax 
Regime, 61 Bull. Int’l Taxn. 4 (2007), Journals IBFD; T. Rosembuj, International Tax 
Arbitrage, 39 Intertax 4 (2011); J. Prebble, Exploiting Form in Avoidance by 
International Tax Arbitrage–Arguments Towards a Unifying Hypothesis of Taxation 
Law, 17 Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. 1 (2011), Journals IBFD. Nevertheless, the concept of 
international tax arbitrage is arguable, mostly when dealing with situations when 
taxpayers legitimately arrange their affairs in order to achieve DNT, using the 
uncoordinated tax rules among jurisdictions. In this opinion see, e.g. H.D. Rosenbloom, 
Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly, Taxes—The Tax Magazine, 
Vol. 85 (2007), p. 116. Accordingly, the concept of tax arbitrage is still unable to 
explain how, e.g. differences in the characterization of entities or the corporate residence 
give rise to arbitrage, while differences in tax rates not. For a further analysis on this 
subject, see M. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in International Responses to 
International Tax Arbitrage, 53 Emory L.J. 89 (2004). See also, J. Roin, Taxation 
Without Coordination, 31 The Journal of Legal Studies 1, Part 2 (2002); D. Ring, One 
Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 Boston 
College Law Review 1 (2002); T. Gresik, The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals, 39 
Journal of Economic Literature 3 (2001); T. Edgar, Corporate Income Tax Coordination 




single cross-border transaction at least once nor the differences in the tax 
characterization of entities have been proved to be a priori a true concern.
5
  
In spite of the above, the influence of the current international tax reforms, 
and perhaps also the simplification offered in the use of notions given by 
granted, has created the perfect scenario for the appearance of even more 
pragmatic approaches that simply combine both elements, i.e. DNT outcome 
and disparities in the tax characterization of entities, into one single target, 
which ought to be counteracted.
6
 This idea seems to convince many and it is 
sometimes difficult to argue against due to its pragmatism and complex 
construction. Nonetheless, it should not be encased as unquestionable at all. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
as a Response to International Tax Competition and International Tax Arbitrage, 51 
Canadian Tax Journal 3 (2003).   
5  For example, the OECD BEPS Action Plan states: “No or low taxation is not per se a 
cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with practices that artificially 
segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it”. (Emphasis added). See 
OECD (2013), supra n. 2, p. 10. In contrast, Action 11 seems to get back to the original 
idea that DNT is indeed the evil, regardless of the element of artificiality in a cross-
border transaction, when it says: “single taxation in cross-border transactions is indeed 
one of the principal aims of the project both in cases when the interaction of different tax 
rules leads to such an outcome or when the outcome arises from the shifting of profits 
from the jurisdictions where the activities creating that profits took place”. Id. As 
regards to the disparities in the tax characterization of entities, they seem to be the result 
of sovereign tax policy decisions, representing the general rule and not the exception in 
the international tax practice. Infra Chapter III. 
6 OECD (2015), Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2-
2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris. In 2012, the OECD also produced a Report 
on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, which reviewed domestic anti-abuse norms 
responding to various potentially abusive practices and concluded that they were 
successful in combating such practices, recommending these solutions to the problem of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements from a unilateral perspective. OECD (2012), Report on 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD Publishing, Paris. The concept of HMA is 





In this vertiginous path of international tax changes, therefore, this work 
adopts a different approach, taking the time to discover to which extent the 
DNT outcome and the use of hybrid entities are (if they were once) 
interconnected elements that should serve each other in the design of 
domestic and tax treaty anti-hybrid provisions, or whether a re-orientated 
debate as regards to the use of hybrid entities might be proposed. This task 
is not superfluous, because only once these issues have been properly 
clarified, it will be possible to seriously determine whether or not the 
positions adopted and solutions proposed up to this date shall be supported, 
improved or simply discarded.  
1. Object and Purpose 
The object and purpose of this study is to analyze the interaction between 
the DNT outcome and the use of hybrid entities within the international 
context, including also the application of tax treaties. For this purpose, this 
work considers the following research questions: 
 
1. Is there necessarily an interconnection between the use of hybrid 
and reverse hybrid entities and the DNT outcome? Should the rules 
targeting the use (or misuse) of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities be 
designed based exclusively on the DNT outcome? 
 




2. Is there an alternative approach to deal more directly with the use 
(or misuse) of disparities in the characterization of entities for tax 
purposes, which does not consider the DNT outcome, or should the 
current consequentialist approach prevail? 
 
Likewise, this work starts from the following hypotheses, which will be 
proved or disproved during the development of this work:  
 
a. The sole result of a D/NI outcome, i.e. DNT, should not be considered 
per se a matter of concern in any cross-border transaction. Likewise, 
the use of the DNT outcome as an immediate proxy to determine the 
existence of practices that might be considered abusive when they 
derive exclusively from the use of hybrids or reverse hybrid entities 
should be prevented.  
  
b. Linking rules, i.e. rules matching deductions with the respective 
inclusion of income in the other country, as the ones proposed within 
the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2, have the risk of setting up strong 
presumptions of abusive practices by the sole reason that the outcome 
of DNT has been achieved. Likewise, these rules are highly complex to 
administer and they do not target the core issue with respect to hybrids 
and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the different tax characterization of 






c. Rules regulating the use of transparent entities at the level of tax 
treaties in order to prevent the access to the benefits of a bilateral tax 
treaty by third countries out of that treaty are, in principle, 
recommendable. Nevertheless, the inclusion of an Article 1(2) within 
the OECD Model, resembling Article 1(6) US Model, might generate 
important issues with respect to developing countries, mostly 
considering that these countries generally rely on source taxation. 
Similar concerns are shared as regards to Article 3(1) MLI, which 
mirrors the OECD proposal of Article 1(2) OECD Model. Alternatives 
solutions, including domestic ones, should be analyzed. 
2. Scope 
This work refers exclusively to the study of the cases in which a DNT 
outcome derives exclusively from the different characterization of the same 
entity by two different jurisdictions, i.e. when a different characterization of 
the same entity results in a D/NI outcome. Therefore, this study will not 
refer to cases of “double deduction” (DD) included within the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan 2 and will not analyze the cases of “dual resident mismatches” 
either, as those cases refer neither to the characterization of entities, such as 
the case of dual resident mismatches, nor they involve the DNT outcome, 







Accordingly, this study will exclude the cases of DNT derived from the use 
of hybrid financial instruments, i.e. when the same financial instrument is 
qualified differently by two jurisdictions: as debt in one jurisdiction while as 
equity in the other.
7
 This exclusion is justified by two reasons. Firstly, 
hybrid entities and hybrid instruments are two different problems. Whilst the 
former supposes the different characterization of an entity by two different 
jurisdictions, the latter implies a different characterization of the payment 
(income) made by one taxpayer to the other. The above, however, does not 
mean to recognize that many transactions can, in practice, involve both a 
hybrid payment and a hybrid entity at the same time. Secondly, the 
exclusion has the purpose of simplifying the analysis of DNT as an outcome 
derived exclusively from the use of hybrid entities and to enable a better 
understanding of the nature of the issues involved. In the same order of 
ideas, the study will not refer to the cases concerning “hybrid transfers”, 
namely, arrangements to transfer a financial instrument where the laws of 
two jurisdictions differ on whether the transferor or the transferee has got 
the ownership of the payments on the underlying asset, e.g. re-purchase 




Finally, this work will not include the cases of “hybrid PEs mismatches”, 
i.e. when two jurisdictions disagree on whether a business activity is being 
carried out through a PE or not. The reasons for this last exclusion are 
                                                          
7  For a complete study about this specific topic, see, e.g. J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial 
Instruments in International Tax Law, Wolters Kluwer, BV, The Netherlands (2017).  





certainly obvious. On the one hand, PEs are not strictly entities or separate 
entities, regardless that they can be part of an entity. On the other hand, the 
“mismatch” in this case arises with respect to the existence (or not) of a PE, 
i.e. a legal fiction in itself created to tax the profits of a business (branch) 
when there was enough economic presence in a territory, and not with 
respect to the existence or not of an “entity” due to its different 
characterization in two countries. This is also perhaps the reason why the 
OECD also opted for elaborating a separate report for this purpose.
9
 As per 
the justification for the exclusion of “PE mismatches” from this work, any 
reference to the potential application of the proposed reactive coordination 
rule (Chapter VI) to these cases will also be omitted.  
3. Methodology 
This work has opted for an analysis not strictly linked to any specific tax 
jurisdiction, which, in principle, might not necessarily follow the traditional 
paths of a doctoral thesis in law that normally uses as a starting point the 
specific provisions of a jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the methodology chosen 
                                                          
9  As well confirmed by the OECD: “Branch mismatch arrangements are not ‘hybrid’ in 
the sense that they are not the result of differences in the tax treatment or 
characterization of an instrument or entity”. See OECD (2016), Public Discussion Draft: 
BEPS Action 2 Branch Mismatch Structures, OECD Publishing, Paris. Accordingly, all 
of the examples involving hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities within the OECD 
BEPS Action 2 assume that there is no PE in the country of establishment of the entity 
once this is considered as transparent in the country of the investors. See also, 
OECD (2017), Neutralizing the Effects of Branch Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2: 






in this case finds its justification in two main reasons. On one hand, it is 
given by the nature of the concepts under analysis, i.e. DNT and hybrid 
entities. Both issues represents problems that involves the interaction of 
different jurisdictions, i.e. international tax law issues that are not limited to 
a particular State, and that many times also involve the application of 
supranational law, i.e. EU law, and tax treaties. To this extent, it results 
more accurate to situate all these issues under analysis within an 
international context, rather than to limit their scope to the laws of a given 
country, which might finally restrict the results of this work. On the other 
hand, a more agnostic analysis, i.e. not linked to the analysis of a specific 
jurisdiction, allows this author to carry out a deeper study into the 
foundations of the concepts in abstract, absent of the specific limitations of 
domestic tax legislation, which might finally allow elaborating solutions 
applicable to a generality of cases. As such, thefore, this research work 
might properly be considered as an international tax law thesis.  
 
The above, however, does not mean to recognize that the author completely 
renounces referring to the laws of specific tax jurisdictions either as a way 
of example or as a way to support the analysis of the specific subjects 
treated during the development of this work. In this regard, it is important to 
note that the election of the countries whose domestic legislations, including 
also domestic jurisprudence, are used or analyzed has not been randomly 
made. On the contrary, it strictly follows the directions given by the nature 
of the general topics under analysis, i.e. DNT and hybrid entities, and the 





sense, the author has chosen to carry out a more extensive analysis upon the 
rules of characterization of foreign entities for tax purposes in the United 
States of America (Check-the-box rules or CTB) in Chapter III. This 
analysis is justified in the importance of these rules as to originate hybrid 
and reverse hybrid entities in the international context, being also a unique 
example in the world of a system of characterization of foreign entities in 
which the taxpayer may choose the tax characterization of them. Likewise, 
the Spanish Income Attribution Regime is analyzed in Chapter III as a 
manner to provide a concrete example of coordination in the 
characterization of foreign entities, even though such a coordinated result is 
the result of an administrative practice of the Spanish tax authority (DGT), 
which does not necessarily have a proper foundation within the strict text of 
the law. Likewise, the Danish law is analyzed in Chapter III as another 
important example of coordination to solve issues as regards to hybrids and 
reverse hybrid entities. Indeed, the Danish rules appear as a reaction to the 
use (or misuse) of the CTB rules in the United States and have served as an 
orientation to the latest reforms within the EU ATAD II, delaing with HMA 
with third countries outside the EU. All the other references to speficic tax 
jurisdictions are used according to the specific subjects analyzed during the 
thesis. In this regard, e.g. Chapter I refers to the tax credit and LOB clause 
within the United States tax system as regards the discussion upon the 
existence of an international principle that would oblige to pay taxes in at 
least one State in cases of cross-border transactions, known as single tax 





arguments to prove or disprove its existence, and thus, they might rarely be 
omitted. Another example can be found in the use of the German tax law to 
exemplify the use of switch-over clauses within tax treaties or the reference 
to tax treaty override in Chapter II. Accordingly, some examples of 
solutions to deal with the dichotomy between Article 1(2) OECD Model and 
the beneficial ownership requirement of Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD 
Model, are taken from the treaties between Poland/United States and 
Canada/United States as it can be noted in Chapter IV. All of the above 
ratifies the international tax law character of this research work and justifies 
the use of tax laws and jurisprudence of different countries as per the 
development of the work requires. 
 
The apparent unsystematic analysis of EU tax law, on the other hand, might 
also be a cause of concern from a traditional point of view. Nevertheless, the 
use of EU tax law follows the whole methodlogy adopted for this thesis, i.e. 
EU tax law is analyzed as part of the whole international context appearing 
and disappearing during the thesis as per its development requires. That is 
the reason why some references to EU tax law firstly appear in Chapter I as 
part of the non-legal notion of Aggressive Tax Planning (ATP), in particular, 
because of the “EU notion” of ATP given by the EU Commission. 
Similarly, EU tax law is used as part of the analysis of the concept of 
Special Tax Regimes (STR), included as part of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan 6, and analyzed in Chapter II, because it might indeed generate 
concerns under primary and secondary EU tax law. In Chapter III, appears 





the treatment of HMA within the EU. This evolution is certainly interesting, 
because of the most recent developments within the EU to deal with HMA, 
in particular the launch of the EU ATAD I and II. Finally, it appears as part 
of the analysis of the OECD linking rules in Chapter V and its compatibility 
with EU primary and secondary law. The use of EU tax law to test the 
efficacy of linking rules finds its justification in two main reasons. On one 
hand, because the notion of discrimination elaborated within the CJEU 
when compared, e.g. to the one of Article 24 OECD Model, also analyzed in 
this Chapter, might drives to different results. On the other hand, because 
the EU has been particularly compromised in the implementation of the 
OECD BEPS measures, including HMA. This task has been materialized 
with the approval of the EU ATAD I, which opted for including the OECD 
linking rules to deal with hybrids (both as regards to entities and financial 
instruments), and the recent development included within the EU ATAD II, 
which covers HMA with third countries. All of the above sustains a 
methodological analysis of EU tax law as per the development of the 
research requires, certainly disclosing a sistematic treatment. 
 
A more agnostic analysis not restricted to any specific jurisdiction has also 
special relevance with respect to the study of the concepts of DNT and the 
use of hybrid entities within the tax treaty context. Although tax treaties 
constitutes a singular world, the use of tax treaty models, specially the 
widespread use of the OECD Model, might be helpful to extract general 





provisions. Chapter II, e.g. analyses some specific provisions of the OECD 
Model, which at first glance might be interpreted in a manner of preventing 
DNT. However, a closer look at them demonstrates that they are far from 
being interpreted in light of this broad tax policy goal. Similarly, Chapter IV 
deals with the analysis of Article 1(6) US Model, which regardless of not 
being included in all the treaties signed by the United States, may be 
compared with the proposed Article 1(2) OECD Model in order to extract 
general conclusions with respect to the use of hybrid entities and reverse 
hybrids within tax treaties. In particular, the use of study cases in Chapter 
IV, both to explain the consequences of the application of Article 1(6) US 
Model and 1(2) OECD Model, finds a proper justification in the subsequent 
analysis of the same cases within the proposal of Chapter VI, which creates 
an harmonic point of comparison, even though this latter proposal does not 
attempt to be implemented directly within tax treaties. 
 
Finally, there is another important reason to prefer an analysis not restricted 
to any specific jurisdiction. This work proposes an alternative approach (i.e. 
the reactive coordination rule) to deal with hybrid entities and reverse 
hybrid entities, which does not only deviates from the the OECD linking 
rules, but also it has the characteristic of being designed without considering 
a specific jurisdiction in mind. The above has the advantage of being a rule 
that, in principle, might be implemented in any jurisdiction, keeping in mind 
that hybrid entities are an international concern not restricted to a specific 
State only. As regards to the proposal, this is based on some fundamental 





set of OECD linking rules, and which might also serve as a valid and more 
administrable alternative to the above-mentioned domestic solution. In 
second place, it attempts to focus on the real issue involving the use of 
hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the disparate characterization of 
entities by two or more jurisdictions, disregarding the outcomes of the 
transactions involving the use of hybrid entity structures, particularly the 
DNT outcome. Thirdly, it attempts to be a rule that might provide also more 
consistent results in the application of tax treaties, in particular as regards to 
Article 1(2) OECD Model and Article 3(1) MLI. The above might be 
intuitively understood since once coordination in the characterization of 
entities has been achieved, the conflicts within tax treaties disappear and the 
application of Article 1(2) OECD Model is restricted only to those cases in 
which the two Contracting States considers the entity as fiscally transparent, 
which will happen exclusively in those cases in which the entity was given a 
tax transparent treatment in its county of legal organization. All these 
outcomes are further on analyzed at Chapter VI. 
4. Structure of the work 
This work is divided in three parts.  
 
Part One refers to the study of the DNT outcome. This part of the study 
includes two Chapters. Chapter I, on one hand, which attempts to 
demonstrate that the DNT outcome should not be considered per se as a 




cause of concern in any cross-border transaction. This Chapter also includes 
the arguments against the supporters of the idea that an international tax law 
principle exists to obligate that income is taxed at least once in a cross-
border transaction. Accordingly, by analyzing the traditional legal concepts 
of tax evasion and tax avoidance, the Chapter attempts to demonstrate that 
DNT should not be confused with these concepts that distorte its nature. The 
analysis in abstract of the notion of DNT will allow us to prevent an a priori 
negative perception of it, reinforcing its nature of a simple outcome. Chapter 
II, on the other hand, analyzes the concept of double non-taxation in light of 
the application of bilateral tax treaties. Taking some provisions of the 
OECD Model and some examples of tax treaty clauses, this Chapter aims to 
demonstrate that no provisions within tax treaties adopt the general tax 
policy goal of preventing DNT.  The above does not mean to recognize that 
under some circumstances tax treaties might indeed prevent DNT, such as 
the case when subject-to-tax or switch-over clauses are expressly introduced 
within a tax treaty. However, these situations are as exceptional as when 
some provisions are introduced within tax treaties regardless the DNT 
outcome, e.g. tax sparing or matching credits.  
 
Part Two turns the analysis into the second main subject of this work: hybrid 
entities. This part of the study also includes two Chapters. Chapter III, on 
one hand, refers to some key concepts that are necessary to circumscribe the 
subsequent analysis of the concepts of hybrid entities and reverse hybrids. 
This Chapter also includes a general analysis of the different existing 





i.e. the comparative approach; legal personality approach; overall approach 
and fixed approach, in order to demonstrate that no system prevails over the 
other and that there is no completely inviolable method of characterization 
of entities. Likewise, it provides a detailed analysis of the U.S. CTB system 
as the largest and most famous “elective system” to characterize entities for 
tax purposes, reserving the taxpayers the exclusive right to determine when 
a foreign entity will be taxable or not, addressing also the previous 
characterization system used in the United States, i.e. Kintner test. 
Accordingly, it analyzes the cases of tax planning opportunities derived 
from the CTB election, specifically with reference to the avoidance of 
Subpart F income (CFC rule) and the inappropriate use of foreign tax credit, 
demonstrating that the electivity of the CTB system is more apparent than 
real, and when compared, e.g. with a resemblance or comparable system, 
there is practicably no difference in terms of the possibilities to predict a 
desired characterization of entities. Finally, the Chapter addresses three 
concrete examples of coordination in the tax characterization of foreign 
entities around the world: Spain, Denmark and the attempted coordination 
within the Proposal for an EU ATAD and the inclusion of Article 9a EU 
ATAD II, dealing with cases of payments made to reverse hybrid entities. 
These examples attempt to demonstrate that coordination in the 
characterization of entities is not only a utopian academic idea, but it can 
also be an effective manner to deal with hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, 
serving also as an anteroom to the general proposal of this work.  Chapter 
IV, on the other hand, deals with the use of hybrid entities and the 




entitlement to tax treaty benefits. For this purpose, the Chapter briefly refers 
to the general rules regarding the entitlement to tax treaty benefits with 
respect to entities and analyses the principles established within the OECD 
Partnership Report as regards to conflicts of allocation of income. 
Accordingly, it provides a detailed analysis of Article 1(6) US Model, which 
is the first positive recognition of the principles settled within the OECD 
Partnership Report, and the immediate precedent of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model, which is subsequently analyzed in this Chapter. Despite a general 
analysis of the wording of these two provisions, the Chapter provides 
specific illustrations with respect to the application of both provisions, 
which are divided in two groups: (i) strict bilateral cases and (ii) triangular 
cases. Likewise, as regards to Article 1(6) US Model, it also provides some 
examples where the interplay between Article 1(6) US Model and other tax 
treaty and domestic provisions is either not entirely clear or they simply 
conflict with each other. The above includes the interplay with the concept 
of beneficial owner in Article 10, 11 and 12 US Model; the U.S. “saving 
clause”, the U.S. CTB regulations and I.R.C. Sec. 894(c). Similarly, as 
regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model, it also addresses some specific issues 
referred to its application, which include the interplay with the concept of 
beneficial owner, the saving clause and double taxation relief’s issue 
(particularly considering the proposal of paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS 
Action 6), and the negative impact that Article 1(2) OECD Model has with 
respect to developing countries. Finally, the analysis and conclusions 
referred to Article 1(2) OECD Model are extended to Article 3(1) of the 





provided as regards to Article 3(3) and Article 11 MLI, referred to the 
simplified and detailed “saving clause” version introduced within the MLI. 
Accordingly, this analysis is complemented with the study of Article 3(2) 
and Article 5–Option C MLI, dealing with the impact of the saving clause 
and the double taxation relief’s issues. 
Finally, Part Three analyzes how both the DNT outcome and hybrid entities, 
analyzed in Part One and Two of this work, interact together within the 
notion of “hybrid mismatch arrangements” (HMA). For this purpose, 
Chapter V firstly analyzes the notion of HMA and criticizes its confusing 
and limited construction. It is also argued in this Chapter that the attempt to 
connect disparities derived from different characterization of the same entity 
by two different jurisdictions and the DNT outcome might ultimately create 
presumptions of abusive practices. Likewise, this Chapter aims to 
demonstrate that the deficient construction of the notion of HMA is 
replicated in the elaboration of the remedies proposed to counteract them, 
i.e. “linking rules”. For this purpose, the Chapter reinforces some issues of 
compatibility between linking rules and tax treaties and EU Law, 
respectively. Against this attempted interconnection between the use of 
hybrid and reverse hybrid entities and the DNT outcome, which has derived 
in a complex set of rules to implement both at a domestic and tax treaty 
level and whose true efficacy is still an incognito, Chapter VI proposes a 
different alternative: a domestic reactive coordination rule. The proposal 
aims to be a domestic alternative to coordinate the characterization of 




entities according to the legal characterization of the entity in the home 
country, i.e. the country where the entity, whose characterization is under 
debate, is formally and legally organized, and it is based in three main tax 
policy ideas: simplicity, coherence and administrability. The first part of the 
Chapter describes the mechanics of the proposal, including its scope of 
application and the policy objectives. Likewise, it explains the functioning 
of the proposal using specific illustrations in this regard, and detailing also 
its advantages and disadvantages. It finally provides a comparison between 
the proposed rule and other existing rules addressing the same path of 
coordination in order to clearly set up the common points and deviations 
that makes the proposed rule in this Chapter preferable. The second part of 
the Chapter analyzes the implications of the domestic reactive coordination 
rule within tax treaties. As recognized in Chapter IV, the inclusion of a new 
Article 1(2) OECD Model (and Article 3(1) MLI) solves many issues 
regarding the proper allocation of tax treaty benefits when tax transparent 
entities are involved. However, this article if far from being a fair solution 
for developing (source) countries. This issue could, nevertheless, be 
mitigated in the hypothetical that the domestic reactive coordination rule is 
applied worldwide. Indeed, if that occurs, the scope of application of Article 
1(2) OECD Model will be automatically reduced, providing more consistent 
tax treaty outcomes, and indirectly enhancing the position of source 
countries in those cases where the pure application of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model originated unfair results. The proposal, however, does not attempt to 
be neither a perfect solution nor an improvable one, but rather to serve as a 





regarding hybrid entity mismatches, especially in this time where we have 
witnessed how issues are presented in a pragmatic costume, being 
sometimes very difficult to see beyond that or to argue against. Chapter VII 
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Double Non-Taxation: A Conceptual Analysis 
1. Introduction  
The use of the notion of DNT
10
 has acquired considerable prominence 
during the last years. The appearance in the media of public tax cases 











, just to mention some of them, using 
                                                          
10  Some authors use the term “white income” as equivalent to DNT. Nevertheless, this 
term might create certain confusion with other new notions that have also recently 
appeared in the international tax arena, such as the notion of “stateless income”. This 
latter, however, is certainly not a synonymous of DNT. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, 
the author will only refer to the classic term of DNT as the complete absence of taxation 
in an international transaction. For the explanation of the term “stateless income”, see 
infra Section 2.2.  As an example of authors referring to “white income” as an 
interchangeable concept of DNT see, e.g. W. Haslehner, Double Taxation Relief, 
Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law, in: I. Richelle, W. Schön and E. 
Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation, Springer, Heidelberg, 2016. 
11  See, e.g. US: US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Hearing on Offshore Profit Shifting and 
the U.S. Tax Code – Part 2, Apple Inc. (2013). See also, e.g., A. Ting, The Politics of 
BEPS – Apple’s International Tax Structure and the US Attitude towards BEPS, 69 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 6/7 (2015), Journals IBFD; L. Sheppard, Apple’s Tax Magic, Worldwide Tax 
Daily (26 May 2013). 
12  See, e.g. J. Martin, Amazon Fighting IRS Over Cost-Sharing Agreements, Tax Analyst, 
Featured Articles, posted online on 21 January 2013. 
13  See, e.g. T. Ciro and B. Mascitelli, Machinations in the Global Automotive Industry: The 
Fiat and Chrysler Deal Examined, 12 Derivs. & Fin. Instrums. 2 (2010), Journals IBFD. 
See also, L. Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, Commission, 56 Eur. Taxn. 1 (2016), Journals 
IBFD. 
14  See, e.g. H. van den Hurk, Starbucks versus the People, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 1 (2014), 
Journals IBFD. See also, C. Allison, How Starbucks Lost its Social License—and Paid 
20 Million pounds to Get it Back, 71 Tax Notes Int’l 7 (2013), p. 637. 
15  See, e.g. EU: European Commission Press Release, State aid: Commission opens formal 
investigation into Luxembourg's tax treatment of McDonald’s (3 Dec. 2015). 




sophisticated tax structures to reduce or to eliminate taxation, including the 
role of activists promoting “tax justice” and “fairness”
16
, have certainly 
created an interesting scenario to debate or re-debate about a notion that 
seems to be understood a priori as something negative. The recent work of 
the OECD, the 2013 BEPS project, has not only reaffirmed this negative 
idea on what double non-taxation is, but it has gone further and provides 




Nevertheless, a proper debate could not start from the basis of notions given 
by granted. On the contrary, within the debate on DNT, it is important to go 
one step back and to ask whether we really have certainty on what are we 
debating on? Do we know what is DNT? Is it correct to use this notion as an 
interchangeable one with some illegal or undesirable concepts, such as tax 
evasion or tax avoidance? Where is the limit? Is there a general prohibition 
under international law by which taxpayers are not permitted to legitimately 
pursue a DNT outcome in cross-border transactions? 
 
This Chapter provides an analysis in abstract of DNT aiming to answer 
those questions and to demonstrate that the notion of DNT should be neither 
                                                          
16  In this regard, one of the biggest “think tank” activists is the Tax Justice Network 
launched in 2003. The organization has a wide network around the world, including 
North America, Latin America, Asia and Europe. More information about the Tax 
Justice Network at www.taxjustice.net  






regarded per se as a cause of concern in any cross-border business nor 
confused with other illegal or undesirable activities, such as tax evasion or 
tax avoidance. Equally undesirable is the use of “non-legal notions” or 
pseudo-legal concepts created to justify international limits to cross-border 
tax planning. Particularly important is the notion of “aggressive tax 
planning” (ATP), whose consequentialist approach, i.e. based upon the 
outcome of DNT instead of traditional elements of economic substance or 
artificiality, may jeopardize even more the understanding of the notion of 
DNT. The Chapter also argues against the belief, supported by some 
international tax scholars and defended even as a an “international tax 
principle”, that income should be taxed at least once in any cross-border 
transaction, as one of the main responsible for the ambiguity of a notion 
whose nature is that of a simple outcome. Section 2 summarizes the 
traditional understandings of the notion of DNT in the international tax 
doctrine. Section 3 analyzes the “single tax principle” (or the belief that 
income should be taxed at least once in cross-border transactions) and its 
negative influence upon the understanding of the notion of DNT. Section 4 
analyses in brief the traditional concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance, 
reinforcing the idea that DNT should not be assimilated to any of these 
undesirable activities, whose limits are normally set up by law. Section 5 
attempts to demonstrate that the consequentialist approach adopted within 
the pseudo-category of ATP may also negatively influence the 
understanding of the notion of DNT, creating an artificial limit (not legal) 




for those transactions on which a legitimate tax planning took place. Section 
6 provides some final remarks.  
2. The traditional attempts to explain an ambiguous concept 
The several and traditional attempts to explain the notion of DNT are 
ambiguous. While some scholars have been inclined to describe it as the 
simple reverse effect of double taxation or the absence in exercising the 
sovereign taxing rights, others have included subjective elements, i.e. 
intentionality, to differentiate between objectionable and non-objectionable 
double non-taxation. There are also who have simply opted to consider it as 
a per se undesirable and illegitimate outcome. Following these ambiguous 
developments, the author revisits the main attempts to explain the notion 
and summarizes them as follows: 1) double non-taxation as the reverse side 
of double taxation; 2) double non-taxation; under-taxation and stateless 
income; 3) double non-taxation as an intended or unintended outcome, and 
4) double non-taxation as a per se undesirable outcome. 
2.1. Double Non-Taxation as the reverse side of Double Taxation 
Strictly speaking, DNT arises exactly in the reverse situations of double 
taxation.
18
 This is to say, while double taxation implies that income is taxed 
                                                          
18  In this sense, e.g. S. Pulido, Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in Portugal, in: M. 
Lang (ed.), Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation, Linde, Vienna, (2003), p. 284; M. 





twice or multiple times in a cross-border taxation, double non-taxation 
supposes the complete absence of taxation in those similar scenarios. In 
other words, DNT is the result of an uncoordinated exercise of taxing 
powers by different tax authorities, each of whom provide different criteria, 
territorial, personal, material, to establish a link between the taxable base 




Scholars have historically distinguished between two types of double 
taxation: juridical and economic. Juridical double taxation implies the 
imposition of identical or similar taxes in two (or more) states on the same 
                                                                                                                                       
Ullah, Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in the United Kingdom, in: M. Lang (ed.), 
Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation, Linde, Vienna, (2003), p. 427; A. Verstraeten, 
Double (Non)Taxation in VAT and Direct Taxes: Which Tax is better for Developing 
Countries?, in: M. Lang, P. Melz and E. Krostoffersson (eds.), Value Added Tax and 
Direct Taxation: Similarities and Differences, IBFD (2009), p. 374; G. Bizioli, 
Comparative Analysis of the Causes of Double (Non-) Taxation in the Income and 
VAT/GST Contexts, in: M. Lang, P. Melz and E. Krostoffersson (eds.), Value Added Tax 
and Direct Taxation: Similarities and Differences, IBFD (2009), p. 400. In the field of 
indirect taxation, specifically regarding VAT, some authors have considered that double 
non-taxation arises: “ [W]hen no country has imposed the relevant tax on the relevant 
subject matter, which is therefore effectively ‘tax-free’ in the sense that there is no tax 
burden to pass on to consumers.” See, e.g. R. Millar, Intentional and Unintentional 
Double Non-Taxation, in: M. Lang, P. Melz and E: Kristofferson (eds.), Value Added 
Tax and Direct Taxation: Similarities and Differences, IBFD (2009), p. 417. Also in this 
position see, e.g. S. Menuchin and N. Baram, Israel, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international—Vol. 89a, Double Non-Taxation (IFA 2004), p. 439. 
19  E. Traversa and C. Hellepute, Double (Non-) Taxation in VAT and Direct Taxes: How to 
Achieve Some Convergence within a Summa Divisio? A European Perspective, in: M. 
Lang, P. Melz and E: Kristofferson (eds.), Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation: 
Similarities and Differences, IBFD (2009), p. 340. Double taxation normally occurs 
because most States tax their residents on their worldwide income irrespective of 
whether the income derives from their country of residence or from abroad. See also, M. 
Rasmussen, International Double Taxation, Wolters Kluwer, New York (2011). 




taxpayer with respect to the same taxable income or capital or event.
20
 For 
example, a dividend received by a shareholder who is non-resident in the 
State of the payer company will be normally subject to a WHT in the State 
of source and it will be also included as income in the State of residence of 
the shareholder. Accordingly, economic double taxation occurs where two 
different persons are taxable in respect of the same income or capital.
21
 For 
instance, when income is received according to the law of one state by a 
partnership treated as a taxable entity in that state, while the other State 
considers the partnership as transparent and attributes the income directly to 
the partners liable to tax in its territory. In this order of ideas, if DNT is 
simply the reverse side of double taxation, then DNT will occur when a 
taxpayer engaged in an international transaction is not subject to any tax on 
behalf of the countries that have the right to tax.
22
  In other words, as double 
taxation arises from the exercise of sovereign taxing rights of two or more 
countries, double non-taxation is a consequence of the opposite, and it 
occurs when no country exercises its sovereign taxing rights, either because 
the country of residence decides to exempt an item of foreign source income 
and the source country also decides not to tax such an income or because the 
                                                          
20  A. Rust, in: Reimer and Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th 
edn (2015), Article 23 at m.no.1. For a deeper analysis of the phenomenon of juridical 
double taxation see, e.g. M. Pires, International Juridical Double Taxation of Income, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Boston (1989).  
21  Rust, supra n. 20, at m.no.2. See also, M. Lang, Introduction to the Law of Double 
Taxation Conventions, 2nd. Ed., Linde Vienna (2013), pp. 29-30. 
22  Verstraeten, supra n. 18. 





DTC in force assigns taxing rights to either the source or resident country, 




The understanding of DNT as the reverse effect of double taxation does not 
imply, however, to consider it immediately as an undesirable outcome. 
Indeed, neither the elimination of double taxation nor the avoidance of DNT 
are sacred principles of international tax law. On the one hand, the former 
idea confuses between how much taxes should be levied and how many 
times. From a legal point of view, however, both questions should not 
deserve the same attention. There should be concern about how much taxes 
are levied, mostly considering that taxes should at any case become 
confiscatory, but the same attention should not be paid on how many times 
these taxes are levied.
 24
 After all, many taxpayers should be indifferent if 
they are taxed once at a rate 35% than 35 times at a rate of 1%. On the other 
hand, the latter idea (the prevention of DNT) simply disregards the nature of 
the concept, whose desirability (or not) will depend exclusively upon the 
agreement of two jurisdictions.
 25
 In fact, there is actually no evidence that 
                                                          
23  Id., p. 378. 
24  Accordingly, in some cases the relief of double taxation seems not to be a problem at all, 
as it happens with developing countries or transition economies. As residents of these 
countries are expected to receive less income from foreign sources, the relief of double 
taxation is, in fact, not a priority. See R. Vann, Chapter 18: International Aspects of 
Income Tax, in: V. Thuronyi (ed.), Tax Law Design and Drafting, Vol. II, International 
Monetary Fund (1998), p. 37.  
25  This can be easily seen in the case of countries that, e.g. within a tax treaty, include a 
subject-to-tax or switch-over clause in order to counteract the effects of DNT. In such 
cases, there is no doubt that the outcome of DNT is indeed an undesired outcome. See a 
further analysis on the use of subject-to-tax and switch-over clauses in infra Chapter II, 
Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 




the international law imposes any obligation on the countries to relief double 
taxation or to prevent DNT in absence of such agreements. As provided by 
Vogel: “Double taxation, resulting from the interaction of the domestic laws 
of two (or more) States, will be consistent with international law as long as 
each individual legislation is consistent with international law”.
26
 The above 
simply reinforces what the PCIJ stated in the Lotus case (1927), in terms 
that what it is not prohibited under international law, it is indeed permitted.
27
 
In other words, in the absence of an international norm prohibiting either 
double taxation or DNT, one should conclude that both are generally 
permitted or tolerated outcomes. 
 
 
                                                          
26  K. Vogel and A. Rust, in: Reimer and Rust (eds), Reimer and Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel 
on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th edn (2015), Introduction at m. no. 11. 
27  The Lotus case of 1927 referred to a collision occurred in high seas between a French 
vessel (SS Lotus) and a Turkish vessel (Boz-Kourt) and which involved the application 
by Turkey of criminal law against both the French and Turkish officers on watch of the 
vessels. France alleged that the SS Lotus was using the French flag; therefore, it should 
be assimilated to French territory and thus Turkey had no jurisdiction to carry out 
criminal proceedings against the French captain of the SS Lotus. Accordingly, it alleged 
that it was a common practice on that time that countries would avoid to apply any of 
such criminal proceedings outside the territory. Denying the French request, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the judicial branch of the League of Nations, 
precedent of the United Nations, sustained: “Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to 
be found among the reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the 
circumstances alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would merely show 
that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and 
not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so […]”.  International: The 
case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Collection of Judgments, Publications of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, Series A-No.10 , 7 September 1927, p. 28. 





2.2. Double Non-Taxation; under-taxation and Stateless Income 
In another attempt to explain the concept of DNT, some scholars have not 
only included the complete absence of taxation, but also the cases of low 
taxation or under-taxation, even achieved by a legitimate tax strategy.
28
 
However, putting in equal footing DNT and under-taxation deviates from 
the nature of the concept of DNT which is, in essence, the absolute absence 
of taxation either by the disparities in domestic laws, the application of a tax 
treaty provision or the simple decision of a State not to exercise its taxing 
rights.  
 
The distinction between DNT and under-taxation can be easily illustrated 
using the Apple’s international tax structure as example.
29
 The tax structure 
of Apple is simple when compared with others international tax structures. 
Apple Inc., a US Corp, owns a 100% of the stock in Apple Operations 
International (AOI), which subsequently owns 100% of the stock in Apple 
Operations Europe (AOE) and which subsequently owns 100% of the stock 
in Apple Sales International (ASI).
30
 These last three companies are 
incorporated in Ireland, however AOI and ASI have their effective 
management and control in the United States.
31
 AOI basically acts as a 
holding company for many group companies involved in overseas 
                                                          
28  Even though the ultimate goal of any tax planning is to legitimately achieve DNT. Infra 
Section 4.2.1. 
29  For a deeper analysis upon the Apple’s tax structure, see A. Ting, iTax–Apple’s 
International Tax Structure and the Double Non-Taxation Issue, BTR 1 (2014). 
30  Id., at 42-46. 
31  Id. 




operations and receiving dividends from its subsidiaries.
32
 ASI engages 
unrelated contract manufacturers in China to assemble the products and sells 
the final ones to distribution subsidiaries in Europe and Asia.
33
 
Consequently, ASI entered into a “cost sharing agreement” with the ultimate 
parent company, Apple Inc., under which it posses the economic rights to 
Apple’s intellectual property, while the legal ownership of that property 
remains with Apple Inc. in the United States.
34
 Finally, Apple derives over 
60% of its income from foreign jurisdictions
35
, paying an effective tax rate 
lower than the 12,5% of corporate tax rate in Ireland. As per the Apple’s 
international tax structure, it is possible to figure out clearly that while that 
the outcome of DNT derives exclusively from the disparities in the domestic 
                                                          
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  A cost sharing agreement is a regime introduced during the early 1990s and whose idea 
was that when a US multinational starts a new R&D project, it can enter into an 
agreement with its offshore subsidiaries in order to share the cost of development. If the 
project is finally a success, they also share the profits derived from it. Id., at 47. The 
primary tax benefit from entering into a cost sharing agreement is that all participants to 
such agreement will be considered the owner of their respective interest in the intangible 
created, thereby preluding the application of the general transfer pricing rules related to 
the transfer of intangible property. Accordingly, if the participants enter into a qualified 
cost sharing agreement, i.e. a written agreement under which the participants agree to 
share the costs of developing intangibles proportionally to their relative shares of 
reasonable benefits from the individual exploitation of their assigned interest in the 
intangibles, the IRS is precluded from making Section 482 adjustments (according to 
arm’s length), unless it is strictly necessary to make each participant’s share of 
intangible development costs equal to its share or reasonable anticipated benefits. See M. 
Levey and S. Wrappe, Transfer Pricing: Rules, Compliance and Controversy, 3th ed., 
Wolters Kluwer Business, Chicago, 2010, pp.137-138, para. 460. 
35  This issue does not necessarily mean profit shifting. On the contrary, it could perfectly 
represent the successful business position of the group overseas.  





concepts of corporate tax residence,
36
 the one of under-taxation derives from 
the legitimate use of a cost sharing agreement between Apple Inc. and its 
subsidiary ASI, a regime introduced in the early 1990s in the United States.  
 
Finally, it is worth to refer to the cases where under-taxation or DNT might 
be achieved through the shifting of profits from high to low tax jurisdictions 
made by multinationals around the world. This phenomenon that involves 
the shifting of income within a multinational tax group in order to reduce or 
completely avoid taxation has been denominated by some authors as 
“stateless income”.
37
 Kleinbard defines stateless income as “the income 
derived for tax purposes by a multinational group from business activities in 
a country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent company, 
but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is not the location of the 
customers of the factors of the production though which the income was 
derived, and is not the domicile of the group’s parent company”.
38
 In other 
words, stateless income implies  “the movement of taxable income within a 
multinational group from high to low-taxed source countries without 
shifting the location of externally supplied capital or activities involving 
                                                          
36  According to the U.S. tax law, a corporation is resident when it is incorporated in the 
United States. Conversely, in Ireland the residency of a corporation is determined in 
accordance to the place of effective management and control. Thus, AOI and ASI, both 
incorporated in Ireland and managed and controlled in the United States, were neither 
resident in the United States nor in Ireland, then there was no link to trigger taxation in 
any place. 
37  E. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Florida Tax Review 699 (2011).  
38  Id., p. 701. 






 Therefore, it involves the application of a series of 
international tax norms, including e.g. the recognition of separate tax 
persons; transfer pricing rules; the treatment of income as debt or equity, 
etc., whose outcome might be or not non-taxation all-together. Hence, 
stateless income is a more complex construction whose treatment exceeds 
the purpose of this work; however, what it is interesting to point out here is 
that it that it does not necessarily mean to be a concept equivalent to DNT, 
despite the fact that such outcome might sometimes be achieved.
40
  
2.3. Double Non-Taxation as an intended or unintended outcome 
For a part of the international tax doctrine, DNT may also be divided into 
two sub-categories: intended (or voluntary) and unintended (or involuntary) 
DNT.
41
 Intended DNT, on the one hand, would exist when every country 
                                                          
39  Id., p. 703. 
40  For further references on this topic see, e.g. E. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless 
Income, 65 Tax Law Review 99 (2011); E. Kleinbard, Stateless Income’s Challenge to 
Tax Policy, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization, Research Paper No. C11-
8, USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-13 (2011); E. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, 
Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income Planning, 139 Tax Notes 13 (2013), pp. 1515-
1535; K. Carey, Stateless Income’s Agency Problem: Are Multinationals Acting in the 
Best Interest of Shareholders through the creation of Stateless Income? (14 May 2012), 
full text available at SSRN. 
41  More recently, some authors have also made use of the notion of “unintended double 
non-taxation” to explain the modern pseudo-legal notion of “aggressive tax 
planning”(ATP). See, e.g. P. Pistone, La Planificación Fiscal Agresiva y las Categorías 
Conceptuales del Derecho Tributario Global, Revista Española de Derecho Financiero 
170, Abril-Junio 2016, pp. 109-151. Pistone provides that unintended double non-
taxation would be a constitutive element of this pseudo-legal notion of aggressive tax 
planning, jointly with the exploitation of disparities among jurisdictions to obtain a tax 





that has the right to impose the relevant tax on a particular subject matter 
has agreed that no tax should be imposed upon that subject matter, or the 
countries have agreed on which of them should exercise the jurisdiction to 
tax a particular subject matter, but the relevant country has not exercised 
that jurisdiction, either because it has chosen not to impose a tax of that type 
or simply not to tax that subject matter, or because the country has no 
effective ways to enforce the tax.
42
 Unintended DNT, on the other hand, 
would be represented by the cases in which “more than one country could 
impose the relevant tax on a particular subject matter but none of them has 
done so because each of them is of the view that another has the (or a 
superior) jurisdiction to impose the tax”.
43
 This could happen if the relevant 
countries disagree about the underlying principles that determine who has 
the jurisdiction to tax and they both take the position that they do not have 
it, or they agree in the underlying principles, but they interpret them 
differently, either in their laws or in the interpretations of the law made by 
courts, taxpayers and/or the tax administration.
44
 In other words, unintended 
double non-taxation would be the case when the DNT outcome was not the 
result originally aimed by the States. Some authors have expressly 
reinforced the idea that the intentional element within the notion of 
                                                                                                                                       
advantage and the desalination between the place of origin of the income and the place 
where taxes on that income are actually paid. For a further analysis on the concept of 
aggressive tax planning in connection with the DNT outcome, see infra Section 5. 
42  Millar, supra n. 18, p. 418-419. The intentional DNT is normally related with the 
stimulation of certain activities in both countries, having usually an economic-political 
character. See Lang, supra n. 21. See also, Bizioli, supra n. 18. 402.  
43  Millar, supra n. 18, p. 428. 
44  Id. 




unintended DNT refers exclusively to the “intention of the States”,
45
 rather 
than the intention of the taxpayers, regardless the ambiguity of the notion of 
intention of States itself. Yet, excluding from this intentionality element the 
taxpayers’ intention makes sense since the taxpayers’ intention in a cross-
border transaction will be always to reduce their costs, i.e. taxes, if possible 
to zero.
46
 An interpretation a contrario sensu will simply not recognize the 





                                                          
45  Pistone, e.g. when referring to unintended double non-taxation as an element of the 
notion of aggressive tax planning, clearly states that the former excludes the intention of 
the taxpayers. In the original Spanish text, it can be read as follows: “En este sentido, 
este tercer elemento viene comúnmente definido como «doble no imposición 
involuntaria» sin que esta expresión implique una reconstrucción de los aspectos 
subjetivos relativos a la planificación fiscal agresiva realizada por el contribuyente”. 
[In this regard, this third element comes normally defined as unintended  «double non-
taxation», but without implying that this expression means a subjective reconstruction of 
the subjective elements of aggressive tax planning made by the taxpayer] (author’s 
translation).  See Pistone, supra n. 41, p. 123.  
46  Some authors, however, state that unintended DNT would be the result of the improper 
use of domestic tax laws, tax treaty law or Community Law, being thus an undesirable 
effect in cross-border transactions. See, e.g. Bizioli, supra n. 19. In a similar position: J. 
Almudi, Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in Spain, in: M. Lang (ed.), Avoidance of 
Double Non-Taxation, Linde, Vienna, (2003), p. 341; Ullah, supra n. 18; D. Gutmann, 
Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in France, in: M. Lang (ed.), Avoidance of Double 
Non-Taxation, Linde, Vienna, (2003), p. 87. This notion becomes closer to the intention 
of the taxpayers, at least when referring to the “improper use” of the domestic laws, 
treaties or Community Law (EU Law). In these cases, the improper use of a tax treaty, 
for example, will be determined by objective and subjective factors, including the 
“purpose” or “principal purpose” of a transaction, which might be an indirect reference 
to the taxpayers’ subjective intention. 
47  Infra Section 4.2.1. 





The whole idea of using a subjective element, i.e. intentionality, to explain 
the notion of DNT is, however, not only debatable, but also very precarious. 
On the one hand, it might give rise to many ad-hoc interpretations upon 
what “intention of the States” actually means and how it should be 
expressed. For example, someone could argue that the intention of the States 
needs to be established literally within the domestic laws of the States or 
within specific bilateral tax treaty provisions. In other words, no 
interpretation of the reasoning of the policy-makers should be relevant to 
interpret whether two States intended or not to achieve DNT with respect to 
a certain item of income, being the express wording of the law the primary 
and unique source of intentionality.
48
 However, others could legitimately 
argue that in the absence of a literal reference, the intention of the State 
could be tacitly obtained from somewhere else, e.g. legislation discussion 
meetings or treaty negotiation acts, opening the door for random tax policy 
interpretations that could finally jeopardize the taxpayers’ legal certainty. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, the argument forgets the complex 
problems of political malfunction that involves the lawmaking process both 
in a domestic and in a global basis.
49
 Indeed, the “intention of the law” (or 
                                                          
48  Pistone seems to follow this path when he states that each limitation to the legitimate 
right to minimize the taxpayer’s tax burden must be established within specific rules. 
Otherwise, the principle of legality (civil law countries) or the rule of law (common law) 
would be violated. See Pistone, supra n. 41, p.127 (footnote 43). 
49  A. Christians, Avoidance, Evasion and Taxpayer Morality, 44 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 39 
(2014), pp. 49-50. The UK Government, e.g. has criticized the role of the Big Four 
accounting firms for initially offer assistance to draft anti-avoidance legislation, and then 
abuse their position by finding ways to do exactly what the legislations intended to stop. 
See also, e.g. J. Martin, UK Lawmakers Lambaste Big 4 Accounting Firms, 69 Tax 
Notes Int’l 6 (2013), pp. 518-519. In this latter article is provided the example of how a 




the politicians making the law) is most of the time influenced by external 
actors, e.g. multinationals, which directly or indirectly manipulate the final 
outcomes of a tax reform.
50
 The above does not only include a direct lobby 
within the domestic lawmaking process, which is normally regulated and it 
is publicly known, but also an indirect influential participation of these 
actors within the various international tax networks, such as the same OECD 
forum.
51
 In this order of ideas, framing DNT based on the legislators intend 
is incapable of truly controlling the taxpayers’ behaviors, because it is 
indeed very difficult to distinguish a pure “intention of the States” in most of 
the cases, adding more difficulties to the always problematic holistic 
approach of determining legislative intends.   
 
It is thus the author’s opinion that the use of subjective elements, such as 
intentionality, to explain the outcome of double non-taxation should be 
simply discarded, or alternatively, be used only when such an “intention” is 
                                                                                                                                       
big four assisted in the drafting of the U.K patent box legislation to latter on advice 
clients on how to use the law to avoid tax. Similar examples are provided with the 
drafting of CFC rules. See also, J. Martin, Lawmakers Seek New Code of Conduct for 
Tax Accountants, 70 Tax Notes Int’l 6 (2013), pp. 519-520. 
50  Christians, supra n. 49. In this opinion as well, Essers states: “The choices in the field of 
international tax law have to be made, explained and justified by responsible politicians 
and policymakers. But before those decisions are taken, many of these stakeholders in 
the international tax arena will do their best to influence and convince these politicians 
and policymakers”. P. Essers, International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and 
Habermas, 68 Bull. Int’l Taxn. 2 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 54. 
51  Christians states that multinational companies play an important marketing role (“native 
advertising”) presented as journalism, academic research or even the participation in 
international networks, being the most notably case the OECD where the access to 
lawmakers is perhaps held in an informal and unobservable way. Christians, supra n. 49. 





no other result than the express wording of the domestic laws or tax treaties 
dealing specifically with cases of DNT.
52
 In all of other cases, its use should 
be simply avoided for sake of clarity and legal certainty. 
2.4. Double Non-Taxation as a per se undesirable outcome 
There are finally who simply identify double non-taxation as an outcome 
per se negative, constituting a pervasive reality in the world of cross-border 
investment and commercial activity, whose opportunities can derive either 
                                                          
52  For example, when tax treaties include either subject-to-tax or switch-over clauses to 
prevent DNT, or when they include tax sparing and matching credit clauses in a clear 
tolerance of the DNT outcome. For a further analysis tax sparing and matching credit 
clauses within tax treaties, supra Chapter II, Section 4.2. Taking also the “intentions” 
expressed within the wording of domestic laws or tax treaties, some authors have 
attempted to create new categories to explain the difference between intended and 
unintended DNT. In particular, Martinez Laguna distinguishes between “proper DNT” 
and “twice non-taxation”. The former notion, on one hand, would represent the 
agreement of the parties within a tax treaty, being intended DNT in this case, e.g. when 
tax sparing or matching credit clauses are included and unintended DNT when, e.g. 
subject-to-tax and switch-over clauses are introduced. The latter notion, on the other 
hand, relates to the parallel exercise of sovereignties by two States. In this case, 
Martinez Laguna argues that it is not possible to ascertain intentions in this context of 
uncoordinated exercises of sovereignty, being thus in his view, this one the notion used 
within the international debate referring to “unintended DNT”. F. Martinez Laguna, 
Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning: Between OECD and EU Initiatives–The Dividing 
Line between Intended and Unintended Double Non-Taxation, 9 World Tax J. 2 (2017), 
Journals IBFD. In the author’s view, however, the categorization proposed by Martinez 
Laguna is not only very complex, but also it seems to serve the simple purpose of 
justifying a notion that will be further analyzed in this work, and whose legal validity is 
more than arguable: the notion of ATP (aggressive tax planning). Indeed, it is Martinez 
Laguna himself who recognizes that when he says: “Unintended twice non-taxation is 
part of the concept of aggressive tax planning. Aggressive tax planning is reflected in all 
of the different measures implemented in domestic and treaty law tackling non-
acceptable (unintended) outcomes from a state perspective in advance”. Id., Sec. 6. For 
an analysis of the concept of ATP as regards to DNT, infra Section 5. 




from tax treaties, the differences of domestic laws or the failure to report 
income to the appropriate jurisdiction.
53
  
3. Double Non-Taxation and the Single Tax Principle 
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the ambiguity in the concept of double 
non-taxation is derived from the influence of the so-called single tax 
principle or the assumption that income should be taxed once (and no more 
than once) in any cross-border transaction. This Section attempts to 
demonstrate that beyond the debate regarding the simplistic construction of 
the single tax principle,
54
 its downside departure, as named by some 
scholars,
55
 i.e. the avoidance of DNT, cannot be supported neither under the 
traditional argument of the use of the tax credit method to relieve double 
taxation nor under the more recent ones that involves a misinterpretation of 
the LOB provision within the US Model. 
 
                                                          
53  See, e.g. D. Ring, United States, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international—Vol. 89a, 
Double Non-Taxation (IFA 2004), p. 725. 
54  Shaviro, e.g. criticizes the simplistic construction of the “single tax principle” when he 
says: “Tax treaties generally require that the signatories eliminate “double taxation” […] 
The treaties also commonly seek to address “fiscal evasion”[understood by some 
commentators as the avoidance of “double non-taxation”]  […] Put the two concern 
together and you arguably have a ‘single tax principle’ […]”. D. Shaviro, The Two 
Faces of the Single Tax Principle , New York University Law and Economics Working 
Papers, Paper 419 (2015), p. 1. 
55  Id. 





3.1. Historical Background 
In 1998 H. D. Rosenbloom delivered an important lecture upon international 
tax arbitrage, i.e. whether exploiting differences between the tax systems of 
two jurisdictions to minimize the taxes paid could be considered a problem, 
and if so, whether something could be done without a centralized 
international tax organization.
56
 Rosenbloom’s thesis exposed by then was 
that international tax arbitrage would be the natural response of the 
taxpayers to the normal differences that exist between the tax systems 
around the world.
57
 These differences would be the result of sovereign 
decisions that consider the legal, economic and political aims of a 
determined tax system. Therefore, they should not represent a problem, or at 
least an appropriate explanation for why they could be a problem should be 
given, other than appealing to the existence of an “international tax 
system”.
58
 Rosenbloom’s reaction was motivated on a statement about 
international tax policy emanated from the U.S. Senate Finance Committee 
in 1986, in which the Committee, in reference to the discussion about dual 
                                                          
56  Unlike Avi-Yonah made a previous reference to the “international tax regime” in 1997, 
the academic debate regarding its existence started with the The David R. Tillinghast 
Lecture on International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax Regime’ held at 
N.Y.U. in 1998. See, H. D. Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: 
International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 
(2000). See also, R. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax 
L. Rev. 507 (1997). 
57  Rosenbloom, supra n. 4, p. 116. 
58  Id., p. 166. Also in line with Rosenbloom’s argument see, e.g. J. Roin, Competition and 
Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L. J. 543 
(2001); M. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 
261 (2001), M. Kane, supra n. 4.  




residence companies, referred to the international tax system. The statement 
was as follows: “The committee does not believe that the United States 
Senate wittingly agreed to an international tax system where taxpayers 
making cross-border investments, and only those taxpayers, could reduce or 
eliminate their U.S. corporate tax through self-help and gain an advantage 




Contrary to Rosenbloom’s position, Avi-Yonah supported the antagonist 
idea.
60
  This is the existence of an international tax system (that he prefers to 
call an “international tax regime”), which would rest basically in the 
bilateral tax treaty network and in domestic tax laws of the major trading 
nations, and which would form part of customary international law.
61
 The 
pillars of this regime would be two basic principles that underline it: the 
single tax principle, which implies that the income should be taxed once (no 
more and not less), and the benefits principle which means that active 
business income must be taxed primarily at source and passive investment 
                                                          
59  S. Rep. No. 99-313, p 422 (1986), in: Rosenbloom, supra n. 56, p. 137. 
60  In support of his thesis, Avi-Yonah provides a question based upon the hypothetical case 
that a developing country or transition economy decided to adopt an income tax for first 
time: how free would this country be to write its international tax rules if it wishes to 
attract foreign investment? He argues that the freedom of this country and most of the 
countries around the world to adopt international tax rules is severely constrained, even 
before entering a tax treaty, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles of 
international taxation. See R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An 
analysis of the International Tax Regime, Cambridge University Press, New York 
(2007), pp. 3-4. See also R. Avi-Yonah, Commentary (Response to article by H. David 
Rosenbloom), 53 Tax L. Rev. 167 (2000). 
61  Avi-Yonah, supra n. 56. 





income primarily at residence.
62
 The comfortable idea of recognizing such a 
regime would directly imply that countries would not be free to adopt any 
international tax rules they please, but rather should operate under the rules 
of this regime, disregarding a basic premise in taxation, which is that taxing 
and spending is still a matter of domestic tax policy.
63
 In particular, the 
recognition of a single tax principle would drive us to an early conclusion 
that both double taxation and DNT must be equally eliminated, mitigated or 
at least prevented. 
3.2. The downside of the Single Tax Principle 
As already stressed, the single tax principle states that cross-border income 
should be taxed once, i.e. not more and not less than once, at the rate 
                                                          
62  The benefit principle provides that the residence jurisdiction would have the primary 
right to tax passive income (investment), while the source jurisdiction would have the 
primary right to tax active income (business). See Avi-Yonah (2007), supra n. 60, pp. 8-
13. Although the benefit principle has been proved since long time not to explain in a 
good way the development of the modern digital economy, only recently Avi-Yonah has 
recognized its obsolescence arguing that, at least “temporarily”, this principle (pillar of 
the “international tax regime”) should be re-evaluated and be understood in a complete 
opposite way. As provided by Avi-Yonah: “Most of the current issues can be solved if 
we taxed passive income primarily at source and active income primarily at residence”. 
See R. Avi-Yonah, The International Tax Regime: A Centennial Reconsideration, 
University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 462 (2015), full text available at 
SSRN. 
63  Important international tax scholars have also supported the idea of the existence of an 
international tax regime. See, e.g., H. Ault, The importance of International Cooperation 
in Forging Tax Policy, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1693 (2001); H. Ault, Some Reflections on 
the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70 Tax Notes Int’l 12 
(2013). Y. Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 
(2003); Y. Brauner, Integration in an Integrated World, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 51 
(2005); Dell’ Anese, supra n. 4. 




determined by the benefits principle.
64
 Thus, the single tax principle would 
include both the traditional tax policy aim of avoiding double taxation as 
well as the avoidance of double non-taxation. Some tax scholars refer to 
these effects as the “upside departure” and “downside departure” of the 
single tax principle.
65
 Both sides of the principle are built under the 
assumption that all the countries would like to maintain both a personal and 
a corporate income tax, justifying the single tax principle from a theoretical 
and from a practical point of view.
 66
 On the one hand, the upside departure 
of the single tax principle would help to avoid that income derived from 
cross-border transactions is taxed more heavily than domestically.
67
 Indeed, 
double taxation leads to tax rates that can be extremely high and tend to 
disincentive international investment. The downside departure, on the other 
hand, would help to avoid that cross-border income is under-taxed or not 
taxed at all, violating both the horizontal and vertical equity when compared 
to the higher rates imposed at the domestic level, avoiding also an erosion of 
the national tax base.
68
 In other words, both the outcomes of double taxation 
and DNT would be naturally forbidden by the existence of a supreme 
principle under international tax law that obliges to eliminate or mitigate 
these outcomes. 
 
                                                          
64  Avi-Yonah (2007), supra n. 60, p. 9.  
65  Shaviro, supra n. 54. 
66  Avi-Yonah (2007), supra n. 60. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 





Scholars supporting the existence of a principle of single taxation have 
traditionally argued based on the extended tax treaty network around the 
world, and specifically, the use of the tax credit method to relieve double 
taxation rather than the exemption method. More recently, however, some 
scholars have also come up with some new arguments involving the 
interpretation of the 1981 LOB provision in the US Model. All of these 
arguments are subsequently analyzed.  
3.2.1. The Tax Credit Method to ensure Single Taxation 
Countries around the world tend to relieve double taxation, either 
unilaterally or bilaterally, mainly by two different manners: granting an 
exemption upon the foreign income received by a resident taxpayer, no 
matter the taxation of that income in the other country, or granting a credit 
upon the foreign taxes paid in the foreign country.
69
 In other words, unlike 
                                                          
69  The use of credit or exemption is connected with the classic economic arguments 
regarding tax neutrality, which has been largely discussed in the literature, and which 
promote different forms of efficiency. On one hand, capital export neutrality (CEN) is 
an economic standard holding that taxation should be a neutral factor in a taxpayer’s 
choice between carrying on economic activity in the taxpayer’s residence country or in a 
foreign country. It is given effect in its purest form when the taxpayer’s residence 
country taxes each resident’s worldwide income as it is earned and provides the resident 
with an unlimited credit for foreign income taxes imposed on that income. In other 
words, it ensures that taxpayers face the same rate of tax on the return to capital 
irrespective of the country where the capital is deployed. On the other hand, capital 
import neutrality (CIN) ensures that taxpayers face the same rate of tax on the return to 
capital deployed in a given jurisdiction irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the 
taxpayer is resident. In other words, it ensures that local and foreign capital competes on 
equal foots in a determined country. Some authors also refer to a third type of neutrality 
called national neutrality (NN), which consists in providing relief of double taxation 
giving the taxpayer a deduction for the foreign taxes paid, the same way a deduction is 




the exemption method, the focus of the credit is on the amount of taxes 
effectively paid in the other country.
70
 Therefore, the credit method would 
implicitly pursue the object of ensuring that the income is taxed at least in 
                                                                                                                                       
granted for other costs. This type of neutrality would make investors indifferent between 
the pre-tax return on domestic investments and the return on foreign investments after 
paying foreign taxes. See D. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax 
Policy, 68 Nat’l Tax J. 635 (2015). In addition to the traditional discussion between 
CEN and CIN, some authors have developed the concept of capital ownership neutrality 
(CON), which means, in simple terms, that the world welfare is maximized if the 
identities of capital owners are unaffected by tax rate differences. See M. Desai and J. 
Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 487 (2003). See also, M. 
Desai and J. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global 
Setting, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 937 (2004). The usual policy recommendation to achieve CON 
is for countries to adopt territorial tax systems, namely, not to tax business income 
earned in some countries. Indeed, the CON has been advanced as the basis of a policy 
reform in the United States to move toward a territorial tax system. For a critical 
analysis on the concept of CON, see Kleinbard (Tax Law Rev. 2011), supra n. 40. For 
Kleinbard, the CON principle assumes that the source country taxation is fully 
capitalized into prices of firms operating in that source country as well as they [MNEs] 
face a constant after-tax rate of return everywhere in the world, and suffer the same tax 
burden everywhere, when taxes include both implicit and explicit taxes. He argues that 
what he calls “stateless income tax planning” vitiates the plausibility of this assumption. 
Id., p. 100.  As he provides: “ Without the full capitalization of source country taxes in 
firms valuations, reliance on the CON principle to recommend that the United States 
adopt a territorial tax system reduces to a plea for a “competitive” international tax 
framework, by which is meant a system no less generous than those available to firms 
domiciled in other countries. But that plea, in turn, is little different in practice from a 
call for trade export subsidies or the like, and strangely ignores the competitiveness of 
domestic operations”. Id., p. 101. Kleinbard’s work is added to the existing work of 
Grubert and Altshuler, who have also criticized the economic efficiency arguments for 
territorial tax systems. See, e.g. H. Grubert and R. Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the 
World Economy: Reforming Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Working Papers, 
Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey No. 2006, 26 
(2006). 
70   This is because, if taxes are not effectively paid in the other country, then no credit is 
granted. Perhaps the exception to that are the clauses of tax sparing introduced within 
some treaties. A further analysis is carried on at infra Chapter II, Sec. 4.1.1. 





one country when a cross-border transaction takes place.
71
 This assumption 
is, in principle, correct. As the foreign tax credit is granted in a dollar-by-
dollar basis, no credit is allowed when there is no income taxes paid in the 
source country.
72 The above could drive us to preliminary conclude that 
income will be taxed at least once. However, there is no proof that the real 
aim of the tax credit method is indeed to ensure single taxation. On the 
contrary, historical arguments in the design of the tax credit method 
(specifically in the US) as well as examples of tax treaty practice should 





The US Foreign Tax Credit proposal came into play right after the end of 
the World War I.
74
 At that time, countries in Europe needed money for 
                                                          
71  Avi-Yonah argues that T.S. Adams, the designer of the U.S. tax credit system, implicitly 
recognized the existence of a principle of single taxation when he stated as follows: “the 
state which with a fine regards for the rights if the taxpayers takes pains to relieve 
double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the person or property pays at 
least one tax”. See T.S. Adams, Interstate and International Double Taxation, in 
Lectures on Taxation 101, (Roswell Magill ed., 1932), cited in: Avi-Yonah, Who 
Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 309 (2014), p. 313. 
72  In contrast, the exemption method applies no matter what happens in the source country. 
Indeed, if the income is by any reason not taxed in the source country, the exemption is 
granted anyway in the residence country. See, e.g. the application of Article 23A of the 
OECD Model. 
73  This example is not random. The Unites States was indeed the pioneer country 
introducing a tax credit system to relieve double taxation. Likewise, it is the design of 
the US Foreign Tax Credit normally used by the supporters of the single tax principle to 
argue in its favor. For an analysis on the history of the U.S. FTC, see M. Graetz and M. 
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 Duke Law J. 1021 
(1997).  
74  Id., p. 1051. 




reconstruction and increased their tax rates accordingly.
75
 This phenomenon 
was extended even beyond Europe and implied that American investors 
were inevitable subject to tax outside the United States. In other words, the 
original design of the foreign tax credit system in the United Stated did not 
consider whether the foreign countries would tax or not the income of 
American investors abroad, because in fact the historic context was 
completely the opposite: countries after the war wanted to get revenues 
through taxation, thus the main idea in designing the tax credit relief was to 
avoid the potential double or multiple taxation that American investors 
might suffer, which reveals that the original aim of the credit method was 
not ensuring single taxation, but rather simply avoiding double or multiple 
taxation.
76
 The above brings us to the second important historical factor in 
the design of the US Foreign Tax Credit, which is related to the lack of 
competitiveness of the American businesses abroad precisely derived from 
the potential double or multiple taxation to which they were exposed to. As 
provided by Carroll: “The American credit system is ideal for a wealthy 
nation that desires to encourage the expansion of its foreign trade, and is 
willing to afford relief from double taxation to its citizens or residents […] 
The United States says, in effect, to its citizens—go abroad and trade. If you 
                                                          
75  As provided by Graetz and O’Hear: “A variety of American economic and diplomatic 
interests required that a substantial quantity of American capital be channeled to rebuild 
post-war Europe. The United States was owed billion dollars by allied governments for 
wartime loans; somehow Europe would need access to American dollars to pay off this 
debt”. Id. 
76 “Americans wanted smaller government, lower taes, and fewer international 
entanglements” Id., p. 1052. 





have to pay tax on your earnings in foreign countries, show me your bill and 
I will give you relief […]”.
77
  This concern about competition was also 
presented by T.S. Adams into his tax treaty work: “[Legislation authorizing 
U.S. negotiation of tax treaties] will enable the businessmen [sic] of those 
foreign countries which have benefit of conventions or treaties of this kind 
protecting them from the burden of international double taxation”. 
Therefore, unlike an instrument to ensure that income in a cross-border 
transaction must be taxed at least once, the history behind the U.S. foreign 
tax credit (1918) demonstrated us that it was primarily conceived as a tool to 
promote competitiveness of American businesses abroad avoiding the unfair 
result of taxing twice the income derived from these businesses. Then, the 
single and unavoidable taxation abroad was simply the result of the historic 
moment in which the foreign tax credit came into life, but it was neither a 
purpose nor a condition for the implementation of the foreign credit system. 
To think otherwise would simply distort the history behind the origin of the 
foreign tax credit. 
 
There are also strong tax treaty practice arguments to reject the idea that the 
tax credit method to relieve double taxation would serve the purpose of 
ensuring single taxation. It is undeniable that in most of the cases the tax 
credit is granted in the resident country to the extent that taxes have been 
effectively paid in the source country. Nevertheless, this outcome is indeed 
                                                          
77  M. Carroll, The Double Taxation Conference 28-29 (3 Sep. 1927), unpublished 
manuscript available at T.S. Adam Papers, Yale University, Box 16, Sep. 1927 folder, 
cited in: Id., p. 1050. 




far from accomplishing with an international tax law principle. The above 
can be easily seen in the use of tax sparing and matching credit clauses. In 
these cases, the tax credit is granted regardless the amount of taxes paid in 
the source country, working indeed as a notional tax credit. Accordingly, 
and despite the rejection to these clauses at the OECD level and the US tax 
treaty practice, these clauses are negotiated and implanted by important 





Moreover, if single taxation is going to be ensured by the tax credit method, 
or whether this is a proof of the existence of the single tax principle, one 
should simply conclude that this is in fact a very inefficient system to 
achieve that purpose. Indeed, if income is not taxed in the source country 
and never repatriated to the resident country, it is clear that a DNT outcome 
will be achieved, being impossible under that scenario, to ensure single 
taxation.
79
 In simple words, the tax credit method complies the primary role 
                                                          
78  See more about the discussion regarding tax sparing and matching credits at infra 
Chapter II, Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. 
79  The above can be illustrated in the following example: if a U.S. Corporation 
incorporates a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and it generates income exempted 
from taxation or taxed at a very low rate in that country, the result, i.e. deferral of U.S. 
taxation, will be an exemption or at least something very similar to an exemption at the 
residence country, because foreign subsidiaries are not taxed in the United States so long 
as they do not repatriate dividends to the U.S. parent company. A foreign subsidiary is 
not regarded as a U.S. person even if wholly owned by a U.S. person. See US: I.R.C. 
Section 7701(a)(5). When the subsidiary makes a distribution to the parent company, the 
parent will use the foreign income taxes the subsidiary paid to offset the tax liability 
imposed by repatriation. See US: I.R.C. Section 902(a). 





of mitigating double taxation, and sometimes indirectly achieving the 
outcome of ensuring single taxation. However, this latter result will depend 
exclusively on the repatriation of the income to the resident country. In 
absence of the above, the argument that the tax credit method ensures single 
taxation seems to be more an altruistic idea rather than a real effect in 
practice.  
3.2.2. The Agnosticism of the Exemption Method  
As already stressed, the main difference between the exemption and credit 
method to relieve double taxation is that the former looks exclusively at the 
income, exempting foreign source income no matter the taxes paid abroad.
80
 
This special feature of the exemption method makes it completely 
ineffective to ensure single taxation, because unless countries decide to 
include specific provisions to maintain a single taxation status, i.e. either a 
                                                          
80  This principle applies both in the case of “full exemption” and “exemption with 
progression” recognized in the OECD Model. In both cases the State of residence has 
the right to tax exclusively the amount of domestic source income, exempting the 
amount of foreign source income received. The only difference is that in the case of 
exemption with progression, the amount of foreign source income is considered in order 
to determine the tax rate applicable in the State of residence, which could finally imply a 
lower amount of taxes relieved in comparison with the full exemption. The above can be 
illustrated as follows: If a resident of State A has $100,000 of worldwide income 
($80,000 domestic and $20,000 from country B), and country A normally taxes 
$100,000 at a rate of 35% and $80,000 at a rate of 30%, then applying the exemption 
with progression, the resident of State A will be subject to 35% on the amount of 
$80,000 of foreign source income ($28,000), while if the full exemption were applied, 
he would be subject to 30% on the same $80,000 ($24,000). There will be a difference 
of $4,000 in relief between both methods, although the principle of exempting the 
foreign source income always will apply. See OECD Commentary on Articles 23 A and 
23 B concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, para. 18 and 19. 




subject-to-tax or a switch-over clause, the DNT outcome will inevitably 
arise.
81
 In other words, the exemption method is totally agnostic with respect 
to the aim of ensuring single taxation, or which is the same, avoiding DNT.  
 
The general agnosticism of the exemption method to prevent DNT is 
recognized at the OECD level as an efficient element when compared with 
the credit method, making thus the election of the former to prevail over the 
latter in relieving double taxation.
82
 Indeed, as the exemption method does 
                                                          
81  Infra Chapter II, Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.  
82  This statement is only focused on the simplicity of the exemption method used to relieve 
double taxation and it avoids the economic discussion on why countries could choose 
one method instead of the other for economic efficiency or equity reasons. This 
discussion refers to the economic notions of CEN and CIN neutrality. As already 
stressed, the former means that the investor should pay the same total tax, whether he 
receives an investment income from foreign or domestic sources. The latter means that 
capital funds originated in various countries should compete in equal feet in the capital 
market of any country. K. Vogel, Worldwide v. source taxation of income– A review and 
re-evaluation of arguments (Part II), Intertax 10 (1988), pp. 310-311. Vogel observes 
that export neutrality thus supposes a worldwide taxation income with the use of foreign 
tax credit, while import neutrality implies a source-based taxation system with the use of 
the exemption method to relieve double taxation. Id. See also, Weisbach, supra n. 69. 
The literature has shown preference for capital-export neutrality. See, e.g. C. McLure Jr., 
Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the International 
Norm, 45 National Tax Journal 145 (1992). Vogel also mentions Richard Musgrave and 
Bernard Snoy in this position. See R. Musgrave, Criteria for Foreign Tax Credit, in: 
Taxation and Operations Abroad, Symposium (1960), and B. Snoy, Taxes on Direct 
Investment Income in the EEC, A Legal and Economic Analysis (1975), both cited in: 
Vogel, Id.  Nevertheless, this preference has also been challenged. See, e.g. L. Mutén, 
Some Topical Issues Concerning International Double Taxation, in: S. Cnossen (ed.) 
Comparative Tax Studies. Essays in Honor of Richard Goode (1983), cited in: K. Vogel, 
Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization, and Tax Neutrality under European 
Law, in: K. Vogel (ed.) Taxation of Cross-Border Income, Harmonization, and Tax 
Neutrality under European Law (1994), p. 24, and re-cited in: D. Pinto, Exclusive 
Source or Residence-Based Taxation–Is a New and Simpler World Tax Order Possible?, 
61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2007), Journals IBFD, p. 286 (footnote 77). It has also been 





not require the State of residence to undertake investigations upon the actual 
taxation in the other State and whether or not the right to tax is in effect 
exercised by the other State, it is normally regarded as the most effective 
one.
83
 This idea of absolute exemption is, nevertheless, partially mitigated 
when the outcome of DNT arises.
84
 Paragraph 35 on the OECD Comm. on 
Article 23A and 23B OECD Model states: “Occasionally, negotiating States 
may find it reasonable in certain circumstances, in order to avoid double 
non-taxation, to make an exception to the absolute obligation on the State of 
residence to give exemption […] Such may be the case where no tax on 
specific items of income or capital is provided under the domestic laws of 
the State of source, or tax is not effectively collected owing to special 
circumstances such as the set-off of losses, a mistake, or the statutory time 
limit having expired”.
85
 Similar concerns on DNT actually motivated the 
modification of the OECD Commentaries on Article 23A OECD in 2000 
and the 2008 update version of the OECD Model although, as we will see 
                                                                                                                                       
argued that the debate about capital export or import neutrality is less relevant in a 
globalized world. See, e.g. D. Frisch, The Economics of international Tax Policy: Some 
Old and New Approaches, 47 Tax Notes 5 (1990). Similarly, analyzing both scenarios: 
an international world with exclusive residence-based taxation and source-based 
taxation, Pinto concludes that beyond the strong theoretical justifications of both 
approaches, none of them can be exclusively applied internationally. See Pinto, p. 291. 
For an interesting analysis about the notion of neutrality and EU Law, see W. Schön, 
Neutrality and Territoriality–Competing or Converging Concepts in European Tax 
Law?, 69 Bull Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2015), Journals IBFD. For the alternative notion of 
capital ownership neutrality (CON), see Desai and Hines, supra n. 69. See also,. Desai 
and Hines Jr., supra n. 69. 
83  OECD Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B concerning the methods for elimination 
of double taxation, para. 34. 
84  OECD Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B concerning the methods for elimination 
of double taxation, para. 35. 
85  Id. 




later on in this work, none of these modifications were enough to solve all 
the situations of DNT that they originally pretended.
86
 Yet, and regardless 
these concerns, the OECD Commentaries recognizes that the faculty of 
implementing the exemption method remains still within the context of 
domestic laws.
87
 The above implies that the obligation to give an exemption 
to relieve double taxation might still be absolute if the countries desire to, 
regardless the concerns about DNT above-explained. More importantly, the 
wording of the Article 23A OECD Model, still suggests that the residence 
State shall exempt the income or capital received by one of its residents to 
the extent that this income “may be” taxed in the State of source. In a 
nutshell, no effective or actual taxation is required in the source State in 




Despite the agnosticism of the exemption method to prevent DNT, this is 
still the preferred method to relieve double taxation among many countries, 
including e.g. the whole continental Europe.
89
 The above responds to a 
                                                          
86  See infra Chapter II, Section 3.3 and 3.4.  
87  OECD Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B concerning the methods for elimination 
of double taxation, para. 35. 
88  This issue is further analyzed in this work, where some examples are provided in order 
to demonstrate the substantial difference when Contracting States actually desire that 
income “is taxed” or “subject-to-tax”, and when this “may be taxed”. See infra Chapter 
II, Section 4.2.1. 
89  The preference of the exemption method in Europe has been largely discussed in the 
European tax literature. See, e.g. W. Schön, Tax Competition in Europe—The National 
Perspective, 42 Eur. Taxn. 12 (2002), Journals IBFD, p. 495. See also, J. Avery Jones, 
Avoiding Double Taxation: Credit versus Exemption ‒ The Origins, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
2 (2012), Journals IBFD; M. Helminen, The Problem of Double Non-Taxation in the 
European Union – To What Extent Could This Be Resolved through a Multilateral EU 





series of factors, e.g. the capital import neutrality tendency among European 
countries and the long-standing domestic tax law traditions giving 
preference to this method to relieve double taxation rather than the credit 
method. As well explained by Schön: “From an economic standpoint, both 
features of “tax neutrality” [capital import and capital export neutrality] 
have their merits. It is a long-standing tradition to which many European 
states have submitted and it is also sound fiscal policy to set up a tax system 
according to the ideal of ‘capital import neutrality’”.
90
 Likewise, the 
European Commission’s proposal for a CCCTB reinforces the primacy of 
the exemption method at the EU level. This proposal foresees unconditional 
exemption for distributions coming from companies outside the group, with 
the switch-over clause and a CFC rule only applying to distributions from 




Therefore, it results difficult for this author to perceive the presence of an 
international tax law principle that prevents DNT in cross-border situations, 
and which is reflected in the application of the credit method to relief double 
                                                                                                                                       
Tax Treaty Based on the Nordic Convention?, 53 Eur. Taxn. 7 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 
309; G. Maisto, Credit versus Exemption under Domestic Tax Law and Treaties, in: M. 
Lang et al., Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, (IBFD 2010), 
sec. 2. 
90  Schön, supra n. 82. 
91  See G. Kofler, Indirect Credit versus Exemption: Double Taxation Relief for 
Intercompany Distributions, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 2 (2012), Journals IBFD, p. 89. For an 
analysis on the CCTB proposal see, e.g. L. Cerioni, The Commission’s Proposal for a 
CCCTB Directive: Analysis and Comment, 65 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 9 (2011), Journals IBFD. 
See also, J. Barenfeld, A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European 
Union—A beauty or a beast in the quest for tax simplicity, 61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2007), 
Journals IBFD. 




taxation, when indeed neither the credit nor the exemption methods are 
strictly effective to ensure single taxation. Whilst the effectiveness of the 
credit method to ensure single taxation will depend exclusively on the 
repatriation of profits, the exemption method is completely agnostic in 
preventing DNT. Accordingly, and when countries must decide among the 
methods to relieve double taxation, there is certain tendency to opt for the 
simplicity of the exemption method rather than the complexity of the credit 
method. The above, however, does not mean that countries might achieve an 
agreement to prevent double non-taxation introducing, e.g. subject-to-tax or 
switch-over clauses within their tax treaties. Nevertheless, this inclusion will 
be in any case a reflection of a tax law principle, but rather the result of an 
ad-hoc tax treaty negotiation.
92
 
3.2.3. New voices in defense of the Single Tax Principle 
The conceptual evidence presented so far does not give space for the 
recognition of the single tax principle as to prevent DNT. Nevertheless, new 
voices have arisen and have insisted in the defense of the downside 
departure of it. Specifically, some scholars have recently argued that the 
original introduction of a Limitation of Benefits (LOB) provision in the 
1981 US Model would be an argument strong enough to sustain the 
recognition of a principle of single taxation in cross-border transactions. 
93
  
                                                          
92  A further analysis can be found at infra Chapter II, Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
93  Avi-Yonah , supra n. 71, pp. 313-318. 





3.2.3.1. The 1981 LOB provision– US Model 
The original design of the LOB provision under the US Model provided that 
the benefits of a reduced WHT under a treaty would not be applicable to 
non-publicly traded corporations residing in the treaty partner, unless more 
than 75% of the shares of that corporation are owned by individual residents 
and the income is not paid out to residents of third countries.
94
 In addition, 
paragraph 3 of the Article 16 of the 1981 Tax Treaty Model provided that 
treaty benefits would not apply to corporations subject to a significant lower 
tax in their country of residence.
95
 The interpretation of paragraph 3 of 
Article 16 is that the reduction of WHT at source is contingent to the 





Although the above interpretation is not completely wrong, it is certainly not 
based on the accomplishment of a principle of single taxation, but rather on 
the legitimate interest of the source country, which restricts its taxation 
rights granting a reduced WHT under a tax treaty, to coordinate this 
restriction with a similar taxation at the residence country. Otherwise, there 
would be no interest for the source country to restrict itself from taxing a 
                                                          
94  US: United States Model Income Tax Convention of 16 June 1981, Article 16(1). 
95  Article 16(3) stated: “Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident 
of the other Contracting State under the Convention shall be inapplicable to the extent 
that, under the law in force in that other Contracting State, the income to which the relief 
relates bears significantly lower tax than similar income arising within that other State 
derived by residents of that other State”. US: United States Model Income Tax 
Convention of 16 June 1981, Article 16 (3). 
96  Avi-Yonah, supra n. 71, p. 317. 




determined item of income. This also reaffirms the original intention of the 
LOB provisions, which is to limit the access of third parties to a treaty 
between two countries from which they are not residents
97
 and not the 
avoidance of either double taxation or DNT. 
 
Furthermore, there are others reasons that reinforce the idea that the 
contingency included in the original 1981 LOB provision had nothing to do 
with the recognition of a principle of single taxation. Firstly, the original 
LOB provision in the 1981 US Model was not applicable to partnerships, 
which are currently recognized as persons under the most recent US Models, 
and therefore, being able to receive the benefits of a treaty. Thus, it is 
difficult to conceive the application of a principle of single taxation 
applicable only to tax treaty cases in which a corporation or trust was 
involved.
98
 Secondly, a tax treaty model is neither a negotiated treaty nor an 
                                                          
97  See, e.g., N. Bammens and L. De Broe, Treaty Shopping and Avoidance of Abuse in Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (M. Lang et al. eds., IBFD 
2010), Online Books IBFD. 
98  This argument lacks importance today with the suggestion to include partnerships within 
the scope of the LOB made by Rosembloom in 1983 and further taken into account in 
the 1996 and 2006 United States Model Income Tax Conventions. As provided by 
Rosembloom: “Partnerships, on the other hand, are not themselves taxpayers in the 
United States or in many other countries, although they are generally regarded as 
‘persons’ under recent U.S. tax treaties, with their residence dependent on that of the 
treaty partners. Because treaty benefits are thus available to partnerships as such, and 
because corporations and trusts can serve as partners, partnerships should be included 
within the limitation as well—if only to preclude their use to avoid a limitation of 
benefits applicable to corporations and trusts. Moreover, because there are numerous 
entities in the world whose statuses as corporations, trusts, or partnerships may not be so 
clear, treaty drafter may find it convenient to speak in terms of ‘all persons other than 
individuals’. Use of this phrase will obviate interpretative problems, and it is difficult to 





ideal world of taxation.
99
 Indeed, LOB provisions are subject to several 
modifications during the negotiation process, and even sometimes not 
included.
100
 Then, it would be difficult to recognize a principle of single 
taxation applicable only in those cases in which either the LOB provision 
was finally included in the negotiated treaty or it was included exactly as it 
was designed in the treaty model. 
 
Moreover, the subsequent elimination of paragraph 3 and the inclusion of a 
“base erosion test” in the 1996 and 2006 model, reaffirms the idea that the 
LOB provisions have (and had) nothing to do with assuring single taxation. 
Article 22(2)(f)(ii) of the US Model establishes: “A resident of a 
Contracting State shall be entitled to all the benefits of this Convention if the 
resident is: […] (f) a person other than an individual, if: (ii) less than 50 
percent of the person's gross income for the taxable year is paid or accrued, 
directly or indirectly, to persons who are not residents of either Contracting 
State (unless the payment is attributable to a permanent establishment 
                                                                                                                                       
see how any possible over inclusion could be harmful”. H. D. Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty 
Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 763 (1983), pp.811-812. See the 
reference to “persons other than individuals” included in Article 22(2)(f) of the United 
States Model Income Tax Convention of 20 Sept. 1996 and Article 22(2)(e) of the 
United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 Nov. 2006. 
99  As Rosenbloom explains: “[A] taxpayer may reject a treaty and its content and invoke 
its rights under domestic law […]”. Rosembloom, supra n. 56, p. 164.  
100  Although it is a policy of the United States to include a LOB provision into its tax 
treaties, there are cases in which this provision has not been included. For example, the 
treaties between the United States and Greece, Hungary, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland 
and Romania do not include a LOB provision. See R. Avi-Yonah and O. Halabi, US 
Treaty Anti-Avoidance Rules: An Overview and Assessment, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 
(2012), Journals IBFD, p. 238. 




situated in either State), in the form of payments that are deductible for 
income tax purposes in the person’s State of residence”.
101
 In other words, 
payments made to any resident of either Contracting State, as well as 
payments made to PEs, will not be considered base eroding payments.
102
 
Then, under the 1996 US Model it was perfectly possible that a US 
partnership pays a deductible payment to a resident of the other Contracting 
State, where that payment was not taxable, without considering that 
payment as base eroding.
103
 Accordingly, Article 22(2)(f)(ii) of the 2006 US 
Model more or less maintained the wording of the 1996 version. This is to 
say, in case of a person other than an individual (a partnership) made 
deductible payments that represent less than 50% of its gross income to non-
residents of either Contracting States, these payments would be considered 
as base eroding.
104
 However, these payments do not include arm’s length 
                                                          
101  US: United States Model Income Tax Convention of 20 September 1996, Article 
22(2)(f)(ii). 
102  US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 20 
September 1996, Article 22. 
103  To the extent that the recipients do not themselves base erode to non-residents. Id. 
104  Article 22(2)(f)(ii) of the 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention states: “A 
resident of a Contracting State shall be a qualified person for a taxable year if the 
resident is:[…] (f) a person other than an individual, if: (ii) less than 50 percent of the 
person’s gross income for the taxable year, as determined in the person's State of 
residence, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, to persons who are not residents of 
either Contracting State entitled to the benefits of this Convention under subparagraph 
a), subparagraph b), clause i) of subparagraph c), or subparagraph d) of this paragraph in 
the form of payments that are deductible for purposes of the taxes covered by this 
Convention in the person’s State of residence (but not including arm's length payments 
in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property)”. See US: United 
States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, Article 22(2)(f)(ii). See 
also, US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
15 November 2006, Article 22. 





payments in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible 
property.
105
 This last inclusion reduces the scope of application of the LOB 
provision, because it expressly excluded payments to non-residents of the 
treaty to the extent that these payments were made on arm’s length in the 
ordinary course of business for services or tangibles, and increases the 
likelihood that certain arm’s length deductible payments made from a treaty 
resident to another resident (or even a non-resident), are excluded from 
taxation in the hands of the recipient. This issue, however, would in any 
case demonstrate that the final target of the LOB provision is to ensure the 
single taxation of cross-border payments. 
3.2.3.2. The 2016 LOB provision–US Model 
A separate reference should be made with respect to the new Article 22 of 
the 2016 US Model.
106
 The new base erosion test include deductible 
payments made to residents of either Contracting State that benefit from a 
“Special Tax Regime” (hereinafter, “STR”) in their Contracting State of 
residence with respect to the deductible payments.
107
 For this purpose, the 
new Article 3(1) will consider a STR as “any statute, legislation, or 
administrative practice in a Contracting State with respect to a tax described 
in Article 2 (Taxes Covered) that meet all of the following conditions: 
                                                          
105  Id. 
106  US: United States Model Income Tax Convention of 17 February 2016, Article 22. See 
also, US: Proposed Limitation on Benefits Article, Select Draft Provisions of the U.S. 
Model Income Tax Convention of 20 May 2015. 
107  Id. 






 Likewise, the definition includes a list of cases where any 
legislation, regulation of administrative practice shall not be considered as a 
STR.
109
 Conversely to the 1996 and 2006 US Model, the proposal of 
amendment includes deductible payments made to a treaty resident subject 
to a special tax regime in the hand of the recipient, including low or zero tax 
jurisdictions. Practically speaking, the wording of the 2015 proposal of 
amendment is quite similar to that one of paragraph 3, Article 16 of the 1981 
US model. Thus, and even though the wording of the norm seems to be 
                                                          
108  US: Proposed Treaty Rules Addressing “Special Tax Regimes”, Select Draft Provisions 
of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, 20 May 2015. It is also important to remark 
that the definition of STR includes as administrative practice a “ruling practice”. This is 
to say, e.g. if a taxpayer obtains a ruling providing that its foreign source interest income 
will be subject to a low rate of taxation in the State of residence, and that rate is lower 
than the normal rate that applies to foreign source interest income received by residents 
of that State, the administrative practice under which the ruling is obtained will be 
considered a STR. See US: Technical Explanation for Definition of “Special Tax 
Regime”, Select Draft Provisions of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 20 May 
2015, p. 2. It is convenient to note that up to the date this work was concluded, no 
technical explanations of the 2016 US Model had been launched. However, it is 
expected that the Select Draft Provisions of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 
20 May 2015 be replicated in the final technical explanations. 
109  The draft of the new Article 3(1) of the US Model states: “[…] However, the term shall 
not include any legislation, regulation or administrative practice: i) the application of 
which does not disproportionately benefit interest, royalties or other income, or any 
combination thereof; ii) that, with regard to royalties, satisfies a substantial activity 
requirement; iii) that implements the principles of Article 7 (Business Profits) or Article 
9 (Associated Enterprises); iv) that applies principally to persons that exclusively 
promote religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural or educational activities; v) that 
applies principally to persons substantially all of the activity of which is to provide or 
administer pension or retirement benefits; vi) that facilitates investment in entities that 
are marketed primarily to retail investors, are widely-held, that hold real property 
(immovable property), a diversified portfolio of securities, or any combination thereof, 
and that are subject to investor-protection regulation in the Contracting State in which 
the investment entity is established; or vii) that the Contracting States have agreed shall 
not constitute a special tax regime because it does not result in a low effective rate of 
taxation;”. Id. 





exogenous to the original purpose of a LOB provision, this author sustains 
again that the source country has a legitimate interest to coordinate a 
restriction to tax an item of income, provided a treaty is in force, with the 
corresponding taxation of that income at residence. This legitimate interest 
to coherently accomplish with the allocation of taxing powers made by a tax 
treaty does not have anything to do with the accomplishment of a principle 
of single taxation that governs cross-border transactions, and rather responds 
to a rational concern of the source country that restrict its taxing powers 
when a tax treaty is negotiated and finally comes into play. 
4. Double Non-Taxation and Tax Evasion/ Tax Avoidance 
This Section turns now to briefly revisit both the legal concept of tax 
evasion and tax avoidance in order to demonstrate that DNT cannot be 
homologated (or confused) with any of those concepts. Likewise, it provides 
a critical analysis on the non-legal notion of “aggressive tax planning” 
(ATP), a modern pseudo-category used within the OECD BEPS Project
110
 
and analyzed by some scholar in equal footing with the legal concepts of tax 
evasion and tax avoidance.
111
 This Section intends to demonstrate the 
                                                          
110  The OECD refers 22 times to the concept of ATP just in the OECD BEPS Report from 
2013. See, OECD (2013), supra n. 2. However, the OECD already referred to the 
concept of ATP in its 2011 report focused on transparency and the design of better tools 
for assessing tax compliance risks. See OECD (2011), supra n. 1.  
111  Pistone, even though recognizing the legal uncertainty behind the concept of ATP 
proposes a systematic analysis of this non-legal concept, referring to it as a “new 
conceptual category of global tax law”. Pistone, supra n. 41, pp. 109-151. 




negative impact of the use of non-legal concepts within the legal debate 
regarding DNT.  
4.1. Tax Evasion in a nutshell 
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are eminently domestic legal concepts
112
, and 
beyond the linguistic differences in the use of the terms,
113
 there is 
substantial consensus of their meanings.
114
  
                                                          
112  The fact that they are domestic legal concepts does not prevent us to recognize that tax 
evasion and tax avoidance can have consequences beyond the domestic borders. Indeed, 
a major problem for domestic tax jurisdictions is the fact that taxpayers hide offshore 
assets, failing to declare them and in some cases failing to pay the taxes due on the 
income derived from those assets. Likewise, and although tax avoidance is not an 
international notion, it is worth to briefly refer to the concept of tax avoidance (or “tax 
abuse”) elaborated by the jurisprudence of the CJEU in Halifax and Cadbury 
Schweppes, both case laws ruled in 2006. In Halifax, on one hand, and referred 
exclusively to indirect taxation, the CJEU provided that an abusive practice exists if 
certain transactions aimed to obtain a tax advantage contrary to the purpose of the law 
and this aim, i.e. obtaining the tax advantage, is indeed an essential aim. In Cadbury 
Schweppes, referred precisely to direct taxation, the CJEU set up the limits on what kind 
of anti-avoidance measures might be justified in order to restrict the fundamental 
freedoms within the European Union. In this regard, the CJEU was clear in providing 
that only “wholly artificial arrangements”, which do not reflect economic reality, may be 
targeted. In both cases, the CJEU set up important boundaries of what should be a matter 
of concern and what should be not, preventing thus Member States to go beyond those 
limits in order to justify restrictive tax measures, which might finally affect the 
functioning of the European internal market. The above does not mean to recognize that 
a uniform concept of tax abuse exists with the EU, but some important patterns of a 
harmonized concept might be recognized. See EU: Judgment in Halifax plc., Leeds 
Permanent Development Services Ltd., County Wide Property Investments Ltd. v. 
Commissioners of Custom and Excise, C-255/02, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, hereinafter 
“Halifax case”  and EU: Judgment in Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544, 
hereinafter “Cadbury Schweppes case”. 





For the majority of the countries, tax evasion represents a fraudulent 
conduct from the taxpayer that it is aimed to cause an illegal reduction in the 
amount of taxes to be paid. It generally involves a willful conduct of the 
taxpayer and the respective lack of information by the authorities, which end 
up in a reduction of the final tax assessment. This conduct is normally 
described within law and it is sanctioned, although the effective sanctions 
will depend of the possibilities and the will of the specific government to 
prevent these patently illegal and objectionable behaviors. Therefore, tax 
evasion is no more than a question about governance failure in collecting 
taxes due to a lack of information. As well explained by Vann: “[T]he 
prevention of fiscal evasion primarily refers to cases where taxpayers 
fraudulently conceal income in an international setting and rely on the 
inability of tax administrations to obtain information from abroad”.  
 
The above means that tax evasion is a per se an illegal conduct, normally 
described and sanctioned by law, and which has to be with the intentions of 
a taxpayer to fraudulently hide his assets/income from the tax authorities, 
achieving in those cases, most probably, double or multiple non-taxation. 
This latter outcome, however, is not necessarily a precondition for the 
                                                                                                                                       
113  For example, in English the term “tax evasion” is synonymous of “tax fraud”, and it can 
be translated into German as “Steuerhinterziehung”, into French as “fraude fiscal”, into 
Spanish as “evasión fiscal” and into Portuguese as “evasao fiscal”. Conversely, the 
term “tax avoidance” is translated into French as “évasion fiscale”, into German as 
“Steuerumgehung”, into Spanish as “elusión fiscal” and into Portuguese as “elusão 
fiscal”. See C. Alves, Preventing Tax Avoidance: Is There Convergence in the Way 
Countries Counter Tax Avoidance?, 67 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 
348.   
114  Id. 




existence of tax evasion situations. In other words, the fact that a taxpayer 
achieves DNT in a cross-border transaction is not a presumption that he is 
evading taxes. In most of the cases, this outcome will be certainly promoted 
or saved by the legislations involved in the transaction and it will respond to 
specific incentives aimed to promote the growth of a specific sector or the 
whole economy of a country.
115
 Thus, what it is sanctioned in those cases of 
tax evasion is thus not that a taxpayer finally achieved non-taxation all 
together in a cross-border transaction, but rather that he unlawfully 
concealed assets from the tax authorities in order to reduce his final tax 
burden.  
4.1.1. Tax Evasion versus Tax Fraud  
Although the majority of the countries do not draw a line to separate both 
tax evasion and tax fraud, there are countries that clearly distinguish among 
them. Perhaps the most interesting example is Switzerland, where tax 
evasion constitutes a willful or negligent behavior of the taxpayer that 
causes a predisposition to improperly omit or to make an incomplete final 
assessment.
116
 Thus, the offender, by action or omission, obtains an 
                                                          
115  This can be seen in the offer of tax incentives around the world, especially with respect 
to the research and development of intangibles with the IP Boxes regimes and the like. 
Accordingly, within the tax treaty context, countries normally negotiate the inclusion of 
clauses that safeguard the success of those incentives, e.g. tax sparing clauses. Infra 
Chapter II, Section 4.1.1. 
116  CH: Article 175 of the DBG (Federal Law on Direct Federal Tax) of 14 December 1990 
and Article 56 of the StHG (Federal Law on Harmonization of Direct Taxes of the 
Cantons and Municipalities) of 14 December 1990. 





unjustified tax advantage causing a deficit to the community.
117
 The causal 
connection between the behavior of the offender and the deficit in the 
community is necessary to consider the action or omission as tax evasion.
118
 
In contrast, tax fraud supposes that a person forges, fake or uses false 
certifications to deceive third persons for purposes of tax evasion.
119
 
Conversely to tax evasion, the deficit in the community is not required.
120
 
Thus, both behaviors are sanctioned, although in a different manner.  
 
The distinction between tax fraud and tax evasion in Switzerland has 
important consequences at the tax treaty level as well.
121
 For example, the 
1996 tax treaty between Switzerland and the United States (currently in 
force) grants exchange of information under Article 26 only in case of “tax 
                                                          
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  CH: Article 186 of the DBG and Article 59 of the StHG. 
120  Id. 
121  See, e.g. CH: Decision of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht] A-737/2012 of 5 April 2012.  In a more recent decision of 6 
January 2014, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht] 
overturned a previous decision of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration granting 
administrative assistance to the IRS in disclosing some bank account data of American 
clients. The distinction between tax fraud and tax evasion was one of the main reasons 
provided by the Court to explain the denial to exchange information in this case. For 
more information about this Court decision, see CH: Press release, Media Relations A-
5390/2013 and A-5540/2013, Swiss Federal Administrative Court, St. Gallen (8 Jan. 
2014). See also the official German text and an unofficial English translation in: CH: X. 
vs. Federal Tax Administration, A-5390/2013, Swiss Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht], 6 January 2014 (ed. P. Baker), 17 ITLR, Lexis Nexis, 
London (2014). See also, L. Parada, Intergovernmental Agreements and the 
Implementation of FATCA in Europe, 7 World Tax J. 2 (2015), Journals IBFD, pp. 232-
235. See also, L. Parada, Lessons Learned from the Swiss Julius Baer Case, 74 Tax 
Notes Int’l 13 (2014); S. Ronco, Scambio di informazioni tra Stati Uniti e Svizzera: il 
caso Julius Baer, Rassegna Tributaria 6, (2014), pp. 1332-1353. 




fraud or the like”.
122
 This is to say, according to paragraph 10 of the 
Protocol, when the taxpayer has engaged in fraudulent conduct that causes 
or it is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount 
of tax paid to a Contracting State.
123
 In other words, exchange of 
information is not granted in cases of mere tax evasion.
 124
 Nevertheless, the 
above situation could change with the entry in force of the 2009 Protocol, 
which eliminates the reference to “tax fraud and the like” and introduces a 
major information clause. Once the Protocol is ratified, it will be applied 
retroactively since 23 September 2009, date of the signature of the 
Protocol.
125




                                                          
122   CH/US: Convention between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income, signed at Washington on 2 October 1996 as amended by the Protocol 
signed on 2 October 1996, Article 26(1). 
123  CH/US: Technical Explanations of the Convention between the United States of 
America and the Swiss Confederation for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, signed at Washington on 2 
October 1996 as amended by the Protocol signed on 2 October 1996. 
124  For more information why Switzerland does not grant administrative assistance in a case 
of simple nondisclosure or tax evasion see, e.g. M. Desax, The Swiss Perspective of 
Information Exchange, 58 Tax Notes Int’l 12  (2010), pp. 955-957. For more 
information about the Swiss bank secrecy law and its coordination with tax treaties see, 
e.g. G. Braidi  and L. Cousinou, Swiss Banking Secrecy: A Heaven of Peace in Distress 
for US Taxpayers, Quid? Fribourg Law Review 2, pp. 7-10 (2014). 
125  CH/US: Protocol 2009 amending the Convention between the United States and the 
Swiss Confederation for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on 
income signed at Washington on 2 October 1996, Swiss Federal Gazette (27 Nov. 
2010), p. 224, Article 5 (2). 
126  The reason is that U.S. Senator Rand Paul argues that the Protocol gives the IRS too 
much power to investigate non-criminal behaviors. See L. Shepard, Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell: Swiss Behavioral Patterns, 66 Tax Notes Int’l 1 (2012), p. 8.  





4.1.2. The reactions to Tax Evasion  
As explained above, tax evasion is basically a lack of information 
problem,
127
 and not a DNT problem. Governments, in cases of tax evasion, 
are unable to track taxpayers who intentionally hide their income, mostly 
offshore, resulting in a failure to collect taxes. That is why the natural 
reaction against tax evasion is exchange of information, namely, to extend 
the channels by which countries can cooperate in order to achieve 
appropriate levels of transparency that prevent taxpayers from hiding 
assets/income.  
 
A global tendency towards tax transparency has been evidenced in the 
recent efforts made by countries to increase the levels of exchange of 
information, which is added to the old measures normally used to combat 
offshore tax evasion.
128
 One major unilateral example is the 2010 FATCA 
legislation in the United States
129
, which beyond the criticism of its 
                                                          
127  Vann, supra n. 24. 
128  Countries also combat offshore tax evasion through voluntary disclosure amnesties. 
These initiatives are generally successful, but they have limitations. For example, 
taxpayers can perceive unfairness and anticipates further amnesties, reducing the level of 
revenues collected by the governments. See L. Lederman, The Use of Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiatives in the Battles Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 499 
(2012), p. 519. See also, C. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and 
the Utility of Amnesty, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 667 (2007), p. 707. 
129  US: Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 
(2010). See also, US: Proposed FATCA Regulations (2012) and Final FATCA 
Regulations (2014), both available at www.irs.gov. For further information regarding 
the discussions about FATCA see, e.g. A Mahboob, FATCA and the Fat Cats: Foreign 
Pass-through Payments and the Blocker Problem, 71 Tax Notes Int’l 12 (2013); J. Arora 
et al., U.S. releases Final FATCA Regs, 69 Tax Notes Int’l 4 (2013); P. Carman, Final 




extraterritoriality and the conflicts with other jurisdictions has opened the 
door to develop more effective international instruments to exchange 
information between jurisdictions. An example of the above is the OECD/G-
20 Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information released on February 2014 (Common Reporting Standard or 
CRS),
130
 which is based on the FATCA Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA) Model 1A.
131  Other global efforts have attended more to the disclose 
of corporate taxpayers’ information, such as the mandatory disclosure rules 
                                                                                                                                       
FATCA Regulations Provide Certainty, Flexibility, 15 Derivs. & Fin. Instrums. 2 (2013), 
Journals IBFD; V. Hammer, US Update, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6 (2012), Journals IBFD; 
W. Cui, Passthru Payments and the Fantastic World of FATCA, 13 Derivs. & Fin. 
Instrums. 4 (2011), Journals IBFD; Parada, supra n.121. 
130  OECD (2014), Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: 
Common Reporting Standard, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
131   As provided in the OECD CRS: “The Common Reporting Standard, with a view to 
maximizing efficiency and reducing costs for financial institutions draws extensively on 
the intergovernmental approach to implementing FATCA”. Id. See also, L. Sheppard, 
Machiavellian Pragmatism in Tax Enforcement, 77 Tax Notes Int’l 11 (2015), p. 927. 
See also, M. Stewart, Transnational Tax Information Exchange Networks: Steps towards 
a Globalized, Legitimate Tax Administration, 4 World Tax J. 2 (2012), Journals IBFD, 
p. 169. It is important to clarify that there are two versions of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement Model 1: (i) the reciprocal version (Model 1A), which provides for the 
United States to exchange information currently collected on accounts held in U.S. 
financial institutions by residents of treaty partner countries (either by bilateral tax 
treaties or TIEAs), and includes a policy commitment to pursue regulations and support 
legislation that would provide for equivalent levels of exchange by the United States; 
and (ii) the non-reciprocal version (Model 1B), where no reciprocal exchange of 
information takes place. See Parada, supra n. 121, p. 204. See also, F. A. García Prats, 
Los Nuevos Estándares Internacionales de Intercambio de Información: FATCA o el fin 
del Secreto Bancario in Intercambio de Información, Blanqueo de Capitales y Lucha 
contra el Fraude Fiscal (Dir. F.A. García Prats), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid 
(2014), pp. 205-206.   





under the OECD BEPS Action 12,
132
 and the imposition on taxpayers to 
disclose their affairs before or after lodgment of tax returns.
133
 Similarly, the 
issuance of the MCMAA
134
 and the CbC Reporting,
135
 have contributed to 




This tax transparency path can also be found within the European Union 
since the establishment of the EU Saving Tax Directive (Council Directive 
2003/48/EC).
137
 This Directive obliges financial institutions to report the 
identity of the EU residents who receive interest payments and to exchange 
                                                          
132  OECD (2015), Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12–2015 Final Report, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
133  For example, in the case of disclose before lodgment of tax returns, through the issuance 
of rulings or voluntary administrative procedures, e.g. APAs. Accordingly, by 
exchanging information through DTCs or TIEAs after lodgment of tax returns.  
134  OECD/EU (2011): Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matter of 1 
June 2011. 
135  OECD (2015), Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, 
Action 13–2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
136  M. Dirkis, The ‘Lyon’s Mouth’ post-box: A Comparative Review of the Limitations on 
the use by Revenue Authorities of Leaked and Stolen Information, Working Paper 
University of Sydney, presented at the Tax Research Conference organized by the Ross 
Parson Centre for Commercial, Corporate and Taxation Law (Sydney) and the Max 
Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich), 28-29 Nov. 2016, p. 1. 
137  EU: Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxation of Saving Income in the 
Form on Interest Payments, OJ L157 (2003) as amended through 2006. As FATCA, the 
EU Saving Tax Directive pursues the combat against tax evasion imposing due diligence 
requirements on financial institutions. However, and contrary to FATCA, it is limited 
only to private individual who receive interests (not including entities) and it concerns 
only financial institutions located in Europe. See L. Cavelti, Automatic Information 
Exchange versus the WHT Regime Globalization and Increasing Sovereignty Conflicts 
in International Taxation, 5 World Tax J. 2 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 191 and I. 
Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?, 
5 World Tax J. 3 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 337. 




it in an annual basis with the respective residence country.
138
 More recently, 
the adoption by the European Commission of the Council Directive 
2014/107/EU
139
, which amended the Directive 2011/16/EU on 
Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation
140
 and extended the 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in accordance with the new 
OECD/G-20 global standards for automatic exchange of information added 
to the proposal of a Council Directive in order to repeal the EU Saving Tax 
Directive (Council Directive 2003/48/EC)
141
, simply demonstrate that idea 
of setting up one unique standard for automatic exchange of information 
within the EU. Moreover, probably the most symbolic recent achievement at 
the EU level is the EU-Switzerland Tax Transparency Agreement of 
2015.
142
 The new EU-Switzerland tax transparency agreement is fully 
consistent with the OECD/G20 global standard for the automatic exchange 
of information and it should not only improve the Member States’ abilities 
                                                          
138  Among the characteristics of the EU Saving Tax Directive is that it provides a 
“transitional WHT regime” which works as a relief for those EU countries that still 
possess strict bank secrecy policies. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the transitional 
WHT regime has been eliminated with the subsequent developments upon transparency. 
See Parada, supra n. 121, p. 218. 
139  EU: Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 Dec. 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, OJ L359 
(2014). 
140  EU: Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 Feb. 2011 on administrative cooperation in the 
field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L64 (2011). 
141  EU: Proposal for a Council Directive repealing Council Directive 2003/48/EC, COM 
(2015) 129 final, 18 March 2015. 
142  See EU: European Commission Press Release IP/15/5043, Fighting tax evasion: EU and 
Switzerland sign historic tax transparency agreement, 27 May 2015. See also R. 
Höltschi, Automatischer Informationsaustausch, Schweiz und EU unterzeichnen AIA, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (27 May 2015).  





to track down and tackle tax evaders, but it should also act as a deterrent 




Despite the importance of these global achievements towards tax 
transparency and exchange of information, one should not forget the 
importance of maintaining a proper balance between the protection of 
taxpayers’ rights and the public interest of combating tax evasion. This is to 
say, there is a natural limitation in the fight against tax evasion, which is the 
protection of taxpayers’ rights.
144
 The above is particularly relevant when 
referring on how to gather information to start, e.g. a civil or criminal 
proceeding against tax evasion and which type of information can be finally 
used in Court. Indeed, as we have witnessed during the last years, there are 
some publicly known cases in which information has been unlawfully 
obtained, either because it was leaked or stolen, and finally used by the tax 
authorities to start a tax evasion proceeding.
145
 Unfortunately there is no a 
                                                          
143  Parada, supra n. 121, pp.219-220. 
144  For different analyses upon the protection of taxpayers’ rights in a world in which 
automatic exchange of information seems to be the final aim see, e.g. P. Baker, Some 
Recent Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Tax Matters, 55 Eur. Taxn. 
2/3 (2015), Journals IBFD; J. Calderón Carrero and A. Quintas Seara, The Taxpayer’s 
Right of Defense in Cross-Border Exchange of Information Procedures, 68 Bull. Int’l. 
Taxn. 9 (2014), Journals IBFD; R. Desax, Practical Protection of Fundamental Rights 
of Taxpayers, 69 Bull. Int’l Taxn. 4/5 (2015), Journals IBFD; N. Serim, Taxpayers’ 
Rights–The Turkish Model, 48 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2008), Journals IBFD; R. Camacho Palma, 
An Overview of the Protection of Taxpayer Rights in Portugal, 50 Eur. Taxn. 1 (2010), 
Journals IBFD, and M. de Zeeuw, The Formulation of Taxpayer Rights and Obligations 
in a Developing Country, 14 Asia-Pacific Tax Bull. 1 (2008), Journals IBFD. 
145  Perhaps the most famous cases of stolen information are: 1) the “LGT Kieber papers”, 
where a former employee of the LGT Bank in Lichtenstein, stole information, putted 
into a CD, and subsequently sold it to the German tax authorities; 2) The “Falciani list”, 




unanimous position on this matter, and domestic Courts around the world 
have generated inconsistent precedents. In Germany, e.g. there is a tendency 
to accept the use of leaked and stolen information without limitations, which 
might certainly jeopardize basics taxpayers’ rights, such as the right of 
defense.
146
 This tendency, however, has been mitigated by recent decisions, 
at least with regards to criminal matters.
147
 France, on the other hand, seems 
to adopt a more restrictive position regarding the use of this type of 
information in Court.
148
 This position was strengthened in 2010 and 2011, 
                                                                                                                                       
where Mr. Hervé Falciani, a former employee of the HSBC in Geneva, stole information 
of around 130,000 customers and sold it to different EU Governments. See Dirkis, supra 
n. 136, pp. 8-13. 
146  The German Federal Constitutional Court, in a case of stolen information by former 
employee of LGT Bank in Lichtenstein and subsequently sold to the German tax 
authorities, stated that it did not affect the fundamental right of privacy being thus not 
against the German Federal Constitution. See DE: BVerfG Beschl. v. 9 Nov. 2010 [2 
BvR 2101/09] – DStR 2010, 2512. See also, S. Soong Johnston, State Court Rejects 
Challenge Against Use of Stolen Bank Data, 73 Tax Notes Int’l 9 (2014) and K. Parillo, 
German Court Permit Used of Stolen Data in Tax Probes, 60 Tax Notes Int’l 10 (2010), 
p. 725. 
147  DE: VGH Urteil v. 24 Feb. 2014 [VGH B 26/13] Steuk 2014, 106. In this case, the Land 
Constitutional Court of Rhineland-Palatinate [Rheinlandpfalz] ruled against the 
arguments of a taxpayer who was trying to prevent the access of the tax authorities to 
register his house in suspicion of tax evasion. The information was contained in a CD 
with stolen data and which was sold to five different Governments. The Court sustained 
that the informant acted at his own initiative; therefore, those acts were not attributable 
to the State and they did not infringed the right to a fair trial. However, what it is 
interesting to highlight is that the Court confirmed that the acquisition of data media for 
purposes of criminal prosecution is indeed admissible only insofar as the public 
authorities do not systematically encourage the committing of crimes. This position does 
not only differ from the one sustained by the German Federal Supreme Court in 2010, 
but also opens the door to provide certain limitations in the use of stolen data, at least 
with respect to criminal proceedings. 
148  For example, in 2011 the Court of Appeal in Paris [Court d’Appel de Paris ] denied the 
French tax authorities the entrance in the house of a taxpayer to search for information 
regarding a potential tax fraud case. J. Delaurière and C. Prest, French Tax Authorities 





when the Civil Supreme Court stated that it is fundamental that a judge 
verifies that the information provided to the tax authorities was lawfully 
obtained, without being distracted by economic considerations that prevent 
him to judge in accordance with the fundamental principles that govern the 
legitimacy of his actions.
149
 Similarly, in Switzerland, the Federal 
Administrative Court has recently stated in a case regarding exchange of 
information under Article 28 of the Switzerland-France tax treaty (exchange 
of information), that Switzerland is not allowed to give any administrative 
assistance if the request for administrative assistance is based on stolen 
data.
150
 Accordingly, the CJEU has recently confirmed, within the Sabou 
case, the domestic law monopoly in the protection of taxpayers’ rights.
151
 In 
this case, the Czech Supreme Court stopped the proceedings between the 
Czech tax authorities and Mr. Sabou and referred to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. Among the inquiries, the Czech Supreme Court stated: 
“[A]re the tax authorities in the requested MS obliged, when providing 
                                                                                                                                       
Lose Battle on Stolen Data, 62 Tax Notes Int’l 3 (2011), p. 176. At that time, the French 
authorities tried to get the authorization based on the information stolen by an employee 
of HSBC with respect to customers with bank accounts in Switzerland. See, Parada, 
supra n. 121, pp. 212-215. See also, Dirkis, supra n. 136,  Sec. 2.2.2. 
149  The Supreme Civil Court strengthened this position in 2011 arguing: “[I]I the economic 
considerations cannot be ignored by the judge, such considerations shall not distract the 
judge from his obligation to judge in accordance with the fundamental principles which 
govern the legitimacy of his action”. Delaurière and Prest, supra n. 148. The 
considerations of the Court were made under the basis of art. 6(1) of the European 
Rights Convention and the duty of loyalty. Id. See also, Parada, supra n. 121, p. 213. 
150  CH: Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht–BVGer], Urteil A-
6843/2014 of 15 Sep. 2015. See also, CH: Bundesverwaltungsgericht: Medienmitteilung 
v. 24 Sep. 2015, Keine Amtshilfe bei gestohlenen Daten, Urteil A-6843/2014 v. 15 Sep. 
2015. 
151  EU: Judgment in Sabou v. The Czech Republic, Case C-276/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:678. 




information in accordance with the Directive 77/799/EEC (mutual 
assistance between MS), to observe a certain minimum content of their 
answer, so that it is clear from what sources and by what method the 
requested tax authorities have obtained the information provided? May the 
taxpayer challenge the correctness of the information thus provided, e.g. on 
grounds of procedural defects of the proceedings in the requested State? ”.
152
 
The CJEU established that the Directive did not govern any of these 
questions and that they must be addressed only at a domestic level.
153
 
However, as per the AG’s opinion was that in order to use the info in the 
requesting MS, the requested MS is obliged to provide “adequate 
statements” about the inquiries conducted and upon which the information is 
based. This statement, in the author’s opinion, brings a small chance to 
further improve the protection of the taxpayers’ right beyond MS’s domestic 
laws.  
To sum up, the reactions against tax evasion are given by the increase of the 
levels of transparency and cooperation in the exchange of information 
                                                          
152  Id., para. 22. 
153  The Court specifically stated: “It must be observed that Directive 77/799 does not 
address the taxpayer’s right to challenge the accuracy of the information conveyed, and 
it does not impose any particular obligation with regard to the content of the information 
conveyed. In those circumstances, only national laws can lay down the relevant rules. 
The taxpayer may challenge the information concerning him conveyed to the tax 
authorities of the requesting Member State in accordance with the rules and procedures 
applicable in the Member State in question. The answer to the third question is therefore 
that Directive 77/799 does not govern the question of the circumstances in which the 
taxpayer may challenge the accuracy of the information conveyed by the requested 
Member State, and it does not impose any particular obligation with regard to the 
content of the information conveyed”. Id., para. 48, 49 and 50. 





among countries. These reactions, however, cannot be implemented at any 
cost and should not prevent Governments from providing the necessary 
safeguards for the fundamental taxpayers’ rights, even beyond the national 
boundaries of domestic laws, as it has been done so far.
 
This could be made 
through the use of tax treaties; TIEAs or any other international instrument 
that might serve this purpose.
154
  
4.2. Tax Avoidance in a nutshell 
Unlike tax evasion, tax avoidance has nothing to do with illegal or 
fraudulent behaviors aimed to hide assets/income.
155
 On the contrary, tax 
avoidance seems to be more a natural taxpayer’s reaction to the imperfect 
design of domestic tax rules, which are finally used by him to reduce his tax 
burden, if possible to zero. In this regard, tax avoidance is closer to be an 
issue of interpretation of the laws rather than an issue related to the lack of 
information. Indeed, in tax avoidance cases taxpayers will often refer to the 
literal wording of the law or a treaty to support certain tax arrangements. If 
the outcome of the arrangement is against the object and purpose of the law, 
                                                          
154   The author has already argued in this regard when referring to the “Intergovernmental 
Agreements (IGAs)” to implement FATCA. Considering the nature of these agreements, 
they could also be utilized to regulate the use of information unlawfully obtained 
avoiding misinterpretations and contradictory results and contributing to the protection 
of the taxpayers’ rights. See Parada, supra n. 121, pp. 212-215. In a similar direction 
with respect to the protection of taxpayers’ rights, see Calderón Carrero and Quintas 
Seara, supra n. 144. 
155  “In the case of tax avoidance, all facts are disclosed: the taxpayer tries to take advantage 
of a legal rule by interpreting it in the most favorable way from his point of view”. See, 
Essers, supra n. 50, p. 58. 




and the taxpayer was mainly motivated by tax reasons to get involved in 
such an arrangement, the tax judge might deny the outcome of such 
arrangement.
156
 The above does not mean that transparency might not 
contribute in solving tax avoidance problems, but it will not be enough 
because information is not the core of the issue. 
 
Tax avoidance, unlike tax evasion is, however, not a priori objectionable.
157
 
This will depend exclusively upon the level of tolerance given in a specific 
jurisdiction, which is normally limited by the use of GAARs or SAARs at a 
domestic level.
158
 In the United States, e.g. it has been largely accepted tax a 
taxpayer can arrange his businesses in order to pay as low taxes as possible 
or to defer their payment.
159
 A similar doctrine of tolerance can be found 
under English common law.
160
 The practical problem is, of course, that in 
                                                          
156  Id. 
157  The reproach in the case of tax evasion comes directly from the fact that this is indeed 
an illegal conduct.  
158  Infra Section 4.2.2. 
159  For example, in Helvering v. Gregory, it is stated that: “Any one may so arrange his 
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury; there is no even a patriotic duty to increase one’s 
taxes”. US: Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). Another example is 
the well-known tolerance in the United States to accept the deferral on Subpart F income 
through the use of the “Check-the-box” (CTB) regulations that allow the taxpayer to 
choose the tax treatment for U.S. tax purposes of foreign entities not considered per se 
as Corporations. For a further analysis upon the U.S. CTB regulations, see infra Chapter 
III, Section 4.  
160  In Duke of Westminster v. IRC, Baron Thomas Tomlin said: “Every man is entitled if he 
can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than 
it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers 





many occasions it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the line 
between what is objectionable and what is not. This difficulty, however, 
should not prevent Governments and policymakers from setting up the 
boundaries of tax avoidance, and the ones between this latter and tax 
evasion, strictly based upon the rule of law, avoiding the inclusion of non-




As to double non-taxation, it is not possible to argue that this outcome is a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of tax avoidance. In some cases, e.g. 
the reduction in the taxpayer’s burden might be interpreted as the simple 
capacity to access at tax benefits not originally available or to simply 
improve a business position. An example of the above could be the case of a 
corporate taxpayer subject to an interest limitation rule that prevents him 
from borrowing enough money from a related lender outside his residence 
country. Let us also assume that the domestic interest limitation rule is 
designed in such a way that it leaves open the application of transfer pricing 
rules as a carve-out clause, although not expressly stated within the law. In 
this case, nothing would prevent the taxpayer to prove that its interest 
payments accomplishes with the arm’s length standard in order to escape the 
application of the interest limitation rule. Therefore, the use of this gap has 
nothing to do with the achievement of DNT and responds to the simple 
desire of avoiding a rule that limits his capacity of borrowing money from 
                                                                                                                                       
may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax”. UK: Duke of 
Westminster v. IRC, [1936] 19 D.T.C. 490, 520 (Can.) 
161  Infra Section 4.2.2. See also, infra Section 5 as regards to the concept of ATP. 




abroad. In other cases, even when the outcome of DNT is clearly the final 
aim, this aim is completely legitimated by law, such it is in the case of tax 
planning structures, which is in fact a non-objectionable type of tax 
avoidance. Thus, whatever the source of the non-taxation outcome is, i.e. 
legitimate or illegitimate tax avoidance, it remains as an outcome, not 
representing by itself a proxy or presumption of a reproachable taxpayer’s 
conduct.  
4.2.1. Tax Avoidance and International Tax Planning 
As slightly pointed out before, international tax planning is no other thing 
that the natural behavior of an entrepreneur to optimize his costs,
162
 being 
thus a type of tax avoidance, which is legitimated by law. The above could 
be argued at the individual level;
163
 however, there is no doubt about it at the 
corporate level, where the persons called to manage a company are legally 
bound to involve in tax planning structures in order to minimize company’s 
costs. This obligation might be well interpreted within the context of the 
duty of loyalty or the duty of care that directors of a company have with the 
                                                          
162  This is also a fact expressly recognized within the OECD. See OECD (1987), 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of 
Conduit Companies, Issues in International Taxation No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 
11. 
163  For example, there could be always exceptional cases of taxpayers whose level of social 
compromise brings them to pay as many taxes as possible, even twice. For an interesting 
economic analysis on how patriotism might moderate the incentives to avoid taxes, see 
B. Geys and K. Konrad, Patriotism and Taxation, Working Paper of the Max Planck 
Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2016-11 (2016). 





shareholders or investors of the entity. As explained by Schön: “As 
dividends are paid out of profits, which have been subject to corporate 
income tax, the interest of the shareholders goes for the after-tax profit 
rather than for the pre-tax profit […] This makes the minimization of the 
corporate tax burden an integral part of the managers’ duty of care […] 
Therefore, they – i.e. the directors themselves – are legally bound to engage 
in tax strategies”.
164
 Thus, and unlike an individual taxpayer, the manager 
body of a company must respond to the profits expectations of the 
shareholders and must fulfill this duty involving in tax strategies that allow 




The outcome of DNT is thus not only a possible and accepted one within the 
context of an international tax planning, it is indeed, in most of the cases, a 
demonstration of a successful tax strategy aimed to reduce company’s costs. 
Since taxes are basically costs, any cross-border or international tax 
planning will be aimed at least to avoid double taxation, i.e. duplicated 
costs, and to achieve DNT, i.e. the optimization of the overall tax liability in 
order to maximize profits. In simple words, a taxpayer will always intend to 
avoid paying taxes twice and will always try paying as close as possible to 
zero.
166
 This conclusion, however, does not mean to recognize that the 
                                                          
164  W. Schön, Tax and Corporate Governance: A legal Approach in: W. Schön (ed) Tax 
and Corporate Governance, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax 
Law, Springer, Heidelberg (2008), p.46. 
165  Id., p. 47. 
166  R. Eicke, Tax Planning with Holding Companies—Repatriation of U.S. Profits from 
Europe, Kluwer Law International, BV The Netherlands (2009), pp. 11-21.  




boundaries of what is a legitimate tax planning today might vary as per the 
specific tax policies of a domestic jurisdiction in the future, eventually 
affecting the whole tax planning strategy, and indirectly the legitimacy of 
the DNT aim. This variation in the legal boundaries, however, will not 
imply that the DNT outcome will become in a presumption of illegal or 
illegitimate conducts, but it will certainly makes impossible its achievement 
within the new legal framework.
167
 
4.2.2. The reactions to Tax Avoidance 
Generally speaking, countries follow different approaches to draw the line 
between objectionable and non-objectionable tax avoidance, using in most 
of the cases the elements of economic substance and artificiality as a proxy 
to determine the presence of abusive transactions. As explained by Garcia 
Prats, it is possible to distinguish at least three main groups of anti-
avoidance measures: a) countries that use a sham/simulation concept instead 
of specific or general anti-avoidance measures, either by statute or by Court; 
b) countries using GAARs, which may differ from country to country, or 
SAARs, e.g., CFC rules or the non-deductibility of certain foreign 
                                                          
167  However, these new boundaries do not refer to the public perception of what is morally 
right or wrong, but rather to specific rules aimed to reduce the scope of tax planning 
strategies. The above reaffirms the idea of avoiding the use of non-legal notions to set 
up those boundaries, e.g. the notion of ATP. See infra Section 5. 





payments, and c) countries using law theories elaborated by Courts.
168
 
Among this last group, it is also possible to distinguish three main theories: 
1) Step transaction or Ramsay doctrine, which advocates for the recognition 
of series of transactions as a single one.
169
 Then, the step transactions are 
disregarded for tax purposes and they are taxed as a unified transaction;
170
 2) 
Business purpose, according to which transactions should be characterized 
according to their substance.
171
 This is to say, distinguishing between 
transactions with valid business purposes and artificial ones designed 
exclusively to avoid taxes,
172
 and 3) Economic Substance, which does not 
relate to the purpose of the transaction but to its effects.
173
 The basic premise 
of this theory is that a court may deny the tax benefits resulting from a 





Whatever path is taken to draw the line between objectionable and non-
objectionable (or legitimate or illegitimate) tax avoidance, it is important 
                                                          
168  F. A. Garcia Prats, The ‘Abuse of Tax Law’: Prospects and Analysis in: G. Bizioli (ed.) 
Essays in International and European Tax Law, Jovene Editore, Napoli (2010), p. 58-
61. 
169  Id. 
170  J. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 Bos. 
College L. Rev. 3 (2001), p. 587.  
171  Garcia Prats, supra n. 168.  
172  P. Lampreave, An Assesment of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines in the United States 
and the European Union, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 3, p. 155 (2012), Journals IBFD. 
173  Garcia Prats, supra n. 168. 
174  Id., p 154. 




that this is made from the rule of law,
175
 excluding arguments of morality or 
justice.
176
 Following this path will benefit both taxpayers and governments. 
On the one hand, taxpayers can certainly rely on the legal certainty required 
to carry out their businesses. This is to say, they can be aware before 
engaging in any tax avoidance scheme of the expected behaviors, and 
therefore, whether or not certain transactions can be disregarded. On the 
other hand, governments impose effective punishments for the cases in 
which the limits of legitimate tax avoidance are contravened, moving the tax 
system to a more coherent and consistent application.
177
 More importantly, 
there will be a lower chance to confuse between tax evasion, and illegal 
behavior, tax avoidance, a legitimate or illegitimate conduct depending on 
the level of tolerance established by the law of a specific jurisdiction, and 
DNT, an always legitimate tax planning aim. 
                                                          
175  Although this concept belongs specifically to the common law tradition, I use it also as a 
synonymous of the principle of legality used in many civil law countries. In simple 
words, law should provide the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate tax 
avoidance. 
176  This issue is deeply analyzed by A. Christians, who states: “The idea that taxpayer 
behavior must be managed by law, rather than social sanction, rests fundamentally on 
the premise that tax policy can move toward greater coherence over time if the public 
persistently demands a means of monitoring lawmaking”. See Christians, supra n. 49, p. 
59. Christians also argues that the turn to morality, rather than law, to delineate what is 
legal or illegal is indeed counterproductive to pursue a coherent tax policy in the long 
term and it can also have grave consequences for the future of tax policy on a global 
scale. Id., pp. 39-40. See also, e.g., A. Christians, Tax Activists and the Global 
Movement for Development through Transparency in Tax, in: M. Stewart and Y. 
Brauner (eds.), Law and Development, Edward Elgar Publishing (2013), p. 288. 
177  Christians, supra n. 49, p. 55. 





5. Double Non-Taxation and “Aggressive Tax Panning” 
Contrary to the idea stressed in Section 4 that only law should set up the 
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate tax planning (objectionable 
tax avoidance), we have recently witnessed the appearance of a non-legal 
category into the debate: the notion of “Aggressive Tax Planning” (ATP).
178
 
This Section aims only to emphasize how the consequentialist approach 
observed within the ambiguous notion of ATP, i.e. focusing in the results of 
the transaction–DNT or low taxation– might negatively impact the proper 
understanding of the DNT outcome, and indirectly affects the delineation of 
the traditional boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate tax avoidance, 




                                                          
178  The expression ATP is, nevertheless, not new. It was originated in the United States, 
where it was used to refer to structures that were designed against the spirit or purpose 
of the regulations. See J. Calderón Carrero and A. Quintas Seara, The Concept of 
‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the 
BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning, 44 
Intertax 3 (2016), p. 209.   
179  Therefore, this Section does not attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the notion 
of ATP. For this purpose, see, e.g. A. P. Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in EU Law 
and in the Light of BEPS: The EC Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and 
BEPS Action 2 and 6, 43 Intertax 1 (2015); F. A. García Prats, Los límities a la 
planificación fiscal agresiva y el abuso de las normas tributaries, at AEDAF, X 
Congreso Tributario. La Justicia: ¿Garantía del Estado de Derecho? AEDAF, 2015; 
Pistone, supra n. 39; Calderón Carrero and Quintas Seara, supra n. 178; C. Fuest et al., 
Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinationals Firms: Issues and 
Options for Reform, 5 World Tax J. 3 (2013), Journals IBFD; P. Piantavigna, Tax Abuse 
and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: How EU Law and the OECD are 
Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in International Tax Law, Despite 
Linguistic Discrepancies, 9 World Tax J. 1 (2017), Journals IBFD. 




5.1. The notion of ATP in brief 
ATP is a non-legal notion developed by the OECD within the context of the 
BEPS Project,
180
 which, although lacking of a consistent definition, seems to 
have a very clear and instrumental purpose: to reduce the scope of (legal) 
tax planning and to set up new ethical standards for taxpayers in order to 
prevent abusive practices. The above can be noted, e.g. in Action 12 OECD 
BEPS Action Plan,
181
 where the notion of ATP is used to recognize tax-
planning structures that comply with the wording of the law, but not with its 
spirit.
182
 In other words, the notion of ATP would attempt to explain the 
loopholes and inconsistencies in cross-border transactions that involve the 
application of different domestic tax systems aiming to create a more 
coherent framework. In this order of ideas, and at least a priori, this vague 
notion seems to serve more the purpose of being a guiding principle rather 
than a rule that should generally be applied.
183
 
                                                          
180  However, the OECD already referred to the notion of aggressive tax planning in its 2011 
Report. See OECD (2011), supra n. 1. 
181  OECD (2015), supra n. 132. 
182  Calderón Carrero and Quintas Seara, supra n. 178, p. 210.  
183  This conclusion is important, because it allows us to argue that in any case the notion of 
ATP can be used as synonymous of tax avoidance, and reaffirms the idea that the notion 
of ATP is a non-legal category in itself. As provided by Calderón Carrero and Quintas 
Seara: “[T]he new concept of aggressive tax planning does not aim to be a type of 
overriding principle to be applied generally ( like a ‘soft law GAAR’), nor does it aim to 
constitute a ‘rule of teleological interpretation’ of the regulatory language, but its 
purpose may lie more in bringing about a change in the way the new international 
taxation system is understood […]”. Id. On the other hand, if the final aim were to 
establish a general rule that contemplates the new ATP category, i.e. a positive rule 
(hard law), it would be practically impossible to distinguish between this ATP category 





5.2. The EU notion of ATP: A consequentialist approach  
A broader understanding of the notion of ATP can be, however, found in the 
EU Commission Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning launched in 
2012.
184
 According to the EU Commission “[a]ggressive tax planning 
consists of taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of the 
mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing 
tax liability”.
185
 The EU Commission also establishes that the consequences 
of these ATP schemes normally include the outcome of double deduction, 
i.e. when the same loss is deducted both in the State of source and residence, 
and the outcome of DNT, i.e. when income that is not taxed in the source 
State is exempt in the State of residence.
186
 Thus, as per the EU 
understanding, any operation whose purpose is to achieve DNT would be 
included within the notion of ATP, covering also, e.g. non-artificial 
transactions with a pure (legal) tax purpose.  
This broader understanding of ATP is confirmed by some tax scholars who 
explain it as a “conceptual category of the global Tax Law, consisting in the 
exploitation of the disparities between tax systems with the purpose of 
obtaining tax advantages, which would have not been otherwise available”, 
proposing a systematic study of the notion, as if we were referring to a pure 
                                                                                                                                       
and a simple GAAR, generally applied by countries to counteract abusive practices. Id. 
On a different opinion: Piantavigna, supra n. 179. 
184  EU: European Commission Recommendation of 6 Dec. 2012 on aggressive tax 
planning, COM (2012), 8806 final.  
185  Id. 
186  Id. 




legal concept, which would include at least three elements: a) the 
exploitation of the legal disparities between tax systems in order to obtain a 
tax advantage; b) the desalination between the source of the income and 
where taxes are actually paid, and c) the DNT outcome as a result not 
originally intended by the States. Only the simultaneous concurrence of 






, however, or the fact that a tax planning 
structure will be regarded as aggressive or not based on the results of the 
transaction (i.e. DNT or low taxation) adopted by the EU Commission and 
assumed also by some tax scholars, might have serious negative effects. The 
most evident one is that it might turn the understanding of the concept of tax 
avoidance, traditionally linked to the lack of economic substance or 
artificiality of a cross-border transaction, into the focus of eliminating DNT. 
This approach disregards all the other complexities that involve a cross-
border transaction, including e.g. the legality and the methods used within 
the transaction, and contributes even more to the stigmatization of the DNT 
outcome. For some authors, however, these effects are mitigated since the 
DNT outcome is relevant only when the States did not originally ‘intend’ 
this outcome.
189
 Nevertheless, as stated in Section 2.3 of this Chapter, to 
                                                          
187  Pistone, supra n. 41, p. 117. 
188  Calderón Carrero and Quintas Seara, supra n. 178, p. 220. The authors refer indistinctly 
to “consequentialist standard” and “quantitative standard”. 
189  Pistone, supra n. 41, pp. 123-125.  





assume that the ‘intention of the States’ can be obtained purely without 
considering the influence of political malfunctions simply implies not to 
understand the reality in the lawmaking process. Indeed, the influence of 
external actors in the lawmaking process does not only consider the direct 
lobby of multinationals, but also the participation of these and other actors 
within international tax networks, such as the OECD.
190
 Therefore, the 
‘intention of the States’ as to aim or not the DNT outcome should only be 
relevant when is expressly stated in the wording of the law, or the treaty, not 
giving space to subjective interpretations. Unfortunately, a clear tendency on 
the contrary can be seen in the participation of the media into the debate 
regarding tax evasion and tax avoidance, providing a general confusion of 
legal concepts, which, of course, includes an a priori rejection of the double 
non-taxation outcome. In 2012, e.g. James Henry, an American tax justice 
activist, said: “Both evasion and avoidance have the same impact on the rest 
of us, which is, our tax burdens are greater because the truly rich are not 
paying their fair share: they are able to put their money abroad, and 
basically are able to take advantage of a system that allows a double non-
taxation. And that is a real problem (emphasis added)”.
191
 The above can 
riskily drives us to conceive the notion of DNT as a per se pervasive reality 
in the world of cross-border investments and commercial activity, 
disregarding its legal validity as part of a legitimate tax planning strategy. 
The consequentialist approach of the notion of ATP, therefore, starts from a 
                                                          
190  Christians, supra n. 49. 
191  Id., p. 52. 




wrong and not demonstrated premise, which is that income derived from a 
cross border transaction should be taxed somewhere. This idea, as already 
stressed in this Chapter, has validity neither as a principle of international 
tax law nor as customary law.
192
 
Another effect, although not directly derived from the consequentialist 
approach, but from the ‘academic construction’ of the notion of ATP itself, 
is the assumption that ‘disparities’ among legislations used by taxpayers to 
reduce their tax burden is an a priori evil element of the international tax 
system, or at least a proxy to determine abusive practices. As noted before in 
this work, however, disparities in the design of domestic tax laws are indeed 
the general rule and not the exception, and when countries want to restrict 
the potential abuse of these disparities, they normally do that from the rule 
of law and not from grey non-legal categories.
193
 Similarly, the desalination 
between the source of the income and where taxes are actually paid may be 
a valid element to consider with respect to the ‘notion of ATP”. However, 
its determination becomes sometimes very complex, if not impossible to 
                                                          
192  Garcia Prats states that such a premise [single taxation] can be accepted only if a norm 
in each of the States (or at least one of them) establishes it. In absence of such a norm, 
the sole acceptance of the idea of single taxation would produce the nonsense result that 
States could unilaterally declare the exemption of some income, but when such an 
income had an international origin or destiny, this exemption would be nullified. See 
García Prats, supra n. 168, p. 125. The original Spanish text says: “Dicha premisa solo 
puede resultar aceptable si existe una norma tributaria en cada una–o al menos en 
alguna– de las jurisdicciones afectadas que así lo establezca, de conformidad con los 
presupuestos de derecho interno que legitiman el nacimiento de la obligación tributaria 
respectiva”.  
193  As states by Rosenbloom: “Countries differ in regard to the many rules of law that make 
up any system of taxation”. See Rosenbloom, supra n. 56, p. 140. 





determine. A clear example of the above is the case of hybrid entities. In this 
situation, there is no such desalination between the source of the income or 
the place where activities are rendered and the place where taxes were paid 
(at least not that evident). The issue, in most of these cases as we will see 
further on in this work, is reduced to the uncoordinated rules to characterize 
foreign entities among various jurisdictions, which might derive in a DNT 
outcome. Thus, if all the elements of the notion of ATP might 
simultaneously concur to classify a transaction or tax structure as aggressive 
tax planning, the absence of the “desalination element” in the case of hybrid 
entities might drive us to conclude that these types of structures could not be 
regarded as ATP, at least not in a pure theoretical analysis.
194
 
As a result, the notion of ATP seems to be not only unclear and 
consequentialist but also very risky to implement without negative legal and 
tax policy consequences. On the one hand, it puts at risk the principle of 
legality in international transactions, contributing to increase the level of 
uncertainty for taxpayers and situating the discussion on tax avoidance 
closer to moral arguments rather than legal ones. On the other hand, it 
negatively affects the proper understanding of the DNT outcome. Both 
consequences should definitely be avoided.  
 
                                                          
194  According to Pistone, only the simultaneous concurrence of the three elements would 
allow classifying a cross-border transaction as ATP. Pistone, supra n. 41, p. 117. Thus, 
the absence of any of the elements would make the category useless in the case of hybrid 
entities.  




6. Final Remarks 
Double non-taxation is an outcome that implies the complete absence of 
taxation in two or more jurisdictions. This simple understanding is, 
however, normally tergiversated in different manners confusing the outcome 
of the transaction, i.e. DNT, with the intentions of the taxpayers or the 
intentions of the States, producing more confusing results that derives in an 
a priori negative perception of a notion that should, in principle, be 
understood as a simple outcome.  
 
The negative perception of the DNT outcome, as already stressed in this 
Chapter, has its very first origin in the wrong belief that income should be 
taxed at least once in any cross-border transaction. Authors supporting this 
idea generally argue using the credit method to relieve double taxation as an 
example. However, as demonstrated in this Chapter, ensuring single taxation 
through the use of the credit method is very limited in practice, at least in 
order to conclude the existence of a general tax policy or even a tax 
principle aimed to ensure single taxation. Indeed, this outcome will always 
depend of the repatriation of income: if income is finally not repatriated, 
there is no single taxation to be ensured. Accordingly, the historic 
antecedents of the origin of the credit method failed to demonstrate that the 
method was created to ensure single taxation. Regardless the above, new 
voices still claim for the existence of such a tax principle based basically 






that the reduction of WHT at source is contingent to the taxation at 
residence. In the author’s view, however, this rule has nothing to do with the 
application of any principle of taxation (or single taxation), but rather with 
the legitimate interest of the source country, which restricts its taxation 
rights through reduced WHT under a tax treaty, to coordinate this restriction 




The idea of DNT as a simple outcome is not superfluous. Indeed, it is 
especially relevant with respect to the negative consequences that could 
arise from a tax policy perspective if the concept goes beyond that simple 
understanding. On one hand, they could increase the risk of homologating 
the DNT outcome with other traditional and undesired legal issues, such as 
tax evasion or tax avoidance, affecting thus, directly or indirectly, legitimate 
transactions whose outcome is precisely DNT. Likewise, it could give rise to 
the legal recognition of non-legal concepts used to set up the boundaries of 
what should be regarded as tax avoidance in a determined jurisdiction. This 
is particularly relevant with the concept of ATP, whose consequentialist 
approach has only contributed to increase the level of confusion, creating a 
scenario of uncertainty among taxpayers. The above does not mean to 
recognize that the DNT outcome may be achieved through tax evasion or 
tax avoidance. However, it does not mean that DNT can be regarded as a 
proxy of these actions. On the other hand, the understanding of DNT beyond 
                                                          
195  A further analysis on the double non-taxation outcome and bilateral tax treaties can be 
seen in infra Chapter II. 




a simple outcome might derive in the incoherent design of domestic rules, 
such as the case of domestic anti-hybrid rules, i.e. rules dealing with the 
improper use of hybrid entities, using as basis for their design the DNT 
outcome. The above has already been demonstrated in the OECD proposal 
on Action 2 and the “linking rules”, an issue that will be further analyzed in 
this work.  
 
As a result, this Chapter concludes that the boundaries of the notion of DNT 
should remain within its nature of a simple outcome, absent of subjective 
interpretations, not being thus regarded per se as a cause of concern. This 







Double Non-Taxation and Bilateral Tax Treaties 
1. Introduction 
Tax treaties have historically been associated to the object and purpose of 
preventing or alleviating double taxation.
196
 They also seek to address fiscal 
or tax evasion, a problem related with the asymmetries of information and 
the governance failure in collecting taxes,
197
 but that some scholars have 
also interpreted as including a broader tax policy goal: the avoidance of 
                                                          
196   Nevertheless, and although an analysis of double taxation as an object an purpose of the 
tax treaties is out of the scope of this work, it is important to highlight here that the 
capacity of the tax treaties to prevent or mitigate double taxation is also very limited. 
Under the OECD Model, e.g. only the persons “liable to tax” have access to the treaty 
relief of double taxation. Likewise, the relief is granted only regarding the taxes covered 
by the treaty, i.e. taxes on income and capital, and more rarely inheritance and gift taxes 
and it is only contemplated for the so-called “juridical double taxation”. However, 
“economic double taxation”, i.e. when a same element of income or the same economic 
transaction is subject to the same type of tax in the hands of two or more different 
taxpayers, is not included in the treaty relief. See M. Lang, General Report, in: Cahiers 
de droit fiscal international—Vol. 89a, Double Non-Taxation (IFA 2004), pp. 78-81. 
Likewise, other tax scholars have interestingly argued that the prevention of double 
taxation would be more an apparent objective of the tax treaties than a real one at the 
time countries sit down and negotiate them. See T. Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, 32 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. Pol. 939 (2000). Dagan sustains that the idea that tax treaties exist 
primarily to alleviate double taxation would have its origin in a false premise that 
countries would not be able to do so in absence of them. However, most of the countries 
include in their domestic laws either the exemption or the credit method. Accordingly, in 
some cases the relief of double taxation seems not to be a problem at all, as it happens 
with developing countries or transition economies. As residents of these countries are 
expected to receive less income from foreign sources, the relief of double taxation is 
indeed not a priority. See Vann, supra n. 24. In a similar analysis, involving developing 
countries, see e.g. J. Braun and M. Zagler, An Economic Perspective on Double Tax 
Treaties with(in) Developing Countries, 6 World Tax J. (2014), Journals IBFD. 
197  Supra Chapter I, Section 4.1.  






 This tendency has become particularly evident after 
the 1999 OECD Partnership Report
199
 and the inclusion of Article 23(4) in 
the 2000 OECD Model, achieving perhaps its maturity in the recent 




This Chapter attempts to demonstrate that the prevention of double non-
taxation is still an exogenous element of tax treaties. This is to say, unless 
some specific provisions have been included within the tax treaties to ensure 
single taxation, these instruments should not be interpreted in light of the 
broad tax policy goal of avoiding DNT. This conclusion, however, should 
not be interpreted as if the outcome of DNT was a desired and general tax 
treaty outcome either. In fact, in the same order of ideas, and as it will be 
demonstrated further on, unless some specific provisions are directly 
introduced onto tax treaties, e.g. tax sparing or matching credits, the DNT 
outcome will be equally exceptional. The above simply reinforces the idea 
already stressed in Chapter I, which is that DNT is indeed a simple outcome, 
whose impact (negative or positive) will depend of the transaction and the 
countries involved. Section 2 of this Chapter analyses the rules of 
                                                          
198  See, e.g. Ault (2013), supra n. 63; Avi-Yonah, supra n. 71.  
199  OECD (1999), supra n. 1.  
200  For the specific proposal on Action 6: OECD (2015), Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6—2015 Final Report, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. For the OECD “BEPS Project”, see OECD (2013), supra n. 2. For a 
preliminary evaluation of the OECD BEPS Project, see, e.g. Y. Brauner, BEPS: An 
Interim Evaluation, 6 World Tax J.1 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 10. 





interpretation of tax treaties contained in the VCLT
201
 and the role that the 
OECD Model and its Commentaries have for interpretative purposes. 
Section 3 focuses in the analysis of specific provisions of the OECD Model, 
commonly included in tax treaties and which at first glance might be 
interpreted as ensuring single taxation. However, a closer look at them 
should drive us to a different conclusion. Section 4 studies specific 
provisions included within tax treaties that either directly tolerate the 
outcome of DNT, such as tax sparing and matching credits, or that prevent 
the concurrence of the outcome, such as the case of subject-to-tax and 
switch-over clauses. The above has the purpose of emphasizing the 
exceptionality of both the occurrence and the avoidance of DNT within tax 
treaties. Section 5 analyses the impact of some OECD proposal contained in 
Action 6 and referred to the outcome of DNT. These are: 1) a modification 
of the title of the OECD Model including a reference to tax evasion and tax 
avoidance; (2) a recommendation of a preamble, which includes that tax 
treaties cannot create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax evasion or tax avoidance, and 3) the inclusion of the concept of 
“Special Tax Regimes” (STR).  Section 6 provides some final remarks. 
2. Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
There are two elements that should be considered when analyzing the 
interpretation of tax treaties. The first has to be with the object of 
                                                          
201  UN: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [“VCLT”] of 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, I-18232, p. 331. 




interpretation. In this regard, the interpretation of a tax treaty supposes the 
establishment of the true meaning of a validly concluded or negotiated treaty 
and not an abstract MC, regardless the practical importance that a MC can 
have in the interpretative process.
202
 In this order of ideas, a tax treaty 
should be understood as a legal transaction, like a private contract under 
domestic law, by which the contracting parties establish mutual obligations 
and rights and whose law-creating character derives from the application of 
the international law rule of pacta sunt servanda.
203
 The second element 
refers to the specific tools used to interpret a tax treaty. Indeed, tax treaties 
like domestic law are interpreted in accordance to specific rules provided for 
that reason and which are contained in Article 31, 32 and 33 of the VCLT.
 
While Article 31 refers to the general rules of interpretation, Article 32 deals 
specifically with preparatory work, and Article 33 is concerned about the 
interpretation of the treaties in multiple languages.
204
 As follows, the author 
will analyze each one of these rules separately.  
 
                                                          
202  G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th ed., Steven & Sons Limited, 
London (1967), p. 164.  
203  As provided by Kelsen: “[T]he treaty has a law-applying and at the same time a law-
creating character. It has a law-applying character because every conclusion of a treaty 
is the application of the rule of general international law pacta sunt servanda; it has a 
law-creating function because every treaty constitutes obligations and rights that, prior 
to the conclusion of the treaty, had not yet existed, obligations and rights which come 
into existence by the treaty”. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Tax Law, 2nd ed., 
Holt, Rinehart &Winston Inc., New York (1967), p. 456. 
204  The analysis of Article 33 of the VCLT is a matter that exceeds the concern of this 
Chapter. Therefore, the author will focus exclusively on Articles 31 and 32. However, 
for a full analysis of this topic, see G. Maisto (ed.), Multilingual Texts and 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2005. 





2.1. General Rule of Interpretation 
While Article 31(1) of the VCLT establishes the general rule of 
interpretation, Articles 31(2), (3) and (4) elaborate on the general rule 
specifying what the context of a treaty is and which kind of materials should 
be considered along with the context, including the fact that, if appropriate, 
a term of the treaty may be given a special meaning rather than its ordinary 
one.
205
 Article 31(1) of the VCLT states: “A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.
206
 
The above means that the text of the treaty, i.e. the “ordinary meaning” of 
the “terms”, the wording of the entire agreement in its context, and the 
object and purpose of it, are relevant elements to consider for interpretative 
purposes.   
 
The ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty refers to the technical 
language internationally developed and used in certain specialized areas, 
such as tax law, and does not mean an everyday usage.
207
 The text of the 
treaty is generally understood as an independent source of interpretation, 
which means that the text of the treaty prevails over other ways of 
interpretation (e.g. the context or the object and purpose), perhaps under the 
assumption that there is no better place to reflect the intention of the parties 
                                                          
205  B. Arnold, The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality, 64 Bull Intl. Taxn. 1 
(2010), Journals IBFD, p. 5. 
206  Article 31(1) of the VCLT. 
207  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m.no. 84. 




than the text of the treaty itself. This position, whose target is to achieve 
certainty in the interpretation of tax treaties, reducing thus the scope of 
subjectivity, has been not only the position undertaken by the International 
Law Commission, the Institute of International Law and the jurisprudence of 
the International Court of Justice,
208





Unlike the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty, the object and purpose, 
is an integral expression,
210
 which does not refer to the intention of the 
Contracting States but to the objective aim of the treaty reflected by the 
treaty as a whole.
211
 This does not imply that the intention of the Contracting 
States is absolutely useless, but it will only be relevant to the extent it has 
been expressed in the text of the treaty.
212
 As provided by Article 31(4) 
VCLT, the parties may attribute a “special meaning” to a term of the treaty, 
                                                          
208  I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1990, p. 627. 
209  In Germany, e.g. the Federal Fiscal Court [Bundesfinanzhof] did not allow an 
interpretation against the wording of the treaty. DE: 1965 BStBl III 258 (BFH 1965) 
cited in C. Heber and C. Sternberg, Chapter 6: Germany in: R. van Brederode and R. 
Krever (eds), Legal Interpretation of Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, BV the 
Netherlands (2014), p. 185. Accordingly, in France, e.g. the Conseil d’ État does not 
only give more relevance to the literal interpretation, but in fact it provides that the result 
of the literal interpretation is absolutely irrelevant. This is to say, the literal 
interpretation should be applied even if it deprives the taxpayer from a legitimate 
advantage or if it grants an advantage to the taxpayer that was not foreseen by the 
negotiators of the treaty. See D. Gutmann, Tax Treaty Interpretation in France in: M. 
Lang (ed), Tax Treaty Interpretation, Linde, Vienna, 2001, p. 109. 
210  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m.no. 85. 
211  Id., Introduction at m.no.82. 
212  Id., Introduction at m. no. 83.  





which will thus reflect the intention of the Contracting States.
213
  However, 
what it is not acceptable is that an interpretation intends to presume what the 
parties wanted, even if the strict interpretation of the wording carries out a 
non-logical result.
214
 In other words, the purpose shall influence the 
interpretation in a manner of giving light of the terms of the treaty, but it 
will be subordinated to the text of the treaty and it will not constitute and 
independent mean of interpretation.
215
 This approach by which the text of 
the treaty must be the dominant consideration has been criticized by some 
authors, because indeed Article 31 of the VCLT does not establish any clear 
weight that should be given either to the text, the context or the purpose of a 
treaty.
216
 In other words, nothing would prevent a judge or other interpreter, 
e.g. to conclude that a treaty provision is reasonably clear that it must be 
applied without regard to the context and purpose, or in contrast, that the 
purpose of a treaty justify an interpretation, stretching the words of a treaty 
or even ignoring them.
217
 Arnold considers that this amplitude might not be 
                                                          
213  Article 31(4) of the VCLT states: “A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended”. 
214  In France, e.g. the Conseil d’ État decided in 2000 to grant a French resident a tax credit 
with respect to the WHT paid on the interest derived from Italian State bonds. It turns 
out later that, derived from the literal interpretation of Article 22 of the 1958 France-
Italian Income Tax Treaty, the tax credit granted was higher than the amount of foreign 
taxes effectively paid in Italy, contradicting the spirit of the convention. Regardless the 
above, the interpretation prevailed. See FR: CE, 3rd and 8th s.-s., 24 May 2000, req. no. 
209 699 et rec. no. 209 891, CRCAM Normand (Concl.), DF no. 48, 2000, comm. 943, 
concl. Touvet cited in: Gutmann, supra n. 209, p. 110. 
215  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26 , Introduction at m. no. 83. 
216   Arnold, supra n. 205, pp. 5-6.  
217  In Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the Australian Court clearly endorsed a 
“purposive” approach to the interpretation of the treaties. See AUS: Thiel v. Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation [1990] HCA 37; 171 CLR 338, cited in: R. Krever and P. 




necessarily harmful and it could help the interpretative role of the 
judiciary.
218
 After all, the work of the judges is essentially subjective and it 
could be improved if there are less strict rules of interpretation.
219
 Likewise, 
he stresses that taxpayers and tax advisors generally prefer a literal 
interpretation due to a self-motivated interest, considering that they 
normally plan around or take undue advantage of rules read literally.
220
 
Nonetheless, Arnold does not offer sufficient argument neither to disregard 
certainty as a value itself in the interpretative process nor to assume that a 
literal interpretation must necessarily help a misconduct of taxpayers. 
 
The mandate to interpret a tax treaty in light of its object and purpose also 
supposes that both authorities and courts of the Contracting States apply a 
consistent interpretation. This is to say both Contracting States should seek 
the treaty interpretation that is most likely to be accepted in both States, also 
                                                                                                                                       
Mellor, Chapter 2: Australia, in: R. van Brederode and R. Krever (eds), Legal 
Interpretation of Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, BV the Netherlands (2014), p. 42. 
Similarly, in the famous Glaxo case in Japan, the Supreme Court did not only attend the 
text of Article 7 of the Japan-Singapore Income Tax Treaty to consider that the 
application of the Japan’s CFC rules were not prohibited or restricted, but included a 
whole examination of the CFC rules and their compatibility with the object and purpose 
of the treaty. The Court found that the CFC contained various exemptions for genuine 
activities and also a tax credit if the CFC rule was triggered. As the Japan’s CFC rule 
was regarded as reasonable as a while, the Court concluded that it did not impede 
Singapore’s taxation according to Article 7 of the Japan-Singapore Income Tax Treaty. 
See JP: Supreme Court, 29 October 2009, Glaxo, Minshu, Vol. 63 No. 8, 1881 cited in: 
Y. Masui, Chapter 9: Japan, in: R. van Brederode and R. Krever R. van Brederode and 
R. Krever (eds), Legal Interpretation of Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, BV the 
Netherlands (2014), p. 257. 
218  Arnold, supra n. 205, pp. 5-6. 
219  Id. 
220  Id., p. 7. 





known as “common interpretation”.
221
 This does not mean that a State must 
simply accept the case law of the other State without reviewing it, but to 
research and evaluate his reasoning.
222
 This reasoning has been taken to the 
extreme of considering that a common interpretation means to achieve a 
similar result using a similar method of interpretation. The aim seems to be 
that both countries give the same meaning to a tax treaty, avoiding a 
different interpretation that could lead to situations of double taxation or 
DNT. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the common interpretation is 
concerned with the result of the interpretation and not with the method of 
interpretation used.
223
 Accordingly, nothing can guarantee that the use of the 




With respect to the context of the treaties, it should be noted that it includes 
any related completed document made in connection to the treaty, including 
notes and letters exchanged when the treaty was signed.
225
 It also includes 
the preamble of the treaty. However, any “accompanying materials”, i.e. 
                                                          
221  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m. no. 90 and m.no. 92.  
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cases had in the Glaxo case in Japan (e.g. the Schneider Electric case decided by the 
French Conseil d’ État), regardless none of these cases were formally cited in the 
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Courts in Japan never cite foreign tax cases in tax decisions. See Masui, supra n. 217, p. 
258. See also, FR: Conseil d’ État, 28 June 2002, Case No. 232276, Schneider Electric, 
RJF 10/02, no. 1080. For an analysis of the case, see e.g. P. Dibout, L’inapplicabilité de 
l’article 209 B du CGI face à la convention fiscal franco-suisse du septembre 1966, 36 
Revue de Droit Fiscal (2000), p. 1133-1141. 
223  Arnold, supra n. 205, p. 11. 
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225  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m.no. 85. 




materials created during the negotiation of a treaty, supporting documents, 
position papers, etc. may only be referred to as a supplementary source and 
inasmuch they confirm the interpretation made under Article 31 of the 
VCLT or in case of doubts.
226
 Nevertheless, “technical explanations”, like 
the ones normally released by the US Treasury Department after the 
negotiation of a tax treaty by the United States, or any other type of 
explanation post-negotiation is regarded neither as part of the context of the 





Let me finally make some brief remarks regarding the term good faith, 
which is normally read in conjunction with the rest of Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT without any special connotation,
228
 although it is one of the 
cornerstones of public international law.
229
 
Article 31(1) VCLT mandates that a tax treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith according to the ordinary meaning, the context and the object and 
purpose of a treaty. This Article does not give any hints to what good faith 
                                                          
226  Id. Introduction at m.no. 86. 
227  Id. 
228  See, e.g. K. Vogel and R. Prokisch, General Report in: Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international—Vol. LXXVIIa, Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions (IFA 
1993), pp. 55-85.   
229  See L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, Doctoral Series 
IBFD, Vol. 14, Amsterdam (2008), p. 240. See also, K. Olenik, Tax Treaties and the 
Recourse to Historical Interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, in: T. Ecker and G. Ressler (eds.), History of Tax Treaties. The Relevance of 
the OECD Documents for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, Linde, Vienna (2011), p. 
69. 







 However, for the majority of the scholars, good faith in the 
interpretation of tax treaties means that a treaty must be interpreted honestly, 
fairly and reasonably and in accordance with the common interpretation of 
the parties as expressed or implied in the tax treaty.
231
 The most important 
manifestation of the good faith is in fact the general rule of international law 
“pacta sunt servanda” codified in Article 26 VCLT,
232
 an interpretation that 
it is reaffirmed by the jurisprudence of the ICJ
233
 This element of 
“reasonableness” applies to the entire process of interpretation, although it 
finds its limitations in the creation of new obligations which are no longer 
covered either by the wording of the treaty or the intention of the parties.
234
 
Therefore, the principle should act only in a way to clear up ambiguous 
wording in a treaty, and not to create new obligations. In other words, it 
works only as a principle lending contours.
235
 
                                                          
230  N. Shelton, Interpretation and Application of Tax Treaties, Lexis Nexis, London (2004), 
p. 167. 
231  Id., p. 242. See also, F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 
Doctoral Series No. 7, IBFD (2005), pp.131-132. 
232  Article 26 of the VCLT states: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith (emphasis added)”. 
233  In the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ stated: “This latter element [good 
faith], in the Court’s view, implies that […]it is the purpose of the Treaty, and the 
intention of the parties concluding it, which should prevail over its literal application. 
The principle of good faith obliges the parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such 
a manner that its purpose can be realized”. See International: Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, 
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 76. See also a reference to the case in: De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 
241. The Commentary on Article 31 of the VCLT also sustains that good faith “flows 
directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda”. See United Nations, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, Vol. II, New York, 1967, p. 221-§12.  
234  S. Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, Bonn Research Paper on International 
Law, Paper No. 2 (2013), p. 20. 
235  Id. 




2.2. Supplementary Means of Interpretation 
Article 32 of the VCLT represents an attempt to limit the use or influence of 
supplementary materials, specially preparatory work, that are considered 
less authentic than the one provided in Article 31.
236
 In fact, at the Vienna 
Convention’s conclusion the United States proposed to remove the apparent 
hierarchy of sources between Article 31 and 32 and proposed to combine 
both articles, giving therefore more scope to preparatory work and the 
circumstances in which the treaty was concluded.
237
 This proposal received 
little support.
238
  In contrast, the distinction was justified since the elements 
of interpretation in Article 31 relate to an agreement between the parties at 
the time when or after it receives authentic expression in the text, while 




According to Article 32 of the VCLT, supplementary materials can be 
considered basically in three circumstances: a) to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31; b) where, after applying Article 
31, the meaning of the provisions at issue is still ambiguous or obscure, and 
c) where the application of Article 31 leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable.
240
 Nevertheless, the structure of Article 32 is not 
exempt from criticism. First, unless the interpretation of Article 31 leads to 
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an ambiguous, obscure, absurd or unreasonable result, the application of 
Article 32 will be generally dismissed. This is because the remaining 
alternative would be to use the supplementary material to confirm the 
interpretation of Article 31, but what if that interpretation is not confirmed? 
There is no manner to resort to Article 32, unless there is an ambiguous, 
obscure, absurd or unreasonable interpretation under Article 31.  Therefore, 
an unambiguous, clear, not absurd and reasonable interpretation of a 
provision of a tax treaty according to Article 31, which is not confirmed 
under the preparatory work of Article 32, will be anyway acceptable. 
Second, the distinction between supplementary materials and other more 
authentic materials is not always clear. This is especially relevant in the case 
of the OECD Commentaries on the OECD Model and its value as 
preliminary work, an issue that will be analyzed in more details in the 
subsequent Section of this Chapter. 
2.3. The interpretative role of the OECD Model and its 
Commentaries  
The legal basis for reference to the OECD Model and its Commentaries as 
an aid to interpret a specific tax treaty is far from being settled. If we strictly 
analyze the rules of interpretation of Article 31 of the VCLT explained in 
the Section above, we might conclude that the Commentaries do not fit into 
any of these categories. After all, Commentaries on a MC are not made in 
connection with a negotiated tax treaty, which is indeed a unique 






 Likewise, it is arguable if they could be considered as 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT, 
because the OECD Model and its Commentaries are neither an instrument 
made in connection with the conclusion of a treaty nor preparatory work 
used or produced in preparing an individual treaty.
242
 An alternative, 
however, to overcome these formal constrains and the bridge created 
between Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT could be through the use of Article 
31(4) of the VCLT.
243
 As proposed by Ault, the terms contained in the 
OECD Commentaries could be regarded as a special meaning when 
interpreting the provisions of a tax treaty, which can be especially relevant 
in the case of OECD member countries.
244
 Then, the OECD Commentaries 
would represent a sort of “default rule”, which would reflect the intention of 
the Contracting States.
245
 In accordance to this interpretation, it would be 
presumed that OECD member countries wanted to convey the meaning 
                                                          
241  See, P. Baker, Double Taxation Conventions, Sweet & Maxwell, London (2014), p. E-
13. See also, H. D. Rosenbloom, Current Developments in regard to Tax Treaties, 40 
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax’n §31 (1982). 
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work, see e.g. E. Reimer, Tax Treaty Interpretation in Germany, in: M. Lang (ed.), Tax 
Treaty Interpretation, Linde, Vienna, 2001, p. 135.  Reimer sustains that German case 
law and legal theory do not consider the OECD Commentaries neither as a genuine 
source of international law (thus being regarded as not binding documents) nor as 
preparatory work as per Article 32 of the VCLT. Conversely, in Thiel v. Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation in Australia, there is a clear reference to the OECD 
Commentaries as “supplementary means of interpretation” for the purposes of Article 32 
of the VCLT. See Krever and Mellor, supra n. 217, p. 42. 
243  For the complete analysis, see H. Ault, The Role of the OECD Commentaries in the 
Interpretation of Tax Treaties, Intertax 4 (1994), pp. 144-148. 
244  Id., p. 147. 
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intended in the OECD Model and its Commentaries,
246
 being such a 
meaning a special meaning according to Article 31(4) of the VCLT.
247
 This 
conclusion should not discard the possibility of the States to make 
reservations or observations to the Commentaries.
248
 A similar presumption 
would arise if the text of the OECD Model is not adopted literally, but a 
formulation is chosen that permits an interpretation according to the OECD 
Model or if the text of the provision is identical to the OECD Model, but a 




Giving the OECD Commentaries a special meaning carries out two 
important consequences. On one hand, it is the possibility of relying on the 
OECD Commentaries as a sort of “official interpretation” (OECD countries) 
or at least as an important official guidance of interpretation (non-OECD 
members). On the other hand, it is the possibility of recognizing the OECD 
Commentaries a certain binding character, mostly for OECD members. Let 
me refer to both issues in a separate manner.  
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248  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m.no. 103. Reimer, on the contrary, is very 
critic on this matter, because he considers that the ordinary meaning under Article 31(1) 
of the VCLT cannot depend on the lack of such observations. Thus, the issue is to 
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With respect to the first consequence, there are almost no doubts regarding 
to the important guidance that the OECD Commentaries have in solving tax 
treaty cases in practice for both OECD and non-OECD members. An 
interesting example from non-OECD members can be found in the famous 
cases of Eagle I (2006) and Eagle II (2008), regarding the application of 
Brazilian CFC rules and the compatibility with Article 7 and 10 of the 
Brazil-Spain Income Tax Treaty.
250
 In this case law, the Brazilian Courts 
emphasized the role of the OECD Commentaries as a “useful tool to help in 
the interpretation [of tax treaties]” and of “great assistance in the application 
and interpretation of the conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of 
any disputes”.
251
 This issue has special importance considering that 
Brazilian Courts normally refer neither to the VCLT nor to the OECD 
Commentaries when solving tax treaty cases.
252
 Also one should consider 
that Brazil has been trough a long process to become a member of the 
                                                          
250  Brazil: Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals, Judgment No. 101-95.802 – 
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OECD. The above, however, does not imply that the OECD Model and its 
Commentaries have a very limited importance with respect to non-OECD 
countries.
253
 The weight given to the Commentaries will, nevertheless, 




Nevertheless, the practical value that the OECD Commentaries can have for 
interpretative purposes should not drive us, at least not immediately, to 
conclude that they must be regarded as legally binding documents. In other 
words, the presumption that OECD countries wanted to convey the meaning 
of the OECD Model, being that meaning either ordinary or special, does not 
grant per se a binding character to the OECD Commentaries.
 255
  There is no 
doubt that a binding character of the OECD Commentaries might positively 
help in providing a coherent and perhaps more uniform interpretation of tax 
treaties, mostly among OECD members; however, there is no evidence that 
prove their binding nature neither upon OECD members States nor upon 
non-OECD members States.
256
 On the contrary, the non-binding character of 
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254  Id. 
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(1994). 
256  D. Ward et al. state: “There is no consensus concerning the application of Articles 31 
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the OECD Commentaries is specifically ratified within the text of the OECD 
Model, when Paragraph 3 of its introductory chapter provides: “Member 
countries, when concluding or revising bilateral conventions should 
conform to this Model Convention as interpreted by the Commentaries […]” 
(emphasis added).
257
 Accordingly, Paragraph 29 remarks the auxiliary 
character of the commentaries and its non-binding nature when it 
establishes: “Although the Commentaries are not designed to be annexed in 
any manner to the conventions signed by the Member countries, which 
unlike the Model are legally binding international instruments, they can 
nevertheless be of great assistance in the application and interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                       
binding source of international law. It is a legally non-binding document, which has no 
bearing on the State as a whole, and only creates a moral obligation for the executive”. 
See H. Pijl, The OECD Commentary as a Source of International Law and the Role of 
the Judiciary, 46 Eur. Taxn. 5 (2006), Journals IBFD, p. 224.  Also, Engelen, although 
supporting a theory that the OECD members and parties of a treaty would be bound by 
conduct to interpret and apply a treaty in accordance with the commentaries, recognizes 
that the commentaries “as such” are not binding on the OECD member countries when 
he says: “[W]hether the Commentaries as such are legally binding on the OECD 
members countries, I fully endorse Mr. Ward’s view that it should be answered in the 
negative”. F. Engelen, Some Observations on the Legal Status of the Commentaries on 
the OECD Model, 60 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 3 (2006), Journals IBFD, p. 105. Regarding non-
OECD members, it is evident that the commentaries are “less important”. See Vogel and 
Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m. no. 104. Conversely, Baker considers that the 
OECD commentaries can be relevant, even for non-OECD members, when it is clear 
that the specific treaty has been concluded based on the OECD Model. See P. Baker, 
supra n. 241, p. E-19. In a recent article, West analyses the relevance of the OECD 
Commentaries in those cases in which a treaty or a protocol expressly referred to them 
as an interpretational rule. Although he recognizes that this would not change the non-
binding nature of the Commentaries, it could certainly help as a “soft law” tool to 
resolve constitutional conflicts that can appear in case the Commentaries are used as an 
ambulatory interpretation rule. For a further analysis, see C. West, References to the 
OECD Commentaries in Tax Treaties: A Steady March from “Soft” Law to “Hard” 
Law?, 9 World Tax J. 1 (2017), Journals IBFD. 
257  OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentaries (2014), Para. 3, Introductory Chapter. 





the conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of any disputes”.
258
 
Likewise, the Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning the MC 
(1997), simply provided a “recommendation” to the members countries to 
conform to the MC and that the tax administrations follow the commentaries 
when interpreting the OECD Model, but in any case it settle an obligation to 
do so. Therefore, the OECD Commentaries can create only a moral or “soft” 
obligation for these countries in order to follow them for interpretative 
reasons, but in any case they are bound to do so.
259
 This conclusion has also 
special relevance to discard the idea that due to the widespread acceptance 
of the OECD Model and its Commentaries, they can constitute a sort of 
customary international tax law.
260
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depend of the subsequent judicial practice. See Pijl, supra n. 256, p. 220. 
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Necessecity of Opinio Juris in the Formation of Customary International Law, 
Discussion Paper for Panel on “Does Customary International Law Need Opinio 
Juris?”, pp.2-4; M. Mendelson, The Subjective Element in Customary International 
Law, 66 British Yearbook of International Law1 (1995), p. 208; F. Parisi, The 
Formation of Customary Law, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
01-06, p. 5 available at  SSRN. Conversely, however, in 2000 the International Law 
Association (ILA) elaborated a concept of customary international law excluding the 




Some authors have, however, insisted in supporting the binding nature of the 
OECD Commentaries and their interpretative value based on the 
international public law doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel.
261
 The 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law defines acquiescence as “the 
proposition of binding effect resulting from passivity and inaction with 
respect to foreign claims which, according to the general practice of States, 
usually call for protest in order to assert, preserve of safeguard rights”.
262
 
Thus, acquiescence, which finds expression in the adage “qui tacet 
consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset”, means the act of 
implying consent to a certain fact by remaining silent.
263
  By other side, the 
principle of estoppel, very similar to the Roman law principles of non licet 
venire contra factum proprium and allegans contraria non audiendus est, 
attends to the effect that a person who represents a fact to another who in 
turns alters his position in reasonable reliance on such representation may 
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not deny that the fact exists.
264
 In other words, under the principle of 
estoppel a party is not permitted to take up a legal position that is in 
contradiction with its own previous representations or conduct, when 
another party has been led to assume obligations towards, or attribute rights 
to the former party in reliance upon such representations or conducts. For 
example, if State A relies on the conduct of State B, this latter State is 
precluded to act contrary to its representation. If State B acts contrary to this 
representation, it is acting without good faith and contrary to international 
law.
265
 Thus, both acquiescence and estoppel are principles based in good 
faith,
266
 although differing in the components of time and reliance.
267
 While 
acquiescence is that passivity in relation to a right of another State to the 
extent that good faith affords the passivity the character of consent, estoppel 
hinges on previous presentations.
268
 In this order of ideas, if OECD (and 
non-OECD) countries have not made an observation on the interpretation of 
the provisions of the OECD Model as set out in the commentaries, when 
concluding or revising a tax treaty, it would mean that the countries have 
acquiesced in that interpretation and it becomes legally binding, being a sort 
of tacit agreement to interpret the provisions of the treaty as per the 
OECD Model and its Commentaries.
269
Accordingly, if there are any doubts 
as to the parties’ acceptance of the OECD Commentaries, the countries are 
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estopped or precluded from denying such acceptance.
270
   
 
The application of the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel, as explained 
above, seem to be inappropriate to justify a binding character of the OECD 
Commentaries, mostly considering their contradictory results.
271
 Indeed, if 
the principle of acquiescence were applied, it would force countries that did 
not make observations to the Commentaries to tacitly accept the effects of 
their interpretation, recognizing a sort of official interpretation that might in 
fact jeopardize the rule of pacta sunt servanda. This conclusion would 
contradict the international tax treaty practice, which demonstrates that 
OECD members not always enter an observation when they disagree with 
the OECD Commentaries,
272
 but sometimes these observations are simply 
not required. The latter situation can be easily demonstrated through the 
history of the MCs and its Commentaries. In fact, many times the OECD 
Commentaries have been modified in order to include the predominant 
opinion of the OECD members, which means that in those cases the OECD 
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pp. 49-50. 





members departed from the Commentaries, but no observation was 
needed.
273
 The above conclusion does not diminish the value of the OECD 
Commentaries in the interpretative process, but simply reaffirm that they 




Similar concerns should exist with respect to the application of the principle 
of estoppel to justify the binding character of the OECD Commentaries. If 
two countries agree on a tax treaty based on the OECD Model and its 
Commentaries, which both have accepted, they would be precluded from 
denying such acceptance, even if such acceptance comes in a tacit manner, 
e.g. if the tax treaty follows exactly the provisions of the Model Convention. 
Nevertheless, one should not confuse the existence of a soft obligation 
derived from the OECD Commentaries as an interpretation of the OECD 
Model with the real rights and obligation derived from the negotiated tax 
treaty itself and based in the international law rule of pacta sunt servanda. 
Could the parties be really precluded of denying the acceptance of the 
OECD Commentaries when, in fact, this document never created legal rights 
or obligations to the parties? To justify the binding character of the OECD 
Commentaries based on the principle of estoppel seems to go to far, mostly 
considering its restrictive application in the field of international public law. 
Few words should be finally said regarding the different versions in time of 
the OECD Commentaries and their use for interpretation purposes. The 
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majority of the international tax scholars agree that the version of the OECD 
Model and its Commentaries at the time of the conclusion of a tax treaty is 
the only one that can be considered for interpretation purposes.
275
 This 
implies that further changes
276
 to the OECD Commentaries should not affect 
the interpretation of a specific tax treaty concluded before those changes 
entered into force. This approach is particularly relevant considering that the 
OECD Commentaries can represent the ordinary meaning of a treaty 
between two OECD members under Article 31(1) of the VCLT or, at least, 
they could convey a special meaning under Article 31(4) of the VCLT.
277
 
This conclusion has logic since the only version to which the negotiator of a 






                                                          
275  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m.no. 105. See also, M. Lang, supra n. 21, 
p. 50. 
276  But not all changes of the OECD Commentaries will have legal effects. For example, a 
change in the language to make the English or French more alike will have no legal 
significance. See Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m. no. 106 
277  Ault also coincides with this static view when he says: “A later-arising special meaning 
would be hard to conceive. Thus at least with respect to some terms, if the 
Commentaries are to be used, it must be on a static basis”. Ault, supra n. 243, p. 148. 





2.4. The reference to Domestic Law: Article 3(2) of the OECD 
Model 
Article 3(2) of the OECD Model provides a general rule of interpretation 
that allows referring to domestic law in case any term
278
 is not defined in a 
tax treaty, unless the context otherwise requires.
279
 The reference to 
domestic law of the Contracting States (known as lex fori) has logic since a 
tax treaty is negotiated with the domestic laws of the Contracting States in 
mind and tax treaties exist in order to coordinate these two tax jurisdictions, 
limiting their taxing powers by the treaty.
280
 Accordingly, it also provides 
practical advantages, because it prevents the overloading of tax treaties with 
definitions that would render its application difficult,
281
 as well as it 
increases legal certainty.
282
 However, one should also recognize that Article 
                                                          
278  The use of “term” should be interpreted in a manner wider than just “words”. At least 
this should be justified in the fact that many times the governing language of a treaty is 
not the one of the domestic law, and even in some cases it is a third language, commonly 
English, that takes precedent. In this latter case, as provided by Avery Jones, “a third 
language will never be found in either State’s domestic laws, and so the “term” must be 
wider than just words. See J. Avery Jones, The Interaction between Tax Treaty 
Provisions and Domestic Law, in: G. Maisto, Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, EC and 
International Tax Law Series Vol. 2, IBFD (2006), p. 134. 
279  Article 3(2) of the 2014 OECD MODEL was modified in 1995 and according to the 
2014 OECD Model, it provides:  “As regards the application of the Convention at any 
time by a Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State 
for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the 
applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other 
laws of that State”. 
280  Arnold, supra n. 205, p. 9.  
281  Instead, taxpayers, administrative authorities and courts can keep the meaning of a term 
as it is already known in domestic law. See Vogel and Prokisch, supra n. 228, p. 77 
282  As provided by Avery Jones: “Article 3(2) was a brilliant solution. The result is that in 
any case where the treaty relieves a category of income from tax, the relief corresponds 




3(2) contradicts the primary goal of a “common interpretation” of tax 
treaties, increasing also the possibilities of different interpretations and 
qualification conflicts.  
 
Generally speaking, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model is applied with certain 
limitations. Firstly, it only covers the interpretation of the terms used in a tax 
treaty.
 283
 Therefore, the provision does not apply to use principles of 
domestic law in the interpretation of tax treaties or to clarify unclear 
passages of a treaty itself.
284
 Furthermore, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model 
it is possible to conclude that if the terms of the treaty have no particular or 
established legal meaning under domestic laws, or a term is used in private 
law only, then the resort to domestic law would not be possible.
285
 It is also 
important to note that Article 3(2) of the OECD Model refers exclusively to 
                                                                                                                                       
exactly with the internal law taxing provision. This is far more important than that the 
treaty category of income has the same scope in each State; the internal law charging 
provisions are most unlikely to be the same either. Indeed, the result of relying on 
internal law definitions is superior to the treaty containing a definition of a type of 
income, which may well be different from the internal law definition used for taxing the 
income”. See Avery Jones, supra n. 278, p. 125. 
283  A. Rust, in: Reimer and Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th 
edn (2015), Article 3(2) at m.no. 111. 
284  Id. 
285  In Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, e.g. the High Court of Australia rejected 
an interpretation of the terms “enterprise” and “profits”, because these terms did not 
have any particular or established meaning under Australian domestic law. See Thiel v. 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation, cited in: Krever and Mellor, supra n. 217.  A similar 
reasoning can be found in the Dutch case Hoge Raad, where the Supreme Court said 
that Article 3(2) of the OECD Model could not be applied to interpret a term that is not 
used in a similar context under the domestic law. See NL: Decision of the Dutch 
Supreme Court Hoge Raad, 1 Dec. 2006, BNB 2007/75-79 cited in: A. Bosman, 
Casualty under Tax Treaties, 44 Intertax 5 (2016), p. 393.  





the meaning of the terms that the Contracting State applying the treaty give 
at the moment the treaty is applied and not when this is concluded.
286
  
Secondly, the provision only refers to the law of those taxes covered by the 
convention, excluding thus any reference to private or tax law regarding 
taxes not included, e.g. VAT. Likewise, it is clear that when a term has a 





The reference to domestic law is conditioned by the expression unless the 
context otherwise requires used in Article 3(2) of the OECD Model, which 
means that the renvoir to the domestic law under Article 3(2) is limited by 
the interpretation derived from the context of the treaty. In this regard, one 
should not consider the term context in the same manner as it is used for 
purposes of Article 31(2) of the VCLT. Indeed, the function of the term 
context is completely different in both provisions.
288
 For many authors the 
use of context under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model has a wider meaning 
than the one in Article 31(2) of the VCLT, which helps in avoiding the 
inappropriate use of domestic law definitions.
289
 As provided by Helminen, 
the context under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model is clearly indicating 
situations in which the contextual meaning should prevail over the lex fori 
                                                          
286  Rust, supra n. 283. 
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288  Vogel and Prokisch, supra n. 228, p. 82. 
289  J. Avery Jones, United Kingdom, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international–Vol. LXXVIIa, 
Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions (IFA 1993), p. 610. 




meaning as per Article 3(2) of the OECD Model,
290
 even though one should 
stress that it is not possible to extract from the reading of the Article 3(2) 
any kind of preference or hierarchy for interpretation from the context.
291
 
Thus, the term context should be widely interpreted to include any materials 
that indicate that the lex fori meaning is not consistent.
292
 The case law 
Padmore v. IRC in the United Kingdom is a good example of the application 
of the above.
293
 The issue in this case was that the treaty between UK and 
Jersey defined the term “person” including any “body of persons, corporate 
or not corporate”. However, English law expressly excluded Partnerships 
from the concept of “body of persons”. The Court concluded that the context 
required that the internal law be not used, because the context required 
otherwise.
294
 Likewise, in Estate of Burghardt v. Commissioner, regarding 
the US-Italy Estate Tax Treaty, the Court ruled that as neither the IRC nor 
the Treasury Regulations use the term “specific exemption” in the Estate 
Tax Area, the term should be interpreted in the context of the treaty and not 




                                                          
290  M. Helminen, Tax Treaty Interpretation in Finland, in: M. Lang (ed.), Tax Treaty 
Interpretation, Linde, Vienna (2001), pp. 84-86. 
291   Rust, supra n. 283, Article 3(2) at m. no. 121. 
292  Id. See also, Helminen, supra n. 290. 
293  UK: Padmore v. IRC [1989] STC 493. 
294  J. Avery Jones, Tax Treaty Interpretation in the United Kingdom, in: M. Lang (ed.), Tax 
Treaty Interpretation, Linde, Vienna (2001), p. 369. 
295  US: US Tax Court of 11 April 1983, No. 20766-81, Estate of Burghardt v. 
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 705 (1983). 





Some tax scholars have interpreted Article 3(2) of the OECD Model in a 
way by which this provision should be applied only to the extent that no 
other solution can be derived from the tax treaty itself.
296
 Lang explains this 
restrictive interpretation with the example of the concept of “business 
profits” under Article 7 of the OECD Model. He states that the fact this term 
is not defined anywhere in the OECD Model does not mean that one should 
resort immediately to domestic law in order to get the answer.
297
 On the 
contrary, based on the systematic, theological and historical factors of the 
treaty, one should arrive to the conclusion that the concept of business 
profits applies to income from activities that are not services of where there 
is a significant capital expenditure.
 298
 Nevertheless, Lang’s arguments seem 
to be not that convincing, mostly considering the wording of Article 3(2) of 
the OECD Model. Indeed, as noted already, the reference to domestic law is 
limited by the expression “unless the context otherwise requires” and not 
“unless the context yields no other, or absolutely no other, 
interpretation”.
299
 Therefore, no every single interpretation from the context 
should give rise to a divergence with Article 3(2) of the OECD Model, but 
only those based on relatively strong arguments.
300
 This also confirms what 
the author already stressed, which is that there is no priority for 
                                                          
296  Rust disagrees with this conclusion when he states in reference to Article 3(2) OECD 
Model: “It is, on the other hand, itself a special rule of interpretation in relation to the 
general rules contained in the VCLT governing the interpretation of DTCs, as such, it 
takes precedence over those general rules”. Rust, supra n. 283. 
297  Lang, supra n. 21, p 45. 
298  Id. 
299   Rust, supra n. 283, Article 3(2) at m.no. 122. 
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interpretation from the context, at least not one that can be inferred from the 
wording of Article 3(2). Yet, one should recognize that the fewer the cases 
where domestic law is used to interpret treaty terms, the greater the 
probability that both States will try hard to interpret the treaty in its context 
trying to achieve a common understanding, which could also reduce the 




To sum up the preceding, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model sets up the 
following order for interpretation of terms used in the tax treaties: 1) a 
special definition in the tax treaty will be applied; 2) if no special definition 
exists, then the domestic law of the Contracting State applying the treaty 
(lex fori) must be applied to the extent it relates to the taxes covered by the 
treaty and only if the context otherwise requires; 3) if the interpretation from 
the context is strong enough, this should be used instead, although the 
resorting to the context is not automatic and it should be measured among 
with the alternatives interpretations; 4) if the context does not provide for a 
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302  Rust, supra n. 283, Article 3(2) at m.no. 125 and 126. 





3. Double Non-Taxation and the OECD Model and its Commentaries 
As already noted, the OECD Model is not an object of interpretation 
itself.
303
 Nevertheless, it might be useful to analyze some of its provisions, 
normally included in tax treaties, and which at first glance might be 
interpreted in a manner of preventing DNT. This perception, however, may 
easily disappear when a closer look at these provisions is taken and an 
interpretation, as per the rules analyzed in Section 2, is applied. As follows, 
the author analyzes the following OECD Model provisions: a) The term 
“liable to tax” of Article 4 (1) OECD Model; b) the concept of beneficial 
owner; c) the Article 23A (1), and d) the Article 23A (4) OECD Model. 
3.1.  The interpretation of the term “Liable to Tax”  
Article 4(1) OECD Model establishes that a resident, for purposes of a tax 
treaty, means any person who, under the law of that State, is “liable to tax” 
therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criterion of a similar nature.
304
 The meaning of the term liable to tax 
is, however, highly disputed. By one side, tax scholars interpret the term as 
including a person who is subject to actual taxation in the State of residence. 
This idea would support the assumption that tax treaties actually ensure 
single taxation or, which is the same, that they aim to avoid DNT. By the 
other side, commentators attribute to it the meaning of a person who is just 
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subject to full taxation (i.e. worldwide taxation), despite the fact that taxes 
might be effectively applied or not in that State. This latter interpretation, in 
the author’s view, seems to be more in accordance with both the wording of 
the OECD Commentaries and the tax treaty practice. Some observations can 
be made in supporting this idea. 
 
At first glance, the basic function of tax treaties is to allocate taxing rights 
and not to ensure that those rights are effectively exercised.
305
 Indeed, there 
are no mechanisms within the OECD Model to carry out such a task, unless 
specific provisions have been included during the bilateral negotiation of a 
tax treaty.
306
 In other words, once the treaty has allocated the exclusive right 
to tax certain item of income or capital to a Contracting State, that State 
keeps the right to exercise or not such right, not being even necessary the 
concurrence of double taxation for residents to claim treaty benefits. Such 
interpretation could, e.g. lead to an acceptable outcome of DNT, because it 
is a conscious decision of the Contracting State whether or not they enter 
                                                          
305  The above position has been repeatedly supported by the international jurisprudence. 
For example, in 2001, a decision of the Cour Administrative in Luxembourg sustained 
that: “[A] tax treaty is a bilateral instrument limiting each contracting state’s right to tax 
by attributing the taxation right to one of the two contracting states. This limitation is, in 
principle, permanent and cannot be changed by one of the contracting states on the basis 
of the argument that the other contracting state does not make use of its taxation right”. 
See LU: Cour adm., 27 juillet 2011, n°28115C du role.  
306  Article 4(1)(b) of the 1989 tax treaty between India and the United States establishes, 
e.g. that the residence of partnerships, estates and trusts depends on their being subject 
to tax (actual taxation) either in their hands or in the hands of their partners. See Tax 
Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of India of 1 January 1991, Article 4 (1)(b). 





into a tax treaty that leaves open the possibility of DNT.
307
 In an example of 
the tax treaty practice, e.g. it is well known that Belgium does not tax capital 
gains realized neither by individuals nor upon shares realized by 
corporations.
308
 If a State decides to enter into a tax treaty with Belgium, or 
any other country having a similar practice, and includes a provision such as 
Article 13(5) OECD Model, it is reasonable to expect that that State has 
examined or has at least been informed regarding this domestic practice.
309
 
Yet, if that State pursues in concluding the treaty, without any reservation 
that allows him to preserve its taxing rights in case income is not effectively 
taxed in Belgium, or both countries do not include any specific provision to 
ensure single taxation, one should simply conclude that DNT is a tolerated 
outcome. This fact does not contradict the object and purpose of the 
negotiated tax treaty. On the contrary, States normally enter into tax treaties 
with other States reputed as low-tax countries and they still decide to 
unconditionally forgive their taxing rights over income not taxed or low-




Accordingly, it is often understood that a person liable to tax is that who, by 
reason of various criteria (i.e. residence; domicile, etc.), is subject to 
                                                          
307  R. Ismer and K. Riemer, in: Reimer and Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions, 4th edn (2015), Article 4 at m. no. 19. 
308  De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 359. 
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310  See, e.g. A. Martin Jiménez, Domestic-Anti Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: 
A Spanish Perspective–Part I, 56 Bull. Intl. Taxn.11 (2002), pp. 542-553. 






 Although the OECD Commentaries do not 
provide a definition of what comprehensive taxation means, they recognize 
that in many States a person is considered liable to comprehensive taxation 
even if that State does not impose effectively a tax.
312
 This would be the 
case of, e.g. pension funds, charity and other organizations that might be 
exempted from taxation if they meet all the requirements of the specific 
domestic law for that purposes, but who are still subject to tax laws in that 
Contracting State.
313
 It can also be the case of any person whose income is 
below the taxable minimum or who make use of losses or allowances to 
reduce its tax assessment.
314
 If one interprets the term liable to tax in a way 
to ensure effective or single taxation, all those persons would be 
immediately excluded from the treaty protection.
315
 Thus, being subject to 
comprehensive taxation does not mean to be subject to taxes in the other 
country. This conclusion is indeed supported in the wording of Article 4(1) 
OECD Model, which requires that a person is “liable” and not “subject” to 
tax.
316
 While the first expression is commonly used to refer to potential 
taxation, the latter is used to ensure actual taxation.
317
 Explained in a 
different manner, the concept of “liable to tax” comprehends taxation and 
exemption, whilst the concept of “subject to tax” does not include 
                                                          
311  OECD Commentary on Article 4 concerning the definition of resident, para. 8 and 8.6. 
312  OECD Commentary on Article 4 concerning the definition of resident, para. 8.6. 
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314  De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 358. 
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316  Ismer and Riemer, supra n. 307, Article 4 at m.no.26. 
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exemption, but only situation of effective taxation and others in which there 
is no effective taxation due to deductions and reductions in the calculation 




The distinction between the concepts of “liable to tax” and “subject to tax” 
is well illustrated in the “Weiser case” that involved the application of the 
UK-Israel tax treaty.
319
 In brief, the case referred to a resident of Israel who 
received pension income from the UK. He claimed that this pension income 
was exempt from taxes in the UK, because the income was derived by a 
resident of Israel, subject thus to tax in that country. After the taxpayer’s 
claim was refused by the HMRC on the ground that the pensions were not 
“subject to tax” in Israel, he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, who not 
only confirmed the position of the HMRC, but also reaffirmed the clear 
distinction between both expressions.
320
 The First-tier Tribunal sustained 
that the taxpayer confused the expressions “subject to tax” and “liable to 
tax” as employed in tax treaties.
321
 “Liable to tax”, on the one hand, 
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319  UK: FTT, 10 Aug. 2012, Paul Weiser v. Commissioner for Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, [2012] UKFTT 501 (TC), [2012] SFTD 1381, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
See also, B. Cleave, The Weiser Case: UK Pension Income Not Subject to Tax in Israel 
under the Israel-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1962), 67 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6 
(2013), Journals IBFD. 
320  Id., p. 280. 
321  Judge Berner referred to the emblematic cases of Bayfine UK (2011) and 
Smallwood (2010) for the principles to be applied in this case. Id. For the full text of the 
cases, see UK: CA, 23 Mar. 2011, Bayfine UK v. Commissioner for H M Revenue and 
Customs, [2011] EWCA Civ 304, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD and UK: CA, 8 July 
2010, Smallwood (Trevor Smallwood and Mary Caroline Smallwood, Trustees of the 
Trevor Smallwood Trust) v. Commissioners for the H M Revenue and Customs, [2010] 
EWCA Civ 778, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. See also, B. Cleave, The Bayfine Case, 




requires only an abstract liability to taxation, namely, a Contracting State 
might exercise its right to tax the income in question, being irrelevant 
whether or not that State finally exercises its right to tax and whether or not 
an amount of tax becomes payable. “Subject to tax”, on the other hand, 
requires income being actually included in the computation of the 
individual’s taxable income, resulting in a tax payable subject to deductions 
for allowances, reliefs, etc. This clear distinction has also been repeated in 
the tax treaty practice of other countries. In China, e.g. the term “liable to 
tax” is interpreted by the SAT, who has the general power to interpret tax 
legislation and tax treaties and which are rarely contradicted by courts, as 
having the legal obligation to pay tax on a comprehensive basis, but not 




Another issue that it is normally disregarded in the analysis of the 
expression “liable tax” refers to the fact that it is up to the Contracting 
States, according to their domestic laws, to determine the connecting factors 
that will trigger taxation and the requirements under which these factors (i.e. 
domicile; residence; place of management, etc.) will be applied.
323
 In other 
words, it finally depends on each Contracting State to lay down the 
                                                                                                                                       
Elaborate Tax Avoidance Scheme Using Tax Treaty Fails in Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales, 65 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 11 (2011), Journals IBFD, and B. Cleave, The 
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conditions under which a person will be regarded as “resident” for purposes 
of a tax treaty, and therefore, subject to comprehensive taxation. The above 
can certainly derive in different results. In France, e.g. the definition of 
residence is exceptionally modified in certain cases to ensure single 
taxation. Under Article 4B(2) of the French Tax Code, civil servants who 
perform their duties abroad are deemed to have their domicile in France, 
despite they are not residents, to the extent they are not subject to unlimited 
liability in the foreign country where they perform their activities.
324
 In the 
United States, some deviations from the OECD Model can be recognized, 
such as the inclusion of “citizenship” as one of the factor to determine 
residence in the case of individuals, or the “place of incorporation” as a 
residence determination factor in the case of corporations. Accordingly, and 
perhaps the most notably extension of the concept of residence, is the 
inclusion of a LOB provision, which basically limits the benefits of the 
treaty to bona fide residents, namely, taxpayers with strong connections with 
the treaty partner and not only residents as per the domestic law of that 
State.
325
 Since the concept of resident for tax treaty purpose might thus be 
restricted or extended as per the countries’ domestic laws desire, it is 
incorrect to sustain that always the avoidance of DNT is safeguarded.  
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3.2. The concept of Beneficial Owner as a meaning to prevent DNT 
Like the concept of “liable to tax” analyzed before, there is an easy 
temptation to interpret the concept of “beneficial owner” used in articles 10, 
11 and 12 OECD Model in a manner of preventing DNT. Although this 
concept has been profoundly studied in the international tax literature,
326
 and 
it is certainly not the intention of this author to emulate the results of those 
studies here, some brief observations regarding its interpretation are still 
required. 
 
The concept of “beneficial owner” or “bénéficiare effectif” (French 
translation)
327
 was firstly and officially introduced in the 1977 OECD 
                                                          
326  As regards to the literature about the meaning of the concept of beneficial owner, see, 
e.g. C. du Toit, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties, IBFD, 
Amsterdam (1999); R. Fraser and J. Oliver, Beneficial Ownership: HMRC’s draft 
guidance on interpretation of the Indofood decision, BTR 1 (2007); J. Bernstein, 
Beneficial Ownership: An International Perspective, 45 Tax Notes Int’l 12 (2007); P. 
Baker, The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries: Possible Extension of the Beneficial Owner Concept, in: 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters: Fourth Session, 
Geneva, 20-24 October 2008; A. Martín Jiménez, Beneficial Ownership: Current 
Trends, 2 World Tax J. (2010), Journals IBFD; M. Lang et. al. (eds), Beneficial 
Ownership: Recent Trends, IBFD, Amsterdam (2013). For a recent compilation work 
regarding the historic evolution and academic discussions regarding the concept of 
beneficial owner in different jurisdictions, see also A. Meindl-Ringler, Beneficial Owner 
in International Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016. 
327  Some authors argue that the French official translation of the term is more accurate than 
the English expression, because the emphasis is not putted on the person’s ownership of 
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P. Pistone, Italy: Beneficial Ownership as Anti-Abuse Provision in International 
Taxation, in: M. Lang et.al. (eds), Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, IBFD, 
Amsterdam (2013), p. 184. The above, in view of others, could also be an indication that 
civil law countries represented at the OECD did not want to use the common law 







 and makes reference to the limitation that payments of dividends, 
interests or royalties (Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model), normally 
subject to a reduced WHT at source, must be “beneficially owned” by a 
resident of the other State.
329
 The historic reason behind this concept is to 
prevent treaty shopping through the imposition of conduit companies by 
third-State residents in order to claim treaty benefits not otherwise available 
to them,
330
 and it was included for the very first time in the 1966 Protocol of 
the 1945 US-UK tax treaty.
331
 The original intent of this provision, 
according to its design under English law, was actually to distinguish 
between the legal owner and the non-beneficial owner for the title given on 
                                                                                                                                       
concept of beneficial ownership when they negotiate tax treaties, because this concept is 
indeed more referred to the person’s ownership of the income. See, De Broe, supra n. 
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the sale of a land.
332
 A same distinction was made in the law of equity 
between legal ownership of the trustee and the equitable, or beneficial, 
ownership of the beneficiary.
333
 Not surprisingly, however, the term has not 
equivalence in most civil law countries, where a split of ownership is not 
known, at least not to the extent recognized in common law countries.
334
 
Indeed, civil law countries, apart from few exceptions,
335
 do not use the term 
“beneficial owner” in their domestic laws.
336
 The interpretation of the term 
“beneficial owner” presents many troubles, because it is not a defined 
concept at the tax treaty level, unless some references in the OECD 
                                                          
332  J. Avery Jones et. al., The Origin of the Concepts and Expressions used in the OECD 
Model and their adoption by States, 60 Bull. Int’l. Taxn.  6 (2006), Journals IBFD, p. 
246.  
333  Id. 
334  De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 663.  
335  The Netherland is, for example, an exception. Article 4(3) of the 1965 Dividend WHT 
Act; Article 25 of the 1969 Corporate Income Tax Act and Article 9.2 of the 2001 
Individual Income Tax Act define the concept in a negative manner. In this regard, see 
H. Pijl, Beneficial Ownership and Second Tier Beneficial Owners in Tax Treaties of the 
Netherlands, 31 Intertax 10 (2003), p. 353. By other side, there are also common law 
countries in which, even though including reference to the term beneficial owner in their 
domestic laws, it lacks of importance at least in light of its main purpose, which is to 
combat treaty shopping. This is the case, e.g. of the United States where the courts have 
somehow abandoned the concept as a meaningful weapon against treaty shopping. This 
is especially evident in the Aiken Industries case (1971). See US: USTC, 5 August 1971, 
Aiken Industries Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 T.C. 925.  In this case, 
the US court was able to deny treaty relief in absence of a beneficial owner provision. 
For a complete analysis of the case, see Y. Brauner, Beneficial Owner in and outside US 
Tax Treaties, in: M. Lang et.al. (eds), Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, IBFD, 
Amsterdam (2013), pp. 143-166. See also, De Broe, supra  n. 229, pp. 423-430.  
336   See, W. Eynatten, K. De Haen and N. Hostyn, The Concept of ‘Beneficial Owner’ under 
Belgian Tax Law: Legal Interpretation is Maintained, 31 Intertax 12 (2003), p. 523. See 
also, De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 663. 





Commentaries on Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model are made.
337
 The 
interpretation thus could take actually two routes: (i) a domestic 
interpretation, derived by the application of Article 3(2) OECD Model, or 
(ii) an autonomous interpretation, derived by the tax treaties themselves.  
 
The interpretation according to Article 3(2) OECD Model, on the one hand, 
and as already stressed somewhere else in this work, allows resorting to 
domestic law in case any term is not defined in a tax treaty, unless the 
context of the treaty otherwise requires.
338
 But even if the context requires 
otherwise, there is no rule in Article 3(2) OECD Model that allows us to 
conclude a priori that the interpretation based in the context of the treaty 
should have priority.
339
 However, one should bear in mind that the fewer the 
application of Article 3(2) OECD Model, the greater the probability that 
both States achieve a common interpretation, which is one of the final aims 
                                                          
337   Most of the references in the 2014 OECD Commentaries intend to clarify the interaction 
between a reduced WHT in the State of source, granted by a tax treaty, and the income 
derived from dividend, interest or royalties, which is received by intermediaries in the 
State of residence. In this sense, e.g. paragraph 12 of the 2014 Commentaries on Article 
10 states: “The requirement of beneficial ownership was introduced in paragraph 2 of 
Article 10 to clarify the meaning of the words ‘paid…to a resident’ as they are used in 
paragraph 1 of the Article”. Likewise, paragraph 4 of the 2014 Commentaries on Article 
12 provides: “The requirement of beneficial owner was introduced in paragraph 1 of 
Article 12 to clarify how the Article applies in relation to payments made to 
intermediaries”.  Indeed, since 1977 that this requirement was introduced to make clear 
that agents and nominees are not to be regarded as beneficial owners. See De Broe, 
supra n. 229, p. 656. However, none of these references are indeed a definition of the 
concept. See Eynatten, De Haen and Hostyn, supra n. 336. In fact, the information why 
the OECD introduced the beneficial owner requirement is still confidential. See, du Toit, 
supra n. 326, p. 179. 
338  Supra Section 2.4. 
339  Rust, supra n. 283, Article 3(2) at m. no. 121. 




of the interpretation of tax treaties.
340
 There are, however, additional reasons 
to support this line of argumentation. In first place, the concept of 
“beneficial owner” has no counterpart in civil law countries.
341
 The above 
makes difficult for those countries to come up with an interpretation based 
on a concept that does not exist under their legislations.
342
 In second place, 
the history behind the notion of “beneficial owner” tells us that this was 
introduced to avoid treaty shopping; therefore, a uniform interpretation 
seems to be more in line with this aim. Otherwise, there would be a clear 
risk that its ordinary meaning goes beyond its tax treaty use, ending up 
perhaps in cases of treaty override, which is especially clear in the case of 
countries that use the term beneficial owner as an anti-avoidance 
provision.
343
 Furthermore, a domestic interpretation of the concept could 
also lead to inappropriate results, suggesting that an autonomous treaty 
meaning makes more sense. De Broe explains well this situation under the 
                                                          
340  Vogel and Rust, supra n. 26, Introduction at m. no. 90 and 92. 
341  Civil law countries do not split ownership, at least not to the extent recognized in 
common law countries. De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 663.  
342  Even though in those cases in which there is no meaning for the term under income tax 
law, but under other domestic laws, such meaning should only be used in those cases in 
which this is relevant for tax purposes. This has been widely recognized in the 
comparative jurisprudence. See, e.g. the cases of Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (Australia) and Hoge Raad (The Netherlands), referred at supra n. 217  and 
supra n. 285, respectively. 
343  The U.S. rules on conduits entities are an example of the above. See US: Treas. Reg. 
Sec. 1.881-3 et seq. These regulations empower the district director to disregard the 
participation of a conduit entity in a conduit financing arrangement if the taxpayer 
engages in such an arrangement pursuant to a tax avoidance plan. There is no reference 
to beneficial owner in the regulations, which rely more in domestic anti-abuse doctrines, 
such as substance over form, rather than the treaty concept. De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 
670.  Nevertheless, this is not surprising considering the little relevance of the concept 
of beneficial owner in the United States. Brauner, supra n. 335.  





perspective of Belgian law, although its implications can also be 
extrapolated to any other civil law countries. The term “beneficial owner” is 
recognized neither under Belgian private law nor under Belgian tax law. 
Thus, many authors simply apply the equivalent concept of “legal 
ownership” under the Belgian Civil Code. In simple words, the “beneficial 
owner” would be either the person holding the legal title or another right in 
rem, e.g. usufruct.
344
 Such interpretation, as expected, leads to the 
inappropriate result that a fiduciary owner or a nominee holding the legal 
title to the assets and collecting income from such property in his own name, 
but on behalf of the principal, is characterized as the beneficial owner, and 
thus, is entitled to tax treaty benefits.
345
 Similar inappropriate tax treaty 
results have been produced in the past due to the absence of equivalent 
concepts in common and civil law countries.
346
 Yet, for some authors it is 
                                                          
344  The legal concept of “usufructus”(from Latin “usus fructus”), recognized in civil law 
countries, grants a person a limited right in rem to use something (usufruct holder); 
however, the full ownership remains in the hands of another person who has the legal 
title. Id. 
345  De Broe, supra n. 229, pp. 668-669.  
346  An example is the civil law concept of “Commissionaire”, which is recognized in civil 
law countries, but interpreted as if it were a simple “undisclosed agency” (common law 
concept) for purposes of the application of Article 5(6) of the OECD Model. As the 
“indirect representation” does not have counterpart in common law countries, all the 
commissionaires are treated as binding the principal in common law countries. 
However, in civil law countries, the commissionaire acts on behalf of the principal, but 
in his own name. Thus, the principal is not a party in the contracts with the customers 
and only relates to the commissionaire being therefore not bound, unless specific 
domestic law provisions provide the opposite. For tax treaty purposes, the above means 
that a “commissionaire” will be always regarded as a PE in a common law country, 
whilst it will not be such in civil law countries, unless provided otherwise. The 
interpretation of the concepts of Commissionaire lead in the past to contradictory results 
in the famous Zimmer and Dell cases in France and Norway respectively. For a deeper 
analysis on this topic, see J. Avery Jones and D. Ward, Agents as Permanent 




unobjectionably today that the term “beneficial owner” is an international 
term and a domestic meaning is only relevant inasmuch this is consistent 
with the OECD Commentaries. That would be confirmed in the 2011 and 
2012 OECD discussion draft papers on the concept of “beneficial owner” 
and the wording of the 2014 OECD Model, which suggests a contextual 
meaning without reference to any “technical meaning that it could have had 




The treaty meaning of the term “beneficial owner”, on the other hand, could 
be understood in three different manners: (i) the domestic meaning in 
common law jurisdictions imported to the OECD Model;
348
 (ii) the meaning 
                                                                                                                                       
Establishments Under the OECD Model Tax Convention, 1 BTR 346 (1993). See also, 
e.g. L. Parada, Agents v. Commissionaires: A Comparison in light of the OECD Model 
Convention, 72 Tax Notes Int’l 1 (2013).  
347  See Kemmeren, supra n. 330, Pre Articles 10-12 at m.no. 31. See also, OECD (2011), 
Clarification of the Meaning of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in the OECD Model Convention. 
Discussion Draft, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2012), OECD Model Tax 
Convention: Revised Proposals Concerning the Meaning of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in Art. 
10, 11 and 12, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
348  In this opinion, C. du Toit argues that there is a strong presumption that the term 
“beneficial owner” would have been included within the OECD Model adopting its 
meaning from domestic common law countries. C. du Toit’ s argument is sustained in 
two main precedents. First, the drafter of the OECD Model opted for this term instead of 
alternatives, such as “final recipient”, “economic owner” or “beneficially entitled”. 
Second, the term was used before its introduction within the OECD Model, and even 
after that there were no observations to the term, as it would have been expected from 
civil law countries. See du Toit, supra n. 326, pp. 178-179. In a critical opinion on this 
theory, De Broe argues that it is unrealistic to think in two civil law countries 
negotiating a treaty and intending to incorporate a common law concept, which is indeed 
exogenous to their legislations. Accordingly, De Broe states that there is no evidence in 
the OECD materials suggesting that the drafters wanted to incorporate the common law 
the meaning of the concept of beneficial owner. De Broe, supra n. 229, pp.676-680. 





of the OECD Commentaries,
349
 or (iii) the “beneficial owner” considered as 
the person to whom the income is attributed under the tax law of the 
residence and/or source State. This last alternative deserves special 
attention, because the idea of considering the term  “beneficial owner” as 
the person to whom income is attributed sets up a meaning of the concept 
beyond of a simple anti-avoidance device,
350
 driving some scholars to 
sustain that the concept of “beneficial owner” would actually ensure that 
income is “subject to tax” in the State of residence, underlying the idea that 





The interpretation of the term “beneficial owner” as the person to whom 
income is attributed makes sense.  Juridical double taxation, the main object 
and purpose of tax treaties,
352
 could only arise if the income is attributed to a 
“taxpayer” of the other Contracting State. Thus, the fact that the source State 
                                                          
349  On this matter, it is publicly known that the OECD Commentaries only describe in a 
negative fashion manner the persons who are not going to be considered as beneficial 
owners. Such a description comes from the 1977 OECD Model and it is reinforced in 
the 1986 OECD Conduit Companies Report. De Broe, supra n. 229, pp. 680-690.  
350  In this opinion see, e.g. B. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions 
to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 58 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6, (2004), Journals IBFD. 
Arnold states that the beneficial ownership requirement in the Articles 10, 11 and 12 is 
more a fundamental rule of taxation rather than an anti-avoidance rule.  
351  Oliver, e.g. explains his position as follows: “The question that arises for purposes of 
defining the beneficial owner of the payment is whether the recipient of the payment is 
subject to tax on that payment in the resident country, not simply subject to tax or liable 
to tax generally, but subject to tax on that payment”. See J.D. Oliver et al., Beneficial 
Owner, 54 Bull. Int. Taxn. 7 (2000), Journals IBFD, p. 322. 
352  With respect to the limitation of tax treaties to relief all cases of juridical double taxation 
and economic double taxation, see the references in supra n. 196. 




gives relief from double taxation only in those cases in which the income is 
attributed to a person who is a resident in the other State is certainly 
convincing. Similar suggestions might be extracted from the 1999 OECD 
Partnership Report with respect to transparent entities and the access to 
treaty benefits, when it states that the determination of the beneficial owner 
will be made by looking at the treatment of the entity in the country of 
residence of the taxpayer claiming the treaty benefits.
353
 Nevertheless, there 
are several reasons to discard that such an interpretation necessarily means 
that the person to whom the income is attributed must be the person “subject 
to tax” in the State of residence, or which is the same, that the terms 
“beneficial owner” and “subject to tax” are equivalent ones. On one hand, 
and as it has been already stressed, the term was officially introduced in the 
1966 Protocol of the 1945 US-UK tax treaty with the idea of replacing the 
“subject-to-tax” clause contained in that specific treaty, under which the 
source country would deny benefits under Articles 10, 11 and 12 if the 
recipient of the income was not subject to tax in the residence country.
354
 
Thus, it would be at least contradictory to interpret the term “beneficial 
owner” in a manner of ensuring single taxation, through a “subject-to-tax” 
requirement in the State of residence, when the concept precisely replaced 
an original specific provision aiming to accomplish with that target. 
                                                          
353  However, neither the OECD Partnership Report nor Article 1(2) OECD Model properly 
considers the interplay with the concept of beneficial owner. This issue is specifically 
analyzed in infra Chapter IV, Section 3.3.2.3, as regards to the OECD Partnership 
Report and Section 5.3.1, as regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model. 
354  See Vann, supra n. 329, and Ng, supra n. 328.  





Likewise, the original provision implied to exclude, e.g. charities and 
pension funds from the reduced WHT granted by the treaty, because they 
were actually exempt from taxation in the country of residence. However, 
this exclusion could only be regarded as a “subjective subject-to-tax 
criterion”, as some authors refer to,
355
 but in any case it implies the 





On the other hand, when revisiting the process of review of the 1963 OECD 
Model, it is possible to see that the OECD began asking delegates to identify 
some problems in the draft document.
357
 The UK delegation proposed the 
inclusion of a “subject to tax” clause as a way to solve the defective 
drafting of article 10, 11 and 12. The UK delegates observed: “If a ‘subject 
to tax’ test is not included in these Articles we think that the drafting is 
defective […]”.
358
 However, in 1967, the Fiscal Committee created the 
                                                          
355  See, e.g. M. Distaso and R. Russo, The EC Interest and Royalty Directive- A Comment, 
44 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2004), Journals IBFD. See also, B. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax 
Law, 6th ed., Kluwer Law International, BV The Netherlands, 2012. 
356  A similar requirement is found, e.g. in the definition of qualified companies in the EU 
Interest and Royalty Directive, where a company must be “subject” to one of the 
specific listed corporate taxes, without being exempt. This requirement, however, seems 
to be rather clear in excluding companies that are “subjectively exempt” and does not 
mean any form of effective taxation of the interest or royalty income. See J. López 
Roriguez and G. Kofler, Beneficial Ownership and EU Law, in: M. Lang et.al. (eds.), 
Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, IBFD, Amsterdam (2013), p. 223. 
357  OECD (1967), Observations of Member Countries on Difficulties Raised by the OECD 
Draft Convention on Income and Capital, Fiscal Committee TFD/FC/216, Paris, 
available at www.taxtreatieshistory.org.   
358  Vann, supra n. 329, p. 282. See also, OECD (1967), supra n. 357, p. 14. According to 
Avery Jones, the uncertainty created by the United Kingdom, suggesting that a “subject-




Working Party No. 27 consisting of Luxembourg, France and the 
Netherlands, dealing with the redrafting of the interest and royalties articles, 
who rapidly clarified that the real UK intent was indeed to propose either a 
“subject to tax clause”, under which the source country would renounce its 
taxing rights inasmuch the resident country taxed the income, or that 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 were to be applied only if they were paid to the 
“beneficial owner” of the income.
359
 The above emphasizes the different 
meaning of both concepts, a fact that was reaffirmed in the Working Party 
No. 1 of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on Double Taxation, Working 
Group No. 23 (Germany-Belgium), where referring to Article 10 OECD 
Model, it recommended the second solution, i.e. the inclusion of the 
beneficial owner’s concept rather than a “subject-to-tax” requirement.
360
 
                                                                                                                                       
to-tax” test was required, or alternatively that there should be a beneficial owner 
requirement, attended to the interpretation of specific domestic rules which existed 
during the time of the discussion draft in 1967, but that no longer existed at the 
implementation of the “beneficial owner” provision in the 1977 OECD Model. In other 
words, the inclusion of the provision was indeed not really necessary. For a full analysis, 
see Avery Jones, supra n. 294, pp. 333-339.  
359  “The United Kingdom Delegation considers that as they stand Articles 10, 11 and 12 are 
defective in that they would apply to dividends, interests and royalties paid to an agent 
or a nominee with a legal right to the income. To remedy this situation, it proposes 
either that a ‘subject to tax clause’ be introduced, under which the country of source 
would give up its right to tax only if the country of residence taxed the income, or else 
that these Articles be made to apply only to income paid to the ‘beneficial owner’ ”. See 
OECD (1970), Working Party No. 27 of the Fiscal Committee (Luxembourg-France-The 
Netherlands), Report on suggested amendments to Articles 11 and 12 of the Draft 
Convention, relating to interest and royalties respectively, FC/WP27(70)1, Paris, p. 13, 
available at www.taxtreatieshistory.org.   
360  OECD (1973), Working Party No. 1 of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on Double 
Taxation, Working Group No. 23 (Germany-Belgium), Revision of Article 10 of the 1963 
Model Convention and Commentary Thereon, CFA/WP1(73)2, Paris, available at 
www.taxtreatieshistory.org.  See also, Ng, supra n. 328, p. 523. 





Furthermore, the absence of correlation between the terms “beneficial 
owner” and “subject-to-tax” is also reaffirmed in the 2014 Commentaries 
on Article 12 OECD Model. The Commentaries emphasize that it is not 
specified whether the application or not of the exemption in the State of 
source should be conditional upon the royalties being subject to tax in the 
State of residence.
361
 In fact, they provide that those issues could be settled 
during the bilateral negotiation.
362
 Thus, it is possible that the Contracting 
States agree during the negotiation of a tax treaty the specific inclusion of a 
“subject-to-tax clause” within the treaty, but in any case the requirement of 
subjecting to (effective) tax the income in the State of residence should be 
considered as an ordinary interpretation of the concept of “beneficial 
owner”.  
3.3. Conflicts of Qualification and DNT: The new interpretation of 
Article 23A(1) OECD Model 
A third provision that might be interpreted as preventing DNT is related to 
what is known in doctrine as conflicts of qualification. A conflict of 
qualification arises when a tax treaty contains terms from domestic law that 
are understood in their respective meanings by the residence or source State 
or that can be interpreted in an independent or autonomous manner.
363
 These 
qualification conflicts are originated, inter alia, due to the interaction of 
                                                          
361  OECD Commentary on Article 12 concerning the taxation of royalties, para.6. 
362  Id. 
363  Vogel and Prokisch, supra n. 228, p. 82 




Article 3(2) OECD Model and the normal disparities between the domestic 
systems of the Contracting States, and they can derive either in double 
taxation or DNT.
364
 For example, in the case two States characterize 
differently the same item of income or the same entity.
365
 As regard to DNT, 
it might arise because of the application of Article 23A OECD Model 
(exemption method) when two Contracting States, due to differences in their 
domestic laws, apply different provisions of the tax treaty in such a way that 
the source State considers itself prevented from taxing the income at issue 
whilst the residence State, in application of another distributive rule, 
considers that the source State has the right to tax the income and therefore 
exempts the income under Article 23A(1) OECD Model.
366
 The OECD 
Model and its Commentaries deal specifically with these cases in paragraph 
32 et seq. of the OECD Commentary on Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD 
Model.  
 
                                                          
364  Id. See also, C. Marchgraber, Conflicts of Qualification and Interpretation: How Should 
Developing Countries React?, 44 Intertax 4 (2016), p. 307. 
365  See, e.g. the example of paragraph 32.4 of the OECD Commentary on Article 23 A and 
Article 23 B concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, referred to the 
conflict derived from the different qualification of the same entity for tax purposes. 
These conflicts, however, are not strictly related to the different characterization of 
entities (like conflicts of allocation of income), but rather to the discrepancies as regards 
to the nature of an item of income. For the analysis of hybrid entities and the entitlement 
to tax treaty benefits, see infra Chapter IV.  
366  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 32.6. See also, R. Sudoczky, Double Taxation 
Relief, Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law: Comments, in: I. Richelle, E. 
Traversa and W. Schön (eds), State Aid Law and Business Taxation, Springer, 
Heidelberg (2016), p. 169. 





The OECD approach, originated in the Partnership Report of 1999
367
 and 
included in the 2000 OECD Commentaries (updated in 2008) on Article 
23A and 23B OECD Model, suggests that the phrase “in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed”, included in those Articles, 
should also be interpreted in relation to possible cases of DNT arisen due to 
the application of Article 23A.
368
 This is to say, the OECD proposes that the 
State of residence is not obliged to exempt an item of income or capital if 
the source State considers itself prevented from taxing that item of income 
or capital, which would otherwise have had the right to tax, if the State of 
residence consider, in application of another distributive rule, that the source 
State has the right to tax the income and therefore exempts the income as 
per Article 23A OECD Model.
369
 Thus, DNT might be avoided by means of 
the interpretation of Articles 23A(1) and 23B(1) OECD Model.
370
 The 2008 
update of the OECD Model extends this approach even to the cases where 
                                                          
367  Article 23A(1) OECD Model states: “Where a resident of a Contracting State derives 
income or owns capital which, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, 
may be taxed in the other Contracting States […]”.  
368  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 32.6. With respect to the avoidance of double 
taxation, the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of this Convention” is 
interpreted by the OECD Commentaries as requiring the State of residence to grant 
relief from double taxation (through exemption or credit) in case of conflicts of 
qualification resulting from differences in domestic law. In these cases, the State of 
residence is bound by the qualification of the State or source. OECD Commentary on 
Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, 
para. 32.3. See also, Lang, supra n. 301, p. 204.  
369  A. Rust, The new Approach to Qualification Conflicts has its Limits, 57 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
2 (2003), Journals IBFD, p. 45. The original 2000 version used the phrase “have taxed” 
instead of “have had the right to tax” and the phrase “to tax” instead of “to have the right 
to tax”. See Lang, supra n. 301. 
370  Marchgraber, supra n. 364, p. 309. 




the State of source refrains from levying tax under its domestic law, but 
would have been prevented anyway by the treaty, understood in light of its 
domestic law.
371
 In simple words, the application of the OECD approach 




The conclusion that the new OECD interpretation of Article 23A(1) OECD 
Model effectively counteracts cases of DNT when a conflict of qualification 
is involved, ergo constituting a sort of indication that the avoidance of DNT 
might be regarded as an object and purpose of the tax treaties, is certainly 
not precise and it can be subject to a serious criticism. Firstly, Article 
23A(1) OECD Model is applicable only if the income “may be taxed” in the 
State of source.
373
 A person “may be taxed” in the State or source “in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention” only if the tax treaty 
does not prevent the State from doing so.
374
 Therefore, whether or not the 
tax was indeed levied in the source state is absolutely irrelevant.
375
 A 
different interpretation should simply derive in absurd results. As accurately 
explained by Lang: “[…] the same approach should be followed in the 
mirror situation [the exercise of taxing rights]. If the source state, under its 
domestic interpretation of the treaty terms, is able to exercise taxing rights 
but refrain from doing so domestically, the income still ‘may be taxed’ in 
                                                          
371  Lang, supra n. 301. 
372  Id. 
373  Id. 
374  Id. 
375  Id. 





‘accordance with the provisions of the Convention’. Thus, a resident state 
that, under its domestic law interpretation, takes the position that the income 
falls under a different allocation rule and that therefore it may also exercise 
taxing rights should be prevented from doing so since the income “may be 
taxed” in the other state”.
376
 Secondly, there are qualification conflicts to 
which Article 23A(1) OECD Model is simply not applicable; therefore, in 
those cases DNT should be a tolerated outcome. Vogel explains that tax 
treaties contain two types of distributive rules: complete and open.
377
 
Complete distributive rules are those that while maintaining the taxation by 
one of the Contracting States, they exclude the other Contracting States 
from taxing the item of income in question. They can be normally 
distinguished by the use of the words “shall be taxable only”, e.g. Article 
7(1) when it provides that the profits of an enterprise that it is not regarded 
as a PE in the State of source shall be taxable only in the State of residence; 
or Article 8(1) OECD Model that provides that the profits from the 
operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall be taxable only in 
the State where the place of effective management of the enterprise is 
situated;
378
 or Article 19(1)(a) when, according to the interpretation of the 
State of residence, the taxpayer receives a salary from the other Contracting 
State and become a resident solely for the purpose of rendering a service.
379
 
                                                          
376  Id. 
377  K. Vogel, Conflicts of Qualification: The Discussion is not Finished, 57 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
2 (2003), Journals IBFD, p. 43. 
378  Id. 
379  Rust, supra n. 369, p. 49. Also Article 20 OECD Model can be a good example when a 
student or business apprentice becomes a resident of the State in which he is studying or 




The distributive rules might be considered as a lex specialis to Article 23 
and be applicable at least side-by-side.
380
 On the other hand, open 
distributive rules are those who maintain the taxation by one of the 
Contracting States; however, they do not determine whether and how the 
income in question will be taxed by the taxpayer’s State of residence. They 
normally use the words “may be taxed”, e.g. Article 7(1) when it provides 
that income received through a PE in the State of source may be taxed by 
that State. Contrary to the complete distributive rules, these rules must be 
completed by Article 23 OECD Model. Furthermore, the distinction 
between “shall be taxable only” and “may be taxed” is not accidental and it 
is indeed a standard pattern of tax treaties, observed by the OECD Model 
and by all the treaties following it.
381
   
 
Following Vogel’s classification of the tax treaty provisions, one could 
conclude that Article 23A(1) OECD Model is not effective to solve cases of 
DNT in cases where the State of residence applies a complete distributive 
rule that allows only the State of source to tax the income.
382
 Indeed, Article 
23A(1) OECD Model does not impose an additional obligation on the State 
of residence to exempt the income (article 23 OECD Model might be 
                                                                                                                                       
training. See J. Avery Jones, Conflicts of Qualification: Comments on Prof. Vogel’s and 
Alexander Rust’s Articles, 57 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 5 (2003), Journals IBFD, p. 184. 
380  Rust, supra n. 379. 
381  Id.  
382  Vogel, supra n. 377, pp. 42-43.  







 Likewise, the obligation to exempt the income contained in the 
distributive rule is still in force, because Article 23A(1) cannot lift the State 
of residence from that obligation. In other words, the source’s State 
qualification is not binding on the State of residence.
384
 Thus, if the State of 
source believes that it is prevented from taxing the income, this income 





Moreover, tax treaties not only contain distributives rules, they also have 
non-distributive rules, e.g. rules determining the territorial and personal 
scope of the treaty; or the taxes to which it applies; definition of treaty 
terms, etc. All these provisions use terms taken from domestic laws of the 
Contracting States; therefore, conflicts of qualification might also arise.
386
 
Vogel explains how “unsolved” DNT also remains in the case of non-
distributives rules, despite the new interpretation of Article 23A and 23B 
OECD Model, in the following example: “An independent singer who is 
citizen of Austria alternates between performing in Austria and in Germany. 
He has a permanent contract with an opera company in Germany, 
committing him to a certain number of appearances each year. During the 
                                                          
383  Id. 
384  Id, p. 50. 
385  This does not mean that a different solution can be followed, e.g. the application of 
Article 25 OECD Model (Mutual Agreement Procedure). See OECD Commentary on 
Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, 
para. 32.5. In this opinion: Avery Jones, supra n. 379. 
386  Although Vogel recognizes that, as these conflicts do not refer to types of income, a 
varying qualification does not lead to double taxation and very rarely to DNT. Vogel, 
supra n. 277, pp. 42-43. 




taxable year in question, he had, in addition, some separate engagements in 
Austria. In both states, he lives in hotels. On several occasions, he stayed 
part of the day in Austria and part in Germany. Therefore, the aggregate of 
his stays in each of the two states was more than six months. He received 
dividends and interest from portfolios in a third country. Both Austria and 
Germany want to tax these receipts”.
387
 The issue in this case is that both 
countries would allege unlimited tax liability (worldwide taxation). 
Germany would argue that the stay more than six months constitute a 
habitual abode, whilst Austria, would say that under Austrian law he is a 
resident, although he does not have a habitual abode. Austria and Germany 
will prefer to exclude the application and articles 10 and 11 of the OECD 
Model and to apply Article 21 (other income), which grant exclusive 
taxation to the resident state. For that purpose, however, the singer should 
also be considered a resident for tax treaty purposes. The tie-breaker rule of 
Article 4(2)(b) OECD Model establishes that if the taxpayer does not have a 
permanent home available in either State (he was living in hotels), the 
residency will be that of his habitual abode, a term that should be 
interpreted in accordance with the domestic laws.
388
 Article 4(2)(b) OECD 
Model does not contemplate the time necessary to be considered habitual, 
and it just says that the time must be sufficient. Thus, a resort to domestic 
law in accordance to Article 3(2) OECD Model is needed. For Austrian law 
                                                          
387  Id., p. 42 at “Case 2”. 
388  Vogel, however, recognizes that this is controversial and there are tax scholars who 
consider that the term habitual abode has an autonomous interpretation. Id. 





purposes, there was no habitual abode; therefore, his habitual abode would 
be in Germany. For German tax purposes, however, the habitual abode 
implies the fact of staying more than six months, which means that under 
German domestic law, the singer has habitual abode in both countries. This 
would imply that, according to the tie-breaker rule of Article 4(2) OECD 
Model, the citizenship of the singer would prevail (he is Austrian). Germany 
thus cannot tax either, being the result no other than DNT. Vogel’s example 
can be criticized because it does not include the possibility of a MAP to 
resolve the dual residency problem.
389
 However, beyond this legitimate 
criticism, the example illustrates very well that when a term exists in 
domestic law and it is used in a tax treaty context, qualification conflicts 
might arise and they cannot be solved by application of Article 23A(1) or 
23B(1) OECD Model, at least not in cases of non-distributive rules. 
 
Some final words should be said regarding the tax policy implications of the 
new interpretation of Article 23A(1) OECD Model upon developing 
countries or emergent economies. Despite the fact that Article 23 UN Model 
recently included the OECD Commentaries of paragraph 32.1 to 32.7, it is 
still not clear why developing countries should agree in accepting that 
OECD’s interpretation that the State of residence always tax in the case of a 
conflict of qualification leading to DNT (or low taxation as well).
390
 More 
important is the wording of the updated 2008 OECD Model, which states 
                                                          
389  Avery Jones, supra n. 379, p. 186. 
390  For an extended analysis: Marchgraber, supra n. 364. 




that the State of residence should not be obliged to apply the exemption 
method if the State of source, in light of its domestic law, interpret the 
provision of the treaty as precluding it from taxing an item of income or 
capital, which would have not taxed under its domestic law anyway. If such 
an interpretation is adopted, the tax incentive normally granted by 
developing countries to attract FDI might be totally offset if the exemption 
method is finally not applied in the State of residence.
391
  
3.4. Conflicts of Interpretation and DNT: Article 23A(4) OECD 
Model 
As noted before, the OECD interpretation of Article 23A(1) OECD Model 
does not mitigate all the cases of DNT, being its effects rather limited to the 
qualifications resulting from disparities between the domestic tax systems of 
the Contracting States. Indeed, if, e.g. DNT arises from the varying 
evaluation of the facts or the diverging interpretation of a treaty provision 
(known as “conflicts of interpretation”), Article 23A(1) OECD Model is 
absolutely ineffective to ensure single taxation.
392
 Considering the above, 
the OECD included Article 23A(4) in the OECD Model in order to deal 
specifically with those cases of DNT resulting from the different 
                                                          
391  Developing countries have similar incentives to negotiate “tax sparing” clauses with tax 
credit countries, because despite of the tax incentive in the host country, if a credit is not 
granted in home country (investor), the incentive can be nullified. See a further analysis 
on tax sparing clauses at infra Section 4.1.1. 
392  Marhgraber, supra n. 364, p. 312. 










As per Article 23A(4) “[t]he provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to 
income derived or capital owned by a resident of a Contracting State where 
the other Contracting State applies the provisions of this Convention to 
exempt such income or capital from tax or applies the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 or 11 to such income”. Therefore, under the 
OECD approach, the residence state shall not be obliged to grant an 
exemption if the source state interprets the facts of a case or the provisions 
of the Convention in such a way that it consider itself fully or partially 
restricted from taxing an item of income or capital, whilst the residence state 
adopts a different interpretation of the facts or the provisions of the 
Convention, considering that the same item of income or capital should be 
taxed in the State of source, which thus would lead to apply the 
exemption.
394
 In this order of ideas, the effect of Article 23A(4) OECD 
Model is identical to a “switch-over clause”.
395
 The OECD also emphasizes 
that these cases where Article 23A (4) OECD Model applies should be 
distinguished from those “where the qualification of an item of income 
under the domestic law of the State of source interacts with the provisions of 
the Convention to preclude that State from taxing an item of income or 
                                                          
393  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 56.1.  
394  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 56.1. 
395  Infra Section 4.2.2. 




capital in circumstances where the qualification of an item under domestic 




Regardless the above, the truth is that Article 23A(4) OECD Model is not 
completely effective to solve all the cases of DNT derived from a conflict of 
interpretation. According to the OECD Commentaries, if the State of source 
considers that it may tax an item of income or capital in accordance with the 
OECD Model, but no tax is actually payable on that income or capital 
because of the domestic law, DNT shall be an unavoidable outcome.
397
  In 
such a case, the State of residence must apply the exemption method, 
because the exemption at source does not result from the Convention, but 
rather from the domestic law of the State of source and a tax treaty cannot 
take away that domestic exemption.
398
 This conclusion is also corroborated 
by paragraph 34 of the Commentary on Article 23A and 23B OECD Model, 
which establishes that the State of residence must exempt the item of 
income or capital which, in accordance with the Convention, may be taxed 
by the State of source, regardless whether or not the right to tax is in effect 
exercised by the State of source.
399
 
                                                          
396  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 56.3 
397  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 56.2 
398  Id. 
399  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 34. 





4. Double Non-Taxation and Specific Tax Treaty Provisions 
This Section now turns to study some examples of the tax treaty practice in 
which, through the inclusion of specific provisions within the tax treaties, 
the outcome of DNT is either tolerated or otherwise prevented. 
Nevertheless, and whatever path is followed, it is worth to highlight that the 
use of these provisions is exceptional and it responds to specific tax policy 
reasons. The above simply emphasizes that neither the outcome of DNT nor 
its avoidance are indeed an object and purpose of the tax treaties, unless the 
Contracting States have expressly decided otherwise.   
4.1. DNT as an outcome tolerated by Tax Treaties 
There can be many examples in which tax treaties tolerate the outcome of 
DNT.
400
 However, I hereby will refer exclusively to the cases of tax sparing 
and matching credit clauses, commonly used by developing countries or 
emergent economies to attract FDI.  In these cases, and due to more 
important policy reasons, countries are simply indifferent when facing the 
outcome of DNT.  
 
                                                          
400  In some cases it would be even possible to affirm that the outcome of DNT is directly 
pursued, e.g. in the case of income derived from research activities from teachers or 
professors. An example is the Article 21 of the 1971 France-Portugal Tax Treaty, which 
exempts in both Contracting States the income received by a professor or a teacher who 
is resident of a Contracting State and who is moving to the other states for a maximum 
of two years. See Gutmann, supra n. 46, p. 90. 




4.1.1. Tax Sparing  
Many countries, especially developing countries, provide a series of tax 
incentives, including e.g. tax holidays or reduced corporate tax rates in order 
to attract FDI.
401
 The success of these tax incentives, however, does not 
depend entirely from the exclusive policy in the country hosting the 
investment. In fact, in most of the cases, the success of the tax incentive will 
also depend upon the taxation of the income derived from that investment in 
the investors’ home country and the subsequent relief of the potential double 
taxation generated. In this regard, if the investors’ home country uses the 
exemption method to relieve double taxation, there will generally be no 
effects upon the tax incentive provided by the host country inasmuch the 
exemption method applies disregarding the amount of taxes paid in the 
investment’s host country, which is indeed the general rule.
402
 However, if 
                                                          
401  One reasonable explanation as regards to the importance of attracting FDI in developing 
countries can be found in the change of paradigm of many countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and Latin America after the 1970s. The political movement from 
socialism to market economy, followed by the trend towards a freer flow or investment 
capital, and specially, the process of privatizations can be seen a clear reasons of that. 
Indeed, previously many of these countries were very suspicious regarding FDI, which 
was seen as a form of post-colonialism or dollar-imperialism. See A. Easson, Tax 
Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, Part I: Recent Trends and Countertrends, 55 
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2001), Journals IBFD, p. 267. 
402  Generally the exemption method should apply in this manner, without paying attention 
to the taxes paid in the other country, contrary to the tax credit that is generally granted 
in a “dollar-by-dollar” basis. For a comparative analysis between the credit and 
exemption methods as international mechanisms used to relief double taxation see, e.g., 
G. Maisto, supra n. 89. See also, G. Kofler, supra n. 91. The simplicity of the exemption 
method, when compared to the credit method, have made it the preferred method to 
relieve double taxation among continental European countries, fitting better the 





the home country applies the exemption only to the extent the source State 
has a minimum level of taxation, then the tax incentive is neutralized.
403
 
Similarly, if the home country applies the tax credit method to relieve 
double taxation, the effect of the tax incentive is again nullified.
404
 This is 
because the tax credit method generally applies only with respect to the 
taxes effectively paid in the foreign country. In order to avoid such a result, 
host countries normally negotiate the inclusion of tax sparing clauses that 
enable the investors to obtain a tax credit in their home country upon the 
taxes that they should have paid in the host country in absence of the tax 
incentive. As expected, in some cases the absence of taxation in the host 
country due to a specific tax incentive added to the application on the credit 
method upon a statutory tax (not effectively paid) in the home country may 
derive in DNT.
405
 The result of DNT in this case is an accepted outcome that 
guarantees the success of the tax incentive in the host country, and 
ultimately, helps to promote investment and economic growth in developing 
countries.
406
     
                                                                                                                                       
objectives of the internal market. In this regard, see, e.g. W. Schön, supra n. 82. See 
also, M. Helminen, supra n. 89. 
403  Although the OECD Commentaries uses a different expression: “[…] the incentive 
granted by a State of source may be reduced […] (emphasis added)”. See OECD 
Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for elimination of 
double taxation, para. 72. 
404  Id. 
405  Although this is only true in those cases in which the tax incentive attends to a reduction 
in the tax rates that affect the investment or simply in a tax holiday. Other tax incentives 
do not attend to the direct payment of taxes, e.g. in the case of an accelerated 
depreciation granted.  
406  L. Schoueri, Tax Sparing: uma reconsideração da reconsideração in: R. Mariz de 
Oliveira at al. (eds.), Direito Tributário Atual, Dialética/IBDT (2011), pp. 93-108. See 
also, e.g. A. Celine, R. Desbordes and J. Mucchielli, Do Tax Sparing Agreements 





Some tax scholars have, nevertheless, openly criticized the exaggerated 
importance given to tax sparing clauses.
407
 They basically argue that tax 
sparing is a problem only when the investor invests through a branch in the 
host country, because if he does it through a subsidiary, the residence 
country (home country) will generally not impose taxes on the profits 
generated by the subsidiary and the dividends received from the subsidiary 
will be exempted in the home country, normally because of the application 
of the participation exemption.
408
 Then, if the developed country also 
exempts the profits of the foreign branch, there would not be a problem at 
all.
409
 Accordingly, others scholars sustain that tax sparing clauses can 
                                                                                                                                       
Contribute to the Attraction of FDI in Developing Countries, 14 Intl. Tax and Pub. Fin. 
5 (2007); J. Amico, Brazil: Developing and Implementing Tax Treaty Policy: The Tax 
Sparing Clause, 43 Bull. Intl. Fisc. Doc. 8/9 (1989). 
407  In a complete analysis regarding base erosion in developing countries, see H. Ault and 
B. Arnold, Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview, Paper on 
Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries (UN), Draft Paper 
No. 1, United Nations, New York (2013), p. 32. 
408  Id. The statement of these authors is correct, although it disregards that one of the major 
capital exporter countries in the world, i.e. the United States, does not apply the 
participation exemption, but rather the tax credit upon profits repatriated. Thus, it could 
rarely be argued that a developing country, which has important tax incentives to attract 
FDI, is indifferent in the negotiation of a treaty with the United States. Accordingly, the 
United States has also firmly rejected the inclusion of tax sparing clauses within its tax 
treaties, despite the fact that the tax treaty between the United States and Pakistan was 
indeed the first one to include such a provision in 1957, although finally rejected by the 
US Senate. Previously, in 1953, it was also discussed in the report of the British Royal 
Commission, which recommended the adoption of tax sparing clauses as a way to aid 
British investment abroad. The proposal was finally rejected in 1957. See OECD (1997), 
Tax Sparing–A Reconsideration, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. R (14)-10 and 11. 
409  This critic, however, is not entirely precise, because it does not consider the role of CFC 
rules around the world, and whose strength is recommended in the latest OECD BEPS 
Action 3, as an effective manner to tax the of a subsidiary established in the host 





constitute a clear infringement to the non-discrimination principle 
recognized in Article 24 OECD Model and other supranational legislation, 
such as EU Law.
410
 A similar criticism can be found in the OECD Report on 
Tax Sparing, which also makes equal the concepts of tax sparing and 
matching credits.
411
 The main point of criticism was stated in the report was 
that tax sparing and matching credit clauses had a very limited influence 
upon foreign investors decisions, opening new possibilities for tax evasion 
and other types of abuse.
412
 Likewise, the OECD Commentaries on Articles 
23A and 23B, concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, 
sustain that tax sparing provisions constitute a departure from those 
Articles,
413
 being thus a reproduction of the principles summarized the 




Nonetheless, and beyond the criticism that can exist with respect to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of tax sparing clauses, it is undeniable that they 
                                                                                                                                       
country. This can be especially true when CFC rules apply to both active and passive 
income, e.g. in Brazil. See references at supra n. 250. 
410  This is because tax-sparing clauses involve a worse treatment for residents’ domestic 
investors than foreign investors. Likewise, it could also be argued that they infringe the 
principle of tax neutrality (CEN), although it is not less valid to consider that the 
different treatment between residents and non-residents is justified by the public policy 
goal of encouraging investment in lesser-developed countries. For a further analysis, see 
R. Mason, Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality, 2 World Tax J. 2 (2010), Journals 
IBFD, p. 136. 
411  For a critical analysis on this matter, see V. Arruda and A. Trindade, Tax Sparing and 
Matching Credit: From an Unclear Concept to an Uncertain Regime, 67 Bull. Intl. 
Taxn. 8 (2013), Journals IBFD. 
412  OECD (1997), supra n. 408, p. R(14)-19 to 24. 
413  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 74. 
414  Arruda and Trindade, supra n. 411, p. 399. 




still represent an important tax policy tool for developing countries and only 
few countries are prepared to take the risk of unilaterally withdrawing these 
clauses from their tax treaties.
415
 In a nutshell, unless all developing 
countries decide to withdraw these provisions at once, the incentive to keep 
them is still higher.
416
 The outcome of DNT will thus remain as an 
acceptable one in those treaties which, although exceptionally, still include 
tax sparing clauses. 
4.1.2. Matching Tax Credits 
Unlike the similitude with tax sparing clauses, the matching credit clauses 
have nothing to do with tax incentives or any other kind of subsidy provided 




Generally speaking, a matching credit provision implies that the residence 
State will credit a fixed amount of tax on certain items of income (“notional 
tax”) derived from the source State, regardless whether or not those items 
                                                          
415  Easson, supra n. 401, p. 273. However, from a practical point of view, as many tax 
sparing provisions are subject to a limited period of time, most of them have already 
elapsed. This implies that the practical significance of the provisions has decreased. 
Nevertheless, this does mean that developing countries stop using them as a tool to 
attract investment, as it is the case of many countries part of the MERCOSUR. For an 
analysis on the economic influence of tax sparing and matching credits see, e.g C. 
Forcada, The Economic Effect of Taxation on the Flow of Software Copyright Royalties 
in MERCOSUR, 65 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2011), Journals IBFD.  
416  This is illustrated as the classic economic theory known as the “prisoner’s dilemma”. 
See Easson, supra n. 401. 
417  The OECD, however, mixes both the concepts of tax sparing and matching credits in its 
Report on Tax Sparing. See OECD (1997), supra n. 408.   





were subject to effective taxation in that State.
418
 The tax credit granted will 
be normally higher than the one actually paid or withheld in the source 
country, even higher than the one provided by the specific tax treaty. If the 
notional tax allowed as a credit is equal to the tax at residence, then a full 
exemption will be granted. In other words, the outcome of DNT will be 
again an inevitable consequence of the matching credit provision in the tax 
treaty.  
4.2. DNT as an outcome specifically avoided by Tax Treaties 
Contrary to the cases of tax sparing and matching credits where the 
countries directly tolerate the outcome of DNT, sometimes tax treaties 
attempt to prevent that an item of income remains untaxed in both the 
residence and source State, affecting thus the country which, due to the tax 
treaty, limited its rights to tax a specific income. For this purpose, the 
Contracting States normally negotiate the inclusion within their tax treaties 
of either a subject-to-tax or switch-over provision. Nevertheless, the use of 
these provisions is very exceptional and sometimes is subject to a justified 
                                                          
418  The predetermination in the tax treaty of the exact amount of credit to be granted by the 
State of residence makes the difference between a matching credit and a tax sparing 
provision, because while the former contains this predetermination, the latter responds 
exclusively to a specific tax incentive in the source country which, due to this fact, does 
not exercise its taxing rights. See Arruda and Trindade, supra n. 411, p. 400. See also, L. 
Freitas de Moraes e Castro, Brazil’s Anti-Treaty Shopping Measures: Current and 
Future Developments regarding Beneficial Ownership and Limitation on Benefits 
Clauses in Tax Treaties, 65 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2011), Journals IBFD, p. 662 (footnote 
6).   




criticism, both derived from their ambiguous interpretation and some tax 
policy concerns. 
4.2.1. Subject-to-tax clauses 
As noted already, one of the option for those countries that decide to grant 
tax treaty benefits only in those situations where the item of income in 
question is taxed in the other Contracting State is through the inclusion 
within their tax treaties of specific provisions known as “subject to tax 
clauses”. Although the wording of subject to tax clauses can vary from 
country to country, and sometimes from tax treaty to tax treaty within the 
same country, they all have the same aim in common: to ensure single 
taxation either in the residence or source State.
419
  
                                                          
419  In Austria, e.g. some tax treaties include a subject-to-tax clause in order to ensure the 
taxation of Austria as the source country. An example of the above can be found in the 
Article 15(2) of the Australia-Austria tax treaty, where besides the requirement of the 
183 days, the country of employment (source State) is prevented from exercising its 
taxing rights with respect to income from dependent services only to the extent the 
income is or will be subject to tax in the State of residence. Similar provisions can be 
found in the Article 20(1) of the tax treaty Austria-Malaysia, the Article 12(3) of the 
former tax treaty Canada-Austria, or Article 13 of the treaty Austria-UK and Austria 
Switzerland. See M. Achatz; B. Gröhs and R. Weninger, Taxation of non-resident 
individuals in Austria, 58 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 11 (2004), Journals IBFD, p. 529. Germany 
also includes these clauses in some of its treaties. For example, Article 23(3) of the 
German-New Zealand tax treaty (1978) and Article 23(1) of the German-UK tax treaty 
(2010). However, the inclusion of subject to tax clauses should not be considered as a 
general German treaty policy. See J. Lüdicke, Exemption and Tax Credit in German Tax 
Treaties–Policy and Reality, in: P. Baker and C. Bobbett (eds), Tax Policy Math, Essays 
in honor of John F. Avery Jones, (IBFD 2010), p. 292.  





The OECD Commentaries recognize the possibility of including subject-to-
tax provisions within tax treaties as an exception to the absolute obligation 
in the State of residence to relieve double taxation through the exemption 
method in cases where the other Contracting State does not tax the 
respective item of income.
420
 Those cases could arise when no taxes are 
applied in the State of source with respect to the specific item of income or 
capital, or the taxes are not effectively collected due to, e.g. a set-off of 
losses, an expiration of the statutory time limit or a simple mistake.
421
 
Nevertheless, the application of subject-to-tax clauses is not absent of 
interpretation problems, mostly derived from their varied wording in 
different countries and the absence of common rules at the level of the 
OECD Model. For example, while some countries might consider that 
“subject to tax” is equivalent to “liable to tax” (i.e. being subject to taxation 
in a jurisdiction, regardless whether or not taxes were finally paid), other 
countries could simply consider that “subject to tax” is indeed a synonym of 
“effective taxation”. However, “effective taxation” does not always imply 
“to be taxed”, but sometimes could be regarded as the simple act of “being 
subject to a tax regime”. In most of the cases, the absence of domestic 
jurisprudence increases the uncertain results. The above can be seen, e.g. in 
the case of the subject-to-tax provision contained in Article 22(1)(a) of the 
                                                          
420  OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, para. 35. 
421  Id. 






  This clause targets situations in which 
income remains wholly or partially untaxed in Luxembourg, as Luxembourg 
does not or cannot exercise its taxing rights under the tax treaty due to its 
domestic rules.
423
 The treaty, therefore, grants the exemption to relieve 
double taxation in Germany only in those cases of income sourced in 
Luxembourg, which is “effectively taxed” (“tatsächlich besteuert”) in 
Luxembourg.
424
 Nevertheless, it is not entire clear in Luxembourg what 
“effective taxation” means for purposes of the tax treaty, as there is no 
administrative guidance or case law that might help in clarifying this term. 
Another practical application of the above can be found, e.g. in the Belgian 
tax treaty practice.
425
 Belgian tax treaties generally include in Article 23 the 
exemption method as a relief of double taxation. In the case of some tax 
treaties,
426
 however, the expression “may be taxed”, normally used in Article 
23 OECD Model, is substituted by the expression “is taxed”.
427
 In parallel, 
when interpreting the treaty relief provision and the expression “is taxed”, 
                                                          
422  Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and The Gran Duchy of 
Luxembourg for the avoidance of double taxation of 23 April 2012 (which replaced the 
treaty of 1958), Article 22(1)(a). 
423  F. Jacob and A. Hagena, The Germany-Luxembourg Income and Capital Tax Treaty 
(2012), 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn.10  (2012), Journals IBFD, p. 537. 
424  Id. 
425  N. Bammens, Subject-to-Tax Clauses in Belgian Tax Treaties–“Exemption Vaut Impôt” 
Doctrine Rejected Again in Case Law, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 8 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 
432. See also, L. De Broe and N. Bammens, Interpretation of subject-to-tax clauses in 
Belgium’s tax treaties: critical analysis of the “exemption vaut impôt” doctrine, 63 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 2 (2009), Journals IBFD. 
426  For example, the treaties with Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and the United States. 
See De Broe and Bammens, supra n. 425, p. 69. 
427  Bammens, supra n. 425. 





the Belgian tax authority has been inclined to apply a domestic doctrine 
known as “exemption vaut impôt”, which means that the wording “is taxed” 
is interpreted as being “subject to a tax regime in the source country” and 
not necessarily “to be subject to effective taxation” in the source State.
428
 
The Belgian jurisprudence has been quite contradictory on this matter. The 
Brussels Court of Appeal, e.g. in the Sidro case in 1970 ruled that the 
condition of Article 23 of the Belgian-Canada tax treaty should be 
interpreted as “effective taxation”.
429
 However, the Belgian Supreme Court 
ruled later on in favor of the taxpayer and provided that the requirement of 
being taxed abroad is not subject to any condition based on the nature, form 
or amount of the foreign tax.
430
 In other words, it is enough to be subject to a 
tax regime in the source State, even though no taxes are finally assessed. In 
a recent decision (“Mons Court case”) of 2014,
431
 however, the Tribunal de 
Première Instance de Mons, turned back and reaffirmed that the expression 
“is taxed” should be interpreted as requiring effective taxation in the source 
State and denying the application of the “exemption vaut impôt” doctrine.
432
 
                                                          
428  Id. 
429  The case concerned Sidro, a Belgian company, was the majority shareholder of a 
Canadian company. During the 1960s, Sidro sold its shares in the Canadian subsidiary, 
realizing a capital gain. However, no taxes were charged on that capital gain in Canada. 
Accordingly, Belgium’s unilateral relief provided for a reduced tax rate on income 
earned and taxed abroad. The Court of Appeals in Brussels held that the reduced rate 
could not be applied, because the capital gains were not “effectively taxed abroad”. See 
De Broe and Bammens, supra n. 425, p. 68. See also, Belgium: Brussels Court of 
Appeals, 28 May 1969, Rev. Fisc. 81 (1970). 
430  Id. 
431  Belgium: Mons., 11 Sep. 2013, No. 11/1078/A. 
432  The case, referred to the application of Article 23(2)(a) of the Belgium-Lithuania tax 
treaty (1998), concerned a Belgian resident who worked as a consultant in Lithuania for 
the EBRD. According to Lithuanian domestic law, the remuneration received by the 




As per the Tribunal de Première Instance de Mons’ s decision, the First-tier 
Tribunal (Tax Chamber) in the UK, during the Weiser case in 2012, set up a 
clear distinction between “liable to tax” and “subject to tax”.
433
 In the 
decision was stated that while “liable to tax” is a term normally used to 
refer a taxpayer that falls within the scope of a State’s taxation in general, 
“subject to tax” is used in relation to the chargeability of a specific item of 
income.
434
 In other words, the term “subject to tax” requires that income be 
actually within the charge to tax in the sense of being included in the 
computation of the taxpayer’s taxable income, with the result of a tax being 
paid.
435
 In other cases, it is doubtful whether or not a subject-to-tax 
provision is indeed a “subject-to-tax requirement”. Such is the case of 
Germany, which includes a “general subject to tax clause” in some of its 
tax treaties, known as “Regress clauses or Rückfallklauses”.
436
 An example 
can be found in the wording of Article 23(3) of the 1981 German-Canada 
tax treaty, which reads as follows: “For purposes of this Article, profits, 
income or gains of a resident of a Contracting State shall be deemed to arise 
from sources in the other Contracting State if they are taxed in that other 
                                                                                                                                       
Belgian resident was taxable in Lithuania, but the Framework Agreement between 
Lithuania and the EBRD required Lithuania to exempt it.  The taxpayer, relying in the 
“exemption vaut impôt” doctrine, argued that Belgium should exempt the remuneration 
even though this has not been subject to tax in Lithuania, because of the Framework 
Agreement. See Bammens, supra n.425, pp. 432-433. 
433  See the reference to the Weiser case law at supra n. 319. 
434  Cleave, supra n. 319, p. 282. 
435  Id., p. 281. 
436  H. Chen, Interpretation of Subject-to-Tax Clauses, in: M. Schilcher and P. Weninger 
(eds), Fundamental Issues and Practical Problems in Tax Treaty Interpretation, Linde, 
Vienna (2008), pp. 379-380. 





Contracting State in accordance with this Agreement”.
437
 The BFH, 
however, has been clear in sustaining that such clauses do not constitute a 
subject to tax clauses.
438
  
Other problems associated to the use of subject-to-tax clauses refer to the 
evident contradiction between subject to tax clauses and the pure application 
of the exemption method to relieve double taxation.
439
 As the author has 
sustained before in this work, the exemption method, unlike the credit 
method to relieve double taxation, should be applied regardless the 
consideration upon the taxation of the income in the other country.
440
 This 
simplicity is in fact one of the main reasons for countries to opt for the 
exemption rather than the credit method to relieve double taxation, and it is 
also one of the reasons of its justified success in continental Europe where it 
is the preferred method.
441
 This is why some authors have recommended 
that, unless some particular reasons inspired in the other Contracting States’ 
                                                          
437  Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany for the avoidance of 
Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and certain others of 17 July 1981 
(also “German-Canada Tax Treaty” ), Article 23(3) 
438  DE: BFH 17.02.2003. 1 R 14/02. BStBl II 2004, referred to Article 23(3) of the 
German-Canada Tax Treaty. 
439  Likewise, one could also argue that the economic idea behind the application of the 
exemption method (CIN) is violated through the use of these subject-to-tax clauses. 
Nevertheless, this analysis certainly exceeds the purpose of this Chapter and this whole 
work. 
440  OECD Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B concerning the methods for elimination 
of double taxation, para. 34. 
441  See, e.g. Schön, supra n. 89. 




tax system motivate the inclusion of subject-to-tax clauses, a good tax treaty 
policy should indeed refrain of doing that.
442
  
An issue of particular interest in the whole study of subject-to-tax clauses is 
how some countries have opted for introducing these clauses onto domestic 
laws, overriding the tax treaty provisions that refer to the application of the 
exemption method. This is the case of Germany, e.g. who in 2004 
introduced a treaty override provision under which income from 
employment is only treaty exempt insofar the taxpayer gives evidence that 
this has been taxed or that the other State waived its right to tax.
443
 
Subsequently, in 2007, it introduced a second domestic rule by which the 
tax treaty exemption is denied if the income is not taxed in the other country 
by reason of a domestic law that forbids that State to tax the income for the 
sole reason that the taxpayer is not liable to unlimited taxation, because of 
his residence, habitual abode (domicile), place of management, seat or any 
other similar criterion.
444
 In parallel, and most importantly, a further treaty 
                                                          
442  See Lüdicke, supra n. 419, p. 296. 
443  DE: Sec. 50d(8) of the Income Tax Act [“Einkommensteutergesetz–EStG”]. According 
to Lüdicke, this provision is also inconsistent with a long-standing unilateral exemption 
policy of certain employee income derived from Germany’s non-tax treaty partners. See 
Lüdicke, supra n. 419, p. 294. Interestingly, however, in a decision of 15 December 
2015, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG–Bundesverfasungsgericht) held that 
Sec. 50d(8) of the Income Tax Act is absoulutelty compatible with the German 
Constitution, despite the fact of overriding tax treaty law. See DE: BVerfG, Beschl. 
15.12.2015 – 2 BvL 1/2, URL: http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20151215_2bvl000112.html  
444  DE: Sec. 50d(9), No. 2 of the Income Tax Act [“Einkommensteutergesetz–EStG”]. This 
domestic rule was introduced as a reaction to the jurisprudence of the German Federal 
Tax Court [Bundesfinanzhof (BFH)], specifically to the landmark decision of 17 
December 2003 regarding the application of the 1981 Canada-Germany tax treaty, 





override provision was introduced within German law, with retroactive 
effect in this case, according to which a treaty exemption is not granted 
inasmuch the other State applies the treaty in a way that income is not taxed 
or it is taxed at a very reduced rate.
445
 For some authors, however, this latter 
provision works in practice more as a switch-over clause rather than subject-
to-tax clause.
446
 Needless to say is that the tax treaty override represents a 
real threat to legal certainty.
447
  
Last but not least, it worth to assume the question whether a general subject-
to-tax clause to prevent double non-taxation shall be included in the OECD 
Model. Such type of provision can be found, e.g. in Article 26(2) of the 
Nordic Tax Convention, although its application is limited. According to 
Article 26(2), if the treaty attributes the right to tax to any income or 
property to the source State, and that State, according to its domestic law, 
                                                                                                                                       
according to which relevant provisions contained in the treaty should not be interpreted 
such that they allow Germany to tax only items of income that are not subject to tax in 
the other Sate. This provision is triggered in cases where income that would be taxed in 
the hands of residents of the source State, it is exempt for non-residents, either by 
application of a treaty or domestic law. However, it excludes general domestic tax 
exemptions applicable to both residents and non-residents. See R. Resch, The New 
German Unilateral Switch-Over and Subject-to-Tax Rule, 47 Eur. Taxn. 10 (2007), 
Journals IBFD, p. 480.  
445  DE: Sec. 50d(9), No. 1 of the Income Tax Act [“Einkommensteutergesetz–EStG”]. This 
provision only applies in a tax treaty context. Therefore, it is not triggered because of 
any tax exemption of the domestic laws of the Contracting States.  Id. 
446  Id. 
447  The OECD addressed the problem of treaty override in its 1989 report, in which it 
recommended member countries to avoid enacting any legislation that is intended to 
have effects that contradict international treaty obligations. See OECD (1989), Tax 
Treaty Override, OECD Publishing, Paris. For an analysis on the debate with respect to 
treaty override in Germany see, e.g. A. Perdelwitz, Treaty Override–Revival of the 
Debate over the Constitutionality of Domestic Treaty Override Provisions in Germany, 
53 Eur. Taxn. 9/Special Issue (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 445. 




does not subject entirely such income or property to tax liability, that 
income not included in the tax liability shall be taxable only in the residence 
State. This provision, however, does not apply to qualification or 
interpretation conflicts. It does not apply in case of disagreements between 
the Contracting States on the facts and circumstances of a case or on the 
interpretation of the Convention. In other words, it deals very good with 
cases of DNT caused by national laws, but it does not, however, for cases of 
DNT derived by the treaty itself in a classification conflict situation.  It is 
undeniable that such a clause could make things easier in terms of avoiding 
ambiguous interpretations of tax treaties, at least with respect to the 
avoidance of DNT.
448
 However, it is not surprising that no discussion was 
carried out during (or after) the major tax revolution started with the BEPS 
Project in 2013. It is, thus, the author’s view that inasmuch no general 
subject-to-tax provision comes into play, the use of subject-to-tax-clauses, 
and subsequently the ensuring of single taxation as a tax treaty aim, will 
remain exceptional. 
4.2.2. Switch-over clauses 
Switch-over clauses is another tax treaty manner in which countries may 
ensure that income does not remain untaxed, preventing thus that DNT 
arises. Specifically, these clauses allow a State to switch from the exemption 
                                                          
448   Chen, supra n. 436, pp. 383-384.  





method to the credit method in cases where DNT arises.
449
 As per the 
subject-to-tax clauses, the design and use of the switch-over clauses vary 
from country to country, although they all have in common the aim of 
avoiding that income remains untaxed because of the application of the 




The inclusion of switch-over clauses within tax treaties is, however, not 
always an acceptable tax policy and it can become irrelevant under certain 
circumstances. Thus is especially true if the same “switch-over” effect can 
be achieved under other provisions in the OECD Model, e.g. under the 
OECD interpretation of Article 23A(4) OECD Model. As already stressed 
during this Chapter, the OECD approach on this matter is that the residence 
State shall not be obliged to grant the exemption method if the source State 
interprets the facts of a case or the provisions of the Convention in such a 
way that it consider itself fully or partially restricted from taxing an specific 
                                                          
449  Lang, supra n. 21, p. 129. 
450  Germany, e.g. has used switch-over clauses in its tax treaties since the 1980s. The 
original intention of them was to avoid double taxation and DNT, although later on the 
clauses were restricted to eliminating DNT. The switch from the exemption to the credit 
method applies if in the Contracting States items of income or capital are placed under 
different provisions or attributed to different persons, and inasmuch the conflict cannot 
be solved before through a MAP and if as a result of the difference in placement or 
attribution, the relevance income or capital would remain untaxed or taxed lower than 
without this conflict. Thus, in theory, the application of the clause depends of the 
(un)successful prior MAP, although this requirement has been overridden by the 
application of domestic provisions included in 2007, which made the MAP requirement 
useless. See Lüdicke, supra n. 419, p. 291. For an example of the German tax treaty 
practice of including switch-over clauses, see, e.g. Article 23(1)(e)(aa) of the Germany-
United Kingdom tax treaty (2010) or Article 24(1) of the Germany-Singapore tax treaty 
(2004). 




item of income or capital.
451
 This is exactly the same effect that could be 
achieved through a switch-over provision. Likewise, the use of switch-over 
clauses is redundant in cases where a subject-to-tax clause was already 
included within the same tax treaty. Having in mind the aim of preventing 
DNT, it is certainly impossible to imagine the practical function of a switch-
over clause when an item of income was already taxed due to the proper 
application of a subject-to-tax clause.  
 
The spread use of switch over clauses can also generate special tax treaty 
concerns when domestic switch-over clauses are introduced within domestic 
laws overriding tax treaty obligations.
452
 This problem could be even 
exacerbated if a massive treaty override practice is implicitly encouraged by 
specific legislative projects in a supranational level. An example of the 
above can be materially found in the original text of the proposal for an 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) in Europe, which was issued in the 
beginning of 2016. In brief, the proposed European Directive was part of a 
whole Anti-Tax Avoidance Package that intended to address a number of 
issues connected to the implementation of the OECD BEPS Project. Among 
the provisions proposed, there was the inclusion of a switch-over clause 
                                                          
451  Infra Section 3.4. See also, OECD Commentary on Article 23A and Article 23B 
concerning the methods for elimination of double taxation, para. 56.1. 
452  The issue of tax treaty override and the Constitutional concerns derived from it has been 
largely discussed in Germany. See, e.g. Lüdicke, supra n. 419; Perdelwitz, supra n. 447. 







 that would allow a MS not to apply the exemption system to 
relieve double taxation in cases where the taxpayer receives a profit 
distribution or proceeds from a disposal of shares held in an entity located in 
a third country (not MS) regarded as low tax jurisdiction.
454
 Beyond the 
criticisms stressed somewhere else by this and other authors regarding the 
limitation in the use of the exemption method to relive double taxation and 
the comparison between statutory corporate tax rates to trigger the 
application of this Article,
455
 the promotion of a massive treaty override was 
indeed a major fact, specially because of the prevalence of EU Law over 
treaty commitments, at least regarding tax treaties signed after 1 January 
1958.
456
 Fortunately, the final text of the Directive has been modified and it 
does not currently include a switch-over provision anymore, a decision that 
seems to be more in line with the whole OECD BEPS project, which has 
                                                          
453  The original text of Article 6(1) reads as follows: “Member States shall not exempt a 
taxpayer from tax on foreign income which the taxpayer received as a profit distribution 
from an equity in a third country or as proceeds from the disposal of shares held in an 
entity in a third country or as income from a permanent establishment situated in a third 
country […]”. 
454  The determination of a low tax jurisdiction criterion is made based on a comparison 
between both the corporate statutory tax rates of the State of the subsidiary and the State 
of the taxpayer. If the profits or proceeds were subject to a statutory corporate tax rate 
lower than 40% of the statutory tax rate that would have been charged under the 
applicable corporate tax system in the MS of the taxpayer. Id. 
455  See A. Navarro, L. Parada & P. Schwarz, The Proposal for an EU Anti-avoidance 
Directive: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 25 EC Tax Rev. 3 (2016). 
456  Because of Article 351 TFEU, tax treaties signed before 1 January 1958 would prevail 
over EU Law. For the prevalence of EU Law over tax treaty commitments, see EU: 
Judgment in Costa v. E.N.E.L., C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66. 




never included a literal switch-over clause 
457
 and which finally aims to tax 




It is interesting to note that even considering the undesirable effects of 
switch-over clauses described above, and regardless the inclusion of Article 
23A(4) in the OECD Model, some countries insist in the use of these clauses 
to avoid DNT. The above, in the author’s view, is not only a recognition that 
Article 23A(4) OECD Model is not completely effective to solve all 
situations of DNT derived from conflicts of interpretation, but also a 
demonstration that countries understand that without the explicit inclusion 
of these type of clauses, DNT cannot be implicitly understood as an aim or 
per se object of the tax treaties themselves, remaining thus as an exception 
within the tax treaty practice. 
5. The impact of the OECD BEPS Action 6 proposal  
The OECD has recently proposed a modification of the OECD Model, 
which might include expressly the avoidance of DNT as an object and 
                                                          
457  Indirectly, however, we could argue that the defensive rule promoted under the OECD 
BEPS Action 2 has a similar effect than a switch-over clause. Indeed, as we will see 
further on in this work, this rule obligates a country to deny an exemption in the 
receiving country of the payment if the income received was deducted in the payor 
country. See infra Chapter V. 
458  The concept of “value creation” has been, however, subject to criticism by important 
scholars, basically because of its lack of consistency with the traditional application of 
the arm’s length standard without renouncing to the old belief. See, e.g. W. Schön, 
Transfer Pricing Issues of BEPS in the light of EU Law, 3 British Tax Rev. 417 (2015) 
and Y. Brauner, supra n. 200. 





purpose of the tax treaties. This proposal has been issued through the 2013 
OECD BEPS Action Plan 6
459
 and it is ratified and explained in detail in the 
subsequent 2014 deliverables
460
 as well as in the 2015 final report.
461
 It is 
also ratified in the wording of the recently relseased draft of the 2017 update 
to the OECD Model.
462
 When finally introduced, these changes might direct 
impact in the interpretation of tax treaties as per the rules of Article 31 of the 
VCLT already analyzed in Section 2 of this Chapter.  
 
The OECD proposal can be divided in three main amendments concerning 
the outcome of DNT: (1) a modification of the title of the OECD Model 
including a reference to tax evasion and tax avoidance; (2) a 
recommendation of a preamble, which includes that tax treaties cannot 
create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion 
or tax avoidance, and 3) the inclusion of the concept of “special tax 




                                                          
459   Id. 
460  OECD (2014), Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 
Paris. 
461  OECD (2015), supra n. 200. 
462  OECD (2017), Draft Contents of the 2017 Update to the OECD Model Convention, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. See also, OECD (2017a), Draft Contents of the 2017 Update to 
the OECD Model Convention, Comments received on the 11 July public release, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 




5.1. Modification of the title of the OECD Model 
The first of the modification introduced by the OECD BEPS Action Plan 6 
is to replace the current title of the OECD Model by the following: 
“Convention between (State A) and (State B) for the elimination of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital and the prevention of 




Although this modification is part of 2013 OECD BEPS Action Plan, it is in 
fact not a novel feature in the OECD Model. Specifically speaking, in 2003, 
paragraph 7 of the OECD Commentaries on Article 1 was already modified 
in order to include such a reference to tax evasion and tax avoidance.  
Paragraph 7 reads now as follows: “[…] It is also a purpose of tax 
conventions to prevent tax avoidance and evasion”.
464
 Accordingly, the 
OECD Model 2014 provides that States that wish to include in the title a 
reference to either the avoidance of double taxation or both the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion may do so.
465
 Therefore, 
the real impact of this modification as regards to the question whether tax 
treaties aim or not to prevent DNT is practically zero. Firstly, because it 
                                                          
463  Id., p. 91. The current title of the OECD Model 2014 says: “Convention between (State 
A) and (State B) with respect to taxes on income and capital”, without any reference to 
double non-taxation. The wording is ratified in the draft contents of the 2017 update to 
the OECD Model. OECD (2017), supra n. 462.  
464   OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the Convention, 
para. 7. 
465  Title of the 2014 OECD Model Tax Convention, footnote 1.  





refers to two concepts (tax evasion and tax avoidance) not equivalent to the 
outcome of DNT and whose scope is already included within Article 26 
(new Article 27) OECD Model.
466
 As this author has repeatedly sustained, 
fiscal or tax evasion is in fact an aim of tax treaties recognized in Article 26 
of the OECD Model (new Article 27), regarding to exchange of information, 
and which refers to problems of governance failure in collecting taxes due to 
a lack of information.
467
 However, tax evasion has nothing to do with 
ensuring single taxation or avoiding DNT. Likewise, tax avoidance supposes 
that a taxpayer can use legal alternatives available or can create new ones in 
order to reduce its tax burden as low as possible, not being an illegal 
behavior. Therefore, this behavior of the taxpayer will be considered 
objectionable or not depending of the level of tolerance in a determined 
jurisdiction and the effect in the public revenues.
468
 Secondly, the absence of 
a direct reference to DNT in the title allows this author to conclude that an 
interpretation that tax treaties aim to prevent DNT should be simply 
discarded.  
5.2. The inclusion of a recommended Preamble in the OECD Model 
Jointly with a modification in the title of the OECD Model, it is proposed 
that the OECD Model recommends a preamble that include expressly that 
the tax treaties, are not intended to “create opportunities for non-taxation or 
                                                          
466  Supra Chapter I, Section 4. 
467  Id. 
468  Supra Chapter I, Section 4.2. 




reduced taxation through tax evasion or tax avoidance (including through 
treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this 
Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third States)”.
469
 The 
modification of the preamble is accompanied by an inclusion of a paragraph 
16.1 in the Introduction, which says: “The changes made expressly 
recognize that the purpose of the Convention are not limited to the 
elimination of double taxation and that the Contracting States do not intend 
the provisions of the Convention to create opportunities for non-taxation or 
reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance”.
470
 The above, if 
finally included within a negotiated treaty,
471
 might have an immediate 
                                                          
469  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, p. 92. A similar wording was included in the revised 
preamble of the 2016 US Model, which states: “The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of […], intending to conclude a Convention for the 
elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income without creating 
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance 
(including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed to obtain reliefs provided in this 
Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third states), have agreed as follows:”. 
United States Model Income Tax Convention (2016), front page. See also the same 
wording in the recently released draft contents of the 2017 update to the OECD Model. 
OECD (2017), supra n. 462. 
470  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, p. 93. 
471  The literal wording of this proposed preamble (and title) has already been used in the 
new tax treaty between Germany and Australia, which says: “Australia and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Desiring to further develop their economic relationship and to 
enhance their cooperation in tax matters, Intending to conclude an Agreement for the 
elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without 
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or 
avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs 
provided in this Agreeemnt for the indirect benefit of residents of third States […]” 
(emphasis added). See Agreement between Australia and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the Elimination of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and Avoidance of 11 Nov. 2015, p. 2. 





impact in the interpretation of tax treaties, since the preamble of tax treaties 
is part of their context, and thus a fundamental part of their interpretation.
472
 
Nevertheless, the wording of the preamble at stake is open to criticism both 
in form and in substance. Firstly, the proposed preamble includes not only 
cases of DNT, but also cases of “reduced taxation”, whatever reduced 
taxation means for this purpose. The above might create serious problems of 
interpretation. On one hand, because it is not clear which references should 
be used to compare between tax systems in order to determine that a level of 
“reduced taxation” has been achieved. For example, one might compare 
using statutory tax rates, or “effective tax rates” or, perhaps a pre-elaborated 
OECD table might determine the “minimum” of taxation required by 
country. On the other hand, and as it has been stressed before in this work, 
DNT and reduced taxation (under-taxation) should not be regarded as 
equivalent concepts, because in fact they represent two different 
outcomes.
473
 While the former implies a complete absence of taxation, the 
latter supposes that at least a minimum level of taxation was achieved. Thus, 
the item of income in question was taxed at least once. However, when 
putted together (non-taxation and reduced taxation), we confuse again the 
nature of DNT, creating an a priori negative idea upon it.
474
   
 
 Secondly, it has been intrinsically suggested in the wording of the proposed 
preamble that only the cases of DNT derived strictly from cases of tax 
                                                          
472  Article 31(1) of the VCLT.  
473  Supra Chapter I, Section 2.2. 
474  Id. 




evasion or tax avoidance should be a matter of concern.
475
 Hence, one 
should conclude thus that in all of those cases in which the outcome of DNT 
has been generated neither through a fraudulent conduct from the taxpayer 
that it is aimed to cause an illegal reduction in the amount of tax to be paid 
nor through an objectionable, but not illegal conduct aimed to reduce the 
taxpayer’s tax burden, the outcome of DNT is not be regarded as a cause of 
concern at all. This intrinsic limitation is remarkable because it recognizes 
that DNT is indeed not per se a problem. Nevertheless, it might generate 
new problems of interpretation, because both the concept of tax evasion and 
tax avoidance are eminently domestic concepts, and thus, their boundaries 
are not homogeneous for all countries.
476
 As already stressed in Chapter I, 
tax evasion is generally an illegal conduct around the world. However, tax 
avoidance is not. Therefore, the level of tolerance to tax avoidance in each 
country will certainly determine the extension to which the preamble of the 
treaty contributes to the interpretation of the treaty. In other words, the 
concept of tax avoidance can in any case be interpreted autonomously and it 
will always require a reference to domestic law. 
 
Thirdly, and finally, this author considers that the wording of the proposed 
preamble certainly exceeds the mandate of the G-20 when the BEPS Project 
                                                          
475  The use of the word “through” instead of “for example” or “among others” in the 
proposed Preamble clearly suggests a narrow interpretation. The preamble states that tax 
treaties are not intended “to create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax evasion or tax avoidance […]”. See OECD (2015), supra n. 200. 
476  Supra Chapter I, Section 4. 





was launched. If recalled, the BEPS Action Plan stated: “No or low taxation 
is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with 
practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that 
generate it”.
477
 This is to say, tax treaty entitlement is conditioned to 
substance and economic functionality, i.e. activities that contribute to value 
creation or active trade or business, etc. Therefore, taxpayers should not be 
seen as abusing a treaty where genuine businesses are set up, even if non-
taxation derived from the application of that treaty is the result of those 
businesses. As already stressed in this work, DNT can be indeed an 




5.3. The new concept of “Special Tax Regime (STR)” 
Action 6 also includes a proposal, not originally introduced in the 2014 
draft,
479
 addressing what is called “special tax regimes” (STR).
480
 Under the 
proposal, the treaty benefits related to interest (Article 11 OECD Model), 
royalties (Article 12 OECD Model) and other income (Article 21 OECD 
Model) would be denied in case of persons that are subject to a STR with 
                                                          
477  OECD (2013), supra n. 2, p. 10. 
478  A similar view was provided in the Revised Public Discussion Draft on Action 6. See 
OECD (2015), Comments Received on Revised Public Discussion Draft, Follow-up 
Work on BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 100-101.  
479  OECD (2014), supra n. 460. 
480  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, pp. 96-98. 




respect to these particular items of income.
481
 For this purpose, a STR with 
respect to an item of income or profits “means any legislation, regulation or 
administrative practice that provides a preferential effective rate of taxation 
to such income or profit, including through reductions in the tax rate or the 
tax base […]”.
482
 Several exclusion from the special tax regime status are 
also provided for any legislation, regulation or administrative practice that, 
e.g. is designed to prevent double taxation or that implement the principles 
of Article 7 or Article 9 OECD Model, among others.
483
 The proposal also 
includes the respective modification in Articles 11, 12 and 21 OECD Model 
in order to entitle the source State to tax these types of income, beneficially 
owned by a resident of the other Contracting State, if such resident is subject 
to a STR at any time during the taxable period in which the income is paid, 
                                                          
481  Id. 
482  Id., p. 96. 
483  The 2015 Final Draft states: “However, the term shall not include any legislation, 
regulation or administrative practice: (i) the application of which does not 
disproportionately benefit interest, royalties or other income, or any combination 
thereof; (ii) except with regard to financing income, that satisfies a substantial activity 
requirement; (iii) that is designed to prevent double taxation; (iv) that implements the 
principles of Article 7 (Business Profits) or Article 9 (Associated Enterprises); (v) that 
applies to persons which exclusively promote religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, 
cultural or educational activities; (vi) that applies to persons substantially all of the 
activity of which is to provide or administer pension or retirement benefits; (vii) that 
facilitates investment in widely-held entities that hold real property (immovable 
property), a diversified portfolio of securities, or any combination thereof, and that are 
subject to investor-protection regulation in the Contracting State in which the investment 
entity is established; or (viii) that the Contracting States have agreed shall not constitute 
a special tax regime because it does not result in a low effective rate of taxation;”. Id., p. 
97. 










Unsurprisingly, the STR proposal of Action 6, originally tabled by the U.S. 
delegate to the Working Party, mirrors the draft of the 2016 US Model, 
which includes a similar concept in Article 3(1).
485
 Unlike the OECD 
proposal, however, the draft of the US Model is accompanied by a more 
detailed Technical Explanation draft, from which is possible to determine 
that the tax policy behind its introduction is no other than to mitigate the 
generation of DNT in instances where tax treaties are abused in combination 
with tax regimes that offer specially beneficial tax status. As provided in the 
Preamble of the of the 2016 US Model: “Consistent with the G20-OECD 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative, the STR provisions are 
intended to mitigate instances of double non-taxation whereby a taxpayer 
uses provisions in the tax treaty, combined with special tax regimes, to pay 
no or very low tax in either treaty country”.
486
 This intention is later on 
reaffirmed in the same text when it states: “It is inappropriate for tax treaties 
to reduce U.S. statutory withholding rates on deductible U.S. source 
payments when the related income is subject to no or very little tax”.
487
 
Nevertheless, and although not expressly recognized in the 2015 Final 
Report on Action 6, it was perhaps the existence of specific tax regimes 
                                                          
484  Id., p. 98. 
485  U.S. Model Tax Convention (2016), Article 3(1). 
486  Preamble to U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 17 February 2016, p. 2.  
487  Id. 




related to the transfer of intellectual property rights from one country to a 
lower-tax jurisdiction and the resulting of granting treaty benefits to base-
eroding payments (i.e. “IP Boxes”), the real aim behind this proposal.
488
 
5.3.1. A critical view upon the concept of STR  
There is no doubt about the aim of the new concept of STR rule: the 
prevention of double non-taxation when it derives from the use of STR. 
Some deficiencies in the design of the rule, however, leave still serious 
doubts regarding the capability of it to achieve its aim and open the door for 
criticism. In this order of ideas, it can be firstly argued that the scope of 
application of the STR rule is very broad and subjective. On one hand, it is 
broad if we consider that under the OECD proposal, the STR rule applies to 
both related and unrelated transactions, even though the information 
available as to whether a tax regime is special or not is not equally available 
                                                          
488  The analysis of the “IP Box regimes” certainly exceeds the purpose of this work. 
However, for further and detailed analysis on this subject see, e.g. R. Danon, General 
Report, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 100A– Tax Incentives for R&D 
(IFA 2015), p. 17-56; E. Traversa, Tax Incentives and Territoriality within the European 
Union: balancing the internal market with the tax sovereignty of member states, 6 
World Tax J. 3 (2014), Journals IBFD; P. Palazzi, Taxation and Innovation, OECD 
Taxation Working Paper No. 9, OECD Publishing, Paris (2011); I. Zammit, Centralized 
Intellectual Property Business Models–Tax Implications of EU Patent Box Regimes, 69 
Bull Intl. Taxn. 9 (2015), Journals IBFD; Å. Hansson and C. Brokelind, Tax Incentives, 
tax expenditures theories in R&D: the case of Sweden, 6 World Tax J. 2 (2014), 
Journals IBFD; R. Matteotti and P. Roth, Tax Incentives on research and development, 
Archives de droit fiscal Suisse May/June 2015, Special issue IFA Basel 2015, available 
at www.asa.online, acceded on 11 Jan. 2017; M. Soler and E. Gil, Encouraging 
Research and Development (and Innovation) in the Spanish Tax System, 70 Bull. Intl. 
Taxn. 8 (2016), Journals IBFD. 





in both situations. For example, it is expected that both taxpayers and tax 
authorities will require detailed information about a taxpayer in the other 
Contracting States. This information can easily be obtained in case of 
related-parties; however, it is possible to imagine some important limitations 
in the case of unrelated ones. Likewise, it is more likely that loan or royalty 
transactions made with the purpose of wrongfully acceding to the benefits of 
a treaty be carried out between related than unrelated parties. Hence, this 
author does not see any strong reason to extent the application of the STR 
rule to unrelated-parties.
489
 On the other hand, it is subjective since there is 
no objective benchmark as to what a tax regime should be compared. For 
example, should a tax regime be regarded special with respect to another 
just because the former contains different tax depreciation rules, or different 
rules for claiming financial expense? What if a tax regime contains special 
features included in a comprehensive way within the tax regime as a whole? 
Is that also “special” for purposes of the STR rule? The proposed paragraph 
15.2 of the introduction of the OECD Model is unfortunately helpless in 
providing some clarity in this regard. This paragraph only contains a general 
statement which provides as follows: “States should also consider whether 
there are elements of another State’s tax system that could increase the risk 
of non-taxation, which may include tax advantages that are ring-fenced from 
                                                          
489  Id. The scope of the STR was already narrowed in the 2016 US Model, where the rule 
applies only to related-party interest payments, royalty payments and guarantee fee 
payments within the scope of Article 21 US Model. A similar modification should be 
made with respect to the OECD proposal. 






 Nevertheless, it is still unclear what a “tax 
advantage” means for this purpose. A reference could be made, however, to 
the US Model, which provides some more objectives criteria. One of the 
requirements for a statute, regulation or administrative practice to be 
regarded as a STR is that “is generally expected to result in a rate of 
taxation that is less than the lesser of: A) 15%; or B) 60% of the general 
statutory rate of company tax applicable in the other Contracting State”.
491
 
This objective criterion can certainly help in improving the design of the 
STR rule, but more importantly in avoiding that taxpayers and tax 
authorities adopt conflicting position with respect to the concept of STR.  
Accordingly, it is not entirely clear to which extent an “administrative 
practice” can become a STR. This is to say, it is clear that the term STR 
includes the ruling practice of a State (perhaps the only real motive of this 
rule), although a ruling practice can vary a lot from country to country. 
Some insights might, however, be extracted again from the US Model 
Technical Explanation’s draft, which provides an illustrative example on 
this matter. The example states as follows: “[I]f a taxpayer obtains a ruling 
providing that its foreign source interest income will be subject to a low rate 
of taxation in the residence State, and that rate is lower than the rate that 
generally would apply to foreign source interest income received by 
residents of that State, the administrative practice under which the ruling is 
                                                          
490  Paragraph 15.2 of the introduction of the OECD MODEL. See OECD (2015), supra n. 
200, pp. 94-95. 
491   U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (2016), Article 3(1)(iii). 





obtained is a special tax regime”.
492
 Although the example is clear in 
providing that a ruling will be included as administrative practice, it is still 
not clear from that example if both private and public rulings will be equally 
included.  
 
Moreover, within the list of exceptions of legislations, regulations or 
administrative practices that should not be regarded as STR, there is an 
exception by which any legislation, regulation or administrative practice 
“designed to prevent double taxation” is not considered a STR. Following 
this order of ideas, if a taxpayer obtains a ruling in State X, which grants the 
application of a domestic exemption to relieve double taxation with respect 
to foreign sourced interest coming from State Z, and which are beneficially 
owned by a resident in country Y, that ruling should not be regarded as a 
STR, for purposes of the application of the treaty between State Y and State 
X, because it aims to prevent double taxation. Subsequently, if State Y does 
not tax the interest either,
493
 the DNT outcome remains as an acceptable one. 
A similar conclusion can be achieved if that rule is introduced by statute or 
any other regulation. This effect could, however, be neutralized by the 
parallel proposal in Action 6 that intends to make a tax treaty responsive to 
certain future changes in a country’s domestic tax laws.
494
 Under this 
proposal if at any time after signing the Convention, either of the 
                                                          
492  New Article 3 Paragraph 1(l) definition of “Special Tax Regime”, Select Draft 
Provisions of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 20 may 2015, p. 3. 
493  The fact that the interest payments are beneficially owned by a resident of State Y in this 
case does not mean that State Y must subject to tax those interest payments.  
494  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, p. 98. 




Contracting State provides an exemption from the taxation to resident 
companies or resident individuals for substantially all foreign source income 
(including interest and royalties), the provisions of Article 10, 11, 12 and 21 
OECD Model may cease to have effect.
495
 For this purpose, a Contracting 
State may notify the other Contracting State through diplomatic channel that 
it will cease to apply the above-mentioned provisions, which will have 




Finally, it is important to highlight that under the application of the STR rule 
with respect to Article 11, 12 and 21 OECD Model, it is still up to the 
source State, to which the final taxing rights are assigned in those cases, to 
decide whether or not to tax those items of income. As provided, e.g. in the 
modification of Article 11 OECD Model, and repeated in the proposed 
modifications of Articles 12 and 21 OECD Model: “Interest arising in a 
Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in the first-mentioned Contracting State 
[…]” (emphasis added).
497
 In simple words, the application of the new STR 
rule should not be interpreted as a “subject-to-tax” provision or the like.
498
 
On the contrary, considering the limitation of tax treaties to assign taxing 
rights and not to enforce them, the literal wording of the STR rule only 
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496  Id. 
497  OECD (2015), supra n. 200. 
498  Supra Section 4.2.1. 





suggests an obvious conclusion, which is that tax treaties “may”, but not 
“must” prevent DNT. 
5.3.2. The STR rule and EU Law 
The practical application of a rule such as the one proposed under Action 6 
(STR) can have some inconveniences at the level of primary and secondary 
EU Law. With respect to EU primary law, the CJEU stated clearly in the 
SIAT case (2012), that domestic tax rules cannot determine the tax treatment 
of a payment made in one MS by reference to the characteristic of the tax 
system of another MS.
499
 In brief, the case referred to the application of a 
domestic Belgian law that limited the deductibility of the payments for some 
services received by a Belgian resident company (SIAT). The justification 
of the Belgian Government to deny the deduction was the application of 
Article 54 of the 1992 Belgian Income Tax Code that provides that the 
payments for supply or services, among other kind of payments, e.g. 
interest, shall not be regarded as business expenses where they are made to a 
non-resident taxpayer,
500
 if that payment is not subject there to a tax or is 
subject to a “tax regime which is appreciable more advantageous than the 
applicable tax regime in Belgium” (emphasis added).
501
 The taxpayer 
alleged that this domestic rule would infringe his freedom to provide 
                                                          
499  EU: Judgment in Société d´investissement pour l´agriculture tropicale S.A. (SIAT) v. 
Belgian State, C-318/10, EU:C:2012:415. 
500  BE: Under Article 227(2) of the 1992 Belgian Income Tax Code, foreign companies that 
do not have their seat, principal place of business or centre of management or 
administration in Belgium are among the entities that are subject to tax on non-residents.  
501  BE: Article 54 of the 1992 Belgian Income Tax Code. 






The CJEU finally ruled in favor of the taxpayer arguing that it 
was not clear what a “tax regime which is appreciable more advantageous 
than the applicable tax regime in Belgium” means for purposes of 
application of the rule, creating a level of uncertainty which can only be 
solved in a case-by-case basis.
503
 Accordingly, it sustained that the special 
rule of Article 54 was liable both to dissuade Belgian taxpayers from 
exercising their right to the freedom to provide services and from other to 
offer their services to recipients in Belgium.
504
 It follows thus that such a 





In an analogy between the Belgian rule (Article 54) and the STR rule 
proposed under Action 6, mostly considering the uncertainty of the term 
STR, which in certain manner coincides with the undefined term “tax 
regime appreciable more advantageous” under Belgian domestic law, it may 
be recommendable, at least from a policy perspective, to consider the 
position of the CJEU in cases like the one described above. Likewise, and 
although just some few services could be included under Article 21 OECD 
Model, there could be other fundamental freedoms jeopardized by the 
                                                          
502  The CJEU has consistently sustained that Article 49 EC precludes the application of any 
domestic rules, which have the effect of making the provision of services between MS 
more difficult. See, e.g. EU: Joined Judgments X and Passenheim-van Schoot, C-155/08 
and C-157/08 [2009], ECLI:EU:C:2009:368. 
503  C-318/10, EU:C:2012:415, supra n. 487, para. 26 and 27. 
504  Id., para. 28. 
505  Id., para. 29. 





application of the STR rule, e.g. the freedom of capital derived by the 
limitation of deductibility of interest in case those interest are not subject to 
tax in the other Contracting State. Nothing would prevent the CJEU to apply 
a similar reasoning in such cases. Some could also argue in contrast that a 
restriction of the fundamental freedoms could be anyway justified under the 
aim of combating tax evasion or tax avoidance. However, it is worth to 
recall in this regard that, as sustained by the CJEU in the past, a restriction 
to the fundamental freedoms could be justified in the need to combat tax 
evasion or tax avoidance only if the specific objective of such a restriction is 
to prevent a conduct consisting in the creation of “wholly artificial 
arrangements” which do not reflect economic reality and with the view of 




Regarding EU secondary law, one should bear in mind that Article 1(1) of 
the EU Interest and Royalty Directive provides a general mandate that 
interest or royalty payments arising in a MS shall be exempted from taxes 
impose in that MS (source State), provided that the beneficial owner of the 
interest or royalties is a company of a MS, or a PE of a MS’s company 
situated also in a MS.
507
 Contrary to this general prohibition, however, the 
application of the STR rule would imply that a source MS, which paid 
interest or royalties to the beneficial owner of the other MS (resident) where 
                                                          
506  EU: Cadbury Schweppes case and Halifax case, supra n. 112.  
507  Article 1(1) of the Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system 
of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated 
companies of different Member States, OJ L 157/49 (2003), hereinafter “Council 
Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003”. 




those items of income were subject to a STR, “may tax” them. Thus, a 
potential violation of the Interest and Royalty Directive could arise if the 




The prohibition of Article 1(1) of the Interest and Royalty Directive can be, 
however, released in case it precludes domestic or agreement-based 
provisions required for the prevention of fraud or abuse.
509
 Likewise, a MS 
may refrain to apply the Directive or withdraw its benefits in cases where 
the principal motive or one of the principal motives of the transactions is tax 
evasion, tax avoidance or abuse.
510
 Therefore, if by application of Article 
5(1) or (2) of the EU Interest and Royalty Directive the general prohibition 
of is released, the STR might be applicable. Nevertheless, the above should 
not prevent us to recognize that the limited wording of the rule –which opts 
for using the expression “may tax”, giving the source State the final decision 
of taxing or not– still leaves a high degree of uncertainty with respect to its 
practical application in these cases where the general prohibition of the 
Directive does not apply. 
                                                          
508  As already stressed in this work, the STR rule uses the wording  “may tax”, instead of, 
e.g. “must tax” or “shall be taxed”.  Therefore, it leaves up to the State of source to 
finally exercise the assigned taxing right. 
509  Article 5(1) of the Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003. 
510  Article 5(2) of the Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003. This provision is 
similar to Article 15(1a) of the Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 Oct. 2009 on the 
common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfer of assets and 
exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States and to the 






6. Final Remarks 
When answering the core question of this Chapter, which is whether tax 
treaties aim or not to prevent DNT as a broad tax policy goal, our answer 
should be clear and sound: No. As demonstrated during this Chapter, Tax 
treaties may certainly aim to counteract tax evasion and even sometimes tax 
avoidance. This has been since ever established through the inclusion of 
Article 26 (new Article 27) regarding exchange of information. However, 
and recalling what was explained already in Chapter I, none of those issues 
are necessarily equivalent concepts to DNT.
511
 The above does not mean, 
however, that tax treaties might under certain circumstances be interpreted 
as aiming to prevent DNT. Indeed, this aim is especially evident when 
countries decide to include subject-to-tax or switch-over clauses, mostly to 
limit the pure application of the exemption method to relieve double 
taxation and in a clear attempt to avoid that a specific item of income, in a 
cross-border transaction, remains untaxed. This aim is, nevertheless, as 
exceptional as when tax treaties directly pursue the outcome of DNT when, 
e.g. when tax sparing or matching credit clauses are included within tax 
treaties.  
 
The above puts on evidence some important conclusions. On one hand, 
DNT in a tax treaty context should also be regarded as a simple outcome, 
whose occurrence can be or not desirable depending upon the specific 
                                                          
511  Supra Chapter I, Section 4. 




circumstances surrounding a specific tax treaty. However, it is impossible to 
extract a general tax policy behind bilateral tax treaties that allows us to 
affirm that they, as a general rule, aim to prevent the concurrence of DNT. 
This conclusion remains valid even after the implementation of the new 
OECD interpretation of Articles 23A and 23 B OECD Model in the OECD 
Commentaries and the inclusion of a new Article 23A(4) OECD Model. 
None of the above mentioned Articles are effective enough to solve all the 
situations of DNT derived from either conflicts of qualification or 
interpretation. On the other hand, even when the prevention of DNT is 
included within some tax treaties either through a subject-to-tax or a switch-
over clause, the scope of these clauses is very limited, not being able to 
apply to the generality of situations of double non-taxation. This conclusion 
should not vary with the inclusion of a “general subject-to-tax clauses” 
resembling, e.g. the one included under Article 26(2) of the Nordic Tax 
Agreement. In simple words, no general tax policy aim of avoiding DNT 
might be concluded neither from the wording of the OECD Model nor from 
the tax treaty practice. 
 
Special attention should, however, be paid on the proposals included within 
the BEPS Action 6 (i.e. modification of the title and preamble of the OECD 
Model and the inclusion of the STR rule) and their impact in the 
interpretation of double tax treaties with respect to the aim of avoiding 
DNT. Such proposals, riskily ignored by commentators in favor of perhaps 






might suggest an interpretation of the tax treaties not only as avoiding 
double taxation, but also as preventing DNT. Nevertheless, this suggestion, 
under the author’s view, should rapidly be discarded due to various reasons. 
First, the unhappy wording of the modified OECD Model preamble, if 
finally introduced within tax treaties, could only suggest that these latter aim 
to prevent DNT exclusively in the cases where this outcome is the result of 
tax evasion or tax avoidance. However, the inhomogeneous construction of 
these concepts, eminently domestic ones, added to the imprecise 
equivalence given to the concepts of “DNT” and “reduced taxation” might 
create new and serious problems of interpretation. Needless to say is that the 
proposed wording certainly extend the mandate given by the G-20 when the 
BEPS Project was released. Second, the STR rule in case of Articles 11, 12 
and 21 OECD Model do not suggest any obligation to the source State to tax 
the item of income. On the contrary, it is still facultative to this State to 
exercise or not its taxing right assigned, as demonstrated in the use of the 
word “may be” instead of “is” or “must be”, which could suggest otherwise. 
Therefore, to interpret the rule as generally preventing that interest, royalties 
or other income, remain untaxed because of being subject to a STR, would 









Last but not least, the application of such a rule could face some problems 
within the EU, mostly derived from the current scope of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive. The implicit obligation to tax assigned to the source State 
within the STR rule could be impracticable with respect to transactions 










Hybrid Entities:  












The Hybrid Entities’ Conundrum: A (Simple) Tax Characterization 
Issue 
1. Introduction 
Chapter II and I have been so far devoted to establish the boundaries of what 
DNT is, including its implications within bilateral tax treaties. This Chapter 
turns now to analyze the second main element of this study: hybrid entities. 
For this purpose, the Chapter attempts to answer two simple questions: why 
hybrid entities (and reverse hybrid entities) exist and why one should care 
about them. The answer to these simple queries is, however, crucial for the 
further development of this study, especially when the interaction between 
hybrid entities and DNT is analyzed in further Chapters.
512
   
 
Section 2 refers to some key concepts that are necessary to circumscribe the 
subsequent analysis on hybrids and reverse hybrid entities. The above 
includes the distinction between legal and business entities, the difference 
between domestic and foreign entities, and the taxable and non-taxable 
status of entities from a domestic perspective. Section 3 turns the analysis 
into the concepts of hybrid entities and reverse hybrids, delimiting their 
terminology and subsequently analyzing in a systematic manner the 
different existing manners to characterize foreign entities for tax purposes. 
                                                          
512  Infra Chapters V, VI and VII. 
The Hybrid Entities’ Conundrum: A (Simple) Tax Characterization Issue 
 
 180 
This analysis includes the positive and negative different characteristics of 
the comparative approach; legal personality approach; overall approach and 
fixed approach with the purpose of demonstrating, on one hand, that no 
system prevails over the other, and on the other hand, that there is no 
completely inviolable system of characterization of foreign entities for tax 
purposes, being them therefore the result of specific domestic and sovereign 
tax policy decisions. Section 4, provides a detailed analysis of the U.S. CTB 
system as the largest and most famous “elective system” to characterize 
entities for tax purposes, reserving the taxpayers the exclusive right to 
determine when a foreign entity will be taxable or not. It also provides a 
reference to the previous characterization system used in the United States 
(i.e. Kintner test) as well as it analyzes the cases of tax planning 
opportunities derived from the CTB election, specifically with reference to 
the avoidance of Subpart F income (CFC rule) and the inappropriate use of 
foreign tax credit. This Section also demonstrates that the electivity of the 
CTB system is more apparent than real, and when compared, e.g. with a 
resemblance or comparable system, there is practicably no difference in 
terms of the possibilities to predict a desired characterization of entities. 
Section 5 provides three concrete examples of different degrees of 
coordination in the characterization of foreign entities: Spain, Denmark and 
the attempted coordination within the Proposal for an EU ATAD and the 
inclusion of Article 9a EU ATAD II, dealing with cases of payments made 
to reverse hybrid entities. These examples attempt to demonstrate that 






academic idea, but it can also be an effective manner to deal with hybrids 
and reverse hybrid entities. Section 6 finally provides some final remarks.  
2. Key Concepts 
There are basically three previous and necessary distinctions to make before 
going into the conceptual study of hybrid entities: the distinction between 
legal and business entities, the difference between domestic and foreign 
entities, and the issue regarding taxable and non-taxable entities. I will 
briefly refer to them during the subsequent subsections.   
2.1. Legal Entities and Business Entities 
As expected, there is no straightforward and uniform definition of legal 
entities. Indeed, the concept necessarily varies from country to country 
according to the different civil and company law traditions. Nevertheless, a 
legal entity can generally be understood as “a body having legal existence 
separate from its owners or participants […], such that is capable of having 
its own rights and incurring its own liabilities.”
513
 This separate existence is 
normally recognized in civil law countries as “separate legal personality”, 
and sometimes supposes also an important factor to determine the taxable 
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 In common law countries, however, where the concept 
of legal personality is not generally recognized, other elements can be 
considered.
515
 For example, in the United States whether an organization is 
an entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter or 
federal tax law and it does not depend whether the organization is 
recognized as an entity under state law.
516
 For example, a joint venture or 
other contractual arrangements may create a separate entity if the participant 
carry on a trade, business or financial operation, or venture and divide the 
profits therefrom. On the contrary, a joint undertaking merely to share 
expenses does not create a separate entity for federal tax purposes. 
Similarly, mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, 





                                                          
514  In Belgium, e.g. all entities that are residents for tax purposes, have legal personality, 
and are engaged in profit-making activities, are generally considered subject to corporate 
income tax. On the contrary, legal entities with no legal personality, such as 
partnerships, are considered as tax transparent. P. Vanhaute, Belgium in International 
Tax Planning, 2nd revised ed., IBFD, Amsterdam (2008), Chapter 7.10, Online Books 
IBFD.  In contrast, there are countries like Italy where, even though recognizing the 
concept of legal personality, this is indeed completely irrelevant for purposes of 
applying the Corporate Income Tax. M. Grandinetti, Italy, in: D. Gutmann (ed.) 
Corporate Income Tax Subjects, EATLP International Tax Series, Vol. 12, IBFD, 
Amsterdam (2015), p. 342. 
515  This is arguable, however, in the case of the UK where the jurisprudence has clearly 
recognized that Limited Partnerships have no separate legal personality, while e.g. LLPs 
and Scottish Partnerships have. See, e.g. U.K.: CA, 9 June 1998, Memec Plc. v. 
Commissionaire of Inland Revenue, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD.  
516  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-1(a)(1).  






Nonetheless, legal entities will not necessarily be considered as business 
entities. Business entities will generally include a type o legal entity whose 
purpose is to carry on businesses. In civil law countries, the distinction is 
normally made between civil law and company law companies, 
distinguishing among them with respect to the existence of commercial 
reasons that justifies their existence.
518
 In common law countries, however, 
the distinction tends to be more straightforward and provided directly by 
statute. For example, in the United States the IRC states that a business 
entity is basically any entity recognized for federal tax purposes, including a 
disregarded entity with a single owner that is not properly classified as a 
Trust or otherwise subject to special treatment under the Internal Revenue 
Code.
519
 This is why in the United States and many other countries, the 




Although the determination of legal and business entities seems to be a 
priori a matter of domestic law, it is interesting to note that it is also 
possible to find legal entities organized at a supranational level. Examples of 
the above are the European Company (SE),
520
 the European Cooperative 
                                                          
518  In Spain, e.g. as per the administrative practice of the DGT, a civil law entity might have 
a commercial object when it exercises an economic activity of production, exchange or 
services within the market. ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante V2378-15 of 28 July 2015. 
519  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(a) for the concept of business entities. See also, US: 
Treas. Reg. sec. 301.7701-4 for Trusts. 
520  EU: EC Regulation 2157/2001, Official Journal L 204/01. 





, the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG),
522
 
which are legal forms to a large extent governed by uniform EU law, but 





In spite of the above, this work will use the term entity as including any 
other arrangement as well, regardless the legal position taken by a country 
on who derives the income from that entity or arrangement and on whether 
this has or not legal personality in a specific jurisdiction.  
2.2. Domestic Entities and Foreign Entities 
As a general rule, countries have a clear understanding of what is a domestic 
entity, while such an understanding is not that clear when we talk about 
foreign entities. The reason seems to be obvious: each country decides 
sovereignly about their own legal forms. That is why countries generally opt 
to see foreign entities as the opposite of domestic ones, relying in the 
interpretation of the available legislation instead of providing a clear 
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Wijtvliet, A Consideration of the European Foundation: Alle Menschen werden 






definition of them, or simply using single criteria to determine the 
distinction between domestic and foreign entities.524 An example of the 
above is the worldwide extended use of the concept of place of 
incorporation and place of central management and control, which also 
normally coincide with the criterion to distinguish whether a company is tax 
resident or not in a specific jurisdiction. In the United States, e.g. the 
Treasury Regulations consider an entity as domestic if it is incorporated or 
organized in the United States or under the law of the United State or the 
law of any state or the District of Columbia.
525
 If an entity is organized in 
both a foreign country and in the United States, then it is also considered to 
be a domestic entity. All of the other entities are considered as foreign 
entities.
526
 Similarly, in the Netherlands an entity organized under Dutch law 
is considered as a resident taxpayer or domestic entity.
527
 Conversely, e.g. 
Ireland traditionally used the place of central management and control as a 
single criterion to determine whether an entity is domestic or foreign.
528
 
Other countries opt for using multiple choices to distinguish between 
domestic and foreign entities, recognizing both the place of incorporation 
and the place of management and control as determine factors. In the United 
                                                          
524  This makes the concept of foreign entities a residual (or default) one. See M. Lang and 
C. Staringer, General Report, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, 
Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 34. 
525  US: I.R.C Sec. 7701(a)(4) and Sec. 7701(a)(5). 
526  See the exception for domestic corporations with a wholly owned Mexican or Canadian 
subsidiary, which may elect to be treated as a domestic corporation under certain 
circumstances. US: Sec. 1504(d).  
527  NL: Article 2(4) of the Corporate Income Tax Act 1969. 
528  A. Moore, Ireland-Corporate Taxation sec. 1, Country Analyses IBFD (accessed 1 Feb. 
2017). 
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Kingdom, e.g. it is considered that if a company is incorporated in the 
country, it is thus resident for tax purposes. However, if an entity is 
incorporated abroad, but centrally managed and controlled in the United 




It is difficult to argue which one of the criteria, i.e. the place of 
incorporation or the place of central management and control, is the less 
easy to manipulate.
530
 Indeed, e.g. if Ireland would use the place of central 
management and control as a single criterion with respect to other countries 
using the place of incorporation as a single criterion, some unsound 
outcomes might arise. For example, a company incorporated in Ireland 
before October 2013 and centrally managed and controlled somewhere else, 
e.g. the United States, could have been considered tax resident nowhere, 
because while Ireland understood that the company was centrally managed 
in the United States, this latter country considered it incorporated there, 
                                                          
529  The only caveat is the case of an entity treated as resident in a territory outside the UK 
and not resident in the UK for tax treaty purposes. In such a case, the entity will be 
regarded as non-UK resident. See M. Baldwin and T. Kiranoglu, United Kingdom, in: 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax 
Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p.838. See also, e.g. S. Oliver, The Parent-Subsidiary o 
23 July 1990: A United Kingdom Perspective, 10 EC Tax Rev. 211 (2001).   
530   In reference to the place of incorporation test used in the United States, Bittker and 
Lokken state that: “[A] place of management test is less arbitrary than the present U.S. 
rule [place of incorporation] only if that place is identified by factors that are not easily 
manipulated. For example, if the place of management is considered to be where the 
board of directors meets, a place-of-management test is even more pliable than the 
present U.S. rule”. B. Bittker and L. Lokken, Fundamentals of International Taxation, 
US Taxation of Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpayers, Thomson Reuters, Valhala NY 






therefore, it was not regarded as a domestic corporation.
 531
 After October 
2013, however, these kinds of outcomes are no longer possible and an Irish 




2.3. Taxable and Non-Taxable Legal Entities 
As well as the distinction between domestic and foreign entities, the 
distinction between taxable and non-taxable entities at a domestic level is 
not homogenous around the globe, because it responds to specific and 
sovereign domestic tax policy decisions. Some countries, determine whether 
an entity is taxable or not with reference to its corporate or private law 
status, e.g. using the legal personality of the entity as a factor to determines 
its tax status. Nonetheless, not always the legal personality is decisive in 
determining the tax status of an entity at a domestic level. In the case of 
partnerships, e.g. many countries recognizes them as legal entities, subject 
to rights and obligations and able to appear in Court (i.e. having a separate 
legal personality), but they treat them for tax purposes as transparent 
                                                          
531  This was the situation with AOI, AOE and ASI, the three Irish subsidiaries of Apple Inc. 
that originated a sound and public debate, because these three entities, due to the 
combination of the domestic rules in the United States and in Ireland, were regarded as 
tax residents nowhere. See Ting, supra n. 29, pp. 4-45. 
532  Indeed, since 24 October 2013 where an Irish incorporated company is managed and 
controlled in a tax treaty country but is not resident there under that country’s law, and it 
is not normally regarded as resident in Ireland because it is not managed and controlled 
in Ireland, it will be nevertheless regarded as resident in Ireland for tax purposes. This 
change is effective from 1 January 2015 as regards companies incorporated before 24 
October 2013. See Moore, supra n. 528. See also, D. Stewart, Ireland Targets ‘Stateless’ 
Companies in 2014 Budget, 72 Tax Notes Int’l 3 (2013). 
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entities, not able to assume tax obligations, such as the payment of taxes.
533
 
The advantage of relying in the corporate or private law status of an entity 
is, however, clear: there is no need to look at the structural substance of the 
entities.
534
 That is why many countries follow this criterion.
535
 In contrast, 
there are countries that simply separate between the corporate and the tax 
law status. In the United States, e.g. there is no immediate recognition of 
some legal forms as taxable entities at a federal level.
536
 A U.S. LLC e.g. is 
treated as a corporation at the corporate state level, while it is treated as a 





Although the domestic taxable status seems to be applicable without middle 
points, i.e. the entity is regarded as a separate taxable entity or not, there are 
some exceptions in which it is possible to distinguish “semi-transparent” 
entities or entities subject to a partial tax transparency regime. An 
interesting example of the above is the case of the French Limited 
Partnership (societies en commandite simple), which is regarded as a taxable 
entity, subject to corporate income tax with respect to the share of the profits 
of the limited partners, while it is regarded as a transparent entity with 
respect to the share of the profit of the general partners, unless elected 
                                                          
533  In the United States, e.g., a partnership must file an income tax return even though it 
does not have to pay taxes. US: IRC Sec. 701 and Sec. 6031. 
534  Lang and Staringer, supra n. 524, p. 27. 
535  Id. 
536  Infra Section 4.1. 
537  However, LLCs with publicly traded interests are treated as corporations for federal tax 
purposes. See I.R.C. Sec. 7704. See also, P. McDaniel, M. McMahon, Jr. and D. 
Simmons, Federal Income Taxation of Partnerships and S Corporations, 4th Ed., 








 Similarly, the general partners of a Limited Partnership in 
Czech Republic are taxed at the level of the partners, while the limited 
partners are taxed at the level of the entity.
539
 Likewise, as per the treatment 
of Trusts in Italy, certain beneficiaries are known, while others remain 
unknown.
540
 A Trust will be transparent only in the part of the income 
attributed to the known beneficiaries, while it will remain opaque for the 
rest.
541
 This partial or semi-taxable status, however, should not be confused 
with the situation in which an entity is granted a tax exemption that allows 
this entity not to be taxed on certain items of income or when certain 
activities are exempted of taxation, e.g. in the case of a non-profit 
organization. In general terms, a specific tax exemption or a full tax 
exemption will not change the taxable status of an entity, which will 
continue to be treated as a taxable entity even though is exempted from 
                                                          
538  A. Coustel, France, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of 
Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), pp. 340-341. Indeed, the only 
entity treated as fully transparent under French domestic law is the real property co-
ownership partnership, as defined by Article 1655 ter of the General Tax Code. See J. 
Benamran, France-Corporate Taxation sec. 11, Country Analyses (accessed 1 Feb. 
2017). 
539  T. Balco and H. Skalicka, Czech Republic, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 
99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 260. 
540  A. Bavila, Taxation of Trusts in Italy: Capital Gains on Trust Assets and Transparent 
Trusts, 64 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 8/9 (2010), Journals IBFD, p. 482. 
541  A. Crazzolara, Italy, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of 
Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 445. It is interesting to note 
that “trusts” were recognized only after Italy ratified the Hague Convention of 1 July 
1985, which entered into force on 1 January 1992. The above created a lot of issues for 
practitioners, public officers and judges to understand a concept that comes from 
common law countries, e.g. the United Kingdom or Bermuda. For further analysis, see 
L. Corsini, The Taxation of Trusts in Italy, 53 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 3 (1999), Journals IBFD, 
p. 21. Specific provisions on trusts were not issued until the Law 296 of 27 Dec. 2006, 
which entered in force on 1 Jan. 2007. Bavila, supra n. 540. 
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Corporate Income Tax in a specific jurisdiction. Indeed, in the majority of 
the cases the entity will continue to comply with some obligations inherent 
to taxable entities, such as filing tax returns or other tax formalities.
542
  In 
other cases, the taxable status of an entity might certainly guarantee its 
entitlement to get a tax exemption. In Germany, e.g. only taxable entities are 




Finally, it should be highlighted that the tax status of an entity should not 
vary just because it becomes part of a tax group regime. Indeed, and 
although this will depend exclusively upon the tax regime under analysis, it 
seems to be generally accepted that the tax status granted to a single entity is 
respected once it is part of a tax group.
 544
 
                                                          
542  Spain is an exemption, because totally tax exempted entities do not have to file tax 
returns and they are also excluded from all other tax formalities. See M. Villar, Spain, 
in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and 
Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 743. 
543  DE: Section 5 of the German Corporate Income Tax. 
544  In Germany, e.g. the effects of the tax group regime only extend to the transfer of the 
income from the subsidiary to the parent of the group, but it does not affect the taxability 
of the entities among the group. P. Dorfmüller, Germany, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection 
(IFA 2014), p. 359. See also, DE: BFH of 29 October 1974, I R 240/72, BStBl. 1975 II, 
126 and BFH of 7 Dec. 1994, I K 1/93,BStBl. 1995 II, 175. Similarly, in Spain although 
the tax group is regarded as a taxpayer, the members of the group remain subject to the 
entire obligations in their individual capacity, except with respect the payment of the 
corporate income tax of the group. See ES: Article 56(2) and (3) of the of the Corporate 
Income Tax Law [Ley del Impuesto sobre las Sociedades], Law 27/2014 (consolidated 
text) of 27 Nov. 2014, BOE No. 288 of 28 Nov. 2014. An exception of the above, 
however, could be the case of the Polish tax group regime. A tax corporation group may 
be formed under Polish tax law by an agreement between two or more Spzoos or SAs 
that have their registered office in Poland and it must exist for at least three tax years. 
Once the tax corporation group is formed, the income and losses of all the companies of 
the group is aggregated, having also the advantage that no transfer pricing rules are 
applied to the intra-group transactions, and the group members cannot linger file 





3. Hybrid Entities and Reverse Hybrids 
Having already stressed some key concepts regarding legal entities in 
general, this Section turns now to properly study the origin and existence of 
hybrids and reserve hybrids entities. This includes, specifically, the study of 
the different systems to characterize entities for tax purposes, which is 
indeed the core issue regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. 
3.1. Terminology 
Generally speaking a hybrid entity is an entity considered as a taxable or 
opaque entity in the country of its establishment,
545
 i.e. an entity different 
from its owners and subject to corporate income taxation in its country of 
organization, while in the other country, the same entity will be regarded as 
tax transparent,
546
 namely, there will be no taxation at the level of the entity, 
                                                                                                                                       
separate tax returns. In simple words, the tax group is technically a single taxpayer and 
the members cease to be regarded as separate entities. Nonetheless, this interpretation is 
not entirely clear as exposed by the Directors of the Tax Chambers in Warsaw in 
different tax rulings, tax scholars and tax authorities. See P. Gozdziowska, B. Kuzniacki 
and T. Wickel, Poland, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification 
of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), pp. 638-639. 
545  The terms “taxable entity” and “opaque entity” are used Iin an interchangeable manner 
and during this work. Likewise, the term “tax transparent” and “fiscally transparent” 
entities are used in the same manner.  
546  The OECD Glossary of Tax Terms states that a hybrid entity is “an entity that is 
characterized differently in two or more jurisdictions, for example, an entity that is 
treated as a partnership in one jurisdiction and as a corporation in another”. OECD, 
Glossary of Tax Terms, available at www.oecd.org, accessed on 24 Jan. 2017. Likewise, 
the IBFD Tax Glossary states that a hybrid entity is “generally, an entity that is 
characterized as transparent for tax purposes (e.g. as a partnership) in one jurisdiction 
and non-transparent (e.g. as a corporation) in another jurisdiction. An entity that is 
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but rather at the level of the partners.
547
 Let us assume the following simple 
example: XCo is a corporation incorporated in country X, which has a 
wholly owned subsidiary in country Y (YSub). For country Y tax purposes, 
YSub is recognized as a taxable entity, namely, is it a separate legal entity 
subject to corporate income tax. Accordingly, the sole owner of YSub, i.e. 
XCo, will pay taxes only on the distribution received as dividend from 
YSub. On the contrary, for Country X tax purposes, the same YSub entity is 
considered as tax transparent. In simple terms, YSub is deemed not to exist 
for Country X tax purposes. Therefore, all the income, credit and expenses 
will flow through YSub to its sole owner, XCo.  YSub is thus a hybrid 
entity. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
treated, from the point of view of a particular jurisdiction, as transparent in that 
jurisdiction and as non-transparent in the other jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as 
“regular hybrid”. IBFD Glossary, available online at the IBFD Tax Research Platform, 
accessed on 24 Jan. 2017. 
547  Although this explanation coincides with the traditional tax treatment of ‘Partnerships’ 
as conduit entities where the various items of income and losses flow to the individual 
partners, its use is not limited exclusively to those entities in this work, and it may also 
include, e.g. single ownership entities not taxed at the level of the entity, but rather at the 
level of the single owner, such as the case of a Limited Liability Company (LLC) in the 
United States. See, e.g. L. Cunningham and N. Cunningham, The logic of Subchapter K, 
A Conceptual Guide to the Taxation of Partnerships, 4th Ed., West, United States, 2011, 
p. 1, with respect to the tax treatment of U.S. partnerships. See also, McDaniel, 
McMahon, Jr. and Simmons, supra n. 537, p. 1. Likewise, Australia, Germany and 
Sweden are also examples of countries that follow a tax transparency treatment for 
partnerships, similar to the one applied in the United States. However, there are some 
countries in which partnerships are, nevertheless, subject to tax at the entity level. For 
example, Belgium and Hungary. See J. Barenfeld, Taxation of Cross-Border 
Partnerships, Double Tax Relief in Hybrid and Reserve Hybrid Situations, Vol. 9 IBFD 
Doctoral Series, Amsterdam (2005), Sec. 2.3.2.2, Online Books IBFD. 






Figure 1: Hybrid Entity 
Accordingly, the same phenomenon of “hybridity” can also be found in the 
opposite direction. This is to say an entity treated as tax transparent in the 
country of its establishment, but considered as a taxable entity in the other 
country. These entities are known in doctrine as “reserve hybrids”.
548
 Taking 
the same example as above, YSub is regarded as a tax transparent entity in 
its country of organization, i.e. country Y, while as a taxable entity in the 
country of its sole owner (XCo), i.e. country X. Thus, while country Y will 
not subject YCo to taxation at the level of the entity, considering for this 
purpose that all income, credits and expenses will flow-through YCo until 
its owner (XCo), country X will consider rather the opposite, i.e. it will 
subject XCo to taxation only to the extent of the distributions made from 
                                                          
548  With respect to the concept of “reserve hybrid”, the Glossary of the IBFD states that: 
“[A]n entity is a reverse hybrid when it is treated from the point of view of a particular 
jurisdiction as non-transparent and as transparent in the other. A hybrid entity is, 
therefore, also always a reverse hybrid, the difference depending on whether the 
classification is being made from the point of view of the jurisdiction treating the entity 





YSub is considered as a 
fiscally transparent entity 
for country X tax purposes.  
YSub is considered as a 
taxable entity for country Y 
tax purposes.  
YSub 
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YSub. In other words, YSub is under the eyes of country X as taxable or tax 
opaque entity. 
 
Figure 2: Reverse Hybrid 
The core issue within the existence of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities 
remains thus in the different characterization of an entity made by two or 
more jurisdictions, which can have an impact both with respect to the 
amount of taxes paid as well as to which country taxes should be paid. For 
this reason, the next Sections of this Chapter will be dealing in detail with 
this issue. 
3.2. The Characterization of Foreign Entities for Tax Purposes 
As already stressed, the whole issue with respect to hybrids and reverse 
hybrid entities refers to the rules used to determine the tax status that a 
foreign entity will have in a specific jurisdiction, i.e. taxation at the level of 
the entity or at the level of the owners. Although the characterization of 




YSub is considered as a 
taxable entity for country 
X tax purposes.  
YSub is considered as a 
fiscally transparent entity 
for country Y tax purposes. 
YSub 





country, which also depends exclusively of the specific domestic and 
sovereign tax policies, they can be divided as follows: 1) comparative 
approach; 2) legal personality approach; 3) overall approach; 4) fixed 
approach and 6) elective approach. All of them will be further on explained.  
3.2.1. Comparative Approach 
The majority of the countries opt for a comparative approach or 
“resemblance test” to characterize foreign entities for tax purposes. For this 
purpose, a foreign entity is recognized as a taxable entity or not considering 
certain degree of comparability or equivalence to domestic taxable entities, 
and in some cases also considering the characteristic of the entity under 
foreign law. Germany, e.g. applies a resemblance test (Rechtstypen-
vergleich) in a two level manner. On the one hand, the foreign entity is 
evaluated in abstract according to the applicable foreign corporate law.
549
 
The reason for that is to distinguish the legal characteristic of the foreign 
entity from those domestic entity types in order to rule out non-applicable 
comparisons.
550
 In other words, it seeks to determine whether the foreign 
entity matches a German domestic one based on its functions and economic 
activity. For example, a French SICAV is, from a German perspective, 
considered equivalent to a German investment company by virtue of its 
                                                          
549  The Foreign law is determinative and particular attention is given to the conditions 
under civil law. C. Kahlenberg, Classification of Foreign Entities for German Tax 
Purposes, 54 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 152. See also, U. Henkel, 
Subjektfähigkeit grenzüberschreitender Kapitalgesellschaften, RIW 7 (1991), p. 567. 
550  Kahlenberg, supra n. 549, p. 153. 
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economic activity and functions.
551
 On the other hand, and once this 
abstract-evaluation is made, a specific legal comparison between the foreign 
and the domestic corporate characteristic is made.
552
 If there is no German 
entity to compare, the classification is made by way of an abstract structural 
comparison.
553
 Therefore, while the general-abstract approach applied in the 
first level evaluate the applicable foreign corporate law, without, e.g. 
considering any potential design flexibility in the corporate governance 
documents, the second level or individual-concrete approach includes an 




In 2004, however, and referred specifically to the characterization of a U.S. 
LLC, it was issue the “LLC letter”,
555
 which enumerated some criteria that 
should be considered when applying the comparison. These factors are as 
follows: (a) centralized management and representation; (b) limited liability; 
(c) free transferability of interests; (d) allocation of profits; (e) provision of 
capital; (f) perpetual duration of the entity; (g) profit distribution; (h) formal 
requirements for organization
556
 and (i) other factors.
557
 Nevertheless, it is 
                                                          
551  Id. See also, J. Staigner and V. Köth, Abkommensberechtigung einer französischen 
SICAV sowie des deutschen REIT, BB 47 (2012), p. 2916. 
552  Kahlenberg, supra n. 549, p. 153. 
553  Id. 
554   Id. 
555  DE: Federal Ministry of Finance [Bundesfinanzministerium], 19 Mar. 2004, IV B4-
S1301 USA- 22/04, Schreiben betr. steuerliche Einordnung der nach dem Recht  der 
Bundesstaaten der USA gegründeten Limited Liability Company, BStBl I 2004, pp. 411-
412. 
556  While the entry into the local German commercial register is a mandatory condition for 
the existence of stock corporations, partnerships limited by shares and limited liability 
companies (LLCs), it is not mandatory for the existence of commercial partnerships. In 





still unclear whether the application of these criteria might be extended 




Similarly, the Netherlands uses a resemblance test
559
 that relies on the 
company law features of an entity determined according to its foreign 
incorporation statutes or contracts.
560
 The test in based on the following four 
                                                                                                                                       
such a case, the registration in the local German commercial register will be only 
relevant with respect to third parties. DE: BFH of 13 June 1992, IX R 182/87, BStBl. 
1992 II, 972. 
557  For example, whether the foreign entity has legal personality can be also considered, 
although it does not play a decisive role for classification purposes. Accordingly, the 
number of investors is not a suitable criterion for distinguishing between corporation 
and partnerships. Dorfmüller, supra n. 544, p. 367. 
558  Kahlenberg, supra n. 549. 
559  The test is currently reflected in a degree published by the Dutch Minister of Finance 
dated on 11 December 2009. See NL: Decree of the State Secretary of Finance, 
CPP2009/519M of 11 Dec. 2009. The decree has no legal binding power; however, as it 
is the interpretation made by the State Secretary of Finance, taxpayers can rely on it 
based on the principle of “legitimate expectations” [vertrouwensbeginsel]. See M. De 
Graaf and J. Gooijer, Netherlands, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, 
Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 563. 
560  Id. Originally, however, the test was issued in the end of 2004, when the Ministry of 
Finance issued two decrees addressing the classification of foreign entities. The first of 
these decrees dealt with the classification of foreign entities in the context of the 
amended EC-Parent Subsidiary Directive. The second one attempted to clarify the Dutch 
approach to the classification of foreign entities for purposes of the Dutch participation 
exemption. See NL: Decrees of 18 December 2004, Nos. CPP 2004/2730M and CPP 
2004/1304M. See S. Laghmouchi, Netherlands: Issues Arising under the Decrees on the 
Tax Treatment of Foreign (Hybrid) Entities, 60 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 2 (2006), Journals 
IBFD, pp. 81-82. The test in 2004 was based on similar questions: “1) Can the entity 
hold legal title to the assets and liabilities used to carry out its activities?; 2) Is there at 
least one participant that has unlimited liability for debts and other obligations of the 
entity?; 3) Does the entity have a capital divided into shares?; 4) Is the admission or 
replacement of participants, other than by reason of inheritance or legacy, possible 
without the consent of all other participants? […]. If test 1 was answered affirmative and 
test 2 negative, the foreign entity was classified as non-transparent. If test 1 was 
answered affirmative or negative and test 2 was answered affirmative, test 3 and 4 had to 
be taken into account. If test 3 and 4 were answered affirmative, the foreign entity was 
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questions: a) is it possible for an entity to legally own the assets with which 
it performs its activities? ; b) Are all the participants in the entity legally 
liable only to a limited extent, i.e. liable only for the amount of their capital 
contributions?; c) Does the entity have capital divided into shares for 
company law purposes, or can the capital be regarded as having been into 
shares?, and d) is the entry of new, or the replacement of existing, 
participants possible without the consent of all participants, except in cases 
of inheritance or legacy? If the answer to three of the four questions is 
positive, then the foreign entity is considered as a taxable entity.
561
 The 
Dutch resemblance test is, however, not the only test used in the 
                                                                                                                                       
non-transparent. If test 3 or 4 was answered negative, the foreign entity was transparent. 
If the foreign entity was comparable to a Dutch limited partnership (‘commanditaire 
vennootschap’), only the fourth test had to be applied. If the foreign entity was 
comparable to a Dutch limited partnership and the fourth test was answered affirmative, 
the entity was non-transparent according to the 2004 Decree”. See A.W.G. Lamers, 
Classification of Foreign Entities in the Netherlands: Recent Developments, 38 Intertax 
12 (2010), p. 682. 
561  Prior to this four-question test, the characterization system consisted in a six-criteria test 
contained within the Decree of 18 September 1997, No. DGO 97-00417, which stated 
the following questions: (1) Is a (formal) decision required to distribute the entity’s 
profits to its participants? (2) Do the participants in the entity have limited liability? (3) 
Does the entity have legal title to the assets used in carrying on its activities? (4) Can the 
participants be replaced or admitted without the consent of all the other participants (i.e. 
is there free transferability of interests)? (5) Is the entity’s capital divided into shares? 
(6) Is the entity subject to tax on its profits? An affirmative answer to all six precedent 
questions resulted in a foreign entity characterized an opaque entity and eligible for the 
Dutch participation exemption. On the contrary, if one of the questions was answered in 
the negative, the foreign entity resulted to be regarded as a transparent entity for Dutch 
tax purposes. This 1997 decree was a reaction to a decision of the Amsterdam Tax Court 
of Appeal dealing with the classification of a French société en nom collectif (SNC). An 
SNC has legal personality in France, its participants are liable for the SNC’s debts, and 
the entity does not have capital divided into shares. The Amsterdam Tax Court of 
Appeal held thus that, under Dutch civil law, an SNC should be considered to be similar 
to a Dutch “vennootschap onder firma”, namely, a transparent entity. Id. See also, NL: 
Decision of Amsterdam Tax Court of Appeal of 4 January 1995, No. 93/1467, 
Infobulletin, 95/315. 





Netherlands to characterize foreign entities as taxable or non-taxable. 
Indeed, the Dutch Supreme Court applies a slightly different test. The 
Supreme Court arises the question of who owns the rights and obligations 
from the conduct of the business and, hence is entitled to the profits. For this 
purposes, it considers the following factors: 1) the liability of the 
participants is limited to their contribution in the entity; 2) if the business is 
legally owned by the entity, and 3) if it is not actually being conducted on 
the account and at the risk of the participants in any other way.
562
 If based 
on these factors, it can be concluded that the rights and obligations from the 
conduct of a business are owned by the entity, this will be classified as a 
body corporate for Dutch tax purposes.
563
 Thus, a body corporate is 
considered non-taxable if the capital is wholly or partially divided by 
shares.
564
 Nevertheless, if the partners are directly entitled to the profits of 
the entity, a second test is applied through which it is assessed whether the 
internal regulations imposed on the relationship between the entity and the 
partners resemble those of an open Dutch limited partnership or a 
partnership divided by shares.
565
 In addition, although not officially 
recognized, there is also the possibility of obtaining an advance ruling with 
respect to the tax status of a foreign entity.
566
 
                                                          
562  De Graaf and Gooijer, supra n. 559, p. 564. 
563  Id. 
564  Id. See also, NL: Supreme Court 16 March 1994, no. 27.764, BNB 1994/191. 
565  The distinctive criterion is whether the participations in the entity are freely transferable. 
Id. 
566   As provided by De Graaf and Gooijer: “What most commonly happens in Dutch 
practice is that, in bona fide situations, the tax inspector will be willing to give advance 
certainty depending on whether a specific foreign entity is considered to be transparent 
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In abstract therefore a resemblance or comparative test seems to be the 
simplest manner to characterize foreign entities for tax purposes. After all, 
the determination on whether a foreign entity is taxable or not for tax 
purposes is left exclusively to the domestic characteristics of the taxable 
entities compared to the foreign entity under analysis. Nevertheless, these 
types of tests or comparative approaches normally fail in different manners. 
Firstly, they are unable to deal with the problem that other country’s entities 
may be inherently different to the own ones.
567
 Secondly, they require a high 
level of technical preparation within domestic tax authorities as well 
important costs, mostly related to hiring foreign tax lawyers who can 
confirm the analysis of the corporate characteristics of the entity under 
scrutiny.
568
 Thirdly, and even in those cases in which all these costs are 
assumed, there is no hundred-percent of certainty that the system will not be 
manipulated at all.
569
 Indeed, it is a question of time that taxpayers get used 
to understand how to manipulate the factors or questions that the 
resemblance test involve in order to obtain the desired characterization, 
                                                                                                                                       
or non-transparent for domestic tax purposes. In fact, there is an experienced 
coordinating team within the Dutch tax administration that functions as a back office 
handling questions such as these that are submitted to individual tax inspectors all over 
the country”. Id. 
567  Avery Jones stresses the example of the Lichtenstein “Anstalt”, which is not clear 
whether it is a foundation or a trust. However, he also agrees that similar problems exist 
with respect to the different treatment of partnerships in civil and common law 
countries. See J. Avery Jones et al., Characterization of Other Sates’ Partnerships for 
Income Tax, 56 Bull. Intl. Fisc. Doc. 7 (2001), Journals IBFD, p. 289. For a reference to 
the “Anstalt”, see M. Selig, Half Trust, Half Company, All Anstalt: The History and 
Possible Tax Consequences of the Liechtenstein Anstalt Down Under, 53 Intl. Fisc. 
Docn. 8/9 (1999), Journals IBFD. 
568  See, e.g. the Dutch tax administration and test already explained in this Section. 
569  See, e.g. the “Kintner test” in the United States before the implementation of the CTB 
Regulations. Infra Section 4.2. 





transforming the comparative system in a de facto elective system.
570
 The 
above is not only a negative consequence for the tax administration making 
the comparative analysis, but it is also tremendously unfair result for the 
taxpayers who cannot access to sophisticated tax advisors in order to obtain 
a determined characterization of an entity. Finally, one should also consider 
that an autonomous characterization of entities might necessarily generate 
inconsistent results. In other words, there is no guarantee that a similar 
foreign entity is characterized twice in inconsistent manners, e.g. once as a 
taxable entity and the other as tax transparent, increasing thus the 
probabilities of generating hybrid and reverse hybrid entities.
571
 
3.2.2. Legal Personality Approach 
Conversely to the comparative approach, there are countries that prefer to 
look at the ‘legal personality’ of the foreign entity and essentially grant the 
taxable status to those entities that are considered as legal entities, namely, 
entities separated from their owners.
572
 In Belgium, e.g. the concept of legal 
personality serves as the main nexus to classify a foreign entity as taxable or 
not and it is governed under Belgian international private law.
573
 As a 
starting point, the place of principal establishment of the entity, i.e. where 
the company is effectively managed or the “real seat”, will be the primary 
conflict of law rule under Belgian international private law to be 
                                                          
570  Id. 
571  Supra Section 3.1. 
572  Supra Section 2.1. 
573  De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 67. 





 If the foreign entity has legal personality and it is treated as a 
taxable entity under the private law rules of the foreign jurisdiction, then 
Belgian law will recognize de plano that foreign entity as a separate taxable 
entity.
575
 If the foreign entity lacks of legal personality under the laws of the 
foreign jurisdiction, it will be regarded as a transparent entity in Belgium, 
regardless of how the foreign jurisdiction treats that entity.
576
 Similarly, in 
Switzerland the determination of the foreign entity’s legal personality in its 




Nevertheless, the legal personality is rarely applied as an isolated factor to 
determine the characterization of foreign entities. Indeed, this factor is 
normally used as a first-level test and it is later on combined with a 
resemblance or comparable test in a second-level. In Belgium, e.g. if a 
foreign jurisdiction from which the foreign entity derives does not recognize 
the concept of legal personality, e.g. the United States, the characteristics of 
this entity are compared against the characteristics of the legal entities under 
                                                          
574  Id. 
575  Indeed, the fact that a taxpayer incorporates a foreign company to avoid or reduce tax 
liability is not enough to disregard the foreign entity for tax purposes. Id.  
576  This may result in double taxation, e.g. if the foreign entity is treated as fiscally 
transparent and this country considers that the non-resident owners have a permanent 
establishment. The same situation could occur if the entity is regarded, even in absence 
of legal personality, as a taxable entity. P. Faes, Belgium, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection 
(IFA 2014), pp. 151-152.  
577  CH: Article 49(3) of the Federal Direct Tax Act [Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987 
über das international Privatrecht, SR 291], original text: „Ausländische juristische 
Personen sowie nach Artikel 11 steuerpflichtige, ausländische Handelsgesellschaft und 
andere ausländische Personengesamtheiten ohne juristische Persönlichkeit  werden den 
inländische juristischen Personen gleichgestellt, denen sie rechtlich oder tatsächlich am 
ähnlichen sind“.       





Belgium law in order to determine whether or not that entity is taxable in 
Belgium.
578
 In other words, a resemblance test is applied as a second-level 




Most of the difficulties to conceive the legal personality as a unique proxy to 
determine the characterization of a foreign entity are derived exclusively 
from the own nature of this concept. As noted Avery Jones et al.: “Legal 
                                                          
578  In 1998, the Court of Appeal of Brussels classified a U.S. general partnership as fiscally 
transparent entity, even though the concept of legal personality does not exist under U.S. 
law. For this purpose, the Court took the features of the U.S. general partnership and 
tested against those that would be attributed to a Belgian legal entity, arriving to the 
conclusion that the U.S. partnership had no legal personality because all profits and 
losses were directly allocated to the partners; the partners were personally liable for the 
debts of the partnership; the partnership entered into dissolution in case of death, serious 
illness, bankruptcy or incapacity of one of the partners, and a partner could not withdraw 
from the partnership prior to its dissolution. See BE: Court of Appeals of Brussels, 30 
Apr. 1998, AFT, 1999, 119-125, cited in: Faes, supra n. 558, p. 157. 
579  Similarly, in Switzerland, the legal or factual features of the foreign entity, e.g. by-laws 
and internal decisions that evidence how the entity is effectively organized, are 
compared to the Swiss entity to which it comes closest. There is, however, no uniform 
list of criteria provided by statute for this purposes. For further analysis, see 
S. Oesterhelt and S. Schreiber, in: Zweifel/Beusch (Eds.), Art. 49 of the Swiss Federal 
Law on Direct Taxation [Bundesgesetz über die direkte Bundessteuer], 3r ed., Helbling 
Lichtenhahn, Basel (2017), n. 42 et seq.  However, e.g. the Swiss Tax Conference, an 
association of the Swiss federal and cantonal administrations, published in 2011 some 
guidelines or recommendations with respect to the treatment of a U.S. LLC. In this 
regard, it was possible to circumscribe some factors normally considered to grant 
taxable status, which included: (a) whether or not the foreign entity has legal personality 
and (b) whether or not the partners’ liabilities are restricted. See J. Salom and H. 
Salomé, Switzerland, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of 
Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 801. In the past, it was 
uncertain whether the participation in a U.S. LLC was regarded as a participation in a 
Partnership or a Corporation for Swiss tax purposes. Nevertheless, these guidelines 
clarified that a U.S. LLC was equal to a Swiss GmbH/Sàrl (Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung/société à responsabilité limitée), namely, a Swiss Corporation. 
See P. Hongler, Swiss Tax Authorities Clarify Treatment of a Shareholding in a U.S. 
LLC, 65 Tax Notes Int’l 8 (2012), pp. 595-596.  
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person […] is a concept that each country understands within its own legal 
system, and one tends to assume, wrongly, that it means much the same 
everywhere”.
580
 An example of the above is the case of the EEIG in Europe, 
which is considered to have legal personality in most of the European 
countries, less in Germany and Italy, where it does not fit the concept of 
legal persons.
581
 In case of Germany, this is due to the German legal 
tradition. As regards to Italy, this is because under Italian law there is a strict 
separation between the entity and its owners, which results in the fact that 
the owners cannot be personable liable for the entity’s liabilities.
582
 On the 
contrary, the members of an EEIG are so liable.
583
 
3.2.3. Overall Approach 
Other countries, instead of applying isolated criteria to qualify foreign 
entities for tax purposes, prefer to apply an overall approach in order to 
classify foreign entities for tax purposes.
584
 The U.K. is a good example of 
the above, because the U.K. does not apply fixed labels on foreign entities, 
i.e. opaque or transparent, but rather it applies its tax legislation to determine 
the tax status of a particular entity for a particular tax situation.
585
 The above 
                                                          
580  Avery Jones et al., supra n. 567, p. 297. 
581  Id. 
582  Id. 
583  Id. 
584  Lang and Staringer, supra n. 524, p. 35. The report refers to “overall” or “more 
comprehensive” approach in comparison to the reliance in single criteria. 
585  Baldwin and Kiranoglu, supra n. 529, pp. 835-836. 





also implies, e.g. that a partnership is considered as a fiscally transparent 




The overall approach is thus very uncertain for taxpayers, because it 
depends specifically of the particular entity and tax situation analyzed. This 
level of uncertainty, created mostly by inconsistent rules based on case law, 
can be illustrated in a couple of paradigmatic Court decisions. On one hand, 
it is Memec Plc v. IRC (1998) case law.
587
 This case law referred to Memec, 
a parent company, which entered into a silent partnership agreement under 
German law [stille Gesellschaft]. The other partner was a German GmbH, 
which was wholly owned by Memec. Accordingly, the partnership had no 
separate legal personality, but there was a contractual arrangement under 
which Memec had the right to receive a share of the profits of the business 
carried on by the other partner, in return for a capital payment.
588
 The 
German GmbH had also other subsidiaries from which it received dividends, 
which where also the main source of income of the German silent 
partnership, and thus shared between the partners as per the arrangement. 
Memec argued the profits received by the German GmbH were indeed 
                                                          
586  For this purpose, Baldwin and Kiranoglu provide the example of foreign private 
foundations and state: “These are vehicles which are essentially corporate in nature, but 
with have some of the characteristics of settlement or trust. Because of the different 
definitions used in particular pieces of legislation, the same foundation may be both a 
close company for certain inheritance tax (IHT) purposes and also a ‘settlement’ for 
other IHT purposes. Give the broad range of terms and conditions on which foundations 
are established, the constitution of the particular foundation in question and the effect of 
its local governing law need to be considered in order to determine how the foundation 
affects the UK tax analysis”. Id. 
587  U.K.: Memec Plc. v. Commissionaire of Inland Revenue (1998), supra n. 515. 
588  Baldwin and Kiranoglu, supra n. 529, p. 848. 
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received by Memec, which was able to claim tax treaty relief of double 
taxation.
589
 Memec stated that the German silent partnership did not create a 
new source of income under the arrangement, because the arrangement was 
indeed transparent for tax purposes in the U.K.
590
 These arguments were 
originally rejected by the High Court judge, who considered that the 
question was not on the transparency or not of the German silent 
partnership, but rather on the arrangement. In this regard, it considered that 
Memec had no rights in the shares of the subsidiaries and the distribution 
made to them. However, it did not refer to the main issue, which was 
whether or not the German silent partnership could be regarded as fiscally 
transparent under English law. Later on, nevertheless, when the case was 
appealed, the Court of Appeal referred specifically to the nature of the 
German silent partnership and to which extent the characteristic of the 
German silent partnership was shared by an English or Scottish partnership. 
This decision was the basis for the guidelines of the HMRC International 
Manual INTM 180010, which listed six factors to consider whether an entity 
was treated as transparent or opaque for U.K. tax law purposes, including 
e.g. references to the separate legal existence of the foreign entity and the 
level of responsibility on entity’s liabilities, i.e. if they are assumed by the 
entity of personally by the owners of the entity.
591
 
                                                          
589  Id. 
590  Id. 
591  UK: HMRC, INTM 180010. All the factors included are: a) whether the foreign entity 
has a legal existence separate  from that of the persons who have an interest in it; 
(b)whether  the  entity  issues  share capital  or  something  else  which serves the same 
function as share capital; (c) whether  the  business  is  carried  on  by  the  entity  itself  
or  jointly by the persons who have an interest in it that is separate  and distinct from the 





The factors published in the INTM 180010 governed the characterization of 
entities at least until 1 July 2015, where the decision upon Anson v. 
Commissioner for HMRC
 592 came into play.593 In brief, the Anson case law 
referred to Mr. Anson, a resident individual for U.K. tax a law purposes that 
owned a U.S. LLC in Delaware.
594
 This entity was dedicated to manage 
various profitable venture capital funds.
595
 A U.S. LLC is for U.S. tax 
purposes treated as a disregarded entity (fiscally transparent), while in the 
U.K. was historically treated as a taxable entity.
596
 The issues in question 
were to determine whether the profit remitted from the U.S. were the same 
Mr. Anson was taxed in the U.S. or not and whether he was finally entitled 
                                                                                                                                       
entity; (d) whether the persons who have an interest in the entity are entitled  to  share  
in  its  profits  as  they  arise;  or  whether  the  amount  of  profits  to  which  they  are  
entitled  depends  on  a  decision of the entity or its members, after the period in which 
the profits have arisen, to make a distribution of its profits; (e) who  is  responsible  for  
debts  incurred  as  a  result  of  the carrying on of the business: the entity or the persons 
who have an interest in it; and (f ) whether the assets used for carrying on the business 
belong beneficially  to  the  entity  or  to  the  persons  who  have  an  interest in it. See 
M. Lemos, ‘Non-Transparent’: The Court of Appeal’s Decision on the Delaware LLC in 
HMRC v. Anson, XII GITC Review 2 (2014), p. 46.  
592  UK: Anson (Apellant) v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(Respondent) [2015] UKSC 44 on appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 63, 1 July 2015.  
593  Even up to that date the interpretation of the factors was debatable. See, e.g. O. Popa, 
UK Investors in US LLCs Exposed to Double Taxation–Is This the End of the Story?, 53 
Eur. Taxn. 6 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 299. 
594  Lemos, supra n. 591, p. 48. I will refer broadly to “U.S. LLC”, although the term is not 
precise because indeed every single State of the United States establishes different rules 
as regards to the organization of LLCs. Nevertheless, the tax status is matter of federal 
tax law. Infra Section 4. 
595  Id. 
596  In fact, it is included as such in the list of classifications of foreign entities for U.K. tax 
purposes published by the HMRC. See UK: HMRC, INTM 180030—Foreign entity 
classification for UK tax purposes: List of Classifications of Foreign Entities for UK tax 
purposes. 
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to tax treaty relief.
597
 The HMRC argued that the profit derived from the 
LLC and taxed in the U.S. were not the same income subject to tax in the 
U.K.
598
 In other words, the HMRC considered the U.S. LLC as a taxable 
entity, and thus Mr. Anson could not credit the taxes already paid in the U.S. 




The First-tier Tribunal ruled in 2010
600
 in favor of the taxpayer, allowing 
double taxation relief under the treaty.
601
 The tribunal emphasized that the 
partners were entitled to profits as they arose, and thus Mr. Anson was taxed 
on the same income in both countries, being entitled to tax treaty relief.
602
 
The Upper-Tribunal, however, did not agree with this decision. Indeed, it 
considered that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in holding that the 
members of the U.S. LLC had not merely a contractual but a proprietary 
entitlement to profits, although no evidence supported that conclusion.
603
 In 
                                                          
597  Mr. Anson paid taxes in the U.S. on his share on the LLC’s profits at a rate of 45%. 
Accordingly, he also paid taxes in the U.K. on his after tax amount remitted to the U.K. 
at a rate of 22%. He was thus subject to double taxation. Popa, supra n. 593. 
598  Id., p. 300. 
599  Id. 
600  The case was anonymized as Swift v. Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs. See 
UK: First-tier Tribunal, 22 Feb. 2010, Case TC00399, Appeal No. SC/3106/08, Swift v. 
Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
601  Popa, supra n. 593. 
602  The Tribunal used the Memec Plc’s approach to determine whether the LLC was 
transparent or not for U.K. tax purposes. Id. This also coincides with the majority 
opinion of practitioners in the U.K., who have stated that what makes an entity 
transparent for U.K. tax purposes is the ability of the members to remove profits from 
the organization, without there being any person who can restrict that ability. Lemos, 
supra n. 591, p. 51. 
603  Id., p. 52. Also, UK: Upper Tribunal, 3 Aug. 2011, FTC/39/2010, [2011] UKUT 318 
(TCC), Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD;  B. Arnold, Tax Treaty Case Law News, 66 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 1 (2012), Journals IBFD.  





simple words, it considered the U.S. LLC as a taxable entity, and thus that 
Mr. Anson was taxed in the U.K. on a distribution and not on the same 
profits taxed in the U.S., not granting the tax treaty relief.
604
 Similarly, the 
Court of Appeal considered the U.S. LLC as a taxable entity and did not 
grant the FTC to Mr. Anson.
605
 In the decision of 1 July 2015, however, the 
U.K. Supreme Court interpreted that a U.K. resident individual, member of 
a US Delaware LLC, treated as fiscally transparent for US tax purposes, was 
entitled to a FTC under the treaty with the U.S. for the amount of foreign 
taxes paid and calculated on the profits of the LLC.
606
 In other words, it 
considered the U.S. LLC in the Anson’s case law as fiscally transparent. The 
UK Supreme Court therefore declined to apply the traditional position of 
considering a U.S. LLC as a taxable entity and focused instead in the 
language of Article 23(2)(a) of the 1975 US/UK DTC (currently 24(4)(a) of 
the 2001 UK/US DTC) in terms of determining whether or not the UK tax 
was computed by reference to the same profits or income by reference to 
which the US tax is computed, granting finally the FTC. As provided by the 
Court: “When UK tax is payable on a dividend received from a US 
Corporation, and US tax has been paid by the corporation on the profits out 
of which the dividend was paid, there can be no question of the UK tax 
                                                          
604  Popa, supra n. 593. 
605  The arguments of the Court of Appeal, however, were slightly different and focused 
more in the source of the income. In fact, the Court held that the relevant test for 
determining whether a person is taxed on the same profits is whether the source is the 
same. Lemos, supra n. 591, p. 52. Using Memec Plc’s approach, the Court determined 
that the profit of the LLC did not belong to its members as they arose; therefore, the 
sources of Mr. Anson’s income were different. Popa, supra n. 593. 
606  UK: Anson v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (2015), supra n. 
592. 
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being ‘computed by reference to the same profits or income’ as the profits of 
the corporation, if the source of the income is identified on the basis of UK 
(or, indeed, US) tax law”.
607
 The above confirms the finding of the First-tier 
Tribunal, which stated that: “[I]n light of the of the terms of the LLC 
operating agreement and the views of experts is that  the members of [the 
LLC] have an interest in the profits of [the LLC] as they arise”.
608
 Therefore, 
in the same order of ideas, the Court states: “If, then, Mr. Anson was 
entitled to the share of the profits allocated to him, rather than receiving a 
transfer of profits previously vested (in some sense) in the LLC, it follows 
that his ‘income arising’ in the US was his share of the profits. That is 
therefore the income liable to tax under UK law, to the extent that it is 
remitted to the UK. There is no dispute as to the income which was taxed in 
the US: that was Mr. Anson’s share of the profits of the LLC. Mr. Anson’s 
liability to UK tax is therefore computed by reference to the same income as 




Two important conclusions arise from the Anson case law with respect to 
the characterization of foreign entities.
610
 On the one hand, it is the level of 
uncertainty in the U.K. rules of characterization of foreign entities. As noted 
already, the HMRC recently stated in a list that a U.S. LLC is treated as 
taxable entity. This certainly contradicts the U.K. Supreme Court’s decision 
                                                          
607  Id., para. 92. 
608  Id., para. 119. 
609  Id., para. 121. 
610  Other important conclusions that arise from Anson are related to the use of transparent 
entities and the access to tax treaty benefits, mostly in light of the proposed Article 1(2) 
OECD Model. However, this issue will be further analyzed in infra Chapter IV. 





in Anson, providing again a broader level of uncertainty for all other 
forthcoming cases.
611
 This issue is in part solved since the HMRC has made 
public in September 2015 that it will continue to apply the practice of 
treating U.S. LLCs as taxable entities, regardless the outcome in Anson.
612
 
This is, however, not necessarily an auspicious result for taxpayers, because 
it implies that future potential cases of double taxation may occur. On the 
other hand, Anson has already set up the discussion with respect to the 
“U.K. system” to characterize foreign entities, including those who, based 
on simplicity, claim for a system similar to that existing in the United States, 
i.e. CTB election.
613
 As we will see further on in this work, one of the 
reasons the United States moved from a resemblance test, i.e. Kintner test, 
to an elective system was indeed the level of complexity in the old rules 
determining the tax status of entities, mostly from the tax authorities’ point 
of view.
614
 Under this assumption, it would not be a complete surprise that 
this discussion turns into a more serious debate in the near future. 
 
                                                          
611  See, e.g. S. Rogers, D. Cassidy and J. Mace, U.K. Tax Treatment of U.S. LLCs Post-
Anson, 82 Tax Notes Int’l 4 (2016). 
612  The document issued by the HMRC confirmed the following: “(i) when U.S. LLCs have 
already been treated as companies or corporations, HMRC will not challenge this view; 
(ii) the Anson ruling was specific to the facts and circumstances of that case, particularly 
Delaware law, and did not herald a wholesale shift in interpretation in this area; (iii) 
individual claims for double tax relief in reliance on Anson will be considered on a case-
by-case basis; and (iv) HMRC proposes to continue in its existing approach to determine 
whether a foreign entity has ‘ordinary share capital’ for the purpose of various important 
corporate tax reliefs (including the substantial shareholding exemption)”. Id., pp. 367-
368.  
613  Lemos, supra n. 591, p. 57. 
614  Infra Section 4.3. 
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3.2.4. Fixed Approach 
Tax scholars refer to “fixed approach” to those cases in which all foreign 
entities are characterized in the same way, i.e. either fiscally transparent or 
opaque.
615
 This labeled characterization can be done in many manners. Italy, 
e.g. openly considers all foreign entities as taxable entities.
616
 Other 
countries prefer to provide lists of taxable and non-taxable entities, such as 
the case of Luxembourg.
617
 In other cases, e.g. Greece, the taxable status of 
foreign entities is given based on arguments of neutrality or non-
discrimination.
 618
 In other words, as all domestic entities are regarded as 
taxable entities, similarly all foreign entities should be also treated like 
that.
619
 There also situations in which the absence of specific rules permits to 




At first glance, the fixed approach is less costly for the tax administrations, 
which do not have to determine the tax status of foreign entities. Likewise, it 
                                                          
615  See, e.g. Avery Jones et al., supra n. 567. See also, V. Kumar, Conflicts of Qualification 
and Conflicts of Allocation of Income, in: E. Burgstaller and K. Haslinger (eds.), 
Conflicts of Qualification in Tax Treaty Law, Linde (2007), p. 39. Countries like Greece, 
Italy and Portugal follows this approach. See Lang and Staringer, supra n. 524, p. 35. 
616  A. Crazzolara, supra n. 541,p. 447. 
617   “The opaque entities are listed in article 159 LIR, while the tax transparent entities are 
listed in article 175(1) LIR and §11bis StAnpG”. See P. Berna, P. Mischo and F. van 
Kuij, Luxembourg, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of 
Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 516. 
618  A. Kardachaki and S. Psaroulis, Greece, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 
99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 392. 
619  Id. 
620  See, e.g. M. Texeira De Abreu, Portugal in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 
99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 651; F. 
Yañez, Chile, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable 
Entities and Tax Treaty Protection (IFA 2014), p. 197. 





contributes to predictability for taxpayers who know in advance how some 
foreign entities will be treated for domestic tax purposes and it is less 
subject to abusive practices since taxpayers must rely completely in the 
knowledge on foreign law to plan a tax structure in order to reduce taxation. 
Nevertheless, and as well as the approaches already mentioned, it does not 
entirely avoid the generation of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities and their 
potential misuse. For example, if Italy considers all the foreign entities as 
taxable entities, 
621
 the probability of generating cases of reverse hybrids are 
indeed high, because of the amount of businesses around the world using 
fiscally transparent structures, such as Partnerships.  
3.2.5. Elective Approach 
Finally, there is an approach under which the taxpayer can elect the tax 
status of a determined foreign entity. The majority of the countries, with 
some exceptions, do not follow this approach,
622
 and at this moment the only 
                                                          
621  A. Crazzolara, supra n. 541, p. 447. 
622  In 2013, the Special Tax Treatment Control Act in South Korea allowed certain 
qualified foreign entities to opt to be treated as fiscally transparent in the same manner 
as domestic companies. Under the new rule, a foreign entity is qualified to make the 
election if it meets all the following criteria: (i) the foreign entity has certain similarities 
to the domestic entities which are allowed to make the election; (ii) the foreign entity 
has a PE in Korea; (iii) the foreign entity is treated as fiscally transparent in its country 
of organization. S. Kim and J. Yoon, Republic of Korea, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international Vol. 99B, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection 
(IFA 2014), p. 485. In contrast to the U.S. CTB election, the South Korean rule seems to 
have the purpose of avoiding characterization conflicts, mostly when there is a potential 
PE with potentially significant income. See Lang and Staringer, supra n. 524, p. 38. 
Other countries have recently introduced electivity exclusively within the domestic 
context, i.e. not applicable to foreign entities. This is the case of Italy, where since 1 
January 2017 there is the possibility to elect the tax treatment of Corporation and other 
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example is given by the “CTB regulations” in the United States, which due 
to its special characteristics and complexities will be separately analyzed. 
4. The U.S. Elective System: The ‘Stone Guest’ in a Worldwide Waltz 
The United States represents the largest and most famous “elective system” 
to characterize entities for tax purposes, reserving the taxpayers the 
exclusive rights to determine when a foreign entity will be taxable or not for 
U.S. tax purposes. However, when comparing the previous experience based 
on a resemblance test, i.e. Kintner test, it is possible to realize that the 
current system is indeed not less elective than the previous one, at least in 
practice. The above, however, does not mean to recognize that the CTB 
system represents an important source of disparities with respect to the 
characterization of entities, and therefore, opportunities for tax planning, 
which can be mostly seen in the circumvention of Subpart F income (CFC 
rules in the United States) and FTC rules. Nonetheless, and as it will be 
demonstrated further on in this Section, not always the circumvention of 
those rules attend to the CTB election, but rather to the poor design of those 
rules, being therefore the election completely irrelevant.  
                                                                                                                                       
entities (e.g. Partnerships) either as tax transparent or taxable entities, as the the 
taxpayers decide. The election can take five taxable periods and it is renewable. See IT: 
Article 55 bis Corporate Income Tax Act [Imposta sul reddito d’impresa], Official 
Journal [Gazzetta Ufficiale] No. 301 of 31 Dec. 1986.  





4.1. Introductory issues: Domestic/Foreign and Taxable/Non-
Taxable Entities 
When analyzing the characterization of entities for U.S. tax purposes, it is 
important to clarify two previous issues: the distinction between domestic 
and foreign entities, and the determination on whether an entity is taxable or 
not for U.S. tax purposes.  
Generally speaking, the distinction between domestic and foreign entities in 
the United States is very straightforward: entities organized under U.S. Law 
are domestic entities while the others are foreign.
623
  On the other hand, the 
determination on whether a domestic entity is taxable or not for U.S. tax 
purposes is made as follows: firstly, it is determined whether an 
organization is recognized as a separate entity or not, i.e. an entity separate 
from its owners;
624
 secondly, it is determined whether the entity is a 
“business entity”, which is basically any entity recognized for federal tax 
purposes, including a disregarded entity with a single owner, that is not 
                                                          
623  US: IRS Sec. 7701(a)(4)-(5); US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-5. There is one exception, 
however, which is the case of a domestic Corporation that may elect to have a Canadian 
or Mexican subsidiary treated as a domestic Corporation for U.S. tax purposes if the 
subsidiary is organized and “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with the 
laws [Canada or Mexico] as to the title and operation of property”. US: IRC Sec. 
1504(d). See also, US: IRS Notice 2000-7, 2000-4 IRB 49 regarding the effect of repeal 
of certain Canadian Banking Legislation on Section 1504(d) elections. The US 
jurisprudence has also been clear that a when the solely purpose was not to comply with 
Canadian Law, the election is not allowed. See, e.g. US: Kholer Co. v. US, 124 F3d 
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
624  A “cost sharing arrangement”, e.g. is not recognized as a separate entity for federal tax 
purposes. See US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-1(c). See also, US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 
301.7701-1(a)(1) and Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-1(a)(2), and the references to legal 
separate entities in the United States in supra Section 2.1. 
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properly classified as a Trust or otherwise subject to special treatment under 
the Internal Revenue Code.
625
 A business entity with two or more owner is 
thus classified either as a Corporation,
626
 subject to Corporate Income Tax at 
the level of the entity, or as a Partnership,
627
 not subject to taxation at the 
level of the entity, but rather at the level of the partners.
628
 Accordingly, a 
business entity with one single owner is classified either as a Corporation or 
a disregarded entity.
629
 This distinction is crucial, because all business 
entities not recognized as per se Corporations are regarded as “eligible 
                                                          
625  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(a) for the concept of “business entities”, and US: 
Treas. Reg. sec. 301.7701-4 for the concept of “trusts”. 
626  The term “Corporation” is defined by statute to include: “associations, joint stock 
companies, and insurance companies”. US: IRC Sec. 7701(a)(3). There are domestic 
entities that must be considered as such for US tax purposes, e.g. Banks, insurance 
companies. See US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701(2)(b). Accordingly, there are foreign 
entities that are listed as per se Corporations. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701(2)(b)(8). 
627  Partnerships include: “a syndicate group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated 
organization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture 
is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or state or a 
corporation […]”. US: IRC Sec. 7701(a)(2). Likewise, a “partner” is defined as: “a 
member in such a syndicate group, pool, joint venture, or organization”. US: IRC Sec. 
7701(a)(2). 
628  The pattern of taxation of partnerships (pass-through entities), specially referred to the 
avoidance of economic double taxation has certainly encouraged its use in the United 
States. McDaniel et al. explains it as follows: “Since the partnership is treated as a 
conduit for tax purposes, profits are taxed only once, in contrast to the taxation of 
corporate profits, first when earned by the corporation, and again, when distributed to 
shareholders”. McDaniel, McMahon and Simmons, supra n. 537,p. 1. Likewise, the use 
of losses makes a difference when electing between forming a Corporation or a 
Partnership. As McDaniel et al. state: “In addition, when the enterprise realizes losses, 
the partners may deduct the losses currently on their own tax returns, while losses at the 
corporate level may not be deducted by shareholders”. Id. In addition to Partnerships, 
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are taxed either as Corporations or Partnerships. 
There is no single systematic treatment of LLCs for US federal tax purposes; however, 
most of LLCs are treated as Partnerships. Id., pp. 1-2.  
629  A disregarded entity is an organization with a single owner, which can be recognized as 
an entity separate from its owner. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3. 







, which means that they can elect to be classified either as a 
Corporation (taxable entity), a Partnership (non-taxable) or a disregarded 
entity, which is known as the “Check-the-box” (CTB) system or CTB 
regulations.  
As noted, therefore, the CTB regulations apply primarily with respect to the 
characterization of domestic entities, not being exclusively designed to 
characterize foreign entities for U.S. tax purposes. The above has to be with 
the fact that in the United States entities are formed according to state laws 
(and not according to federal law), which indeed creates lot of problems 
with respect to the legal characteristics of entities.
631
 For that reason, and 
since its very beginning, federal income tax developed its own system of 
characterization for corporation, partnerships, trusts and states.
632
 
Regardless, the above, this work will subsequently refer exclusively to the 
rules of characterization of foreign entities for U.S. tax purposes. 
4.2. The 1954 Kintner test 
Before the implementation of the CTB regulations in 1996, the United 
States characterized foreign entities for tax purposes based on the 
                                                          
630  “Eligible entities” are business entities not classified as a Corporation under Treas. 
Regs. Sec. 301.7701-1(b)(1), (3),(4),(5),(6),(7), or (8). US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-
3(a).  
631  See, e.g. P. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 Cath. U.L. 
Rev. 437 (1995). 
632  US: Section II.D. of the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, cited in: Dell’Anese, 
supra n. 4, p. 217.  
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concurrence of four corporate features which included: limited liability; 
continuity of life; centralized management, and free transferability of 
interests.
633
 Hence, an entity with more than one owner was classified as an 
association, taxable as a corporation, if it possessed at least three of these 
characteristics.
634
 If it possessed fewer than three, then it was classified as a 
partnership for U.S. tax purposes.
635
 The treatment of entities with a sole 




The Kintner test, however, was not always easy to apply and let open a lot 
of possible outcomes, even when similar facts and foreign laws were under 
analysis. An example of the above can be found in the Rev. Rul. 77-214 
                                                          
633  US: United States v. Kintner, 216 F2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). Subsequent Treasury 
regulations were issued as a result of this case law. See US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-1 
to 11, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. Nevertheless, in 1935 the U.S. Supreme Court 
already stated a sort of previous resemblance test. See US: Morrissey v. Commissioner, 
296 U.S. 344 (1935). This decision upholds both the Treasury’s regulatory authority in 
the area of entity classification and the government’s position concerning business trust. 
The decision described the corporate features that a trust should meet to be considered 
analogous to a Corporation, including: ability to hold title to property; centralized 
management; continuity of life upon death of an owner; a structure that facilitates the 
transferability of beneficial interest and limited liability. See Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, 
p. 218. The above responded to a reaction during the early 1930s, where many 
professionals, especially doctors, began abandoning their solo practice in favor of large 
unincorporated groups in the form of trust or partnership agreements. See Hobbs, supra 
n. 631, p. 481. This issue was even more important after Pelton v. Commissioner (1937), 
where these types of organizations received the treatment of associations, taxed as 
Corporation, which allowed them, e.g. to adopt tax-favored pension plans in comparison 
to those applicable to individuals. Sooner taxpayers started exploiting the corporate 
status. Id., p. 482.  See also, US: Pelton v. Commisioner, 82 F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1937).  
634  Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 65-66. See also, M. Gianni, International Tax 
Planning After Check-the-Box, 2 J. Passthrough Entities 39 (1999), p. 9-10. 
635  Id. 
636  Id.  







 and Rev. Rul. 93-4 (1993),
 638
 both referred to the application of 
the Kinstner test to a German GmbH [Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung], owned by two subsidiaries subsequently owned by a U.S. Parent 
Corporation. In the case of the Rev. Rul. 77-214, on one hand, the IRS 
stated that a German GmbH always possesses the corporate characteristics 
of limited liability
639
 and centralized management.
640
 By other side, the 
presence of continuity of life
641
 and free transferability of interest
642
 would 
also exist unless separate interests exist to compel dissolution or to enforce 
transfer restrictions.
643
 The GmbH’s memorandum of association contained 
that the GmbH would be dissolved in case of death, insanity or bankruptcy 
of one of the shareholders [Gesellschafter] and any transfer of the GmbH’s 
shares [Geschäftsanteile] would require the prior written approval of all the 
other shareholders. Because the GmbH was owned by two subsidiaries 
wholly owned by a U.S. parent, the IRS ignored the provisions of the 
GmbH’s memorandum of association and considered that the GmbH 
possessed both free transferability of interest and continuity of life, being 
recognized as a Corporation for U.S. tax purposes.
644
 In the Rev. Rul. 93-4, 
on the other hand, the IRS examined the same facts and foreign laws, 
                                                          
637  US: IRS Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B. 408. 
638  US: IRS Rev. Rul. 93-4, 1993-1 C.B. 225.  
639  DE: Sec. 13 GmbHG –Limited Liability Company Act– [limited liability]. 
640  DE: Sec. 35 GmbHG –Limited Liability Company Act– [management]. 
641  DE: Sec. 60 GmbHG –Limited Liability Company Act– [dissolution of a GmbH]. 
642  DE: Sec. 15 GmbHG –Limited Liability Company Act– [transferability of interest in the 
GmbH]. 
643  B. Spudis and M. Wilczynski, Entity Classification Update: Rev. Rul. 93-4, 71 Taxes 
164 (1993), p. 165. 
644  This is known as the “single interest theory” applied by the IRS to justify the existence 
of free transferability of interest and continuity of life. Id. 
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arriving to the same conclusion, i.e. a GmbH is a Corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes, although letting open some possibilities for achieving the opposite 
outcome: the tax treatment of partnerships.
645
 Although the IRS concluded 
that a German GmbH always possesses the characteristics of limited liability 
and centralized management, coinciding with its previous Rev. Rul. 77-214, 
it modified its previous position regarding continuity of life, stating that the 
presence or absence of separate interests is not relevant to the determination 
of whether an entity possesses continuity of life.
646
 As the GmbH’s 
memorandum of association requires dissolution upon bankruptcy of any 
shareholder, the GmbH lacks of continuity of life, “without further action”, 
the Rev. Rul. 93-4 removes thus the need for any shareholder to compel 
dissolution.
647
 With respect to the characteristic of free transferability, 
however, the Rev. Rul. 93-4 stated that because the two shareholders of the 
GmbH were subsidiaries of the same parent company, all decisions were 
subject to the influence of the parent company, applying the single interest 
theory.
648
 This conclusion is nonetheless arguable, because it is not clear that 
the single interest theory applies also to domestic entities.
649
 Accordingly, 
no reference was made within the Rev. Rul. 93-4 to the specific 
characteristic of the subsidiaries involved, when in fact according to that 
                                                          
645  Id., p. 169. 
646  As provided by Spudis and Wilczynski: “[…] the Service appears to be announcing that 
the single interest theory, as described in Rev. Rul. 77-214, is inapplicable to the 
corporate characteristic of continuity of life. In so ruling, the Service corrects its prior 
statement that dissolution must be compelled”. Id., p. 166. 
647  Id. 
648  Id. 
649  Spudis and Wilczynski state that Rev. Rul. 93-4 and Rev. Rul. 88-8 suggest that the 
single interest theory should be applied to both domestic and foreign entities. Id., p. 168. 









   
The Kintner test, on the other hand, although being the official manner to 
characterize foreign entities for tax purposes, was not always strictly 
followed. The above is demonstrated, e.g. in the General Counsel 
Memorandum 34.376 (1970), where the IRS determined that an entity 
incorporated under the law of Nigeria had also to be treated as a Corporation 
for U.S. federal tax purposes, considering that the concept of incorporation 
was similar to the U.S. concept, regardless the application of the Kintner 
test.
651
 Similarly, in the General Counsel Memorandum 35.294 (1973), the 
IRS concluded that a Colombian company had to be recognized as a 
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes, because it was a separate juridical person 
under Colombian Law, regardless the analysis of the factors under the 
Kintner test.
652
 Later on, the IRS would issue the General Counsel 
Memorandum 36.910 (1976) revoking the General Counsel Memorandum 
                                                          
650  Certainly less influence from the US Parent Company could exist if both subsidiaries 
owning the GmbH were German stock corporations [Aktiengesellschaft] rather than 
GmbH. See Sec. 76, subsec. 1 and sec. 117 AktG. This latter provides a responsibility of 
the directors of the company in case decisions where influenced, e.g. by shareholders. 
Nevertheless, Sec. 291 AktG [controlling company] can restrict the effects of Sec. 76, 
subsec. 1 AktG. Compare with: Sec. 35; Sec. 45 and Sec. 47 GmbHG. 
651  US: IRS General Counsel Memorandum 34.376 of 13 Nov. 1970, cited in: A. Gomez, 
Rationalizing the Taxation of Business Entities, 49 Tax Lawyer 2 (1995), p. 301. See 
also, Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 220. 
652  This position was subsequently limited by Rev. Rul. 73-254, by which the IRS clarified 
that the characterization of the a foreign unincorporated entity should be carry on 
through the Kintner test, regardless that this entity was recognized as a separate juridical 
person in its country of formation. See US: Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613. Id. See 
also, US: IRS General Counsel Memorandum 35.294 of 6 April 1973. 
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35.294, by which it stated that all foreign entities should be characterize 
according to the Kintner test, unless incorporated under common law 
principles.
653
 This issue should be finally settled in the IRS Rev. Rul. 88-8 
(1976), where the IRS opted for considering all foreign entities as 
unincorporated, and thus, subject to the Kintner test in order to determine 




The use of the Kintner test thus puts on evidence some important 
consequences. On one hand, the complexity and the level of legal 
uncertainty a resemblance test may represent for taxpayers. Indeed, under a 
resemblance test, tax authorities really need to get involved onto foreign 
laws in order to understand the proper characteristics of an entity. The above 
does not necessarily guarantee the same outcome, not even when the same 
entities and the same laws are under analysis, increasing thus the levels of 
uncertainty for taxpayers. On the other hand, and even when such analysis is 
accurate, although most of the time costly, the opportunities of planning will 
nevertheless exist since taxpayers can always access to a careful consulting 
with local counsels in order to obtain the characterization desired.
655
 In other 
words, nothing prevents taxpayers to use drafting techniques advices made 
by specialized attorneys to predetermine the classification type desired. This 
                                                          
653  US: IRS General Counsel Memorandum 39.610 of 4 Nov. 1976, cited in: Gomez, supra 
n. 651. 
654  Id. 
655  Gianni, supra n. 634, p. 10. See also, S. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, 
the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 
405 (2005), pp. 430-431, who observed that well-advised taxpayers under the Kintner 
test could certainly avoid the application of corporate income tax. 





is exactly why the Kinstner test remained in practice as a residual test 
applied mostly to unsophisticated taxpayers who were unable to pay the 
professional fees required circumventing its rules,
656
 being not less elective 
than its successor: the CTB regulations.
 657
  The above, however, does not 
mean to categorize the Kintner test as better or worse than the subsequent 
elective system, but simply to emphasize that it proved at that time to be 
inadequate to serve its purpose, mostly after the appearance of small form of 
business with characteristic of both Corporations and partnerships.
658
   
4.3. The 1996 CTB Regulations  
In 1996 the IRS issued the final regulations that simplified of the old system 
of characterization of foreign entities in the United States.
659
 Generally 
speaking, the system allowed certain foreign business entities to be 
classified in a manner different from that provided in their countries of 
incorporation so long they were not regarded as per se Corporations for U.S. 
                                                          
656  Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 222.  
657  In the same opinion, Sicular states: “Over time, of course, practitioners became 
increasingly adept at manipulating the four factors [Kintner test] to change the tax result, 
even for entities that were clearly corporations […]. Getting there, of course took some 
amount of costly […], but the U.S. tax saving frequently justified the cost. Entity 
classification thus was often effectively elective […]”. D. Sicular, The New Look-
Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F?, 46 Tax Notes In’l 6 (2007), p. 601. 
658  This is clearly explained by Hobbs, who states before the implementation of the CTB 
system: “ […] the resemblance test remains the methodology for entity classification 
today. However, it has not become cemented into the foundation of accepted tax 
doctrine. Indeed, given its history of inadequacy, it is remarkable that the resemblance 
test has survived”. Hobbs, supra n. 631, p. 519. And he continues: “The resemblance 
test has proven inadequate because its underlying assumption is that all corporations 
resemble each other and that other organizations resemble corporations”. Id. 
659  US: T.D. 8697, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 of 18 Dec. 1996. 





 These foreign entities able to elect their tax treatment for 




Under the CTB system, an eligible foreign entity can elect to be classified 
either as an association, which is taxable as a corporation in the United 
States, or as a partnership, which is taxable only at the level of the 
partners.
662
 Accordingly, if an eligible foreign entity has only one member, 
it can choose to be classified either as an association or as a disregarded 
entity.
663
 The election can be made at any time and it must accomplish with 
the formal requirements established by law.
664
 Accordingly, the effective 
day of the election will normally be that one specified in the respective 
election form, although it also is possible to provide a specific date different 
from the one on which the election is filed, having even the chance of giving 
the election a retroactive effect.
665
 Once the election has been made, it 
                                                          
660  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(b)(8) states the list of per se Corporations. 
661  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(a). 
662  Id. 
663  Id. 
664  An eligible entity is required to attach a Form 8832 (“Entity Classification Election”) 
jointly with its Federal tax or information return of the taxable year in which the election 
is made. If the entity is not required to file a return for that year, a copy of the Form 
8832 must be attached to the federal tax or information return of any direct or indirect 
owner of the entity for the taxable year in which the election is made. US: Treas. Reg. 
Sec 301.7701-3(c)(1)(ii). 
665  The effective date cannot be more than 75 days prior to the date on which the election is 
filed and cannot be more than 12 months after the date on which the election is filed. If 
an election specifies an effective date of more than 75 days prior to the date the election 
if filed, it will be effective only 75 days prior to the date it was filed. Likewise, if the 
effective date exceeded 12 months after the date on which the election is filed, it will be 
effective 12 months after the date is filed. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3 c)(1)(iii). 
Accordingly, US: IRS Rev. Proc. 2009-41 extended the time for filing the election to 3 
years and 75 days prior to the date on which the lection is filed. Entities that satisfy the 










In absence of an election, the tax status of a foreign business is settled by 
default rules attending to the limited liability and the number of owners of 
the foreign entity.
667
  According to these rules, a foreign eligible entity will 
be considered a Partnership if it has two or more members and at least one 
of them does not have limited liability.
668
 On the contrary, it will be 
classified as an association taxable as a corporation, if all members have 
limited liability
669
 and as a disregarded entity if an eligible entity has a 
single owner who does not have limited liability.
670
 Likewise, a foreign 
eligible entity is considered to have “limited liability” if the member has no 
personal liability for the debts of or claims against the entity, by reason of 
being a member, based solely on the statute or law pursuant to which the 
entity is organized.
671
 Conversely, a member has personal liability if the 
creditors of the entity may seek satisfaction of all or any portion of the debts 
or claims against the entity from the member as such.
672
 The determination 
                                                                                                                                       
requirements set out in Rev. Proc. 2009-41 must follow the prescribed procedures for 
obtaining relief for a late election. See US: IRS Rev. Proc. 2009-41 of 28 Sep. 2009. 
666  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3 c)(1)(iv). 
667  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2) that refers to the classification of foreign eligible 
entities that do not file an election. The default rules, however, do not apply with respect 
to the classification of entities made before 31 Dec. 1996. These entities maintain their 
characterization according to the Kintner test. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(3)(ii). 
668  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2)(1)(A). 
669  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2)(1)(B). 
670  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2)(1)(C). 
671  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii). 
672  Id. 
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thus is left to the statute or law in the foreign country where the entity is 
organized, except when a country allows the entity to specify in its 
organizational documents whether its members will have limited liability.
673
 
In such a case, these organizational documents turn also to be relevant.  
 
As per all the rules described above, it is possible to extract some 
preliminary conclusions. On one hand, although the CTB system is known 
for being elective, this election is subject to important limitations, which 
allow arguing that, indeed, it is just partially elective. The above can be 
seen, e.g. in the fact that the election is relegated only to certain entities 
recognized as eligible entities and based also on limitations of time once the 
election is made. This issue was also recognized within the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (1997) reviewing the U.S. elective system adopted and which 
stated: “[I]t could be said that the regime established under the check-the-
box regulations is not completely elective, because entities eligible to elect 
either corporate or partnership under the regulations generally are 
unincorporated domestic entities”.
674
 Accordingly, the default 
characterization rules reduces the practical application of the election only 
to those situations on which an entity wishes to have a characterization other 
than that provided by statute or in cases it decides to change a previous 
election. In all the other cases thus the foreign entities will have a 
characterization for U.S. tax purposes regardless any election made by the 
                                                          
673  Id. 
674  US: Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Review of Selected Entity Classification 
and Partnership Tax Issues, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1997), 
p. 16. 





taxpayer. On the other hand, and in comparison with the previous Kintner 
test, the CTB system represents an important contribution to simplicity and 
legal certainty in the characterization of foreign and domestic entities for tax 
purposes.
675
 By one side, it eliminates the factual and legal comparisons 
established under the Kintner test, reducing also the costs for the tax 
administration.
676
 By other side, it represents a proof of ‘fairness’ or equal 
treatment of taxpayers, since after the CTB regulations the election in the 
classification of entities is available to all types of taxpayers and not only 
those well-advised ones.
677
 Indeed, as recognized within the US Joint 
Committee of Taxation (2010): “The Check-the-box regulations were 
intended to relieve both taxpayers and the IRS from the need to expend 
considerable resources in determining the proper classification of 
unincorporated entities, when classification was effectively elected for well-
advised taxpayers”.
678
 As such, it is possible to affirm that the CTB 
                                                          
675  Indeed, it also allowed taxpayers to avoid domestic corporate status, and therefore, 
economic double taxation of income. In words of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (1997): “The principal impact is that taxpayers may now choose with greater 
simplicity and lower compliance costs whether they will pay two levels of tax on 
business income under the corporate tax rules, or whether they will pay only one level of 
tax under the partnership tax rules (or as a disregarded single-member entity)”. Id., p. 
17. In the same opinion regarding simplicity and legal certainty for taxpayers, Mullis 
states: “The criteria required to qualify to make a CTB election are simple and explicit. 
Once a classification election is made, it continues until an entity elects for a different 
classification”. K. Mullis, Check-the-Box and Hybrids: A Second Look at Elective U.S. 
Tax Classification for Foreign Entities, 64 Tax Notes Int’l 5 (2011), p. 373. This is in 
fact represented in the succeeding sixty months limitation in which the election cannot 
be changed. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3 c)(1)(iv). 
676  Mullis, supra n. 675. See also, Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 223; Gianni, supra n. 634.  
677  Id. 
678  US: US Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Background Related to Possible 
Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing (JCX-37-10), July 20, 2010, p. 48 
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regulations were not the result of isolated or random tax policy issues, 
disconnected with reality of business in the United States, but rather a 
positive (written) legal response to classification rules that were becoming 




4.4. The CTB and tax planning opportunities 
The CTB regulations have not only improved in simplicity and fairness for 
taxpayers, but have also created important new opportunities for planning 
through the use of hybrid entities in order to circumvent other domestic tax 
rules.
680
 This is especially evident with respect to the avoidance of anti-
deferral rules (CFC rules) and the use of foreign tax credits not originally 
intended under U.S. tax law.
681
 The above, however, does not mean to 
recognize neither that the existence of hybrid entities and reverse hybrids is 
a problem per se nor that coordinated international measures should 
necessarily be adopted. Indeed, most of these issues still remain as domestic 
concerns than could be (and in some case are) solved in a unilateral level.
682
 
                                                          
679  As stated by the Joint Committee (1997): “The check-the-box regulations could have the 
long-term effect of drawing attention to rules that may have become elective (whether 
under new regulations or under prior law) and of sparking a re-thinking of the rationale 
for such rules in some cases”. US: Joint Committee of Taxation (1997), supra n. 674, p. 
18. 
680  However, as this author has argued somewhere else in this work, tax planning is not an a 
priori illegitimate activity. On the contrary, it becomes so depending of the level of 
tolerance in a determined country. Supra Chapter I, Section 4.2.1. 
681  US: Staff of Joint Committee of Taxation (1997), supra n. 674, pp. 19-21.  
682  See, e.g. Denmark and the domestic anti-hybrid and anti-reverse hybrid rules discussed 
in infra Section 5.2. 





Yet, and as this author will argue later on, the coordination in the 
characterization of entities seems to be a better manner to deal with the 




4.4.1.  Avoidance of Subpart F Income 
Under U.S. tax law, a “CFC” is a foreign corporation in which more than 
50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
684
 or the total 
value of all stock, whichever is higher,
685
 is owned by “U.S. shareholders”, 




 10% or 
                                                          
683  Infra Section 5. OECD (2013), supra n. 2. 
684  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.951-1(g)(2) refers to the meaning of “voting power”.  
685  For example, if a domestic corporation owns exactly 50 percent of a foreign 
corporation’s voting common stock (class A) and nonvoting preferred stock (class B). A 
foreign person owns the remaining stock, class A and B, in the same percentage. If at the 
beginning of the next year, the domestic corporation buys one shares class B from the 
foreign person, the foreign corporation will be considered a CFC. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 
1.957-1(c), Example 8. Prior to 1987, the control was measure only by voting power. 
The alternative of total value was added to avoid manipulation. See Staff of Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1989, p. 988, cited in: Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-8. 
686  “Indirect ownership” consists of stock beneficially owned by a U.S. person through a 
foreign corporation, partnership, trust or state. In other words, the stock held by foreign 
entities is considered as indirectly owned proportionally by its shareholders or partners. 
US: IRC sec. 958(a)(2). For example, if P (domestic corporation) owns 80% of F1 
(foreign corporation), and F1 owns 80% of F2 (foreign corporation), and F2 owns 90% 
of F3 (foreign corporation), P is indirectly owner of 64% (0.80*0.80) of F2 and 57.6% 
(0.80*0.80*0.90) of F3. See example in Bitter and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-10. 
However, if P was a wholly owned subsidiary of another domestic corporation (e.g. U 
Corp.), there is no attribution of stock to it. Id.   
687   Under U.S. tax law, the concept used is “constructive ownership” and refers, in general 
terms, to the attribution rules of IRC sec. 318, with some modifications. For example, 
under sec. 318 a person is regarded to be the owner of stock owned by certain relatives 
(e.g. spouse), by his 50 percent controlled corporation, or by a partnership or trust in 
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more of the total voting stock of that foreign corporation.
688
 In such a case, 
all those U.S. shareholders owning 10% or more of the voting stock must 
include each year their pro rata share of certain CFC income, known as 
“Subpart F” income, which is generally passive income, regardless whether 
or not earnings are distributed from the subsidiary to the shareholders.
689
 
Thus, CFC rules have the purpose of avoiding tax deferral through the 
incorporation of subsidiaries abroad, accelerating thus the taxation of certain 
income. 
As per to the CFC rules explained above, it is clear that what makes a 
foreign entity to be considered a CFC is the fact of being characterized as a 
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes, i.e. a taxable entity. Hence, partnerships 
for U.S. tax purposes (i.e. tax transparent entities) will, in principle, not be 
subject to anti-deferral rules. However, since the CTB system is in essence 
elective, giving the taxpayer the possibility of changing the tax 
characterization of an entity,
690
 the possibilities to circumvent the U.S. CFC 
thus rules increases. A classic example of the use of hybrid entities to 
                                                                                                                                       
which he participates. For purposes of Subpart F rules, however, the percentage of stock 
ownership deemed to be controlling is reduced from 50 to 10 percent.  
688  US: IRC Sec. 951(a). See also, P. McDaniel, H. Ault and J. Repetti, Introduction to 
United States International Taxation, 5th Ed., Wolters and Kluwer, New York (2005), 
p. 115.  
689  “Subpart F income” as defined in IRC sec. 952 consists of two principal categories of 
income: 1) insurance income, and 2) foreign base company income. This latter, as per 
the definition in IRC sec. 954, includes: a) foreign personal holding company income, b) 
foreign base company sales income, c) foreign base company service income and d) 
foreign base company oil related income. See, McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, 
pp. 116-119. Generally speaking, Subpart F income is income that the Congress found 
subject to tax haven manipulation. See Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-4.  
690  Subject to the limitations stated in supra Section 4.3. 





circumvent Subpart F Income is earnings stripping through a disregarded 
loan.
691
 Let us assume that a domestic corporation is the wholly owner of a 
foreign entity (F1), organized as a corporation in country A and listed as a 
per se Corporation for U.S. tax purposes. F1 subsequently owns 100% of 
another foreign entity (F2), organized in country B, a low tax jurisdiction, 
where the entity is also a taxable entity for country B tax purposes. Let us 
also assume that F2 grants a loan to F1, and therefore, F1 pays back interest 
associated to that loan.  
 
Figure 3: Hybrid Entities and Subpart F Income 
                                                          
691  Mullis, supra n. 675, pp. 375-376.  
U.S. 
Country A 
F1 is a per se  Corporation for U.S. Tax 
purposes, namely, it is a taxable entity 
and cannot choose to be treated 
otherwise. Accordingly, it is a taxable 
entity for country A and B tax purposes. 
Country B 






F2 is an eligible entity in the United 
States and chooses to be treated as a 
disregarded entity for U.S. Tax 
purposes. On the contrary, it is 
considered as a taxable entity for 
country B tax purposes. 
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F2 is an eligible entity for U.S. tax purposes and it can elect to be treated 
either as a Corporation or as a disregarded entity. If F2 elects to be 
disregarded for U.S. tax purposes; therefore, the loan and the interest are 
also disregarded for U.S. tax purposes. This is to say, no interest income is 
recognized in the United States as Subpart F income. Accordingly, as F2 is a 
taxable entity in country B and F1 is also a taxable entity in country A, the 
interest paid from F1 to F2 is deductible at the level of F1, and most 
probably, not taxed in country B. This latter outcome (non-taxation in 
country B) is, however, irrelevant for U.S. tax purposes, because the fact 
that the income was taxed or not in country B would not change the erosion 
of the domestic tax base due to the circumvention of CFC rules in the 
United States. This is at least the original concern expressed by the Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (1997) as follows: “Under subpart F rules, 
the U.S. 10-percent shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation are 
required to include in income currently their shares of certain earnings of the 
controlled foreign corporation, whether or not the earnings are distributed to 
the shareholders […] were the subsidiary to qualify as a partnership or a 
‘nothing’, its earning may not be included income currently by the U.S. 
owner, making current inclusion, or not, a matter of choice”.
692
 No reference 
is made with respect to the taxation or not in the other country.  
                                                          
692  US: Joint Committee of Taxation (1997), supra n. 674, p. 19. Similarly, it was addressed 
by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (2010), which stated: “[…] Treasury 
and the IRS recognized that such increased flexibility in entity classification in the 
foreign context could provide greater opportunities than under existing regulations for 
inconsistent, or hybrid, entity classification in which an entity is treated as a taxable 





Another way to circumvent Subpart F income through the use of hybrid 





Figure 4: "Same-country" exception 
This exception states that Subpart F income will not include dividends, 
interest, rents and royalties received by a related corporation organized 
under the same laws of the CFC and which has a substantial part of its assets 
                                                                                                                                       
entity in one country but as a flow-through entity in another country”. US: Joint 
Committee on Taxation (2010), supra n. 678, p. 48. 
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used in its trade or business located in that country.
694
  As noted above (Fig. 
4), we are assuming the same structure than in Fig. 3, with the difference 
that a second foreign corporation (F3), wholly owned by a the same 
domestic corporation that owns F1, is organized in country A. Likewise, let 
us assume that F2 grants a loan to F3 and receives interest back. Therefore, 
considering that F2 chose to be treated as a disregarded entity, the loan and 
interest between F3 and F2 is disregarded for U.S. tax purposes. 
Accordingly, the fact that F2 is a disregarded entity implies that F3 is paying 
the interest “directly” to F1, which is indeed organized in the same country. 
Thus, the “same-country” exception applies and the interest paid to F2 is not 
included as Subpart F income of F1, which is clearly a CFC.  
Unlike the example in Fig. 3, however, where it is clear that the 
circumvention of CFC rules came up due to the tax characterization of F2, 
in this second example (Fig. 4) is not entirely clear that the characterization 
of the foreign entity (F2) is properly the cause of the circumvention of the 
CFC rules. Indeed, as it can be seen in Fig. 5 below, the avoidance of 
Subpart F income might be perfectly achieved if F1 granted the loan directly 
to F3, being thus the characterization of F2 completely anecdotic. Therefore, 
the issue in this case attends more to a deficient design of CFC rules, rather 
than the use of the CTB election.  
                                                          
694  Id. 






Figure 5: Same-country exception and the irrelevancy of the CTB election 
A similar situation occurs, e.g. with the “manufacturing exception” with 
respect to the generation of foreign base company sales income (FBC sales 
income).
695
 As a general rule, FBC sales income is income from transactions 
in personal property (goods) where a related person is either the buyer or the 
seller.
696
 However, if CFC’s income is derived in connection with the sale of 
personal property manufactured, produced or constructed by a CFC, that 
                                                          
695  FBC sales income is part of subpart F income, see supra n. 689. 
696  US: Sec. 954(d)(1). See also, Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-51. For example, 
A CFC’s gross profits on a sale of goods are thus usually FBC sales income. Likewise, 
if a CFC acts as an agent for a related person in a transaction in goods, its commission 











Because of the “same-country” exception, the 
interest paid to F1 is not considered Subpart F 
income in the United States. This result is 
achieved regardless the characterization of F2. 
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income is not considered FBC sales income.
697
 In other words, income from 
manufacturing activities is not Subpart F income and it should not be taxed 
as such in the United Sates. Although the exception makes sense since a 
CFC regime should not discourage the expansion of manufacturing 
operations carried on by MNEs in foreign countries, the relaxation of the 
text in 2008 certainly helped to extent the scope of the exception.
698
 Indeed, 
after the modification of the statute in 2008, any CFC that makes a 
“substantial contribution” through the activities of its employees, even 
though the foreign company itself it is not a manufacturer is considered as 
being included within the manufacturing exception.
699 This issue was also 
discussed during the hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the United States Senate, referred to the Apple Inc.’s offshore 
profit shifting.
700
 Recalling what was referred in Chapter I regarding the 
Apple Inc. case, the Apple’s tax structure is as follows:  
                                                          
697  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.954-3(a)(4)(i). 
698  Ting, supra n. 29, p. 50. 
699  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(a). For this purpose, the participation of the CFC 
employees is crucial. Accordingly, even though the determination of whether the 
employees of the CFC made a substantial contribution depends on all relevant facts and 
circumstances, the regulations provides a non-exclusive list of activities of CFC 
employees, including, among others: the oversight and direction of the activities or 
process by which the good are produced; material selection, vendor selection, or control 
of the raw materials, work-in-process or finished goods; management of manufacturing 
costs or capacities; quality control, etc. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), from 
(1) to (7). See also, Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-59. 
700  US: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee of Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, Offshore Profit Shifting and the 
U. S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.), S. Hrg.113-90, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington (2013), hereinafter also “U.S: Apple’s Hearing Report (2013)”.  






Figure 6: Apple's Tax Structure 
Apple Inc., a US Corporation, owns a 100% of the stock in Apple 
Operations International (AOI), which subsequently owns 100% of the stock 
in Apple Operations Europe (AOE) and which subsequently owns 100% of 
the stock in Apple Sales International (ASI). This latter ASI engaged in 
unrelated contract manufacturers in China to assemble the products, and 
subsequently sell them to distribution subsidiaries in Asia and Europe.
701
 
Therefore, theoretically, ASI could have relied in this exception, although 
                                                          






Sales to related distribution subsidiaries 
Sales Income 
The amount of sales income generated 
by ASI would not be considered FBC 
Sales Income for purposes of Subpart F 
in the United States (“manufacturing 
exception”). Thus, theoretically, ASI 
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that was not necessary because of the CTB election. ASI indeed avoided to 
be regarded as a CFC though the CTB election. However, what it is 
interesting to stress here is that, even in the absence of the CTB election, 
ASI could have made used only of the manufacturing exception to obtain a 
similar result (i.e. the avoidance of potential FBC sales income), which 
demonstrates again that the electivity in the treatment of foreign entities for 
tax purposes is just a piece of the whole puzzle.
702
  
There are cases, however, in which the CTB election is completely 
irrelevant to circumvent Subpart F income. This is the case, e.g. of multiple 
chain structures. 
703
 Let us assume the following hypothetical. A domestic 
corporation owns two CFCs: F1 incorporated in country A and FF1 
incorporated in country C. Accordingly, F1 has a wholly owned subsidiary 
in country B (F2) and FF1 has also a wholly owned subsidiary in country D 
(FF2). F1 and FF1 are per se corporations; therefore, not entitled to the CTB 
election. However, F2 and FF2 are eligible entities and they elect to be 
treated as disregarded entities. Likewise, FF2 grants a loan to F2 and 
receives interest back. 
                                                          
702  In this regard, Ting states that this is a demonstration that “the U.S. tax law provides 
multiple shields to protect ASI’s income from U.S. taxation”. Id., p. 51.   
703  “Check-the-box planning also cannot work if, for whatever reason, a corporation’s 
foreign subsidiaries are in multiple chains, rather than being consolidated under a single 
foreign holding company”. Sicular, supra n. 657, p. 606. 






Figure 7: Multiple chain structures and the circumvention of Subpart F Income 
As per the example above (Fig. 7), the interest payments will be recognized 
as payments between FF1 and F1, and thus Subpart F income. The “same 
country exception” does not apply in this case. Likewise, there will be 
Subpart F income, regardless the election via CTB.   
In addition, a more extreme interpretation could even lead the conclusion 
that in some cases the CTB election might create Subpart F income that 
would not otherwise existed in absence of the election.
704
  
                                                          









F1 and FF1 are considered per 
se Corporations for U.S. tax 
purposes. Therefore, they are 






F2 and FF2 are considered 
eligible entities for purposes of 
the CTB election and they 
elected to be treated as 
disregarded entities. 




Figure 8: CTB election and the creation of Subpart F Income 
Taking the original example in Fig. 3, where a domestic corporation owing 
F1, organized as a corporation in country A and listed as a per se 
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes, which subsequently wholly owns another 
foreign entity (F2), organized in country B, with the sole difference that F2 
performs services for a related party in country B, i.e. same country of 
incorporation and receives income accordingly. In absence of the CTB 
election, the services performed by F2 are not considered foreign base 
company sale and services income, because they are rendered in the same 
country of incorporation: country B. Nevertheless, if F2 elects to be treated 
as transparent entity to circumvent other items of Subpart F income, it could 








Services to related parties 
F2 
In absence of the CTB election that 
treats F2 as a disregarded entity for 
U.S. tax purposes, there would not be 
Subpart F income, because the “same-
country” exception would apply. 
However, if the election is made, F1 
(and not F2) would be regarded as 
rendering the services directly. 
Therefore,  the “same-country” 
exception would not apply and Subpart 
F income would be recognized in the 
United States. 





services would be rendered by F1, incorporated in country A, but rendered 
in a different country: country B. The same country exception would thus 
not be applicable and the income should be recognized in the United States 
as CFC income. This result would not exist in absence of the CTB election.  
4.4.2. Reaction from U.S. Tax Law 
The formal reaction of the United States to the circumvention of Subpart F 
rules through the use of hybrid entities came first with the Notice 98-11, 
right after the implementation of the CTB regulations.
705
 The Notice 
attempted to tackle the situations in which a “hybrid branch”, namely, an 
entity with a single owner that is treated as a separate entity under foreign 
tax law and as a branch of a CFC that is its sole owner for U.S. tax purposes, 
was used to make deductible interest payments that reduced the CFC’s 
foreign tax liability, and created low-taxed interest income in another entity, 
without creating subpart F income.
706
 The IRS and the Treasury stated that 
regulations would be issued to prevent that such hybrid branch arrangements 
are undertaken, and when that happens, the branch and the CFC will be 
treated as separate corporations for purposes of Subpart F.
707
 Despite the 
fact that those regulations came in force in the form of temporary 
regulations, including e.g. rules providing that the “same-country exception” 
applied to payments by a CFC to a branch of a related CFC only if the 
                                                          
705  US: Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18. 
706  US: Joint Committee on Taxation (2010), supra n. 678, p. 48. 
707  US: Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18. See also, US: T.D. 8767, 63 Fed. Reg. 14613, 26 
March 1998. 
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payment would have qualified for the exception if the hybrid branch had 
been a separate CFC incorporated in the jurisdiction in which the payment is 
subject to tax (other than a WHT),
708
 the IRS rapidly issued Notice 98-35
709
 
withdrawing Notice 98-11 and later on the temporary regulations in force. 
Notice 98-35, however, maintained the re-characterization of the hybrid 
branch as a separate Corporation in case of hybrid branch payments.
710
 For 
this purpose, three conditions should be met: a) the hybrid branch payment 
must reduce the foreign tax of the payer; b) the hybrid branch payment 
would have been Subpart F income if the transaction were between two 
CFCs,
711
 and c) there must be a disparity between the effective rate of tax on 
the payment in the hands of the payee and the hypothetical rate of tax that 
would have applied if the income had been taxed in the hands of the payer. 
For all other purposes, the hybrid branch is not treated as a separate entity.
712
 
None of these initiatives, however, finally achieved a permanent status.  
                                                          
708  US: Joint Committee on Taxation (2010), supra n. 678, p. 49. This rule interestingly 
focuses upon the taxation (or not) of the income in the foreign country, an issue that 
should be irrelevant if this income is finally included as Subpart F income in the United 
States. Similarly, Notice 98-11 stated: “Treasury and the Service believe that it is 
appropriate to prevent taxpayers from using these types of hybrid branch arrangements 
to reduce foreign tax while avoiding the corresponding creation of Subpart F income”. 
US: Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 34. 
709  US: Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.R.B. 
710  Id. 
711  Specifically, the Notice refers to “foreign personal holding company income”, which 
includes: (a) dividends, interest, rents and royalties; (b) net gains from the sale or 
exchange of property which gives rise to the income described in (a); (c) gain from 
certain commodities transactions; (d) gains from certain foreign currency transactions, 
and (e) income which is the equivalent of interest. See McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, 
supra n. 688, pp. 117-118. 
712  US: Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.R.B. 





Contrary to the above tendency, in 2006, and although inspired in the 
arguments of Notice 98-11, section 954(c)(6) was introduced within the 
Internal Revenue Code. This section states a “look-through” rule by which 
dividends, interest, rents and royalties received or accrued by a CFC, which 
is a related person, shall not be treated as Subpart F income to the extent 
attributable to income of the related person that it is neither Subpart F 
income nor income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or 
business in the United States.
713
 In other words, if e.g. CFC1, organized in 
country A, and CFC2, organized in country B, are both wholly owned by a 
U.S. corporation, and CFC1 grants a loan to CFC2, and therefore, CFC2 
pays interests back, those interests will not be included as Subpart F income 
of CFC1 to the extent they were not attributable to Subpart F income.  
 
 
                                                          
713  US: IRC Sec. 954(c)(6)(A). 




Figure 9: "Look-Through rule" –IRC Sec. 954(c)(6) 
This provision is particularly interesting, because it relaxes the position 
previously adopted with respect to hybrid branch arrangement and Subpart F 
income and it represents to certain extent an extension of the “same-country 
exception”.
714
 The above does not only highlight the contradictory nature of 
the CFC rules in the United States since they were issued,
715
 but also ratifies 
                                                          
714  Ironically also, the provision was very important in the case of Apple to avoid Subpart F 
income. As stated within the Apple’s case hearing: “Apple avoided them [Subpart F 
income] mostly through check-the-box regulations and the controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) look-through rule”. US: Apple’s Hearing Report (2013), supra n. 
700, p. 15. 
715  As stated by Sicular: “The legislature’s original intent in enacting Subpart F was to 
impose some constrains on the offshore movement of American capital, both to limit 
undue advantages enjoyed by investing abroad and to prevent tax avoidance through the 
use of offshore heavens and shelters. As originally enacted, Subpart F reflected a 







The interest paid by CFC2 will not be recognized as Subpart 
F income to the extent attributable to income of the related 
person (CFC1) that it is neither Subpart F income nor 
income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or 
business in the United States.  
CFC 1 
Country A 





by statute a “look-through” practice achieved already through the CTB 
election.
716
   
4.4.3. Use of Foreign Tax Credit 
The U.S. FTC is the method used to relive juridical double taxation at a 
domestic level.
717
 As such, the FTC allows U.S. taxpayers to credit the 
payment of foreign taxes against their domestic tax liabilities, having as 
                                                                                                                                       
“competitiveness” or capital import neutrality […] The last 45 years have not resolved 
the conflict, and that long-running tug-of-war is one of the reasons why Subpart F has 
always been unpredictable and confusing”. Sicular, supra n. 657, p. 590. 
716  “[S]ince 1997 there has been a de facto look-through treatment in many cases through 
the use of the check-the-box rules to achieve. The use of the check-the-box rule to 
achieve look-through treatment in the international context was initially controversial 
and, while Treasury backed down from its initial attack on the technique, it was never 
quite given up. Section 954(c)(6) resolves the controversy, at least for a while; by 
providing an explicit, and broader, look-through rule, which is a logical next step”. Id.  
717  U.S. citizens, resident aliens and domestic corporations can elect annually if they want 
to deduct the foreign taxes paid or to use a credit against its U.S. income tax liability 
instead. See McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 87. See also, US: IRC Sec. 
901-908 and 960. This foreign tax credit is known as “direct tax credit” as makes 
reference to the credit against foreign taxes paid directly by a U.S. taxpayer to a foreign 
country. There is, however, under U.S. tax law, also a so-called “indirect foreign tax 
credit”, which is the credit granted to U.S. Corporations that directly own at least 10-
percent or more of the voting stock in a foreign corporation from which it receives 
dividends. It is thus a legal fiction by which the U.S. Corporation is deemed to pay the 
taxes paid by the subsidiary in the foreign country attributable to those dividends. The 
indirect credit is also extended until the sixth tier subsidiary to the extent that each 
parent owns directly at least the 10-percent voting requirement.  After the third tier, it is 
necessary that the U.S. parent have at least a 5-percent indirect ownership. See 
McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, pp. 93-96. For a detailed explanation with 
respect to the different rules and calculation of the indirect foreign tax credit, see Bittker 
and Lokken, supra n. 530, pp. 72-189 to 72-243.  Rules about indirect foreign tax credit: 
US: IRC Sec. 902 and correspondent Treasury Regulations. For the reference to indirect 
ownership, supra n. 686. For a brief historical reference of the U.S. foreign tax credit, 
see supra Chapter I, Section 3.2.1. For purposes of this Section and the subsequent of 
this Chapter, we will refer to FTC as “direct foreign tax credit”, unless otherwise 
provided.  
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fundamental characteristic that the entity that bears the legal liability, and 
not necessarily the one that remits the payment of foreign taxes, is entitled 
to claim the credit.
718
 The above can be seen, e.g. in the case that a foreign 
entity is required by law to withhold and remit the tax to the IRS in the case 
of interest paid to a non-resident. In this situation, the legal liability remains 
in the recipient of the interest paid and not in the entity in charge of the 
withholding of the tax, which is indeed a mere intermediary or “withholding 
agent”.
719
 The determination on the taxpayer on whom legal liability is 
placed is made according to foreign law.
720
 
Hybrid entities can be used in this case to modify the person entitled to the 
FTC according to U.S. tax law in a manner in which the FTC is claimed, 
although there is no a corresponding income inclusion by the entity claiming 
the credit on foreign taxes.
721
 This is known in doctrine as “tax credit 
splitting”. Let us assume the following example: A domestic corporation is 
the wholly owner of F1, a foreign corporation organized in country A, 
treated for U.S. tax purposes as a disregarded entity, while as a corporation 
for country A tax purposes. Likewise, F1 is the wholly owner of F2, also 
                                                          
718  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(1) and 1.901-2(g)(1).  
719  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(2)(ii), Ex. 1. 
720  Whether a particular foreign income tax is paid or accrued is sometimes an extremely 
difficult task. For example, a U.S. parent Corporation may be liable for the taxes paid by 
a tax group in Luxembourg, even though the majority of the income of the group is not 
subject to tax in the United States. This is because, under Luxembourg law, the parent of 
the group was exclusively liable for the group’s Luxembourg income tax. This was 
precisely the result in Guardian Industries Corp v. Unites States (2005), which is 
discussed later on in this Section. See Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 72-10 and 
72-11. See also, US: Guardian Industries Corp v. Unites States, 477 f. 3d 1368, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
721  Mullis, supra n. 675, p. 377. 





organized in country A and treated as a transparent entity for country A tax 
purposes, although elected to be treated as a Corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes. 
 
Figure 10: Foreign Tax Credit Splitting 
If income is earned by F2, the United States will consider that this income is 
attributable to F2, because this is regarded as a Corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes. However, on the other hand, country A will consider that income 
is attributable to F1, who is also legally liable for the payment of taxes in 









Taxes paid in 
country A 
FTC for taxes paid in 
country A 
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considers that the legal liability upon the foreign taxes paid is attributable to 
the U.S. domestic corporation, who is finally entitled to claim the FTC, 




Although with some minimal differences on the facts, this was the main 




Figure 11: Tax structure in Guardian Industries Corp. v. United States (2005) 
                                                          
722  Income was not included at the level of the domestic parent company, because the 
United States considers that income never flew from F2 to F1, because F2 is regarded as 
a Corporation for U.S. tax purposes. However, income actually flew from F2 to F1, 
because as per the rules of country A, F2 is a transparent entity.  










Fiscal Unity Regime 
 
Guardian Industries files a 
consolidated tax return, which 
includes the subsidiaries’ 
income in Year X and the 
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In Guardian Industries, the taxpayer, a U.S. Corporation, indirectly owned a 
hundred percent of the stock in Guardian Industries S.a.r.l. (“Guardian 
Industries”), which was an entity organized under the laws of 
Luxembourg.
724
 Guardian Industries was a corporation for purposes of 
Luxembourg corporate income tax and a disregarded entity for U.S. tax 
purposes.
725
 Guardian Industries also owned stock in several subsidiaries in 
Luxembourg, all treated as Corporations for U.S. tax purposes.
726
 Guardian 
Industries and the subsidiaries were also part of the same fiscal unity regime 
under the laws of Luxembourg.
727
 Therefore, Guardian Industries reported 
income and paid taxes on the combined amount, i.e. including the 
subsidiaries’ income.
728
 Likewise, the taxpayer in the United States claimed 
a FTC for the foreign taxes paid by Guardian Industries, even though no 
income was reported in the United States.
729
 The IRS argued that Guardian 
Industries and the subsidiaries had joint and severally liable for the 
Luxembourg corporate income tax; therefore, the tax paid should be 
allocated among the subsidiaries.
730
 The trial court, however, concluded that 
                                                          
724  J. Riedy, IRS Uses Voluntary Payment Rule to Challenge Foreign Tax Credits 
Separated from the Income Base, 34 Int’l. Tax J. 3 (2008), pp. 11-12. 
725  Id. 
726  In the example in Fig. 11, they are represented by Lux SubA and Lux SubB, as a 
simplification.  
727  Riedy, supra n. 724. 
728  Id. 
729  Id. 
730  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(3). This regulation states that if foreign income tax is 
imposed on the combined income of two or more related persons and they are jointly 
and severally liable for the income tax under foreign law, then the foreign law is 
considered to impose a legal liability on each person as per the amount of the foreign 
income tax attributable to its portion of the base for the tax. For example, following the 
hypothetical of Bittker and Lokken: “[I]f a domestic corporation’s subsidiaries in 
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Guardian Industries was not joint and severally liable for the taxes paid in 
Luxembourg. The Federal Circuit confirmed that finding and affirmed that, 
under the Luxembourg consolidated return, Guardian Industries bore the 
legal liability for the consolidated group’s taxes, which added to the fact that 
Guardian Industries was treated as a disregarded entity for U.S. tax 
purposes, allowed the domestic parent company in the United States to 
claim the hundred-percent of the FTC, regardless that no income was 
associated to those foreign taxes paid.
731
 This decision would pavement the 
origin of the U.S. rules regulating tax credit splitting events discussed 
below. 
4.4.4. Reaction from U.S. Tax Law 
Perhaps the first attempt to regulate in positive law the results achieved in 
Guardian Industries and the issues with respect to foreign tax credit splitting 
was through the proposed regulations under Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f).
732
 
The proposed regulations essentially attempted to provide rules that match 
                                                                                                                                       
country X file a consolidated tax return and the members of the country X are jointly 
and severally liable for the tax on the group’s income, each subsidiary is the taxpayer 
with respect to the country X tax on its portion of the consolidated income. In contrast, 
if the country X parent is exclusively liable for the country X tax on all income of the 
country X group, the parent is deemed to have paid all of the group’s country X tax, and 
other members of the group are deemed to have paid none of the tax”. See Bittker and 
Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 72-11. 
731  Riedy, supra n. 724. 
732  Id. Also, as provided by Rosenberg: “The general theory behind matching (as a big 
picture concept) is that the FTC is intended to reduce double taxation on foreign-source 
income, which is only achieved if the credit is given to the same person who recognizes 
the foreign-source income for U.S. tax purposes”. R. Rosenberg, New Foreign Tax 
Credit Anti-Splitting Rule, 129 Tax Notes 6 (2007), p. 701. 





the results when FTC was separated from the income on which the tax 
provided through the use of disregarded entities. In this order of ideas, the 
proposed regulations stated, on one hand, that if an entity is a reverse 
hybrid, i.e. considered as a Corporation in the U.S. and a fiscally transparent 
entity in its country of incorporation, the tax imposed on the owner’s share 
of income from each reverse hybrid and the tax imposed by the foreign 
country on other income of the owner, is considered to be imposed on the 
combined income of each reverse hybrid and the owner, being thus allocated 
between the owner and the reverse hybrid in a pro rata basis.
733
 Let us 
assume the following simplified example: A and B are domestic 
Corporations, owners of 95% and 5% of C, a Partnership organized under 
the laws of country X. This Partnership, however, elected to be treated as a 
Corporation for U.S. tax purposes. In year X, C has income of 500i, and was 
subject to a CIT of 30% in country X. The partners A and B must pay taxes 
in country X for the amount of 142.5i and 7.5i, respectively.
734
 Under the 
matching rule, however, if an owner’s share in a reverse hybrid’s income 
has no other income taxable by the foreign country where the reverse hybrid 
is organized, all of the foreign tax is allocated to and considered paid by the 
reverse hybrid.
735
 In our case thus C is liable for the whole amounts of taxes 
that A and B paid, because A and B did not have other income in country X. 
                                                          
733  US: Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(2)(iii).  
734  US: Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(6) Ex. 7. 
735  US: Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(2)(iii). 
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Figure 12: Proposed Treas. Reg. sec. 1.901-2(f) and reverse hybrids 
Accordingly, if foreign taxes are imposed on a hybrid entity, i.e. a taxable 
foreign entity regarded as fiscally transparent for U.S. tax purposes, the 
hybrid entity is considered to be legally liable for such tax under foreign tax 
law, and therefore, deemed, for U.S. tax purposes, to pay the foreign 
taxes.
737
 In other words, the foreign taxes are allocated among the 
partners.
738
 Assuming the same facts of the hypothetical above, with the 
                                                          
736  US: Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(2)(v). 
737  US: Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(3). 




Year X’ s Income of C = 500i 
CIT in country X = 30% (150i) 
 
The full amount of taxes is deemed to be paid by C for U.S. tax 
purposes. A and B do not have FTC for the amounts paid, because 










only difference that C is an entity regarded as opaque for country X tax 
purposes, while as fiscally transparent for U.S. tax purposes, the outcome is 
that A is entitled to a FTC of 142.5i and B on the amount of 7.5i, which is 
calculated in proportion to the income attributable to them: 475i are 




Figure 13: Proposed Treas. Reg. sec. 1.901-2(f) and hybrid entities 
                                                          
739  For some authors, however, this does not appear to change the results under the existing 
rules. See, e.g. J. Riedy, Proposed Code Sec. 901 Regulations Revise the Technical 
Taxpayer Rule, 6 J. Tax’n Global Transactions 19 (2006), p. 22. Indeed, the proposed 
regulations did not change the rule by which income tax is considered paid, for U.S. 
income tax purposes, by the foreign person on whom foreign law imposes legal liability 
for such tax, and presented the regulations as a clarification of that general rule. For a 
critical analysis in this regard, see, e.g. H. Levine and M. Miller, Proposed Regulations 





Year X’ s Income of C = 500i 





Year X’ s allocable 
income of C = 25i 
Country X’s taxes 
allocable = 7.5i 
  
Year X’ s allocable 
income of C = 475i 
Country X’s taxes 
allocable = 142.5i 
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On the other hand, the proposed regulations modified the results achieved in 
Guardian Industries since foreign income tax must be allocated to all 
members of the group in proportion to the income of each member.
740
 
Indeed, as per the proposed regulations, if foreign law imposes tax on the 
combined income of two or more persons, it is deemed that the legal 
liability is imposed on each of these persons for the amount of the foreign 
tax that it is attributable to such person’s portion of the tax base.
741
  Taking 
the example on Fig. 11, let us assume that the gross income of the tax group 
in year X is 200i, which is subject to a 30% of CIT in Luxembourg. We will 
also assume that under the laws in Luxembourg the loss of Lux Sub B is 
allocated to Guardian Industries and Lux Sub A according to their income.   
Guardian Industries      100i 742 
Lux Sub A 100i 
Lux Sub B (60)i 





Figure 14: Income of the group– Prop. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.901-2(f) 
As noted, therefore, Guardian Industries and Lux Sub A had both 70i of net 
income, the taxes paid in Luxembourg by the group are allocated as follows: 
21i on Guardian Industries; 21i on Lux Sub A and 0i on Lux Sub B. The 
above means that Guardian Industries would have declared its correspondent 
                                                          
740  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(2)(i). 
741  Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 72-15. 
742  “i” represents a foreign currency. 





income in the United States and would have claimed a FTC of 21i, instead 
of 42i paid by the whole group. Similarly, if no income were allocated to 
Guardian Industries, no foreign taxes would be allocated either, regardless 
of which person actually remits the taxes, or which person of the foreign 
country could proceed against to collect the taxes if they were not paid.
743
 
These regulations, however, never achieved the status of final regulations.
744
  
In 2010, nonetheless, the United States adopted a new matching rule with 
the purpose of preventing the separation of creditable foreign taxes from the 
associated foreign income that originated them.
745
 Under this new rule, if a 
foreign tax credit splitting event occurs with respect to a foreign income tax, 
this tax will not be taken into account for U.S. tax purposes before the 
taxable year in which the “related income” is also taken into account by the 
taxpayer.
746
  The term “related income” is referred in the statute as to any 
income, or earnings and profits, to which such portion of foreign income 
                                                          
743  The term “person” includes a disregarded entity. Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 
72-15. See also, Riedy, supra n. 724. 
744  See, e.g. D. Forst, Recently Enacted Code Sec. 909 Targets “Splitter” Transactions 
(Part 1), 14 J. Passthrough Entities 1 (2011). The proposed regulations also addressed 
an amendment to the voluntary payment rule in Proposed Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(e)(5). 
Under the proposed regulation, all foreign entities in which the same U.S. person has a 
direct or indirect interest of 80% or more would be treated as a single taxpayer. For a 
further analysis, see Riedy, supra n. 724, pp. 11-12 and 69-71. 
745  US: Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanations of the Revenue 
Provisions of the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment 
to the H.R. 1586, Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on 
August 10, 2010, (JCX-46-10), 10 August 2010, p. 4.  
746  US: IRC Sec. 909(a). Nevertheless, the key is on the person. For example, if the same 
person has both the foreign taxes and the related income, and no covered person takes 
the income into account, the failure in recognizing the income in the same year does not 
delay the use of the FTC. See Rosenberg, supra n. 732, p. 702. See also, Forst, supra n. 
744, p. 12. 





 Accordingly, it is understood that there is a “foreign tax 
credit splitting event”
748
 with respect to foreign income taxes if the related 
income is or will be taken into account by a “covered person”, which is, 
with respect to any person who pays or accrues the foreign income taxes: a) 
any entity in which the payer holds, directly or indirectly, at least 10 % 
ownership by vote or value;
749
 b) any person which holds, directly or 
indirectly, at least 10 % ownership by vote or value in the payer,
750
 and c) 
any person which bears a relationship with the payer according to IRC Sec. 
267(b) or 707(b).
751
 Therefore, a splitting event will take place when foreign 
taxes and related income are allocated to different but related persons for 
U.S. tax purposes, being a related person technically called “covered 
person” for this purposes.
752
 In addition, and contrary to the proposed 
regulations under Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f), the rules on foreign tax credit 
splitting event (Sec. 909), do not disallow the use of the FTC, but rather they 
suspend its use until the entity claiming the credit takes into account the 
related income.  
The application of the new IRC Sec. 909 can be illustrated as follows: let us 
assume a simplified structure based on Guardian Industries by which a 
domestic Corporation, USCo, wholly owns LuxCo, a Luxemburgish 
Corporation acting as holding, which subsequently wholly owns OpCo, an 
                                                          
747  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(3). 
748  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(4). 
749  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(4)(A). 
750  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(4)(B). 
751  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(4)(C). Letter (D) of Sec. 909(d)(4) also includes: “any other person 
specified by the Secretary”, which may certainly expand the list of covered persons. 
752  Rosenberg, supra n. 732. 





operational subsidiary of LuxCo.
753
 Both entities situated in Luxembourg 
are part of a single tax group. LuxCo is solely liable to file the tax returns of 
the group and to pay the CIT tax at a rate of 30% on the amount of 100i of 
income that OpCo generated in Year X. Accordingly, while OpCo remains 
treated as a Corporation for U.S. tax purposes, LuxCo elects to be treated as 
a disregarded entity. No dividends are distributed from OpCo to LuxCo in 
year X. 
 
  Figure 15: Application of IRC Sec. 909 "FTC splitting event" 
                                                          
753  This example is taken from Bittker and Lokken, Section 72.5A: “Deferral of foreign 
income tax on Income not currently recognized”, with some modifications. See Bittker 






CIT rate 30% 
No dividends 






Fiscal Unity Regime 
 
LuxCo is solely liable for the 
taxes of the group. It files a 
consolidated tax return, which 
includes OpCo’s  income of 
100i in Year X and pays the 
taxes associated to that 
income (30i). 
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In absence of IRC section 909, LuxCo would be regarded, for U.S. tax 
purposes, as solely liable for the taxes of the group. Accordingly, as LuxCo 
is a disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes, USCo could claim a FTC in the 
amount of 30i, regardless that this latter in the United States recognizes no 
income, because indeed OpCo did not distribute dividends to LuxCo in Year 
X.  Nevertheless, under IRC section 909, OpCo would be regarded as a 
“covered person” with respect to USCo, because this latter through LuxCo 
(disregarded as an entity in the U.S.) owns at least 10% of OpCo. In 
addition, the amount of 100i, from which LuxCo paid 30i of taxes in 
Luxembourg, would be considered as “related income”, and there would be 
a FTC splitting event with respect to the taxes paid by LuxCo because, for 
U.S. tax purposes, the related income of 100i is included only in the E&P of 
a covered person (OpCo).
754
 
Despite the importance of IRC section 909 to counteract situations in which 
due to hybrid entities a FTC is improperly granted, they are not exempt of 
criticism. On one hand, it is argued that the definition of ‘related income’ is 
not as precise as it should be in order to determine when a foreign tax credit 
splitting event occurs. Indeed, it is undeniable that the definition of ‘related 
income’ is circular: it refers to income to which foreign taxes relates.
755
 One 
should argue, on the contrary, that similar matching rules exist with respect 
to the allocation of foreign taxes to income divided in two baskets (general 
active income and passive income) for determining the FTC for U.S. tax 
                                                          
754  Id. 
755  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(3). 







 Nevertheless, such regulations attempt to match foreign taxes 
with income according to the foreign law’s perception of the tax base, whilst 
the FTC splitting rules attempt to do the same, but according to U.S. tax 
law.
757
 For example, under these latter rules no consideration is made with 
respect to the share of losses or whether a payment is debt or equity for 
foreign tax purposes.
758
 The above makes the task of matching foreign taxes 
with related income an extremely difficult one.
759
 Similarly, on the second 
hand, the focus upon the person who takes the income into account for U.S. 
tax purposes seems to deviate from the historic approach adopted by the 
IRS.
760
 As noted, IRC Section 909 attempts to grant the FTC to the person 
who takes into account the related income for U.S. tax purposes, rather than 
for foreign tax purposes. This approach seems to deviate from the previous 
regulations that intended to match the FTC with the related income for 
foreign tax purposes.
761
 Finally, although the concept of ‘covered persons’ 
includes only related persons, limiting thus the application of section 909 to 
the cases in which FTC and related income is split, the statute gives the IRS 
                                                          
756  According to U.S. tax law, the credit for the amount of foreign taxes may not exceed the 
U.S. tax, before the credit, on income from foreign sources. This is known as FTC 
limitation. US: IRC Sec. 904(a). The FTC limitation must be determined separately for 
foreign taxes on each the two baskets: passive category and general category. US: IRC 
Sec. 904(d). See also, Bittker and Lokken, supra n. 530, pp. 72-93 and 72-123. 
757  Rosenberg, supra n. 732, p 703. 
758  Id. 
759  Id. See also, J. Bates, Nature Abhors a Splitter: The FTC Splitter and Indirect FTC 
Rules, 61 Tax Notes Int’l 7 (2011), p. 517. 
760  Rosenberg, supra  n. 732. 
761  As provided in Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(1): “The person by whom tax is considered 
paid for purposes of section 901 and 903 is the person on whom foreign law imposes 
legal liability for such tax, even if another person (e.g., a withholding agent) remits such 
tax”. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.901-2(f)(1). 
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the possibility of extending the concept of covered persons to “any person 
that the Treasury specifies”.
762
 In other words, cases in which the splitting of 
FTC and related income is made between unrelated person are also 
hypothetically possible.     
5. Coordination in an Uncoordinated World 
As it can be noted so far, the whole issue regarding hybrid and reverse 
hybrid entities responds to the domestic characterization of foreign entities 
for tax purposes. Thus, it seems to be legitimate to ask at this point whether 
or not coordination might be indeed a more accurate approach in order to 




This Section provides three examples of different degrees of coordination in 
the characterization of foreign entities: Spain, Denmark and the attempted 
coordination rule within the Proposal for a EU ATAD and the recent Article 
9a of the EU ATAD II. These examples demonstrate that coordination in the 
characterization of entities is beyond being a utopian academic idea and it 
might be a very effective manner to deal with hybrids and reverse hybrid 
entities. 
                                                          
762  US: IRC Sec. 909(d)(4)(D). 
763  Coordination, however, must not be understood as synonymous of harmonization. As it 
will be detailed in infra Chapter VI, this author proposes a rule (“reactive coordination 
rule”), which, on one hand, helps eliminating the hybrid mismatch itself, and, on the 
other hand, can be applied in a simpler and more coherent manner.   





5.1. The Spanish Experience: An example of coordination in the 
home country? 
The Spanish characterization system of foreign entities for tax purposes is 
an interesting case of analysis. Originally designed as a resemblance test by 
statute, its practical application by the Spanish Tax Administration (DGT) 
considers specially the tax treatment given to the entity in its own 
jurisdiction, i.e. where the entity is established, reducing thus the 
possibilities of disparities in the characterization of foreign entities 
practically to zero in all cases in which Spain is the country classifying a 
foreign entity in a different manner. Disparities in the characterization of 
Spanish entities will, however, still exist with respect to Spanish domestic 
entities characterized by a foreign country. In such a case, Spain does not 
change the domestic characterization of its own entities in order to 
coordinate them with a foreign characterization of them.
764
 
5.1.1. Spanish Legal Entities in brief 
Article 1665 of the Spanish Civil Code defines a ‘legal entity’ [Spanish: 
sociedad] as “a contract by which two or more persons agree to put in 
common money, goods or industry, with the aim of distributing the benefits 
among them”.
765
 A similar definition is held in Article 166 of the Spanish 
                                                          
764  This latter situation occurs, nevertheless, in the case of specific Danish provision dealing 
with the U.S. CTB Regulations. Infra Section  5.2. 
765  ES: Article 1165 of the Royal Decree of 24 July 1889 that publishes the Civil Code 
(hereinafter, “Spanish Civil Code). 
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Commercial Code, which provides that an entity is: “a contract by which 
two or more persons agree to put in common money, goods, industry or any 
of these in a common fund, to obtain profits, will have commercial nature, 
whatever the type, as far as it has been incorporated according to this 
Code”.
766
 Therefore, ‘legal entities’ [or sociedades] can be regarded as civil 
or commercial [or business] law entities under Spanish Law.
767
  
The distinction between civil and business entities is crucial under Spanish 
law since, as a general rule, only business entities are subject to the 
Corporate Income Tax Law.
768
 All civil law entities, on the contrary, are 
subject to a special regime called “Income Attribution Regime” or [Regimén 
de Atribución de Rentas], which in simple words means that these legal 
entities will not be taxable, but rather their income and the respective taxes 
will be attributed to their partners who will suffer the final tax burden.
769
 
                                                          
766  ES: Article 166 of the Royal Decree of 22 Aug. 1885 that publishes the Commercial 
Code (hereinafter, “Spanish Commercial Code”). Articles 166 to 168 of the Spanish 
Commercial Code are currently repealed by the Law No. 19/1989 of 25 July 1989 on 
partial reform and adaptation of the commercial law to the Directives of the European 
Community with respect to legal entities [B.O.E. 27 July 1989]. 
767  Other distinctions can be made, e.g. between public and private entities. See ES: Article 
35 of the Spanish Civil Code. 
768  Since 2014, however, civil law entities with a commercial object will be subject to 
Corporate Income Tax. See ES: Article 7(a) of the Corporate Income Tax Law [Ley del 
Impuesto sobre las Sociedades], Law 27/2014 (consolidated text) of 27 Nov. 2014, BOE 
No. 288 of 28 Nov. 2014.  
769  ES: Article 8.3 of the Personal Income Tax Law, Law 35/2006 of 28 Nov. 2006 [Ley de 
Impuesto a la Renta sobre las Personas Físicas (LIRPF)]. Original Spanish text: “No 
tendrán la consideración de contribuyentes las sociedades civiles no sujetas al Impuesto 
de Sociedades, herencias yacentes, comunidades de bienes y demás entidades a que se 
refiere el artículo 35.4 de la Ley 58/2003, de 17 de diciembre, General Tributaria. Las 
rentas correspondientes a las mismas se atribuirán a los socios, herederos, comuneros o 
partícipes, respectivamente, de acuerdo a lo establecido en la Sección 2ª del Titulo X de 
esta Ley”. Articles 86 and 90 of the LIRPF regulate the “Income Attribution Regime”.  





The above, however, does not mean Spain makes a systematic distinction 
between Corporations and Partnerships or opaque and transparent entities in 
its internal legislation, at least not as it can be seen in common law countries 
such as the US or the UK, but it provides a very close distinction when 
separates between civil and business entities for purposes of the application 
of the Corporate Income Tax.
770
 
5.1.2. The “Income Attribution Regime” of the Spanish NRITL 
The special “Income Attribution Regime” can also be applicable to foreign 
entities whose juridical nature is similar or identical to the Spanish entities. 
Indeed, according to Article 37 of the Spanish NRITL states: “Those entities 
incorporated abroad and whose juridical nature is identical or analogous to 
those of the entities subject to the income attribution regime, which are 
incorporated according to the Spanish Law, shall also be considered as 
entities subject to attribution of income regime”.
771
  Thus, in simple words, 
non-resident or foreign entities having an identical or analogous legal nature 
to “Spanish transparent entities”, i.e. entities subject to the Spanish income 
attribution regime, will also be considered transparent. This analysis of 
                                                          
770  Considering the transposition of EU law into Spanish law, several legal entities subject 
to tax transparency treatment have arisen. This is the case, e.g. of the Spanish Economic 
Interest Groups, the European Economic Interest Group and the Temporary Business 
Association [Union Temporal de Empresas]. See ES: Law No. 12/1991 of 29 April 1991 
on Economics Interest Groups, and Law No. 18/1982 of 26 May 1982 on Temporary 
Business Associations. See also, EU: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137/85 of 25 July 
1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping–EEIG– (OJ L 199, 31.7.1985). 
771  ES: Article 37 of the Spanish Non-Resident Income Tax Law–NRITL, Royal 
Legislative Decree No. 5/2004 of 5 March 2004. 
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equivalence or resemblance test includes several factors, such as the legal 
form of the foreign entity; legal personality; capital divided or not by shares, 
etc. 
5.1.3. The Spanish Characterization Test in Practice 
Despite the textual wording of Article 37 Spanish NRIT, which can be read 
as a simple resemblance test,
772
 Spanish tax scholars coincide that when this 
test is applicable by the DGT, i.e. Spanish tax authority, the tax treatment 
given in the foreign country is the central element to determine the legal 
characterization of the foreign entity.
773
 In simple words, the administrative 
practice of the DGT seems to settle a unique example of coordination in the 
characterization of foreign entities that reduces practically to zero the 
possibilities of disparities in the characterization of foreign entities, at least 





The above has been ratified in several binding rulings issued by the DGT up 
to this date. For example, a recent consultation of 2015
775
 referred to the 
                                                          
772  See, e.g. the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, supra Section 3.2.1. 
773  See, e.g., D. Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois and F. Vega Borrego, Chapter 
29: Spain in Corporate Income Tax Subjects (ed. D. Gutmann), EATLP International 
Tax Series, Vol. 12 (2016), pp. 460-464. See also A. Mosquera Mouriño, Régimen de 
atribución de rentas: especial referencia a las actividades económicas, Carta Tributaria 
4 (2012), pp. 3-16. 
774  It is, however, always possible to get a ruling clarifying the tax status of an entity liable 
(or potentially liable) to tax in Spain. See ES: Articles 88 and 89 of the General Taxation 
Law [Ley General Tributaria], Law No. 58/2003 of 17 Dec. 2003. 
775  ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V3836-15 of 2 Dec. 2015. 





juridical nature of a “German Kommanditgesellschaft” (German KG)
776
 
owned by some Spanish residents. As per the German tax law, a KG, 
independently of its legal personality, is subject to tax regime in Germany 
by which the income of the entity is not subject to tax at the level of the 
entity, but rather at the level of the partners. The DGT considered that the 
German KG had a similar or identical nature than the Spanish entities 
subject to the income attribution regime.
777
 Thus, for purposes of Spanish 
Income Tax Law, such German KG will have the same tax treatment in 
Spain, which means that the Spanish partners should recognize the income 
of the KG according to their participation in the entity. Likewise, the DGT 
clarified that if dividends were distributed from the German KG to the 
Spanish partners, which were attributed to previous tax years in which the 
Spanish partners included their respective income attribution, will not be 
subject to tax again in Spain.
778
 This opinion with respect to the German KG 
resemblances a previous binding ruling issued by the DGT in 2014.
779
 
Similarly, the DGT stated in a general ruling of 2005, with respect to the 
consultation regarding a Scottish General Partnership, that this entity has a 
nature similar or identical to the Spanish entities subject to the income 
attribution regime.
780
 One of the element considered in this consultation was 
the fact the General Partnership, according to Scottish tax law, was regarded 
                                                          
776  This could be equivalent to the concept of “Limited Partnership” used in common law 
countries. 
777  ES: DGT, supra n. 775. 
778  Id. 
779  ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V1631-14 of 25 June 2014.  
780  ES: DGT, Consulta General No. 0196-05 of 1 June 2005. 
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as transparent for Scottish tax purposes.
781
 In 2007, in another general 
ruling, the DTG stated that a British partnership rendering legal services in 
Spain through an office should be regarded to have a nature similar or 
identical to the Spanish entities subject to the income attribution regime.
782
 
This conclusion was achieved bearing in mind specially the “legal regime 
applicable to partnerships in the UK”.
783
 On the contrary, when the tax 
transparency treatment of the entity is not clear at all, either because of the 
foreign legislation of for the lack of information when the taxpayer 
submitted the consultation, the DGT has considered the tax treatment of the 
entity as opaque. For example, in the binding ruling No. 0012-11 of 11 
January 2011,
784
 referred to the legal nature of some international funds of 
capital risk using the form of limited partnerships, the DGT analyzed the 
concurrence of several factors, including limited liability of the limited 
partners, the administration of the fund by a third party and the existence of 
an agreement to distribute profits in which the limited partners have no 
influence. However, the taxpayer submitting the consultation in this case did 
not provide enough information regarding where exactly these funds were 
incorporated,
785
 which, under the author’s view, influenced the final 
decision of the DGT to consider these funds as opaque entities. Someone 
could also argue that the limited liability of the partners as well as the other 
                                                          
781  Id. 
782  ES: DGT, Consulta General No. 0024-07 of 1 July 2007.  
783  Id. See also, ES: DGT, Consulta General No. 2110-04 of 30 Dec. 2004, with respect to 
tax treatment given to a British partnership in Spain. 
784  ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V0012-11 of 11 January 2011. 
785  In this case the taxpayer limited to inform that such funds where incorporated in the 
form of limited partnerships (LP), similar to the ones of Anglo-Saxons countries. Id. 





factors analyzed by the DGT were information enough to achieve the same 
conclusion. Nevertheless, the DGT has opted clearly in other rulings to treat 
a LP or LLP as transparent entities when such a treatment is clearly stated in 
the country of incorporation.
786
   
 
Although it is arguable to affirm that Spain completely deviates from the 
resemblance test established by statute, it is evident from the administrative 
practice of the DGT that there is at least a tendency, when applying the 
resemblance analysis, to respect the characterization of the foreign entity 
given in its country of incorporation, having thus this feature a decisive 
weight in the final characterization of the foreign entity.
787
 This tendency 
can be seen, e.g. in a very recent binding ruling No. 3319-16 of 14 July 
2016,
788
 referred to a Spanish entity owned 100% by a German KG, which is 
subsequently owned by two partners: a general partner in Germany and a 
limited partner in the UK. The question referred exclusively to the potential 
application of the tax treaty between Spain and the UK with respect to the 
                                                          
786  E.g., ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V1398-16 of 5 April 2016, referred to the 
nature of a LLP incorporated in the UK. In a similar response regarding the treatment of 
a British LLP, see ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V036-14 of 10 February 2014. 
787  For example, other factors considered in the DGT Consulta General No. 0196-05 of 1 
June 2005, were that, according to the UK tax law: 1) the general partnership had legal 
personality, although its capital was not divided in shares; 2) the unlimited liability of 
the partners; 3) the management if the entity is made by each of the members who act as 
agents of the entity and the rest of the members; 4) the partnership is not obligated to 
deposit annual accounts in the UK; 4) the partners are entitled to the profits without need 
of a decision or agreement at the entity level. None of these factors, however, were as 
relevant as the fact that the entity was not subject to tax in the UK at the level of the 
entity, but rather at the level of the partners. See ES: DGT, Consulta General No. 0196-
05 of 1 June 2005. 
788  ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante No. V3319-16 of 17 July 2016.  
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limited partner of the German KG in the UK. Even though the DGT 
pronounced already with respect to the legal nature of the German KG for 
Spanish tax purposes, considering it as fiscally transparent, the DGT 
repeated in several passages of this recent ruling that the fact that the KG is 
regarded as transparent in Germany, and in this case also in the UK, permits 
to treat it also as transparent in Spain (subject to the “Income Attribution 
Regime”), and making also applicable the Spain-UK tax treaty.  
 
By other side, it is the author opinion that the level of coordination achieved 
with respect to the characterization of foreign entities for tax purposes has to 
be specifically with the similitude between the Spanish “Income Attribution 
Regime” and the concept of “transparent entities” mostly used, but not 
exclusively, in common law countries. Indeed, while a transparent entity 
will be an entity not subject to tax at the level of the entity, but at the level 
of the partners, e.g. a partnership, an entity subject to the “Income 
Attribution Regime” will be an entity whose income is attributed directly to 
the partners. In other words: a fiscally transparent entity. In the same order 
of ideas, if a foreign entity is taxable at the level of the entity (i.e. it is a 
opaque entity), it will also be considered as such for Spanish tax purposes. 
This coordinated outcome thus nullifies all the possibilities of disparities in 
the characterization of foreign entities for Spanish tax purposes, i.e. when 
Spain classifies foreign entities, reducing also the complexity of the Spanish 





resemblance test and increasing the levels of legal certainty for taxpayers 




Finally, it is interesting to highlight that the Spanish solution provides to 
certain extent a degree of coordination in the characterization of the entity at 
source. Indeed, and contrary to other solutions that will be analyzed further 
on in this work,
790
 it is not the country receiving a hybrid payment who 
states the characterization to be followed, but rather the country where this 
payment is sourced. This solution seems to be, in principle, fairer with 
developing countries and interesting it was also proposed within the original 
text of the EU ATA Directive in 2016.
791
   
                                                          
789  On the contrary, Villar argues that the question of characterizing foreign entities in 
Spain is highly an individual task, which is very time consuming and lead to legal 
uncertainty. See Villar, supra n. 542. This author does not disagree that the factors to be 
considered in the characterization of a foreign entity are several, and as any other 
resemblance test, it is costly. However, the author estimates that the Spanish IFA report 
does not properly evaluate the extensive Spanish tax administrative practice, which 
clearly shows a tendency to recognize the tax treatment of the foreign entity in its 
country of organization, which should certainly reduces the time consuming cost, at 
least in part. Accordingly, if a taxpayer asking the DGT regarding the tax treatment of 
an entity, e.g. a US LLC, whose tax treatment in the United States is clear will, on the 
contrary, experience a higher degree of certainty with respect to the DGT’s answer.  
790  Especially the one proposed within the OECD Partnership Report, which attempts 
coordination in the characterization of entities in the residence country. Infra Chapter IV 
Section 3. 
791  Infra Section 5.3. There is no doubt, however, that the deviation from the textual 
wording of the law made by the Spanish Tax Administration as to interpret the Income 
Attribution Regime affects the principle of legality and it might thus be considered 
undesarible. However, it is undeniable that from a pragmatic point of view, the 
interpretation of the Spanish Tax Administration provides an interesting solution of 
coordination as regard to the issue of hybrid entities. 
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5.2. The Danish Experience: Re-characterization of its own entities 
Unlike the Spanish example above, Denmark has some specific rules 
providing for a certain degree of coordination in the characterization of its 
own domestic entities with the one provided by a foreign country, under 
certain circumstances.
792
 In other words, if certain requirements are met, a 
domestic Danish taxable entity, considered tax transparent by a foreign 
country, can be re-characterized also as a transparent entity in Denmark. 
Likewise, a Danish transparent entity can be re-characterized as taxable 
entity if the foreign country considers it also as taxable entity. Both rules are 
indeed a targeted reaction to the characterization of entities derived 
specifically from a potential electivity in the characterization of Danish 
entities by a foreign country (i.e. the U.S. Check-the-box rules), rather than 
a general rules attempting to coordinate the characterization of foreign 
entities for Danish tax purposes at any level.
793
 The above, however, does 
not rest merits to this interesting example of coordination in the 
characterization rules in order to deal with both hybrid entities and reverse 
hybrids. 
                                                          
792  This can also be referred as “coordination at residence”, considering that Danish entities 
are re-characterized as per the tax treatment given in the place where the parent 
company or investors are residents.  
793  In this opinion, e.g. Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 254. See also, A. Møllin Ottosen and M. 
Nørremark, New Anti-Avoidance Rules in Denmark Targets Reverse Hybrids and 
Convertible Bonds, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 11 (2008), Journals IFBD, p. 513; J. Bundgaard, 
Coordination Rules as a Weapon in the War against Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage–The 
Case of Hybrid Entities and Hybrid Financial Instruments, 67 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 
(2013), Journals IBFD, pp. 200-201. All these authors coincide that the target of the 
2004 and 2008 rules were exclusively the negative impact of the U.S. CTB regulations. 





5.2.1. Danish Reaction to Hybrid Entities 
In 2004, Denmark adopted a rule by which a Danish taxable entity may be 
re-characterize as tax transparent if certain requirements are met:
794
 i) the 
taxable entity is a Danish resident entity or a PE of a foreign resident 
company; ii) the Danish taxable entity is disregarded for foreign tax 
purposes; iii) the income of the Danish company is included in the taxable 
income of the “controlled foreign legal entity”, i.e. an entity that owns more 
than 50% of the Danish company or holds more than 50% of the voting 
rights, and iv) the foreign country is a member of the EEA or a tax treaty 
partner with Denmark.
795
 If all the requirements are met, the Danish entity 
will be treated as a branch of the controlled foreign legal entity.
796
 
As repeatedly argued by some authors, the reasons of these rules seem to be 
settled specifically to counteract some commonly used transactions in the 
                                                          
794  DK: Section 2A of the Corporate Income Tax Law [SEL–Selskabsskatteloven]. This rule 
was adopted by the Bill 119 of 17 Dec. 2003. See, J. Wittendorff, Denmark’s Hovmand 
Clarifies Pending Transparent Entities Legislation, 33 Tax Notes Int’l 9 (2004), p. 758.  
See also, Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 254. 
795  Wittendorff, supra n. 794. J. Wittendorff, Danish Parliament Enacts Transparent Entity 
Legislation, 34 Tax Notes Int’l 1 (2004). 
796  The fact that a Danish companies is regarded as a branch, does not entitle the company 
to take a deduction for payments made to the foreign parent company or to the group-
related entities, which are also treated as fiscally transparent under laws of the residence 
State of the foreign company. The payments are indeed considered made within the 
same legal entity. Accordingly, dividends paid from the Danish entity to the foreign 
controlled legal entity are not subject to WHT. See A. Riis and P.E. Lytken, Denmark-
Corporate Taxation sec. 10, Country Analyses IBFD (accessed 6 Feb. 2017). 
Nevertheless, “if there is a direct link between external borrowings by the foreign parent 
company and the loan granted to the transparent entity, the interest paid by the foreign 
parent should be allocable to the transparent entity in accordance with ordinary 
principles of PE taxation”. Wittendorff, supra n. 794. See also, Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, 
pp. 254-255. 
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past, which involved a Danish SPV financed with debt and owned by U.S. 
persons, who has always the chance to elect how to treat the Danish 
company for tax purposes.
797
 Therefore, since a SPV is a taxable entity for 
Danish tax purposes, the Danish company was able to deduct interest 
payments made to its U.S. parent, although the interest income was never 
included in the United States due to the CTB election, treating the SPV as 
tax transparent for U.S. tax purposes.
798
 Interestingly, however, this 
domestic rule does not provide for a denial in the deduction made at the 
level of the SPV, but rather it targets the real issue here, which is the 
different characterization of the same entity by Denmark and the United 
States.
 799
 Since the SPV will, after the application of the rule, be considered 
also as tax transparent, the payment of interest will not be deductible any 
                                                          
797  See, e.g. N. Bjørnholm and A. Obery Hansen, Denmark in International Tax Planning, 
Online Books IBFD, 2005, p. 41–sec. 4.16.2. Also, as provided by Bundgaard: “Despite 
the general wording of the provision [Section 2A SEL], the practical scope appear to be 
Danish entities that are eligible for the U.S. check-the-box election. As a practical issue, 
this [application of the rule] includes primarily Danish companies organized in the form 
of a private limited company (Anpartsselskab–ApS). If an election is made according to 
US law to treat a Danish ApS as a transparent entity for US tax purposes, this may 
invoke this provision”. Bundgaard, supra n. 793, p. 201. Accordingly, Møllin Ottosen 
and Nørremark state: “Different classifications of entities have been considered a 
problem mainly in relation to Danish limited partnerships whose direct owners are tax 
resident in the United States”. Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, supra n. 793. 
798  We are assuming, of course, that the Danish SPV is an eligible entity for purposes of the 
CTB election. Supra Section 4.3. 
799  Indirectly, however, the deduction is denied since it is disregarded for Danish tax 
purposes after the re-characterization. Infra Chapter V refers specifically to this solution, 
proposed by the OECD within the BEPS Action Plan 2, and known as “primary 
response”. 





longer, although without the need of introducing a new domestic rule that 
denies the deduction.
800
   
The application of the Danish anti-hybrids rule seems to be very 
straightforward; however, there are still some doubts about its real 
effectiveness. For example, the Danish rule requires for re-characterizing a 
domestic taxable entity as transparent that the income of the Danish SPV is 
included in the taxable income of the U.S. parent, which is assumed to be a 
controlled foreign entity. The above represents, on one hand, an important 
practical limitation of the rule, since no re-characterization will occur in all 
those cases in which the Danish company has indeed no operating income in 
a specific taxable year. On the other hand, the fact that Denmark treats a 
domestic taxable entity as tax transparent does not change the fact that the 
United States disregards the payments of the interests and any other 
transactions between the Danish company and the U.S. parent. Therefore, 
the interests will not be subject to tax anywhere and no matter what, because 
they will be disregarded for all tax purposes. Likewise, the rules are not 
entirely clear whether they apply in cases of a U.S. taxpayer treats a Danish 
entity as transparent, without making use of the CTB election, but rather due 
to the default rules of classification in the United States.
801
 Is in this case the 
                                                          
800  A Danish company, which has been re-characterized as fiscally transparent, is also not 
considered as a Danish tax resident and thus is not subject to the benefits of the EU 
Directives and tax treaties signed by Denmark. Riis and Lytken, supra n. 796. 
Accordingly, the Danish company will no longer be subject to full-Danish corporate 
taxation. Wittendorff, supra n. 794.  
801  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(3)(ii), with respect to the U.S. default rule of 
characterization of entities. See also, supra Section 4.3. for a further analysis. 
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Danish anti-hybrids rule applicable? If not, there would certainly be a range 
of situations that would not be covered under the rule, allowing a 
circumvention of it.
802
 If yes, it would make more sense, because in such a 
case the rule would counteract both the effect of the election and the default 
rules, coordinating completely the characterization of entities. Indeed, as 
stressed already in this Chapter, the CTB system is indeed just partially 
elective and this is an issue that should not be underestimated.
803
 
Another example of the limited application of the rules is the case of group-
related entities.
804
 Let us assume a U.S. corporation directly owns a holding 
company (Holding 1), incorporated in country X and this latter owns 
another holding company (Holding 2), incorporated in country Y, which 
finally owns a Danish company (DCo). Let us also assume that Holding 2 
grants a loan to DCo and that this latter pays back interests associated to that 
loan. 
                                                          
802  This will certainly depends on the Danish law. If Danish law, e.g. allows to modify the 
responsibility of a Danish entity with two or more members (e.g. SPV, ApS, etc.), and 
one of these members becomes unlimited liable for the responsibilities of the entity, the 
Danish entity will be considered by default as a tax transparent entity for U.S. tax 
purposes. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(b)(2)(1)(A).  
803   Supra Section 4.3. 
804  “Unless the Danish subsidiary is held by the US parent company through one of more 
intermediate holding companies, which are not treated as fiscally transparent for US tax 
purposes, the Danish subsidiary is reclassified as a branch under section 2A”. See Riis 
and Lytken, supra n. 796. 







Figure 16: Danish anti-hybrid rule and group related entities 
In this case, the Danish rule applies only to the extent that DCo and all the 
holding companies are treated as fiscally transparent under the tax rules of 
the foreign parent company, i.e. under the tax rules in the United States.
805
 If 
the above does not happen, the interest will still be tax-deductible, although 
subject to the Danish thin capitalization rules.
806
  
                                                          
805  Id. 












DCo will be re-characterized as a fiscally 
transparent entity in Denmark only if Holding 
1 and Holding 2 are also treated as fiscally 
transparent for U.S. tax purposes. 
Interest 
Loan 




Figure 17: Danish anti-hybrid rule and group related entities (second assumption) 
In the example above, if Holding 1 is considered opaque for U.S. tax 
purposes, while Holding 2 and DCo are regarded as tax transparent, the 
interest paid by DCo will still be deductible, but subject to the Danish thin 
capitalization rules, assuming also that the income of the foreign creditor 




                                                          











The interest will still be 
deductible in this case. 
Interest 
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Let us now assume that Holding 2 does not exist anymore and that the 
structure only contemplates the U.S. parent, Holding 1 and the Danish 
subsidiary, DCo.  
 
Figure 18: Danish anti-hybrid rule and group related entities (third assumption) 
In such a case, the interest paid from DCo to Holding 1 would be also 




Although it is undeniable from all the assumptions above that the elective 
characteristic of the CTB rules certainly helps in circumventing the 
application of the Danish anti-hybrid rule when intermediary holding 
                                                          







The interest paid are deductible to the extent 
Holding 1 is considered as a taxable entity for 
U.S. tax purposes. 
Interest 
Loan 





 one should also consider that in all those cases 
where the U.S. parent decides to treat Holding 1 and 2 as taxable entities in 
order to avoid the Danish anti-hybrids rule, they would most probably 
remain subject to CFC rules in the United States to the extent that Subpart F 
income is generated.
810
 The above could perhaps not eliminate completely 
the abusive use of the CTB election, but at least increases the alternative 
costs for taxpayers when deciding about tax planning strategies involving 
holding companies in Denmark.
811
    
Finally, it is interesting to note the rational behind the Danish anti-hybrids 
rule, especially with respect to the collection of taxes and the intention that 
income is taxed somewhere, but not in Denmark. On one hand, if e.g. a 
country wanted as a general rule to keep its taxing rights, collecting thus 
revenues, the Danish rule produces exactly the opposite effect, encouraging 
the collection of taxes in the other country. Indeed, since the moment that all 
requirements are met, a Danish company will be re-characterized as tax 
transparent, therefore, not being subject to tax in Denmark anymore to the 
extent the income of the Danish company is recognized in the other country. 
This situation can be compared with the Spanish coordination in the 
characterization of a foreign entity, which is made under a completely 
                                                          
809  Supra Section 4.3. 
810  Nonetheless, one should also consider that Subpart F income can be easily avoided in 
the United States without necessarily making use of the CTB election, e.g. through the 
“same country exception”. Supra Section 4.4.1. 
811   Although recognizing that this is a very difficult issue to measure, Bundgaard states, 
from a practical experience, the following: “[T]he provision has had a significant effect 
on the structuring of the investments of US multinationals enterprises (MNEs) in 
Denmark”. See Bundgaard, supra n. 793, p. 201. 





opposite rational: to follow the domestic treatment of a foreign entity in its 
country of organization.
812
 In this latter case, however, the possibilities of 
revenue losses are lower.
813
 On the other hand, and with respect to the aim 
of taxing the income somewhere, i.e. requesting that income of the Danish 
company is recognized in the other country, one should consider that this 
aim could be easily avoided in case the parent company is not necessarily 
located in the United States and rather in a low tax jurisdiction. This issue 
could occur in theory since the Danish rule is written to be generally applied 
to all situations in which a Danish company is treated as tax transparent, and 
so long all the other requirements are met, and not only in those cases in 
which the parent company is organized in the United States.
814
 Likewise, the 
re-characterization of a Danish entity as a tax transparent entity does not 
change the characterization made in the United States. This means, a 
payment of interest from the Danish company to its parent will be 
completely disregarded in both countries. The above solves the hybrid 
                                                          
812  Supra Section 5.1.3. 
813  For example, in a simple structure in which a Spanish company wholly owns a 
subsidiary in country X, and this country treats the entity as opaque, Spain will also 
follow this characterization. Therefore, income will be taxed in country X. However, 
Spain could also tax the income by application of the CFC rules, decreasing the risk of 
tax deferral in Spain. Likewise, if the tax treatment of the subsidiary in its country of 
organization were as fiscally transparent, Spain would follow that treatment and would 
again collect the taxes in the hands of the Spanish company (income is considered 
flowing-through directly to the shareholders). In both cases thus the revenue loss risk 
would be minimal.  
814  Bundgaard, supra n. 793. Nevertheless, this rule would have any impact when applied to 
Spain. In such a case, as Spain will follow the Danish characterization of the entity, 
there will be no space for the application of the Danish anti-hybrid rule. Supra Section 
5.1. 
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5.2.2. Danish Reaction to Reverse Hybrids  
As per the case of hybrid entities, in 2008 the Danish Parliament adopted the 
Bill No. L181, which contained measures to counteract the effects of cross-
border structures involving reverse hybrids,
816
 namely, Danish entities 
considered as tax transparent in Denmark, whilst as taxable entities in the 
other country part of the transaction.
817
 For this purposes, the rule provides 
that certain entities normally treated as fiscally transparent in Denmark, e.g. 
limited partnerships [kommanditselskaber], partnerships limited by shares 
[partnerselskaber] and branches of non-Danish entities, must be re-
characterized as taxable entities if: (i) the direct owners/partners holding 
more than 50% of the capital or voting rights are tax residents in one or 
more foreign jurisdictions, the Faroe Islands or Greenland,
818
 and (ii) the 
                                                          
815  This proves again the inconsistent logic behind the single taxation ideal. In contrast, 
however, Dell’Anese states: “[T]he tax policy significance of the Danish initiative is 
clear: developed countries are beginning to take notice of U.S. entity classification rules 
[…]. They are also beginning to react, applying the single tax principle logic, to the U.S. 
inaction in the outbound area, reaping this way all the tax advantage, as typical for first-
movers in arbitrage situations”. Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 256. See also the discussion 
about the single tax principle and the DNT outcome at supra Chapter I, Section 3.  
816   It also containes measures to counteract convertible bonds. However, this topic will not 
be analyzed here. For a reference, see Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, supra n. 793. The 
rule is contained in DK: Section 2C of the Corporate Income Tax Law [SEL–
Selskabsskatteloven]. 
817  Supra Section 3.1. 
818  The “direct owners/partners” do not need to be affiliated parties. Indeed, they can be 
separated companies or individuals that reside in foreign countries and that together hold 
more than 50% of the capital or voting powers. See Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, 





jurisdiction where the owners are tax resident either considers the Danish 
entity to be a separate taxable entity, or it does not exchange information 
with the Danish tax authorities.
819
 Accordingly, if the re-characterization 
applies, it affects not only those who belong to the countries treating the 
Danish entity as taxable entity or who do not exchange information with 
Denmark, but also the other owners residents in countries treating the entity 
as tax transparent or those who indeed exchange information with 
Denmark.
820
 Let us assume the following example where a U.S. parent 
company has 51% of the voting rights in a Danish limited partnership 
[kommanditselskaber]–DLP–, which is regarded as fiscally transparent 
entity in Denmark. The remaining 49% belongs to owners resident in 
country X. While the U.S. owners elect to treat the DLP as a taxable entity, 
the owners in country X treat the DLP also as fiscally transparent. Let us 
also assume that the DLP enters into a manufacturing agreement according 
to which a third party manufactures a product on behalf of the limited 
partner. According to this agreement, the DLP maintains the ownership of 
                                                                                                                                       
supra n. 793, p. 514. Accordingly, non-Danish entities and branches, which are deemed 
to be fiscally transparent in their country of organization, are disregarded fur purposes of 
determining who are the direct owners/partners. The above is relevant, e.g. in the case a 
taxpayer decides to use an intermediary company (e.g. organized in country Y) between 
the U.S. owners and the Danish transparent entity, which is deemed to be transparent in 
country Y, but as a taxable entity in the United States. In such a case, the entity in 
country Y is disregarded for purposes of determining who is the direct owner of the 
Danish entity. Id. 
819  An exception to this anti-reverse hybrid rule applies for venture funds investing in 
medium and small-sized companies if certain conditions are met. The reason for 
exempting venture funds is the desire to continue to encourage the start-up and growth 
of these types of businesses. Bundgaard, supra n. 793, p. 202. 
820  Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, supra n. 793, p. 514. 
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the IP, raw materials and final products. These latter are sold by DLP to 
unrelated parties outside Denmark.  
 
Figure 19: Danish anti-reverse hybrid rule 
In absence of the Danish anti-reverse hybrids rule, the DLP is regarded as 
fiscally transparent in Denmark, and if there is no a Danish PE either, the 
income derived from the sales is disregarded for tax purposes in Denmark. 
This is to say, it flows through the owners in the United States and country 
X. Likewise, and because the U.S. owners elected to treat the Danish entity 
as a taxable entity, the income is not taxed in the United States either, at 
least until dividends are distributed to the United States. Moreover, as 
income from manufacturing activities is not considered as Subpart F income 




DLP is a fiscally transparent entity in Denmark. Likewise, country X treats it as fiscally 








Final products sold outside Denmark 





CFC rules is also nullified.
821
 Accordingly, as in this case USCo owns more 
than 50% of the voting rights in DLP and they elected to treat it as taxable 
entity for U.S. tax purposes, the DLP is re-characterized as a taxable entity 
in Denmark, affecting also those owners/partners who are not U.S. 
residents.
822
 In other words, the characterization of the Danish entity is 
coordinated with the characterization of the other country where the parent 
company is resident, i.e. the United States in this case. Thus, the DLP will 




Interestingly, the Danish anti-reverse hybrid rule deviates from the recent 
OECD proposal in Action 2 of the BEPS Action Plan.
824
 In brief, Action 2 
provides for introducing a domestic rule denying a deduction at the level of 
the payer with respect to a payment made to a reverse hybrid (primary 
                                                          
821  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.954-3(a)(4)(i). See also, supra Section 4.4.1. 
822  Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, supra n. 793, p. 514. 
823  Other effects following the re-characterization will include: 1) contrary to the normal 
rule that the owner of a fiscally transparent entity is deemed to own a proportionate part 
of the entity’s assets and liabilities, this will be deemed to have an ownership in a 
separate entity. The above mans that any disposal of interest in the Danish entity will be 
regarded as a sale of shares, whose capital gains are not taxed in the hands of non-
Danish residents; 2) a “rollover principle” at the level of the owners of the entity, which 
ensures that they are generally not taxed on any gains on the assets held by the entity as 
a consequence of the re-characterization. On the contrary, the owners or participants of 
the re-characterized Danish entity are deemed to have acquired their ownership interest 
in the entity at a price equal to the tax value of the assets and liabilities held by the entity 
at the time of the re-characterization; 3) assets and liabilities held by an entity that is re-
characterized will be deemed to be acquired at the same time as the participant acquired 
the and at a similar price (“rollover principle” at the entity level); 4) dividends 
distributions from the re-characterized entity might be subject to WHT in Denmark. Id., 
pp. 514-515. 
824  OECD (2015), supra n. 6. A further analysis will conducted at infra  Chapter V. 
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response), attempting finally to match outcomes. The Danish anti-reverse 
hybrid, on the contrary, attempts to match the characterization of the 
entities, which is indeed the core of the issue with respect to reverse hybrids. 
Yet, it is interesting to note that even when the final target were to match 
outcomes in order to tax income somewhere, the Danish rule seems to be 
more effective, because it does not require determining when a deduction 
has been taken in the third country payer (an issue normally difficult to 
determine in a big scale). In contrast, the re-characterization of the domestic 
entity as a taxable entity guarantees that the income will be subject to tax in 
Denmark, regardless of the deduction in the third country. Thus, at least in 
principle, the Danish rule would accomplish with the target of ensuring 
taxation in a simpler manner than calling for denying a deduction at the 
level of the payer and relying in the application of CFC rules at the level of 




In spite of the above, there are still some features of the Danish anti-reverse 
hybrid rule that are not completely convincing in order to apply as a solution 
in an international level. On the one hand, it is the one referred to the effect 
of the re-characterization. It seems, at least a priori, unfair that the re-
characterization of a fiscally transparent entity as a taxable entity is applied 
                                                          
825  Indeed, if the OECD proposed rule (primary response) is applied in case a deductible 
payment is made to a reverse hybrid, the denial of the payment does not change the fact 
that the country of organization considers the entity as fiscally transparent while the 
country where the parent company is located considers it as a taxable entity. In other 
words, the reverse hybrid issue will remain and the income will be recognized neither in 
the country of organization of the entity nor in the country of the parent company.  





to all partners, letting the interest of minority shareholders subject to the tax 
treatment of the entity in the countries where the majority shareholders 
reside. Such a rule seems to be not only disproportionate and very 
disadvantageous for minority shareholders, but also it could give rise to 
important internal conflicts and negative consequences for the normal 
functioning of a business. Indeed, in the worse scenario, it could influence 
the decisions of domestic investors to carry out businesses based on the 
residents of the foreign investors and the tax treatment given to the entity in 
their country. The above result is not only absurd, but it could generate 
important limitations to the economic development. On the other hand, 
although connected with the above, it is the author’s view that the Danish 
anti-reverse hybrid rule relies too much in foreign law, i.e. with respect to 
the tax treatment of a domestic entity, which could finally increase the level 
of uncertainty for taxpayers, even violating domestic basic legal principles, 
such as legal certainly.  
5.3. From the EU ATAD I to EU ATAD II: A frustrated example of 
supranational coordination  
In January 2016 the European Commission issued a proposal for a Council 
Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that might affect 
the functioning of the internal market.
826
 The proposal for a Directive 
                                                          
826  EU: Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices 
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM (2016) 26 final, 
hereinafter “Proposal for EU ATAD”. The proposal for Directive was only a part of a 
The Hybrid Entities’ Conundrum: A (Simple) Tax Characterization Issue 
 
 286 
contained a very interesting rule attempting to coordinate the 
characterization of entities according to the characterization given in the 
source MS. This rule, unfortunately, did not see the light, most probably 
attending to the global influence (and why not to say it, the political 
pressure) of the OECD proposal, i.e. linking rules.
827
 On 12 July 2016, 
therefore, a final text of the Directive (“EU ATAD I”)
828
 came up with rules 
resembling the above-mentioned OECD linking rules, which have been 
recently (29 May 2017) also been extended to deal with hybrid entity 





                                                                                                                                       
full Commission’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Package that also included other initiatives at a 
regional level. Other initiatives included in the package are, e.g. a recommendation on 
tax treaties; a revision of the Administrative Cooperation Directive; a Communication 
on an external Strategy for Effective Taxation and a Chapeau Communication and Staff 
Working Document, explaining the political and economic rationale behind the 
individual measures that intends to address a number of issues in response to the 2013 
BEPS project and which is also in line with some previous work in the area at the 
European level. See EU: Report of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), 
16553/114 Rev. 1, FISC 225, ECOFIN 1166, Brussels (11 Dec. 2014). See also, EU: 
Commission Communication, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the 
European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM (2015) 302 final, 17/6/2015. For an 
analysis of this Action Plan see, e.g., S. Krauß, EU-BEPS? Aktionsplan für eine faire 
und effiziente Unternehmensbesteuerung in der EU, Internationales Steuerrecht 2 
(2016), p. 45 et seq. 
827  Infra Chapter V, Section 3. 
828  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax 
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, OJ L193, 
(2016), hereinafter “Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I)”. 
829  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 
2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, OJ L144/1 (2017), 
hereinafter “Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II)”. 





Nevertheless, and despite the frustrated process of coordination in the 
characterization of entities within the EU, the recent EU ATAD II seems to 
retake the original approach proposed by the European Commission, at least 
with respect to issues involving reverse hybrid entities, proposing a rule that 
has nothing to do with the OECD BEPS approach, and which attempts to 
solve the issue of reverse hybrids through a re-characterization rule 




The above-mentioned process of coordination, or attempted coordination, 
since the proposal for an EU ATAD until its final text (EU ATAD I) and the 
launch of the EU ATAD II, dealing with mismatches with third countries, is 
subsequently analyzed. 
5.3.1. The  EU ATAD I (original text): A coordination at source 
The proposal for EU ATAD contained a specific provision dealing with 
hybrid entities: Article 10 of the original text of the proposal for Directive. 
This article stated as follows: “Where two Member States give a different 
legal characterization to the same taxpayer (hybrid entity), including its 
permanent establishments in one or more Member State, and this leads to 
either a situation where a deduction of the same payment, expenses or losses 
occurs both in the Member State in which the payment has its source, the 
expenses are incurred or the losses are suffered and in another Member State 
                                                          
830  EU: Article 9a of the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
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or a situation where there is a deduction of a payment in the Member State 
in which the payment has its source without a corresponding inclusion of the 
same payment in the other Member State, the legal characterization given to 
the hybrid entity by the Member State in which the payment has its source, 





Leaving aside for a moment the analysis of the connection between hybrid 
entities and the outcome of D/NI (DNT),
 
which will be assumed in detail 
further on in this work,
832
 the Proposal for EU ATAD provided a very 
interesting solution to deal with cases in which a different characterization 
of the same entity is given by two MS. The solution, unlike other proposals 
launched at that time, especially the OECD linking rules, attempted to 
coordinate the characterization of the entity as per the one given in the 
source country, countering thus the true reason of hybrid and reverse hybrid 




                                                          
831  EU: Article 10(1) of the Proposal for EU ATAD. 
832  The article refers to DD and D/NI. While the former is excluded from the analysis of 
this work, the latter will be further on analyzed. Infra Chapter V. 
833  Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 129. The solution proposed is partially in 
line with the recommendation of the European Parliament of December 2015, where the 
Parliament calls the European Commission for a proposal “to either harmonize national 
definitions of debt, equity, opaque and transparent entities […]; or prevent double non-
taxation, in the event of a mismatch”. See EU: Recommendation C6 ‘Hybrid 
Mismatches’ of the Resolution of the European Parliament with recommendations to the 
Commission on bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax 
policies in the Union, 16 Dec., (2015/2010 (INL)), cited in: G. Fibbe and A.J.A. 
Stevens, Hybrid Mismatches Under the ATAD I and ATAD II, 26 EC Tax Rev. 3 (2017), 





Let us assume the following simple example: X, an entity organized in MS1 
has a subsidiary, Y, in MS2. For purposes of MS1, Y is not recognized for 
tax purposes (tax transparent), while for MS2’s tax purposes, this is indeed a 
taxable entity subject to corporate income tax. Likewise, X grants a loan to 
Y and it receives interest back accordingly.  
                                                                                                                                       
p. 155, footnote 19. A harmonized solution, i.e. harmonization in the rules 
characterizing entities for tax purposes within the EU has also been proposed 
somewhere else. In particular, Fibbe proposed a uniform classification method within 
the EU by mutually recognizing the tax classification in the host country. This mutual 
classification method is based in the principle of mutual recognition of entities and it 
would be materialized in a EU Directive. For further details on Fibbe’s proposal, see G. 
Fibbe, EC Law Aspects of Hybrid Entities, Vol. 15, Doctoral Series IBFD, Amsterdam 
(2009), pp. 293-384. See also, EU: Judgment in Columbus Container Services BVBA & 
Co. v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, C-298/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:754, where the 
CJEU argued that a disparity derived from the autonomous classification of entities 
within EU MS was an issue beyond the fundamental rights and freedoms. Fibbe, based 
in the outcome in Columbus Container Services, reinforces the idea of introducing a 
Directive on Mutual Recognition of Entities within the EU. As stated by Fibbe: “If the 
ECJ did not consider in the Columbus case that the consequence of a classification 
conflict is a forbidden restriction […] Therefore, the new directive introduces a better 
system than the current tax classification methods that are applied autonomously […]” 
Fibbe, Id., p. 378. In spite of the fact that I agree that the EU is a better place for 
achieving harmonized or coordinated results, harmonization in the characterization of 
entities would still be a utopic idea to implement in a global scale. Likewise, if only 
implemented within the EU, it would still leave open issues of disparate characterization 
of entities between MS and non-MS. For that reason, this author is more inclined to 
propose a reactive coordination rule, which, unlike a full harmonization, it provides for 
coordination in the rules characterizing entities. For the proposal, see infra Chapter VI.  
 




Figure 20: Article 10 EU ATA Directive (original text) 
Therefore, any transactionS between X and Y would be disregarded for 
MS1’s purposes, while the same transactions would be recognized in MS2. 
In other words, the interest payments will be deductible in MS2, while not 
recognized as income in MS1, giving rise to a D/NI outcome.    
 
The proposed Article 10, however, instead of opting for a rule matching the 
outcomes, i.e. denying a deduction in the country of the payer to the extent 
that income is not included as such in the country of the payee, or letting 
this latter country to defensively react recognizing the transaction between 
X and Y, follows a different path.
834
 It provides that as MS1 and MS2 do not 
agree in the characterization of the entity Y, established in MS2, and this 
disagreement results in a D/NI outcome, MS1 should follow the 
characterization of entity Y in MS2, i.e. the source country of the payment. 
                                                          




Y is considered as a taxable 
entity in MS 2, its country 
of organization. However, 
MS 1 treats it as a fiscally 
transparent entity. 
MS1 must follow the characterization of Y in the source country MS2, 
namely, it must treat the entity as a taxable entity, which implies to recognize 









In other words, MS1 should align its characterization of entity Y with the 
one provided in MS2, which is not only the country where the entity is 
established, but also the source of the interest payments. The above does not 
only avoid the D/NI outcome, which is arguably the true reason of the 
mismatch, but also directly solve the disparity in the characterization of the 
entity Y, which is indeed the core of the issue at stake. 
 
The solution proposed by Article 10 EU ATAD does not only differ from 
the one proposed by the OECD within the BEPS Action Plan 2, but also 
makes more sense in a regional-coordinated context such as the EU,
835
 
where similar domestic measures have been adopted, or they operate at least 
in practice.
836
 Likewise, coordinating the characterization at source may, on 
one hand, avoid implementing more invasive measures, such as obligating a 
MS to deny a deduction when a correspondent inclusion of income is not 
made in the other MS, or to force a MS to tax a payment received by an 
entity, even though this MS decided sovereignly to exempt it. On the other 
hand, it attends specifically to the core issue regarding hybrid entities: the 
different characterization of the same entity by two countries, avoiding 





                                                          
835  The author has already argued in this sense. See Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 
455, p. 129. 
836  For example, Spain. Supra Section 5.1. 
837  Infra Chapter V, Section 5. 
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Regardless the above, one could still argue that a similar regional-
coordination could be also achieved following the characterization of the 
entity given in the residence country.
838
 What are thus the reasons to give 
preference to the characterization of the entity in the country where the 
payment is sourced rather than the country where the investors are 
residents? Both tax policy and practical reason might justify the preference 
for the source country.
839
 On one hand, as the country producing the hybrid 
entity mismatch is precisely the country of the investors, there are strong tax 
policy reasons to argue that a coordination in the characterization of entities 
should be settled following the characterization of the entity as per the rules 
of the country where this is established, and not in the other way around. In 
other words, the country that is primarily called to react in case of a 
mismatch is the country producing such mismatch, i.e. the country of 
residence of the investors.
840
 On the other hand, there are also practical 
                                                          
838  This is indeed the solution proposed within the 1999 OECD Partnership Report with 
respect to transparent entities and the access to tax treaty benefits. Infra Chapter IV, 
Section 3.1. 
839  The Proposal for EU ATAD refers to “source country”. However, as it will be explained 
later on in this work, this author is more inclined for using the term “home country” (i.e. 
where the entity is established or incorporated) in order to create a coordinated solution 
in the characterization of entities. This is because the use of the concept “source 
country” might not always coincide with the “home country” of the entity, e.g. in case of 
payments made to a hybrid entity in a triangular situation). Moreover, this author 
believes that the pretended wording of Article 10 of the Proposal for EU ATAD when it 
says “source country” is indeed “home country”. The reason of using finally “source 
country” has to be with the fact that the Proposal for EU ATAD is only covering 
payments made by a hybrid entity and which derive in a D/NI outcome. Therefore, in 
such cases, the source and home country will always coincide. For the proposal or 
reactive coordination rule, which explains the use of “home country” rather than “source 
country”, infra Chapter VI, Section 2.1. 
840  J. Lüdicke, “Tax Arbitrage” with Hybrid Entities: Challenges and Responses, 68 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 6/7 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 317. 





reasons, e.g. following the characterization at source might be an easier way 
to deal with reverse hybrid entity mismatches in cases where the reverse 
hybrid entity receives payments. Indeed, up to now a reverse hybrid entity 
mismatches of this type is mostly counteracted either denying a deduction in 
the country where the payment is made o relying on the use of CFC rules in 
the country of the investors.
841
 Nevertheless, this situation could be simply 
solved making the country of the investors to follow the classification of the 
entity in its country of establishment. This is to say, considering also the 
entity as tax transparent. Let me illustrate the above as follows: X, a 
corporation incorporated in MS1 has a subsidiary, Y, in MS2. This latter 
considers the entity as transparent, while the former as a taxable entity. Y 
receives interest income from a third country. If Y, therefore, receives 
interest from a third country, MS2 will not tax that item of income, because 
it considers that Y is a non-taxable entity. MS1, on the other hand, considers 
that the entity exists, and thus will not consider that the income flows 
through Y, being finally allocated in X. 
 
                                                          
841  However, the OECD also proposes limiting the tax transparency in the country where 
the reverse hybrid entity in organized. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 64, 
Recommendation 5.2. 




Figure 21: Article 10 EU ATA Directive (original text) and reverse hybrids 
In absence of Article 10 of the EU ATAD this reverse hybrid case would be 
left exclusively to the capacity of MS1 to use its CFC rules in order to 
recognize the interest income in MS1.
842
 Nevertheless, if Article 10 were 
applied, MS1 should also consider Y as a transparent entity, and thus it 
would tax the interest in the hand of X, without having to rely exclusively 
on its CFC legislation. Thus, in principle, the solution proposed by the EU 
ATAD seems to drive us to a simpler manner to deal with these cases, 
solving also the problem in its core, i.e. eliminating the disparate tax 
treatment of the entity. 
 
                                                          




Y is considered as a fiscally 
transparent entity in MS2, 
its country of organization. 
However, MS1 treats it as a 
taxable entity. 
Y 
Interest from a 
third country 
For MS2 tax purposes, the interest should flow through and be allocated to 
X. They are thus not taxed at the level of Y. On the contrary, MS1 considers 
that the interest are allocated in Y and no income arises until dividends are 
distributed. 





In spite of the above, the application of the proposed Article 10 had also 
important limitations, mostly derived from its restricted regional scope.
843
 
Indeed, the rule was created to apply only to hybrid and reverse hybrid 
entity mismatches within the EU. In other words, assuming any of the 
examples mentioned above, with the only difference that the residence 
country’s entity (MS1) is the United States, the results would evidently 
change to the extent that Y in both examples is an eligible entity for 
purposes of the CTB election.
844
 The above could raise serious issues 
regarding competition between EU and U.S. investors willing to invest 
within Europe, resulting in the latters to have a competitive advantage in 
comparison with the formers.
845
 This issue is, however, (partially) solved 
with the extension of the rule to cases involving hybrid entity mismatches 
outside the EU according to the amendments in the EU ATAD II.
 846
 
                                                          
843  Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 130. 
844  Supra Section 4.3. 
845  The author has also proposed somewhere else that, considering the unlikeliness that the 
United States decides to amend its characterization system when applied to EU entities, 
this issue should simply assumed as a stranded cost in the implementation of the 
proposal. See Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 130.  
846  However, there are still doubts with respect to certain transactions included within the 
scope of the EU ATAD II. For example, payments made to a reverse hybrid entity in 
case the reverse hybrid entity is not organized within the EU. The wording of Article 9a 
suggests that those cases would not be within the scope of the Directive. However, some 
authors disagree on this statement. See, e.g. Fibbe and Stevens, supra n. 833, p. 165.  
See also a further analysis of the EU ATAD II in infra Section 5.3.3. The other 
limitation, in the author’s view, is the link to specific outcomes (DD and D/NI). This 
issue will, however, analyzed in infra Chapter V. 
The Hybrid Entities’ Conundrum: A (Simple) Tax Characterization Issue 
 
 296 
5.3.2. The EU ATAD I (final text): When political pressure comes 
first 
Despite the potential positive outcome that the original text of the EU 
ATAD proposal could have achieved, i.e. an unprecedented regional-
coordination in the characterization of foreign entities for tax purposes 
within the European internal market, the final text included within the 
Directive substantially deviates from its original draft. As provided in the 
final Article 9 (Hybrid Mismatches) of the EU ATAD I, with respect to 
D/NI outcomes: “2. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a 
deduction without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny the 
deduction of such payment”.
847
 
Interestingly, the core issue regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. 
the characterization of entities, is relegated to the backyard in the final text 
of the EU ATAD I, giving again priority to the artificial matching of tax 
outcomes.
848
 This result can only be explained due to political reasons. Since 
the modification of the PSD in 2014,
849
 which included a rule by which a 
parent company is refrained from taxing profits distributed by qualifying 
subsidiaries of another Member State only to the extent that the distributions 
                                                          
847  Article 9 of the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). 
848  The arguments on why the author sustains that matching outcomes, i.e. DD and D/NI, is 
an artificial construction will be further analyzed in connection with the concept of 
hybrid mismatch arrangement in infra Chapter V. However, this analysis excludes the 
cases of DD. 
849  EU: Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on 
the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and 
subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ 219/40 (2014), hereinafter "Council 
Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU”. 





are not tax deductible in the Member State of the subsidiary,
850
 there was no 
equivalent rule at the EU law level denying a deduction if a correspondent 
inclusion of income did not take place.
851
 While the former rule included 
within the PSD corresponds to the so-called “defensive rule”, the latter one 
included in the EU ATAD I corresponds to what is known as “primary 
response”, both measures designed and proposed within the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan 2 in order to deal with “hybrid mismatches”.
852
 In other words,  
if the text would have been approved in its original wording, we would have 
two incompatible rules solving the same issue at a EU level. On one hand, 
the PSD providing for a compulsory taxation when income was deducted in 
the MS of the payer, i.e. the OECD “defensive rule”; on the other hand, a 
rule attempting to solve the problem through the coordination in the 
characterization of entities at source, i.e. a completely different solution to 
the one proposed by the OECD. As this latter rule is contained in a wider 
and ex-post Directive, it might have implied a tacit derogation of the former, 
or which is the same, it could repeal the legal basis created to implement the 
OECD solutions on hybrids mismatches, unless of course a modification in 
the PSD came also into play.
853
 Therefore, in the author’s view, it is evident 
                                                          
850  If the profit distributions are tax deductible in the Member State of the subsidiary, then 
the parent company’s Member State will be obliged to tax them. Id. 
851  C. Marchgraber, Tackling Deduction and Non-Inclusion Schemes–The Proposal of the 
European Commission, 54 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 142. See also, 
Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 128. 
852  A further analysis on linking  rules will be made in infra Chapter V. 
853  As this author has argued somewhere else with respect to the Proposal for EU ATAD: 
“[…] a positive immediate result can be concluded: there will be no need to force a 
sovereign Member State to deny a deduction or to tax an in tem of income to counteract 
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that the turn over from a rule coordinating the characterization of entities 
among MS to one denying a deduction when income is not correspondently 
included in the other MS, or allowing a deduction only in the MS where the 
payment has its source, represents a surrender to the political pressure at the 
OECD level in terms of aligning the rules to the proposal launched by the 
OECD, missing perhaps the chance of providing a rule more in line with the 
idea of a European internal market, and more directly targeting the core of 
the issue with respect to hybrid entity mismatches.
854
  
5.3.3. The EU ATAD II: Confirming (but no exclusively) the 
OECD standards 
As stressed already, on 29 May 2017, it was published the final text of the 
ATAD II.
855
 This EU Directive attempts to extend the scope of application 
                                                                                                                                       
a hybrid mismatch. The above however will require a modification in the current Parent-
Subsidiary Directive”. Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 129. 
854  As Fibbe and Stevens also argue as regards to the EU ATAD I and II: “[…] the 
approach chosen by the Council does seem to close many of the existing loopholes were 
hybrid mismatches are used. Main remaining question is whether all twenty-seven 
Member States will be able to consistently implement the complex anti-mismatch rules. 
The authors see it as a missed chance that in the ATAD it has not been decided to 
address the very cause of hybrid mismatches” (emphasis added). Fibbe and Stevens, 
supra n. 833, p. 153. 
855  The first proposal came up, however, on 25 October 2016, which subsequently derived 
in a second draft published on 2 December 2016. See EU: Proposal for a Council 
Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third 
countries, COM (2016) 687 final, 25 Oct. 2016, hereinafter “Proposal ATAD II (25 Oct. 
2017)”. Later on, a text was made public on 17 February 2017, which was accepted by 
the European Council during the ECOFIN meeting of 21 February 2017. See EU: 
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid 
mismatches with third countries, 6333/17 FISC 46 ECOFIN 95, 17 Feb. 2017, Article 
9(2), hereinafter, “Proposal ATAD II (17 Feb. 2017)”. The final text approved and 
released on 29 May 2017 has, nevertheless, no variations in comparison with the latest 





of the proposed rules to mismatches with third countries, confirming, on one 
hand, the OECD recommendations established in Action 2 of the BEPS 
Action Plan through a modification of Article 9 EU ATAD I, and, on the 
other hand, introducing also a very interesting rule to deal with payments 
made to reverse hybrid entities, which is perhaps more in line with the 
original intention of the EU ATAD.
856
  
5.3.3.1. Article 9(2) EU ATAD II: The OECD Approach  
With respect to Article 9 EU ATAD, referred to D/NI outcome, it reads now 
as follows: “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction 
without inclusion:(a) the deduction shall be denied in the Member State that 
is the payer jurisdiction; and (b) where the deduction is not denied in the 
payer jurisdiction, the amount of the payment that would otherwise give rise 
to a mismatch outcome shall be included in income in the Member State that 
is the payee jurisdiction”.
 857
 The wording is not a surprise, because it simply 
                                                                                                                                       
one of February 2017. EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD 
II). 
856  The ATAD II also includes measures related to dual inclusion of income and hybrid 
transfers, which will not be treated in this work. The rules related to imported 
mismatches will be mentioned further on in this work, infra Chapter V, Section 2.4.3. 
857  Article 9(2) of the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). A 
mirror Article can be found in the launched proposal of 17 Feb. 2017. See EU: Proposal 
ATAD II (17 Feb. 2017). The wording of the Article was slightly different in the draft of 
25 October 2016. However, the idea remained the same: the inclusion of a primary 
response and a defensive rule to counteract hybrid mismatches. As provided in Article 
9(2) of this draft: “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch involving a third country results 
in a deduction without inclusion: (i) if the payment has its source in a Member State, 
that Member State shall deny the deduction, or (ii) if the payment has its source in a 
third country, the Member State concerned shall require the taxpayer to include such 
payment in the taxable base, unless the third country has already denied the deduction or 
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aligns, or attempts to align, the EU proposal on hybrid mismatches with the 
OECD proposal.
858
 This intention is indeed interpreted from the wording 
used in the preamble of the Directive, which provides: “In response to the 
need for fairer taxation and, in particular, to follow up on the OECD BEPS 
conclusions, the Commission presented its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package 
[…]”.
859
 Likewise, it states: “Directive (EU) 2016/1164 includes rules on 
hybrid mismatches between Member States and should thus also include 
rules on hybrid mismatches with third countries […]”.
860
 The aligning 
intention can also be seen in the modification of certain specific 
requirements related to the scope of the proposed rules in order to make 
them closer to the OECD proposal.
861
 For example, the EU ATAD I 
contained a more restricted definition of “associated enterprises”
 862
, when 
                                                                                                                                       
has required that payment to be included”. See Article 9(2) of the Proposal ATAD II (25 
Oct. 2017). MS have until 31 DEC. 2019 to publish the adopt the measure into domestic 
laws, which should also come into force from 1 Jan. 2020, with the exception of new 
Article 9a (“tax residency mismatches”), whose text can be communicated to the 
Commission until 31 Dec. 2021 and comes into force from 1 Jan. 2022. See Article 2 of 
the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). See also, EU: 
European Commission Press release, Fair Taxation: Commission welcomes new rules to 
prevent tax avoidance through non-EU countries, 21 Feb. 2017. 
858  Also in this opinion: Fibbe and Stevens, supra n. 833, p. 156. 
859  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), rec. 3. 
860  Id., rec. 8. 
861  The OECD BEPS Action Plan 2 limits the application of the proposed linking rules to 
“control groups” (and structured arrangements). Infra Chapter V, Section 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2. The EU ATAD refers instead to “associated enterprises”, although in practice 
both concepts, after the modifications introduced by the EU ATAD II, include the same 
assumptions.  
862  Article 2(4) of the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I) 
provides that: “ ‘associated enterprises’ means: (a) an entity in which the taxpayer holds 
directly or indirectly a participation in terms of voting rights or capital ownership of 25 
percent or more or is entitled to receive 25 percent or more of the profits of that entity; 
(b) an individual or entity which holds directly or indirectly a participation in terms of 
voting rights or capital ownership of 25 percent or more or is entitled to receive 25 





compared to the definition included within the EU ATAD II.
863
 Indeed, this 
latter measure includes within the concept of “associated enterprises” also 
the cases of persons being part of the same consolidated group; a person 
“acting together” with another person with respect to the voting rights or 
capital ownership of an entity, or an enterprise in which the taxpayer has a 
significant influence in the management, or the other way around, when an 
enterprise has a significant influence in the management of the taxpayer, 
which are concepts expressly included within the OECD BEPS Action 2.
 864
 
Once again, however, it would have been more interesting to see an 
approach more in line with the idea of a European internal market, although 
still in line with the OECD BEPS Action 2, but addressing directly the core 
of the hybrid entity mismatches. The European Union is indeed the best 
scenario to achieve this aim.
865
 
                                                                                                                                       
percent or more of the profits of the taxpayer […] For the purposes of Article 9 [hybrid 
mismatches] and where the mismatch involves a hybrid entity, this definition is 
modified so that the 25 percent requirement is replaced by a 50 percent requirement”.  
863  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), rec. 13 and 14. 
864  To compare, see the concepts of “control group” and “acting together” under the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan 2 in infra Chapter V, Section 3.3.1. 
865  Fibbe and Stevens share this critic and refer to a more “principled based EU approach” 
in terms of “introducing either a consistent system of anti-abuse rules whereby always 
the same country (source country or investor country; from an EU policy perspective the 
source country seems preferable) should make the adjustments or by implementing a 
uniform classification method [of entities] between Member States”.  Fibbe and Stevens, 
supra n. 833, p. 156, footnote 22. 
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5.3.3.2. Article 9a EU ATAD II: The characterization of entities is 
back on the scene 
Regardless, the tendency to align the EU proposals on hybrid entity 
mismatches with the one proposed by the OECD, it is interesting to 
highlight a small deviation of this tendency which can be found in Article 9a 
EU ATAD II dealing with payment received by reverse hybrid entities 
established in a MS.  
Article 9a EU ATAD II reads as follows: “Where one or more associated 
non-resident entities holding in aggregate a direct or indirect interest in 50% 
or more of the voting rights, capital interests or rights to a share of profit in a 
hybrid entity that is incorporated or established in a Member State, are 
located in a jurisdiction or jurisdictions that regard the hybrid entity as a 
taxable person, the hybrid entity shall be regarded as a resident of that 
Member State and taxed on its income to the extent that this income is not 
otherwise taxed under the laws of the Member State or any other 
jurisdiction”.
 866
 As per the wording of the Article, it is possible to affirm 
that it attempts (to certain extent) to coordinate the characterization of 
entities as a solution to the reverse hybrid mismatch, rather than 
constructing a rule focused exclusively on the tax outcomes in a 
transaction.
867
 The above can be seen in the wording of the Article, when it 
says: “[…] the hybrid entity shall be regarded as a resident of that Member 
State and taxed on its income to the extent that this income is not otherwise 
                                                          
866  Article 9a(1) of the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
867  In this opinion, see also Fibbe and Stevens, supra n. 833, p. 164. 





taxed under the laws of the Member State or any other jurisdiction”. 
868
 
Thus, in other words, the Article is providing for a re-characterization of the 
entity at the level of the MS where this is organized, which at least gets 
closer to the true issue regarding reverse hybrid entities: the disparate 
characterization for tax purposes.
869
  
The rule on Article 9a EU ATAD II seems also to apply with priority over 
the rule contained in Article 9(2) (linking rules). The above seems to be 
confirmed in the recital 29 of the preamble of the Directive, which says: 
“The hybrid mismatch rules in Article 9(1) and (2) only apply to the extent 
that the situation involving a taxpayer gives rise to a mismatch outcome. No 
mismatch outcome should arise when an arrangement is subject to 
adjustments under Article 9(5) or 9a and, accordingly, arrangements that are 
subject to adjustment under those parts of this Directive should not be 
subject to any further adjustment under the hybrid mismatch rules”.
870
 In 
simple words, to the extent that Article 9a has solved the reverse hybrid 
entity mismatch, there is no need to apply the rules of Article 9(2) EU 
ATAD II. The above seems also to be the rule when CFC rules, contained 
                                                          
868  Id. Despite the confusion that the reference to a “hybrid entity”, it is clear that the article 
refers to the case of a “reverse hybrid”, i.e. an entity considered as tax transparent in its 
country of organization, while as non-tax transparent in the country of the investors. 
869  The reverse entity mismatch rule resemblances what we have already study with respect 
to the Danish anti-reverse hybrid provisions. Briefly recalling, the Danish rule provides 
that certain entities normally treated as fiscally transparent in Denmark must be re-
characterized as taxable entities if the direct owners/partners holding more than 50% of 
the capital or voting rights are tax residents in one or more foreign jurisdictions, and 
these jurisdictions considers the Danish entity to be a separate taxable entity. Supra 
Section 5.2.2. 
870  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), rec. 29. 
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within the EU ATAD I, might solve the reverse hybrid entity mismatch first. 
According to the recital 30 EU ATAD II: “ Where the provisions of another 
directive, such as those in Council Directive 2011/96/EU [EU ATAD I], 
lead to the neutralization of the mismatch in tax outcomes, there should be 
no scope for the application of the hybrid mismatch rules provided for in 
this Directive”.
871
 A similar priority to CFC rules is confirmed under the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan 2.
872
  
The rule in Article 9a EU ATAD II is, however, still ineffective to target 
payments made to a reverse hybrid entity in all those cases when the reverse 
hybrid is incorporated in a third country, outside the EU. Let us assume the 
following hypothetical: MS1 is a corporation incorporated in a MS, which 
has a subsidiary in a third country, outside the EU. This latter (Sub) has 
subsequently a subsidiary in a MS (MS2). Sub and MS2 engaged in a loan 
agreement through which MS2 pays interest payments to Sub. Sub is tax 
transparent entity in its country of establishment, although both MS consider 
it as an opaque entity. 
                                                          
871  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), rec. 30. 
872  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 64. See also, infra Chapter V, Section 4.2 referred to the 
interaction between CFC rules and linking rules. In addition, it is interesting to remark 
that the rule in Article 9a EU ATAD II seems to be, in principle, in contradiction to 
Article 62 of the CCTB proposal, which provides that where an entity is treated as 
transparent in a MS where it is established, a taxpayer holding an interest in the entity 
shall include in his tax base his share in the income of the entity. See EU: Proposal for a 
Council Directive (EU) 2016/0337 of 25 Oct. 2016 on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 
COM (2016) 685 final, Article 62(1) on allocation of the income of transparent entities 
to taxpayers holding an interest. See also, Fibbe and Stevens, supra n. 833, p. 164. 






Figure 22: Article 9a EU ATAD II 
In such case, Article 9a EU ATAD II is inapplicable. However, Article 9(2) 
may still apply, obligating MS2 to deny the deduction of the interest 
payments in that MS. Nevertheless, if MS2 is also located in a non-EU MS, 
both Article 9(2) and 9a EU ATAD II are inapplicable, i.e. those 
mismatches would be out of the scope of the EU ATAD I and II rules.  
 
Figure 23: Article 9a EU ATAD II 
In this scenario, therefore, the only option to solve the reverse hybrid entity 
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where Sub and MS2 are organized, introduced the OECD recommendations 
(i.e. either linking rules or that the non-MS country where the reverse hybrid 
is organized denies the tax transparency), or that the CFC in MS1 are 
effective enough to accomplish such an aim.  
Yet, this author still argues that these types of rules, i.e. rules attempting to 
coordinate the characterization of the entities, makes more sense than those 
constructed based exclusively on the matching of tax outcomes. On one 
hand, and as repeatedly stressed in this work, they focus on the core of the 
issue regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities: the different 
characterization of the entity. On the other hand, they are simple to 
administer both for taxpayers and tax administrations. After all, matching 
the characterization of the entities is easier than determining whether a 
deduction was or not taken in the other State or whether income was or not 
included. Nonetheless, this author considers that some questions remain still 
unsolved. Firstly, there is still not enough justification to provide rules 
matching the characterization of the entity as per the one provided in the 
residence country of the majority controlling partner, rather than the 
characterization given in the MS where the entity is organized.
873
 Of course 
the immediate consequence of this rule is that the revenues are maintained 
within the EU, which could be enough justification for many.
874
 However, 
re-characterizing an entity in the MS where the entity is organized may also 
                                                          
873  Supra Figure 19: Danish anti-reverse hybrid rule. 
874  Revenues will be maintained within the EU, because the entity will be treated as a 
taxable entity, being thus subject to corporate income tax in the MS where it is 
organized (EU MS). 





create uncertainty for those taxpayers who originally decided to carry on 
business using these types of organizations rather than tax opaque ones.
875
 
Secondly, there are still some doubts regarding the effect that the re-
characterization might have for those minority shareholders or partners who 
reside in countries where the entity is considered fiscally transparent. Will 
the re-characterization proposed also affect those shareholders? The 
intuitive answer should be no. However, the experience of other countries, 
like Denmark, which offer similar solutions as the one proposed in the EU 
ATAD II, demonstrates that they will finally affect those shareholders who 
originally did not have any mismatch.
876
 Thirdly, one should also consider 
the potential double taxation if the entity in the MS is re-characterized as 
taxable entity. In such a case the income received by the entity will be 
subject to tax in the MS where the entity is organized and might also be 
subject to taxation in the country of the majority of owners/partners treating 
the entity as a taxable entity, because of the application of CFC rules. The 
priority operation of CFC rules granted in the EU ATAD II seems, however, 
to be dealing correctly with this issue, because it switches off the application 
                                                          
875  As noted already, in some cases the decision to opt for a traditional transparent entity, 
such a Partnership, rather than a Corporation attend to the simple fact of avoiding 
economic double taxation. This pattern is evident, e.g. in the case of the United States, 
where the use of partnerships was basically because of the avoidance of double taxation. 
See the explanation of McDaniel, McMahon and Simmons at supra n. 628.  
876  Møllin Ottosen and Nørremark, supra n. 793, p. 514. 
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of Article 9a EU ATAD II in case the mismatch was already solved through 
the CFC legislation in MS1.
877
  
All in all, this author is still of the idea that a reactive coordination rule, 
which respects the characterization of the entity given in the country of 
establishment (i.e. home country) might still bring better results. This idea 
will be elaborated in details further on in this work.
878
  
6. Final Remarks 
When answering the questions why hybrid entities (and reverse hybrids) 
exist and why we should be concerned about them, this Chapter has left us 
important conclusions. On one hand, hybrid entities and reverse hybrids are 
the result of domestic and sovereign tax policy decisions that determine the 
tax treatment that a foreign entity will have for domestic tax purposes. This 
result should not be surprising at all considering that tax systems around the 
world are neither uniform nor consistent in their tax policies and they 
normally differ with each other in many aspects. On the other hand, and 
derived from the above, one should note that there is no entities’ 
characterization rules that fit all the requirements to be completely 
inviolable. Indeed, and contrary to the doctrine that tends to blame elective 
systems as a major source of hybrid and reverse hybrids, this Chapter has 
demonstrated that this result is not less likely to occur with other 
                                                          
877  This outcome could be avoided granting an indirect FTC, although in this is not 
something that can be guaranteed in all cases. 






characterization rules, e.g. resemblance tests. Indeed, resemblance or 
comparative tests normally fail in creating consistent characterizations of 
foreign entities due, most of the time, to the incompatible characteristics 
between foreign and domestic entities. Likewise, these tests tend to be 
generally not less elective than a formally elective system that relies 
completely in a taxpayer’s election. A good example of the above is the 
Kintner test in the United States, which was in force before the issuance of 
the CTB regulations. Under this system, a sophisticated taxpayer could, after 
a proper legal advice, set up the structures that most accurately fit his 
pretentions, predicting thus in advance the desired tax treatment of those 
entities. The above, however, does not mean to recognize the influence of 
the CTB system to circumvent Subpart F Income and to inappropriately 
claim a FTC. However, and as demonstrated already, some of these 
circumventions did not attend exclusively to the CTB election, but rather to 
the poor design of domestic anti-deferral and FTC rules. The above 
therefore reinforces the idea that determining whether a characterization 
system is more or less elective is certainly not the true path to solve the 
issues on hybrids and reverse hybrid entities. In other words, the analysis of 
the existing systems to characterize foreign entities for tax purposes cannot 
be made in isolation, disregarding e.g. the design of other rules within the 
tax system, e.g. anti-deferral rules, and how they interact with the 
characterization rules within the global economy.  
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In the same order of ideas, this Chapter has attempted to demonstrate how 
the coordination in the characterization of foreign entities, i.e. the real issue 
regarding hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, is far from being just a utopian 
academic idea and could become indeed relevant to properly deal with the 
issue of hybrids and reverse hybrid entities. This tendency can indeed be 
seen already materialized in different countries and to different extents of 
development, including supranational law. For example, in Spain, unlike 
being a casual practice rather than an intended law rule, it results in an 
effective coordination in the characterization of entities, nullifying the 
appearance of hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities in all those cases in 
which Spain is the country characterizing a foreign entity located in a 
country from where Spanish residents receives income. This idea was also 
recently included within the Proposal for an EU ATAD (2016), which 
provided that in all those cases in which different characterization of entities 
by two MS existed, and it derived in certain outcomes, the resident MS 
should follow the characterization of the source MS in order to solve the 
dichotomy. Unfortunately, this rule was not longer included in the final text 
of the EU ATAD I (2016), which opted for following the recommendations 
made by the OECD on this matter, i.e. a domestic implementation of a 
primary response and a defensive rule. In spite of the above, the recent EU 
ATAD II (2017) included a rule dealing with reverse hybrid entities and 
third countries, which provides for a re-characterization of a fiscally 
transparent entity when the entity is regarded by the majority of the 
shareholders, residents in a third country, as a taxable entity. This rule 






hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, which attempts to coordinate the 
characterization of entities through a re-characterization of its own domestic 
entities, producing interesting results. This approach, however, has still the 
disadvantage of relying excessively in foreign law, increasing also the levels 
of uncertainty for taxpayers. Yet, it is the author’s opinion that rules aimed 
to match the characterization of entities are indeed more effective manner to 
deal with hybrids and reverse hybrids entities, than attempting to create an 
artificial match of tax outcomes, as proposed by the OECD and the BEPS 
Action Plan 2. After all, hybrids and reverse hybrid entities exist exclusively 
because of the different characterization of the same entity by two 




                                                          






Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
1. Introduction 
Tax treaties have the purpose of allocating taxing rights between the source 
and residence jurisdiction in order to avoid double taxation.
880
 This division 
of taxing rights implies that either of these countries will give up part of 
their sovereignty to tax an item of income when two persons, considered 
residents for purposes of the treaty, are subject to taxation in both countries 
on the same income.
881
 
                                                          
880  On the other hand, as stressed in Chapter II, the aim of avoiding DNT as a general tax 
policy goal of tax treaties is rather arguable. This conclusion remains valid even after the 
implementation of the new OECD interpretation of Articles 23A and 23B OECD Model 
within the OECD Commentaries and the inclusion of a new Article 23A(4) OECD 
Model, because none of these articles are effective enough to solve all the situations of 
DNT derived from either conflicts of qualification or interpretation. Supra Chapter II, 
Section 3.4. The above can also be concluded after the recent proposal to modify the 
title and preamble of the OECD Model in order to include a reference to the avoidance 
of DNT and the inclusion of a STR rule under Action 6 of the BEPS project. Supra 
Chapter II, Section 5.3 and 6. On the one hand, the unhappy wording of the modified 
OECD Model preamble could only suggest that the prevention of DNT is exclusively 
relegated to the cases where this outcome is the result of tax evasion or tax avoidance. 
Supra Chapter II, Section 5.1 and 5.2. Likewise, the STR rule does not suggest any 
obligation to the source State to exercise its taxing rights as demonstrated in the use of 
the word “may be” instead of “is” or “must be”. Supra Chapter II, Section 5.3. In spite 
of the above, nothing prevents that some specific tax treaties might include provisions 
aiming to prevent DNT, e.g. subject-to-tax or switch-over clauses. Supra Chapter II, 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
881  However, as already stressed in Chapter II, the relief of double taxation is also limited to 
the cases of juridical double taxation. Economic double taxation, on the other hand, i.e. 
when a same element of income or the same economic transaction is subject to the same 
type of tax in the hands of two or more different taxpayers, is not included in the treaty 
relief. See references to this discussion in supra Chapter II, supra n. 196. 
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Although the determination of persons and residents for tax treaty purposes 
is rather clear in the case of individuals, it can be quite problematic when 
referring to entities, mostly when those entities are treated differently for tax 
purposes by the Contracting States. Accordingly, this disparity in the 
characterization of entities may give rise to conflicts of allocation of income, 
i.e. where the same income is attributed to different taxpayers in the source 
and residence States within the tax treaty context.
882
  
                                                          
882  The disparities in the characterization of entities might also give rise to what is known in 
doctrine as “conflicts of qualification”. Nevertheless, as these conflicts depend on the 
nature of an item of income, rather than exclusively on the discrepancies as regards to 
the characterization of an entity either as fiscally transparent or tax opaque, they will not 
be included in the analysis of this work. In this opinion also, e.g. Fibbe, supra n. 833, p. 
216 and p. 219. However, a good example illustrating a conflict of qualification derived 
from the different characterization of entities can be found in the OECD Commentary on 
Article 23A OECD Model. The example consists of a partnership organized in State A, 
which has a PE in State E. Accordingly, its owner, who is a resident of State R alienates 
its interest in the partnership. While State E considers the partnership as tax transparent, 
State R, the State of the partner, considers it as a taxable entity. Derived from the 
different characterization of the partnership thus State R and State E apply a different 
provision of the treaty. In other words, they apply a disparate characterization of the 
income influenced by the different tax treatment of the entity. State R, on one hand, 
considers that the alienation of the interest corresponds to the alienation of the shares in 
a company, and thus, it is regulated under Article 13(5) OECD Model (which exempts 
the owner from taxation). State E, on the other hand, considers the owner to be 
alienating the underlying assets of the business in State E (PE), and thus, it might tax the 
income according to Article 13(1) or (2) OECD Model. The solution provided by the 
OECD in this case, and which derives from the 1999 OECD Partnership Report is that 
the State of residence (State R) should apply either the exemption or credit method to 
relief double taxation, following thus the characterization of the income in the State of 
source. This line of reasoning is founded in the wording of Article 23A and 23B OECD 
Model, which require the State of residence to check whether the income may be taxed 
in the State of source “in accordance with the provisions of the Convention”. R. Danon, 
Qualification of Taxable Entities and Treaty Protection, 68 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2014), 
IBFD Journals, p. 200.  A further discussion on the interpretation of the phrase “in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed”, referred to conflicts 






The concern regarding conflicts of allocation of income was originally 
assumed in the 1999 when the OECD issued a report referred specifically to 
the case of partnerships. In this report, the OECD suggested that a 
residence-source conflict of allocation of income (or attribution conflict) 
might be solved if the State of source relies on the attribution principles of 
the State of residence. This idea was later on recognized as positive law in 
Article 1(6) US Model, which also included cases of tax transparent entities 
that were not necessarily partnerships, and it is today part of the OECD 
recommendation on treaty issues in the Action 2 of OECD BEPS project, 
which proposes a new Article 1(2) OECD Model, whose text mirrors the US 
Model provision, and which is also replicated within Article 3(1) of the 
MLI.
883
 This Chapter analyzes these provisions and raises some concerns 
with respect to their application. 
Section 2 briefly refers to the general rules regarding the entitlement to tax 
treaties benefits with respect to entities. Section 3 analyses the principles 
established within the OECD Partnership Report as regards to conflicts of 
allocation of income. For this purpose, it analyzes the general principles 
settled within the report, its exceptions and the formal and substantial critics 
raised with respect to the position adopted. Section 4 analyzes Article 1(6) 
US Model, which is the first positive recognition of the principle settled 
within the OECD Partnership Report, and the immediate precedent of 
                                                          
883  The proposal of including Article 1(2) OECD Model is already ratified in the text of the 
recently releseased draft contents of the 2017 update to the OECD Model. See OECD 
(2017) and OECD (2017a), supra n. 462. 
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Article 1(2) OECD Model. This Section firstly provides a general 
interpretation of the wording of this provision. Secondly, it illustrates the 
application of Article 1(6) US Model through seven examples, which are 
divided in two groups: (i) strict bilateral cases and (ii) triangular cases. 
Finally, this Section provides some examples where the interplay between 
Article 1(6) US Model and other tax treaty and domestic provisions is either 
not entirely clear or they simply conflict with each other. The above 
includes the interplay with the concept of beneficial owner in Article 10, 11 
and 12 US Model; the saving clause of Article 1(4) US Model; the U.S. 
CTB regulations and I.R.C. Sec. 894(c). Section 5 follows a similar path. It 
firstly provides a general interpretation of the wording of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model. Later on, it analyzes seven illustrations explaining the application of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model, which are also divided in two groups: (i) strict 
bilateral cases and (ii) triangular cases.  Finally, it addresses some specific 
issues referred to its application, which includes the interplay with the 
concept of beneficial owner, the saving clause and double taxation relief, 
and the negative impact that Article 1(2) OECD Model has with respect to 
developing countries. Section 6, briefly addresses Article 3(1) MLI 
concluding that the analysis as regards to the interpretation and application 
of Article 1(2) OECD Model can also be extended to this mirror provision 
introduced within the MLI. Accordingly, this Section analyzes Article 11 
and Article 3(3) MLI, as two saving clause’s options expressly included 
within the text of the Convention as well as Article 3(2) and Article 5–
Option C as regards to the interplay between the saving clause and the 





obligations to relief double taxation within tax treaties. Section 7 provides 
some final remarks. 
2. The General Application of Tax Treaties to Entities 
As a general rule, a double tax treaty applies only to persons who are 
residents of one or both of the Contracting States. Therefore, in order to 
determine the application of a tax treaty to any entity, i.e. corporate or non-
corporate entity, one should primarily consider two basic questions: (i) is the 
entity a person as per the definition of the OECD Model?, and subsequently, 





As regards to the first question, Article 3(1) a) OECD Model defines a 
person, for purposes of the Convention, as any “individual, company and 
any other body of persons”.
885
 In principle, the reference to “any body of 
persons” generated some questions as to whether partnerships and other 
non-corporate entities were considered persons for tax treaty purposes. This 
conflict, however, was solved in the 1999 OECD Partnership Report, which 
stated: “While the practices of Member countries are not entirely uniform in 
this respect, the Committee has determined that partnerships should be 
considered to be “persons” within the meaning of the definition found in 
                                                          
884  P. Baker, The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-
Corporate Entities, 2 GITC Rev. 1 (2002), pp. 1-2. 
885  Article 3(1) OECD Model Tax Convention. 





 Subsequently, the last sentence of paragraph 2 on the 
Commentary on Article 3 was replaced by the following: “Partnerships will 
also be considered to be ‘persons’ either because they fall within the 
definition of ‘company’ or, where this is not the case, because they 
constitute other bodies of persons”.
887
 At present thus there is no doubt that 
partnerships are regarded persons for tax treaty purposes.  
 
Article 4(1) OECD Model, on the other hand, states that a resident for 
purposes of the treaty is “any person who, under the law of that state, is 
liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of 
management or any other criterion of a similar nature […]”.
888
 As discussed 
already in Chapter II,
889
 the view of the term “liable to tax” is that of a 
person who, by reason of various criteria, e.g. residence; domicile, etc., is 
subject to “comprehensive taxation”.
890
 The OECD Commentaries do not 
define “comprehensive taxation” in a systematic manner. However, it is 
widely recognized and accepted in doctrine and in the tax treaty practice that 
a person is considered liable to comprehensive taxation even if a State does 
not impose effectively a tax.
891
 For example, an entity enjoying a complete 
                                                          
886  OECD (1999), supra n. 1, para. 30. 
887  OECD Commentary on Article 3 concerning general definitions, para. 2. 
888  Article 4(1) OECD Model. 
889  Supra Chapter II, Section 3.1. 
890  OECD Commentary on Article 4 concerning the definition of resident, para. 8 and 8.6. 
891  OECD Commentary on Article 4 concerning the definition of resident, para. 8.6. This is 
also the main reason why to put the terms “liable to tax” and “subject to tax” in equal 
footing is incorrect. While the former supposes full tax liability, which is provided even 
in the absence of an effective taxation, the latter necessarily assumes the effective 
payment of taxes. The requirement provided by Article 4(1) OECD Model certainly 
does not request effective taxation. See the full discussion at supra Chapter II, Section 





exemption from tax is still regarded as resident for purposes of the tax treaty 
to the extent that the State of residence asserts jurisdiction to tax the entity 
on its worldwide income in accordance with one of the internationally 
accepted bases to full liability, i.e. place of incorporation or place of 
management of the entity.
892
 Prima facie, therefore, both corporate and non-
corporate entities would be regarded as residents for purposes of the treaty 
to the extent they are fully liable to tax. Nevertheless, the issue is precisely 
that most of the non-corporate entities, e.g. partnerships and disregarded 
entities with a sole owner, are granted full tax transparency, which is indeed 
inconsistent with the assertion of full tax liability based on worldwide 
taxation.
893
 This is perhaps the reason why the 1999 OECD Partnership 
Report concluded that partnerships are not residents for purposed of Article 
4(1) OECD Model.
894
 In such a case, however, the partners are the ones who 
                                                                                                                                       
3.1. See also the reference to the case law UK: Paul Weiser v. Commissioner for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (2012), which finely illustrates the distinction between 
“liable to tax” and “subject to tax” at supra n. 319. Also in position that “liable to tax” 
does not correspond to “subject to tax”, see e.g. De Broe, supra n. 229. See also, Ismer 
and Riemer, supra n. 307, Article 4 at m.no.26. See also the analysis at supra Chapter II, 
Section 3.1 as regards to the interpretation of the term “liable to tax” and DNT. 
892  Baker, supra n. 884. Similarly, paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 4 provides 
the example of pension funds, charities and other organizations that may be exempted 
from tax, but they are exempt only if they meet all of the requirements for exemption 
specified in the tax laws [i.e. if they are fully liable to tax]. The Commentary recognizes 
that “most States would view such entities as residents for purposes of the Convention”. 
OECD Commentary on Article 4 concerning the definition of resident, para. 8.6. 
893  As well explained by Baker: “[T]he problem with many non-corporate entities is that 
they are partially or fully transparent for tax purposes in their state of establishment or 
management. It would be entirely inconsistent for a state to accord full fiscal 
transparency to an entity and yet assert jurisdiction to tax that entity on its worldwide 
income”. Baker, supra n. 884, p. 3. 
894  Paragraph 34 of the OECD Partnership Report states: “If the State in which the 
partnership has been organized treats that partnership as fiscally transparent, then the 
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should be entitled to the benefits provided by a tax treaty to the extent that 





Let us assume a basic illustration to explain the above: R is an entity 
organized in State R, which has two partners, A and B, who are residents of 
State R. Likewise, entity R receives interest payment from an independent 
debtor in State P. We will also assume that both State R and State P consider 
entity P as tax transparent, and that the general WHT on interest paid abroad 
in State P is 30%. 
 
 
Figure 24: Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits/Transparent entities 
                                                                                                                                       
partnership is not “liable to tax” in that State within the meaning of Article 4, and so 
cannot be a resident for purposes of the Convention […]”. OECD (1999), supra n. 1, 
para. 34, p. 14. 
895  Id., para 47, p. 17. See also, OECD Commentary on Article 8 concerning the definition 
of resident, para. 8.8. 






P is regarded as fiscally transparent in both 
States. 






In such a case, and as per Article 11(2) of the treaty R-P, State P should 
apply a reduced WHT of 10% if the interest payments are paid to the 
beneficial owners of the other Contracting State, which in this case would 
most probably be A and B.
896
 Likewise, according to Article 11(1) of the 
treaty R-P, State R should grant a relief from double taxation to partners A 
and B. In simple words, entity P is neither regarded as receiving the interest 
payments nor granted thus any benefits of the treaty. The treaty R-P is thus 
applicable as regards to A and B, who are residents of State R receiving 
interest from State P.  
3. The 1999 OECD Partnership Report 
In 1999 the OECD issued the Partnership Report, which provided some 
important conclusions with respect to the application of the OECD Model to 
partnerships and to other non-corporate entities.
897
 Jointly with recognizing 
that partnerships can be regarded as persons for purposes of Article 3(1) 
OECD Model,
898
 although not considered as residents for purposes of 
Article 4(1) OECD Model,
899
 it provided important conclusions with respect 
                                                          
896  State P also considers entity P as tax transparent; therefore, it will recognize that income 
is allocated to the partners, who should coincide with the beneficial owners.  
897  The Report adopted a case-study approach under different hypotheticals. The individual 
study of all those hypotheticals certainly exceeds the purpose of this Chapter. 
Nevertheless, some of them are considered later on in this work for purposes of stressing 
some fundamental ideas.  
898  OECD (1999), supra n. 1, para. 30, p. 12 
899  Id., para 47, p. 17. 
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to the cases of different characterization of the same entity in the country of 
residence and the country of source, giving rise to issues with respect to the 
allocation of income and the entitlement to tax treaty benefits.
 900
 
3.1. General Principle 
As a general rule, the OECD suggests that when applying a tax treaty the 
State of source should rely on the attribution principles of the State of 
residence and attribute the income accordingly.
901
 In other words, the State 
of source should take into consideration the way in which income arising in 
its jurisdiction is treated in the jurisdiction of the resident taxpayer.
902
 Thus, 
if the State of residence follows a non-transparent approach with respect to 
                                                          
900  This Section does not deal with qualification conflicts, i.e. where the residence and 
source State apply different articles of the tax treaty on the basis of differences in their 
domestic laws. This issue was already analyzed in supra Chapter II, Section 3.3, referred 
specifically to cases of DNT and the new interpretation of Article 24A(1) OECD Model. 
See also on this topic: F. Engelen and P. Pötgens, Report on “The Application of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships” and the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 
40 Eur. Taxn. 7 (2000), Journals IBFD; A Lamers and J. Stevens, Classification 
Conflicts: The Cross-Border Tax Treatment of the Profit Share of Limited Partners, 44 
Eur. Taxn. 4 (2004), Journals IBFD. 
901  H. Ault, Issues Related to the Identification and Characteristics of the Taxpayer, 56 
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6 (2002), Journals IBFD, p. 264. As provided in the OECD 
Commentaries on Article 1, modified after the OECD Partnership Report: “[…] the state 
of source should take into account, as part of the factual context in which the convention 
is to be applied, the way in which an item of income, arising in its jurisdiction, is treated 
in the jurisdiction of the person claiming the benefits of the convention as a resident”. 
OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the convention, 
para. 6.3. This approach, according to Wheeler, was anticipated by Hugh Ault during the 
IFA Meeting in London on the concept of beneficial owner. J. Wheeler, The Attribution 
of Income to a Person for Tax Treaty Purposes, 59 Bull. Intl. Fisc. Doc. 11 (2005), 
Journals IBFD, p. 488. 
902  M. Steindl and M. Stiastny, The Impact of the OECD Partnership Report (1999) on Tax 
Avoidance in Outbound Cases, 68 Bull. Int’l. Taxn. 2 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 112. 





the entity through which income is received, the entity will be regarded as 
liable to tax and thus entitled to the benefits of the treaty.
903
 On the contrary, 
if the resident State considers the entity as tax transparent, income will be 





The application of the principles stated within the 1999 OECD Partnership 
Report can be illustrated through Example 4 of the Report, which provides 
the following hypothetical: P is Partnership established in State P. A and B 
are P’s partners who reside in State P. State P treats P as a transparent entity 
while States S treats it as a taxable entity. P derives royalty income from 




Figure 25: OECD Partnership Report, Example 4. 
                                                          
903  Id. 
904  Id. 
905  OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Ex. 4, p. 23. 





P is regarded as fiscally 
transparent  
P is regarded as a taxable 
entity 
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In this hypothetical, State S shall follow the characterization of entity P 
given in the State of residence in order to consider to whom the income is 
attributed. As A and B are residents of State P, the royalty income is 
considered to be paid to A and B, who are entitled to the treaty benefits.
906
 
On the contrary, however, i.e. without applying the principle of the OECD 
Partnership Report, one should consider that entity P is not a resident for 
purposes of Article 4(1) OECD Model; therefore, the treaty S-P might not 
be applicable, at least from the perspective of State P.
907
 In other words, the 
royalties might be subject to double taxation, because country S would not 
limit its taxing rights in favor of the resident country. 
 
Similarly, in triangular cases the State of source is bound not only by the tax 
characterization of the entity in the State of residence of the partnership, but 
also by the tax treatment in the State of residence of the partners.
908
 Once 
again, the characterization of the entity given in the State of source is 
completely irrelevant. Let us take the example 9 of the OECD Partnership 
Report, which provides as follows: entity P is established in State P. A and 
B are P’s partners who resides in State R. P owns shares in X, company 
                                                          
906  The above means that, in principle, State S should reduce its WHT and State R would 
grant a relief in case of double taxation. However, it is arguable that State S considers A 
and B as the beneficial owners for purposes of Article 12 OECD Model, and finally 
apply a reduced WHT. Thus issue is further on analyzed at infra Section 3.3.2.3. 
907  For State S, on the contrary, the treaty P-S is applicable with or without the 
considerations on the principles of the OECD Partnership Report, because State S 
considers entity P as a taxable entity.  
908  Steindl and Stiastny, supra n. 902. 





resident in State S. X pays dividends to P. States P and S treats the 




Figure 26: OECD Partnership Report, Example 9. 
The OECD Partnership Report states that in this case the tax treatment given 
to entity P in State S is irrelevant for purposes of determining the to whom 
the income is attributed.
910
 State S, however, will consider the tax treatment 
given in both State P and in State R. In this regard, the tax treaty between 
States P-S is applicable since P is considered as resident of State P by this 
State. A and B, on the other hand, are potentially liable to tax as residents of 
State R. Therefore, State S should, in principle, limit its taxing rights as 
regards to the treaty R-S. In other words, State S should be limited in its 
                                                          
909  OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Ex. 9, p. 29. 
910  Id. 
Dividends 
State P State S State R 
X 
Taxable entity Tax Transparent Taxable entity 
As noted, State S is bound not only by the characterization of entity P in country P, but also by the 
characterization of State R, where the partners of P reside. The double entitlement to treaty benefits is 
solved in a pragmatic manner providing that State S should apply the lowest WHT resulting from the 
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taxing rights by the tax treatment in State R and State P, providing a double 
entitlement to tax treaty benefits, i.e. to the entity P and to its partners, 
although by application of two different treaties. The solution proposed by 
the OECD in the Partnership Report in this case is, however, that State S 
applies the lowest WHT resulting from those two treaties to both applicable 
treaties.
911
 For example, if the treaty P-S provides for 10% WHT and the one 
between R-S provides for 15% WHT, State S should tax the dividends at a 
rate of 10% WHT to satisfy both treaty obligations. The above, however, 
does not prevent the double taxation that might arise because of the non-




The OECD contemplates an exception to the general recommendation: the 
general rule will not apply to restrict the source State’s right to tax its own 
residents. As provided in the OECD Commentary on Article 1, updated as 
per the recommendations of the Report: “Where a partnership is treated as a 
resident of a Contracting State, the provisions of the Convention that restrict 
the other Contracting State’s right to tax the partnership on its income do not 
apply to restrict that other State’s right to tax the partners who are its own 
                                                          
911  Id., Ex. 9, para. 74, pp. 29-30. 
912  There is no relationship residence-source between R and P. Thus, there is no treaty 
applicable, assuming also that P is not regarded as a PE, because in such a case, the 
treaty R-P would be applicable and State R should grant double taxation relief. See a 
further analysis in infra Section 3.3.2.1. 





residents on their share of the income of the partnership”.
913
 In other words, 
if the State of residence of the partnership treats it as a taxable entity and the 
source State considers it as transparent, the source State would not be 
limited to tax its own residents, partners of the Partnership, on the ground 
that the State of residence does not allocate the income to the partners. Let 
us assume the following hypothetical: P is a Partnership established in 
country P and has two partners: A and B. While B is resident of country P, 
A is resident in country S, the State of source. P receives royalties from 
country S. P is considered as a taxable entity in country P, while as fiscally 




                                                          
913  OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the convention, 
para. 6.1. 
914  This example is inspired on Ex. 16 of the OECD Partnership Report. See OECD (1999), 
supra n. 1, p. 45. 




Figure 27: Example inspired in Ex. 16, OECD Partnership Report 
As per to Article 12 OECD Model, the royalties arising in a Contracting 
State and beneficially owned in the other Contracting State should be 
taxable only in this latter State, i.e. the State of residence.
915
 Therefore, since 
P is a taxable entity in State P,  this State has the exclusive right to tax 
those royalties, unless specifically prevented by a provision within the treaty 
or the application of CFC rules.
916
 Nevertheless, the exception to the general 
                                                          
915  Article 12(1) OECD Model Tax Convention. 
916  This was indeed the minority opinion sustained by the OECD delegates. As stated 
within the OECD Partnership Report: “The delegates who adopted that interpretation 
therefore concluded that unless the case fell under the application of CFC rules or the 
Convention included a special provision allowing State R [State S in our example] to tax 
its residents in such circumstances (e.g. a specific provision applicable to partnerships or 
a so-called “saving clause” such as is found in Conventions concluded by the United 
States), the Convention would prevent State R [State S in our example] on taxing partner 
Royalties 
State S State P 
Taxable entity Tax Transparent 
State S is not restricted to tax its own resident, i.e. partner A, regardless the 









recommendation of the Report provides that in this case, State S would not 
be limited by Article 12 OECD Model and could also tax partner A on its 
share on the royalties, i.e. partnership’s income. Indeed, as provided in the 
Report: “Article 12 of the Convention does not affect taxation that is based 
on residence but only taxation that is based on source”.
917
 In other words, 
Article 12 would not apply in this case, because the royalties would have not 
been paid from a Contracting State (State S) to the other Contracting State 
(State P). On the contrary, under State S’s perspective, partner A and not P 




This position, agreed by the majority of the OECD delegates, could certainly 
drive to double taxation unless State S consider that partner A has a PE in 
State P, and thus, State S is obligated to provide double tax relief under the 
tax treaty.
919
 The above, however, seemed not to be a reason enough to 
prevent State S from taxing partner A.
920
 Yet, the double tax issue may 
become even permanent in cases involving other types of transparent 
entities rather than partnerships. As well explained by Danon, this could be 
perfectly possible in a similar situation involving a trust rather than a 
                                                                                                                                       
B [A in our example] on his share of the royalties”. OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Part III 
para. 126, p. 46. 
917  OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Part III para. 127, p. 46. 
918  Id.  
919  Although minimized, double taxation would still exist in the cases where there is no PE 
in State P. 
920  As provided by the OECD Partnership Report: “The fact that double taxation results 
because of the differing income allocations of State R and P [S and P in our example] is 
not a reason to limit its right to tax its residents”. OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Part III para. 
127, p. 47. 





 Following the reasoning of Danon, let us assume the 
following hypothetical: State P is the country where a trust (T) is 
established. The settlor of the of trust is a resident of this State, while the 
beneficiary is a resident of State S, from where the trust receives annual 
royalties. The trust is regarded as fiscally transparent in both States.  
 
Figure 28: Example with Trust 
In this hypothetical, and following the exception to the general 
recommendation of the Report, Article 12 OECD Model would not be 
applicable to limit the taxation rights of the source country S to tax the 
beneficiary, who is also resident of this country. State P, on the contrary, 
would tax the same income in the hands of the settlor, who is resident of 
State P. The difference is that the beneficiary, unlike partner A in the 
previous example, does not maintain a PE in State P. In this situation, 
therefore, the avoidance of double taxation becomes actually impossible.
922
  
                                                          
921  Danon, supra n. 882, p. 197. 
922  Danon argues that this solution is inconsistent. He sustains that “the only reason why the 
OECD arrives at this result is precisely because, without any sound argument, it 
Royalties 










3.3. Critics  
Critics upon the general recommendations of the OECD Partnership Report 
have been elaborated both in form and in substance.  
3.3.1. Formal critics 
Formally speaking, the Report is criticized for its case-by-case approach 
rather than a more general and theoretical one. Indeed, it is undeniable that a 
case-by-case approach is more practical and illustrative. However, it also 
creates a lot of uncertainty, because it is impossible to cover all the potential 
issues that may arise in every single situation using just few hypotheticals.
923
 
Similarly, the Report is criticized for limiting its analysis to the case of 
Partnerships, without including the case of other non-corporate entities, such 
as trusts or LLCs.
924
 Although there are no doubts that the same criteria used 
for Partnership may also be used for other non-corporate entities.  
                                                                                                                                       
suddenly implicitly applies the internal attribution rules of the source state, thereby 
causing the income to be allocated to one of its residents […] More generally, what the 
OECD Partnership Report is doing is erroneously turning a source-residence into a 
residence-residence conflict of attribution”. Although he argues “[…] the real and 
unresolved residence-residence conflict of attribution comes into play where income 
sourced in a third state is allocated to residents of two different resident states”. Id., p. 
198. See also infra Section 3.3.2.1, referring to “residence-residence” and “source-
source” conflicts. 
923  One of the major criticisms to the 1999 OECD Partnership Report came from Prof. M. 
Lang. See M. Lang, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships, A Critical Analysis of the Report Prepared by the OECD, Wolters Kluwer, 
Alphen aan den Rijn (2000). See also, e.g. Danon, supra n. 882, p. 199. 
924  This is, however, clarified in the OECD proposal on Article 1(2) OECD Model. See the 
analysis in infra Section 5. 
Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
 
 332 
3.3.2. Substantial critics 
Substantially speaking, the Report left also important gaps for criticism, 
which can be summarized in three main areas: (i) unresolved conflicts of 
attribution; (ii) a preference for a solution favoring residence States, and (iii) 
the interplay with other attribution rules, especially with the concept of 
beneficial ownership of Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model.  
3.3.2.1. Unresolved conflicts of attribution 
As regard to the unresolved conflicts of attribution, these may arise either in 
the form of “residence-residence” conflicts or “source-source” conflicts.
925
 
The “residence-residence” conflicts, on the one hand, can be illustrated 
using the following hypothetical: P is a partnership organized in State P, 
which has two partners, A and B, who are residents of State R. Accordingly, 
P receives interest and royalties from State S. While State P and S treat the 
partnership as a taxable entity, State R, the residence’ State of the partners A 
and B, considers it as fiscally transparent, although it does not constitute a 
PE.   
                                                          
925  This terminology is indeed used by Danon. See Danon, supra n. 882, pp. 198-200. 






Figure 29: Triangular case illustrating a “residence-residence” conflict 
As per the recommendation of the OECD Partnership Report, if State S has 
a treaty with both P and R, then both treaties would be applicable and State 
S would be obliged to impose the lowest rate upon interest and royalties.
926
 
On the other hand, State R and State P will impose taxation.
927
 Nevertheless, 
State R will not be able to grant double taxation relief under a treaty with P, 
because the relationship between both is not as residence-source countries, 
but rather as residence-residence. In other words, the interest and royalties 
will be subject to double taxation.
928
  
                                                          
926  OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the convention, 
para. 6.5. See also, OECD (1999), supra n. 1, Part II.4, para. 74, Ex.9., p. 30,  
927  If the income is royalties, they [State R and State P] will indeed have the exclusive right 
to tax as per Article 12 OECD Model.  
928  The double taxation issue would be minimized if P were a considered a PE. In such a 
case, State R should grant a double taxation relief on the interest and royalties attributed 
to the PE. See Danon, supra n. 882, pp. 198-199.  
Interest/
Royalties 
State P State S State R 
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Similarly, “source-source” conflicts of allocation may arise without a proper 
solution when a payment derived from an entity considered opaque in its 
country of organization while fiscally transparent in the country of residence 
of its partners and the country where the recipient of the income is located, 
giving rise therefore to an item of income sourced twice.
929
 The above can 
be illustrated in the following hypothetical: P is a partnership organized in 
State P and with partners A and B, residents of State R. Partnership P pays 
interest to C, a company organized in State S. Whilst States R and S treat P 
as fiscally transparent, State P considers it as a taxable entity. 
 
Figure 30: Triangular case illustrating a “source-source” conflict 
As per Article 11(5) OECD Model, the interests are deemed to be paid both 
from country R and P. Therefore, State S should provide double taxation 
relief with respect to the treaty with R and P. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
                                                          
929  Id., p. 199 
Interest 
State P State S State R 










the total WHT levied in State R 
930
and P is not fully creditable in State C, 
originating an unsatisfactory result of double taxation.  
3.3.2.2. Preference for the State of Residence 
Another sound critic against the principles stated within the OECD 
Partnership Report is its remarked preference for the State of residence 
rather than the State of source.
931
 Indeed, as already stressed, the OECD 
Partnership Report provides that it is the State of residence that decides, in 
case of conflicts of allocation of income, whether the tax liability is imposed 




This preference for the State of residence, as explained by Wheeler, does not 
consider the cases in which the State of source might consider that 
attribution unacceptable.
933
 Indeed, the principle stated within the OECD 
Partnership Report is built on the grounds that income is attributed to a 
person, either the partners or the partnership, who carries out the business or 
                                                          
930  Id. 
931  In 2005, and with respect to the OECD Partnership Report, Wheeler argued: “A more 
serious problem with this approach is that it does not take sufficient account of the 
concerns of the source state about income conduits”. Wheeler, supra n. 901, p. 488. 
932  J. Wheeler, The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties, 3 World Tax J. (2011), 
Journals IBFD, p. 260. However, “[…] determining the direction taken by the income 
flow is a prior stage that should not be determined by one state alone. It is not 
satisfactory to give the initiative in this respect to the residence state, leaving the source 
state to combat an attribution that it finds unacceptable by using a concept as 
problematic as beneficial owner”. Id., p. 261. 
933  Id. For example, if the State of source considers that a payment of interest is not paid to 
the beneficial owner of the interest payments, it might in theory deny the reduced WHT 
under Article 11. See also the further analysis at infra Section 3.3.2.3. 
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makes the investment. Nevertheless, States sometimes go beyond these 
paths and attribute income based on less direct connections with the 
income.
934
 In a similar view, Lang provides: “[I]t makes sense to assume 
that it is not up to the residence State to decide who shall be entitled to the 
treaty benefits in the source State. It is the source State that decides on the 
taxpayer status”.
935
 Wassermeyer also stresses that the domestic law of the 
state granting the tax benefits [source State] is crucial for purposes of the tax 
liability and income allocation.
936
 The approach argued by these two 
authors, i.e. favoring the position of the State of source, has been confirmed 
by a case law decision of the Austrian Supreme Court 
[Verwaltungsgerichthof] in 2006.
937
 In a complementary approach, Wheeler 
also proposed in 2005 that the law of the State where the intermediary 
company is located, in case of conduits, should also be decisive. This option 
has been, however, criticized for encouraging taxpayers to shift income to 
jurisdictions with a tax treaty providing for zero source taxation.
938
  
                                                          
934  Id. 
935  Lang, supra n.  923, p. 38.  
936  F. Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung (OECD-Musterabkommen 2010 Kommentar) in: F. 
Wassermeyer, C. Kaeser, M. Lang and J. Schuch (eds.), Linde, Vienna, 2015, Article 
12, m.no. 33.  
937  AT: VwGH, 18 Oct. 2006, case 2003/13/0052, and an analysis of the case in: M. Lang, 
Tendenzen in der Rechtsprechung des österreichischen Verwaltungsgerichtshofs zu den 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkomme, IFF Forum für Steuerrecht 2012, pp. 27-29. See also, 
Steindl and Stiastny, supra n. 902, p. 114. 
938  Steindl and Stiastny, supra n. 902, p. 114. 





3.3.2.3. The (original missed) interplay with the concept of 
beneficial owner 
The principle stated within the OECD Partnership Report seem not to be 
completely in line with the mechanic of tax treaties, especially when 
referred to the interplay between this principle and the concept of beneficial 
owner in Article 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model.
939
 
Let me illustrate the above using a previous example with some additional 
information. Let us assume that entity P is established in State P. A and B 
are P’s partners who resides in State R. P owns shares in X, company 
resident in State S. X pays dividends to P. States P and S treats entity P as a 
taxable entity while State R treats as fiscally transparent. Likewise, while 
the treaty P-S provides for a WHT of 10%, the treaty between R-S provides 
for a WHT of 5%.  
                                                          
939  For the discussion regarding the meaning of beneficial owner, see the references at 
supra n. 326. 




Figure 31: The OECD Partnership Report and the beneficial ownership requirement 
If we consider the solution stated within the OECD Partnership Report and 
reproduced in the OECD Commentaries, we should say that this situation is 
solved if State S taxes the dividend at the lowest WHT rate between the two 
applicable treaties in this case, i.e. 5% WHT within the treaty R-S. 
However, the wording of Article 10(2) OECD Model provides for a reduced 
WHT to the extent the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the 
other Contracting State. In this case, however, the solution provided within 
the OECD Partnership Report, and reproduced in the OECD Commentaries, 
seems to disregard the interplay between the benefits of the treaty and the 
special requirement of the beneficial owner of Article 10(2) OECD Model. 
The OECD Partnership Report assumes that there is only one beneficial 
owner, i.e. partnership P. This is correct from the perspective of State S 
(State of source), who sees P as a taxable entity. However, in the same logic, 
State S should not restrict its taxing rights as regard to the A and B, who are 
Dividends 
State P State S State R 
X 













not the beneficial owners of the same dividends. In simple words, to solve 
the conflict just providing that the source State should apply the lowest 
WHT rate when comparing the treaties with the partnership and the partners 
seems to be at least awkward. Unfortunately, the proposed OECD 
Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model leaves still open the discussion 
as regards to the beneficial ownership’s requirement in Articles 10, 11 and 
12 OECD Model. Indeed, the proposed OECD Commentaries on Article 
1(2) OECD Model simply provide that nothing prevent the State of source 




4. The US Model: The legal precedent for the OECD Proposal 
Although there are no doubts that the principles settled in the 1999 OECD 
Partnership Report are reproduced within Article 1(6) of the US Model, this 
provision can also be found within tax treaties concluded by the United 
States since 1996, and even older ones.
941
  Accordingly, the formal inclusion 
within the US Model came only in its 2006 version,
942
 applying indistinctly 
both to partnerships and other kind of entities, including e.g. trusts and 
LLCs.
943
 This provision is analyzed in the subsequent subsections.   
                                                          
940  A further analysis at infra Section 5.3.1. 
941  Biitker and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 65-59. 
942  R. Avi-Yonah and M. Tittle, The United States Model Income Tax Convention, Bull. 
Int’l Taxn., Vol. 61, p. 224 (2007), Journals IBFD. 
943  US: United States Model Technical Explanation accompanying the United States Model 
Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, p. 7. The inclusion of trusts and LLCs is 
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4.1. General Interpretation of Article 1(6) US Model 
Article 1(6) US Model (2016) states that: “For purposes of this Convention, 
an item of income, profit or gain derived by or through an entity that is 
treated wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the taxation laws of either 
Contracting State shall be considered to be derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State, but only to the extent that the item is treated for purposes 
of the taxation laws of such Contracting State as the income, profit or gain 
of a resident”.
944
 A slightly similar wording was used in the previous US 
Model (2006), which provides: “An item of income, profit or gain derived 
through an entity that is fiscally transparent under the laws of either 
Contracting State shall be considered to be derived by a resident of a State 
to the extent that the item is treated for purposes of the taxation law of such 




Regardless the slightly different wording, the provision rules the same: if an 
item of income is received by a fiscally transparent entity, considered as 
such by any of the Contracting States, it shall be regarded as received by the 
residents of the State considering the entity as transparent, so long as the 
item of income is subject to tax at the partners’ level in that State. This is to 
say, the benefits derived from a tax treaty can be claimed only by the 
partners of the transparent entity to the extent these are also regarded as 
                                                                                                                                       
important, because it was in fact one of the concerns arose in the Partnership Report in 
1999. See OECD (1999), supra n.1. 
944  US: 2016 United States Model Income Tax Convention of 17 Feb. 2016, Article 1(6). 
945  US: 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, Article 
1(6). 





residents in the State characterizing the entity as fiscally transparent. In 
other words, Article 1(6) US Model obliges the State of source to grant 
treaty benefits by the sole fact that the State of residence attributes the 





Nevertheless, Article 1(6) US Model is not designed as an “anti-hybrid 
entity” rule, but rather as a rule that clarifies to whom income is being 
allocated, and thus, the benefits of a treaty are being granted when income is 
received through transparent entities. For example, it applies even if both 
Contracting States treat the entity as fiscally transparent.
947
 The above, 
however, does not prevent the author to recognize its particular importance 
in cases where hybrid entities or reverse hybrid entities are involved.
948
 
Likewise, as per the technical explanations of the 2006 U.S. Tax Treaty 
Model, Article 1(6) has basically two main purposes.
949
 On one hand, it aims 
to eliminate the technical problems that investors would have prevented 
using transparent entities to claim treaty benefits, even though such 
investors would be subject to tax on the income derived through such 
                                                          
946  R. Doernberg and K. van Raad, Hybrid Entities and the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, 
19 Tax Notes Int’l 8 (1999), p. 746. 
947  The reference to “either Contracting State” in the wording suggests that at least one 
Contracting State should treat the entity as fiscally transparent, but it does not restrict its 
application if both States do that. This is, e.g. stated clearly in the OECD proposal, 
which mirrors Article 1(6) US Model. Infra Section 5. 
948  As stressed in Chapter III, the U.S. Check-the-box regulations are indeed an important 
source of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. See the analysis of the U.S. Check-the-box 
system at supra Chapter III, Section 4. 
949  Id. 





 On the other hand, it attempts to directly prevent the use of 
transparent entities to claim treaty benefits in circumstances where the 
person investing through such an entity is not subject to tax on the income in 
its State of residence.
951
 Article 1(6) US Model involves thus a series of 
preconditions within its wording, which are analyzed as follows.  
4.1.1. The reference to “income, profit or gain”  
Article 1(6) US Model refers to “income, profit or gain” received by a 
fiscally transparent entity. Therefore, the provision includes several numbers 
of items of income, such as business profits, income from services, 
dividends, royalties, rental income and gains derived from the sale of 
property.
952
 All of these items of income correspond to the substantive rules 
of Article 6 through 21 US Model.
953
 Likewise, there is no reference to 
“capital”, because there is no provision on taxation of capital within the US 
                                                          
950  Id. The reference to “subject to tax” made in the 2006 Technical Explanation of the 
U.S. Tax Treaty Model could mislead to the wrong idea that Article 1(6) of the U.S. Tax 
Treaty Model is avoiding the result of DNT. However, this interpretation is incorrect. If 
we analyze the use of the term “subject to tax” in a treaty context, we immediately 
realize that it refers to the definition of residents or people liable to tax by reason of their 
domiciles, residence or citizenship. In simple words, and as we will see later on in this 
Chapter, the Article is trying to ensure that the tax treaty benefits arrive to a resident of 
any of the treaty partners and not to a third person, who is not part of the bilateral treaty.    
951  Id. 
952  US: Technical Explanation of the 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention, of 
15 November 2006, p. 5. 
953  Id. 







 Finally, it is also clear that the determinations of income should be 
made on an “item by item” and not “entity-by-entity” basis.
955
  
4.1.2. Income, profit and gain derived “by or through” 
The wording of the 2016 US Model refers also to income derived “by or 
through” an entity. This wording certainly differs from the wording of the 




When analyzing the 2006 Technical Explanation of the US Model, it seems 
to be clear that the terms “by” and “through” are used in an interchangeable 
manner. For example, the Technical Explanations state: “Under paragraph 6, 
an item of income, profit or gain derived by such a fiscal transparent entity 
will be considered to be derived by a resident of a Contracting State […]” 
(emphasis added).
957
 Likewise, they provide: “In the case of a partnership, 
the persons who are, under U.S. tax laws, treated as partners of the entity 
would normally be the persons whom U.S. tax laws would treat as deriving 
                                                          
954  J. Kollmann, A. Roncarati and C. Staringer, Treaty Entitlement for Fiscally Transparent 
Entities: Article 1(2) of the OECD Model Convention, in: M. Lang, P. Pistone, S. 
Staringer (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). The Proposal to revise the 
OECD Model Convention, Linde, Vienna, 2016, p. 21 
955  A. Nikolakakis et al., Some Reflections on the Proposed Revision to the OECD Model 
and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, with respect to Fiscally 
Transparent Entities, BTR 3 (2017), p. 311. See also, infra Section 5.1.1. as regards to 
the OECD Model. 
956  Compare the wordings in supra Section 4.1. 
957  US: Technical Explanation of the 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
15 November 2006, p. 6. 
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the interest income through the partnership”.
958
 Yet, what seems to be clear 
is that, depending of the perspective, i.e. residence or source State, income 
might be considered derived by or through an entity, although this does not 
affect the fact that the country treating the entity as fiscally transparent 
should assign the benefits of the treaty to the owners of that entity only to 
the extent that they are also residents in that State. However, the above 
might be interpreted from Article 1(6) US Model without need of modifying 
its wording.  
 
Although the real practical reasons for a change in the wording of the 
provision are still doubtful, mostly in the absence of technical explanations 
for the new 2016 US Model, some hints might be found within the OECD 
proposal of Article 1(2) OECD Model, which uses a similar wording.
959
 In 
this case, the wording “derived by or through” seems to be interpreted as 
ensuring the application of the provision to cases where the source State 
treats the entity X as transparent, and thus, that the income is derived 
through the fiscally transparent entity and the cases where the source State 
treats the entity X as non-transparent (being regarded as transparent by the 
State of residence), and thus, that the income is derived by such entity.
960
 
The reference to income derived “by or through” seems thus to have a 
broad meaning, and is applied “regardless of the view taken by each 
Contracting State as to who derives that income for domestic purposes and 
                                                          
958  Id. 
959  Infra Section 5.1.2. 
960  Id. 





regardless of whether or not that entity or arrangement has legal personality 
or constitutes a person as defined in subparagraph 1 a) of Article 3”.
961
 In 
simple terms, this wording would reinforce the two functions of the 
provision, i.e. as to grant and to deny treaty benefits, from the perspective of 
the State of source.
962
 
4.1.3. The reference to “entities” (and not arrangements)  
The exclusive reference to “entities” within the wording of Article 1(6) US 
Model seems to be very clear and straightforward: the provision only applies 
to legal entities that qualify as a person as per the definition of Article 3(1) 
US Model, which are treated as fiscally transparent at least by one of the 
Contracting States.
963
 Unlike the OECD Model, the US Model definition of 
person includes specifically partnerships, trusts, estates, companies and any 
other body of persons.
964
 Therefore, the status as person of partnerships and 
other transparent entities was never an issue. In contrast, the definition of 
persons within the OECD Model generated some questions before 1999 as 
                                                          
961  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 141, Proposed Commentary on Article 1, para. 26.8. 
962  This is, however, evident from the wording within the 2006 US Model, which refers to 
the source State attribution “to the extent” of residence State attribution. See Nikolakakis 
et al., supra n. 955, p. 311. 
963  The 2006 Technical Explanation of the US Model states: “Entities falling under this 
description in the United States include partnerships, common investment trusts under 
section 584 and grantor trusts. This paragraph also applies to U.S. limited liability 
companies (“LLCs”) that are treated as partnerships or disregarded entities for U.S. tax 
purposes”. US: Technical Explanation of the 2006 United States Model Income Tax 
Convention, of 15 November 2006, p. 6. 
964  US: 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, Article 
3(1). 
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to whether the wording “any body of persons” would also include 
partnerships and other non-corporate entities.
965
 This discussion was, 
however, settled after the issuance of the OECD Partnership Report and the 
modification of the OECD Commentaries, which includes that: 
“Partnerships will also be considered to be ‘persons’ either because they fall 
within the definition of ‘company’ or, where this is not the case, because 
they constitute other bodies of persons”.
966
 All in all, the scope of 
application of Article 1(6) US Model seems to be rather clear, including 
within the notion of “entities” both corporate and non-corporate ones. 
4.1.4. “Wholly or partial” fiscal transparency  
Finally, the wording of the 2016 US Model refers to entities that are “wholly 
or partially transparent”. This wording, however, does not make much 
sense, because it was clear since the 2006 US Model that Article 1(6) was 
applicable not only to partnerships, but also to others transparent entities in 
general, including common investment trusts under I.R.C. Section 584 and 
grantor trust and LLCs.
967
 Thus, the change in the wording seems to have 
more a practical reason, which is to align the wording with the OECD 
proposal of Article 1(2) OECD Model, facilitating thus the negotiations of 
treaties.
968
   
                                                          
965  OECD Model Convention, Article 3; OECD Commentary on Article 3 concerning 
general definitions, para. 2. See also the discussion at supra Section 2. 
966  Id.  
967  US: Technical Explanation of the 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
15 November 2006, p. 6. 
968  Infra Section 5.1.4. 





4.2. Illustrations as regards to the application of Article 1(6) US 
Model 
The application of Article 1(6) US Model is illustrated below through a 
series of examples. All these examples assume the United States either 
being the resident or source State and are divided in two groups: (i) strict 
bilateral cases and (ii) triangular cases. Likewise, all the examples assume 
that no PE is constituted in the State of source and all treaties include Article 
1(6) US Model. Finally, all the examples also assume that all anti-abuse 
restrictions within domestic laws and tax treaties are accomplished in order 
to apply Article 1(6) US Model.
969
 
4.2.1. Application of Article 1(6) US Model in strict bilateral cases 
This Section contains four illustrations of strict bilateral situations analyzing 
the implication of Article 1(6) US Model. Whilst example 1 and 2 refer to 
income received by or through a hybrid entity, example 3 and 4 refer to 
income received through a reverse hybrid entity.  
4.2.1.1. Example 1: Foreign entity with U.S. owners 
Let us assume a foreign entity P, which is organized and resident in State P 
and has two owners: A and B, who are, nevertheless, U.S. citizens. 
                                                          
969  This includes, e.g. substance over form doctrine or LOB provisions within U.S. tax 
treaties. For a brief reference about the LOB provision in the new 2016 US Model and 
its interpretation as regards to pursue single taxation, see supra Chapter I, Section 
3.2.3.2. 
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Accordingly, entity P receives interest payments from a debtor in the foreign 
State P. While State P considers the entity as a taxable entity, the partners A 
and B in the United States have elected to treat the entity as tax transparent 
for U.S. tax purposes.
970
 Thus, from a U.S. perspective, the income is 
allocated to the partners A and B instead. State P has also a general WHT on 
interest paid abroad of 30%, which is calculated on the gross amount of 
interest payments. 
 
Figure 32: Example 1–Foreign entity with U.S. owners 
                                                          
970  For a detailed analysis with respect to the election under the CTB regulations, see supra 
Chapter III, Section 4.3. 





P is regarded as fiscally 
transparent  
P is regarded as a taxable 
entity 
As foreign entity P is an eligible entity, partners A and B decided to file the 
election to treat foreign entity P as tax transparent for U.S. tax purposes. 





While, on one hand, for State P this is strictly a domestic situation, partners 
A and B, on the other hand, would like to claim the benefits of the treaty 
between the United States and State P, because from a U.S. perspective, 
income is allocated and taxed at the level of A and B. The conflict is thus 
given by the different tax characterization of entity P. 
If we take a look at the application of Article 1(6) US Model, all the 
preconditions are met. There is indeed interest income being derived 
through an entity that one of the Contracting States (i.e. the United States in 
this case) considers as tax transparent, and the income is allocated to A and 
B, who are also U.S. citizens, i.e. residents for purposes of the treaty. The 
above implies that State P will limit its taxing rights and will apply now a 
reduced WHT of 15% according to Article 11 of the United States/State P 
tax treaty. Likewise, the owners A and B may claim a tax credit as per 
Article 23 of the United States/State P tax treaty. 
The solution of Article 1(6) US Model in this case works certainly in favor 
of the United States, i.e. the State of residence in this bilateral case. The 
State of source (State P) should limit its taxing rights just because the 
partners of the entity are U.S. citizens and decided to file the election to treat 
the foreign entity P as tax transparent. In other words, the CTB rules seem to 
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be the real reason for the application of Article 1(6) US model to a situation 
that, in principle, might be perfectly treated as a domestic one.
971
  
Likewise, the solution given by Article 1(6) US Model presents problem 
both from a State of source and residence perspective. From the State of 
source’s perspective, it does not consider the proper interplay with the 
concept of beneficial owner under Article 11 of the United State/State P tax 
treaty. Indeed, for State P, partners A and B will be rarely considered as the 
beneficial owners of the interest under the rules of this State.
972
 On the other 
hand, from the State of residence’s perspective, it results arguable that 
Article 23 of the United States/State P tax treaty be interpreted so 
extensively as to provide relief to A and B, when technically there is no a 
direct payment of taxes. In other words, entity P will be subject to tax in 
State P, because it is a resident of that State. However, and unless Article 23 
is interpreted as providing an indirect tax credit, A and B should not be 
relieved from double taxation.
973
  
4.2.1.2. Example 2: U.S. Corporation with U.S. owners 
Let us assume now that a U.S. Corporation (USCo) [per se Corporation]
974
 
has two owners, A and B, who are also U.S. citizens, which receives interest 
payments from State P. While for U.S. tax purposes a U.S. Corporation is 
indeed a taxable entity, for State P tax purposes, this is a tax transparent 
                                                          
971  Nonetheless, it is important to remember that even if this situation were treated as a 
domestic one, the United State could tax A and B (U.S. citizens) by reason of Article 
1(4) US Model, i.e. the “saving clause”.  





entity. State P generally applies a WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, 
which is calculated on the gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 33: Example 2–U.S. Corporation with U.S. owners 
                                                                                                                                       
972  See a further analysis in infra Section 4.3.1. 
973  The interpretation of Article 23 US Model as to provide an indirect tax credit should be, 
nevertheless, arguable. For a comparison with the solution proposed within the OECD 
Model, see infra Section 5.3.2. The solution to the interpretation of Article 23 in a 
similar case provides that, unless the relief refers to taxes applied according to the treaty, 
no relief should be given to A and B. In other words, if the taxation imposed to entity P 
is derived exclusively by the fact of being a resident of State P, there is no obligation to 
relief of double taxation in the other State. See OECD (2015), supra n. 200, para. 64 
(replacement of Article 23B OECD Model), p. 88. 
974  For the implications regarding being considered a per se Corporation and the application 
of the CTB election, see supra Chapter III, Section 4.3. 





USCo is a per se Corporation. Therefore, USCo is a taxable entity in 
the United States. Accordingly, this characterization cannot be 
changed using the CTB election at a domestic level. State P, on the 
other hand, considers USCo as a fiscally transparent entity. 
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The conflict in this case is thus due to the fact that while the United States 
considers that USCo is a taxable entity and resident for treaty purposes, 
State P considers that USCo is indeed a tax transparent entity. Therefore, for 
the United States USCo is the resident for treaty purposes receiving the 
interest payments form State P, and thus being entitled to claim the benefits 
of the treaty between the United States and State P, while for State P are the 
owners A and B the ones receiving the payments, and the beneficial owners 
of them, being them thus entitled to claim the benefits of the treaty between 
the two countries. 
The preconditions of Article 1(6) US Model to grant the benefits of the 
treaty to A and B are, nevertheless, not met because A and B are not 
considered residents of State P. Therefore, Article 1(6) US Model acts in 
this case as to deny the benefits of the treaty to A and B and to ensure that 
they are granted to USCo. In other words, Article 1(6) US Model makes the 
characterization of USCo in the United States to prevail.  
Yet, it is interesting to note that for the State of source (State P), it would be 
irrelevant whether the income is allocated to A and B or to USCo, because 
in both cases it would apply the treaty between the United States and State 
P, reducing its WHT to 15% according to Article 11 of the United 
States/State P tax treaty. In other words, Article 1(6) US Model is relevant 
in this case only as regards to whom in the State of residence might claim 
the relief of double taxation as per Article 23 of the United States/State P tax 
treaty. Likewise, as noted below, if A and B were residents of State P, the 
application of Article 1(6) US Model would be redundant, because the 





preconditions of Article 11 US Model would not be met anyway, i.e. there 
would not be interest payments arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned in the other Contracting State. The interest payments in 
this case would arise in the same State where the beneficial owners of the 
payments are residents; therefore, it would not go beyond of being a 
domestic situation. However, nothing would prevent the United States to tax 




Figure 34: Ex. 2 (variation)–U.S. Corporation with resident’s owners in the State of source 
                                                          
975  See the interplay between Article 1(6) US Model and Article 1(4) US Model (“saving 
clause”) at infra Section 4.3.2. 





USCo is regarded as tax 
opaque 
USCo is regarded as 
fiscally transparent 
Article 1(6) US Model is irrelevant in this case, because the 
preconditions for application of Article 11 US Model are not met. 
Likewise, interest will be taxed both in the United States, at the level of 
USCo, and in State P, as the share of income in the “foreign 
partnership”.  
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4.2.1.3. Example 3: Foreign partnership with U.S. owners 
Let us now assume that a foreign partnership P is organized and it is resident 
in State P. It has two owners, partners A and B, who are both U.S. citizens. 
Accordingly, foreign partnership P receives interest payments from a debtor 
in State P. The U.S. partners, A and B, elected to treat the foreign 
partnership P as a taxable entity in the United States, while this is indeed a 
tax transparent entity under the domestic laws of State P. Likewise, State P 
applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the 
gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 35: Example 3–Foreign partnership with U.S. owners 
As well as in the previous cases, the conflict is given by the fact that State P 
considers the partnership as a tax transparent entity, namely, that the interest 
payments are allocated to A and B, residents of the United States. On the 





P is regarded tax opaque P is regarded as fiscally transparent 





contrary, the United States considers that the treaty with State P is not 
applicable at all, because in fact the partnership P is, for U.S. tax purposes, a 
taxable entity. The whole transaction raises no treaty concerns for the 
United States. 
As regards to the application of Article 1(6) US Model, the income is 
received through partnership P, considered as fiscally transparent in State P, 
but it is, however, not allocated to residents of this State. On the contrary, A 
and B are U.S. citizens and residents in the United States. Therefore, Article 
1(6) US Model applies in this case as to deny the benefits of the treaty to A 
and B, and to confirm that the payments of interest in this case is a mere 
domestic situation.
976
 Yet, nothing prevents the United States to also tax the 
interest through the application of CFC rules, which might trigger double 
taxation. Double taxation, however, might be avoided in this case through 
the application of the domestic U.S. tax credit system.
977
  
4.2.1.4. Example 4: Domestic partnership with U.S. owners 
Let us assume now that a U.S. partnership (USP) has two owners, A and B, 
who are both U.S. citizens. Accordingly, some interest payments are paid 
                                                          
976  The denial of the benefits of the treaty includes also the possibility that A and B claim 
the reduced WHT at source. In other words, it could not be argued that the source State 
should still reduce its WHT as per Article 11 US Model and that the benefits of the 
treaty to A and B are limited only to the double taxation relief of Article 23 US Model. 
977  US: I.R.C. Sec. 960 provides for a FTC with respect to the taxes paid at the level of the 
foreign subsidiaries. If a Corporation calims the credit (not as in the example above), the 
applicable provision is I.R.C. Sec. 902. Likewise, the deemed FTC under Sec. 960 is 
available for taxes paid by subsidiaries until the sixth tier. See McDaniel, Ault and 
Repetti, supra n. 688, p.121. 
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from State P. While USP is indeed tax transparent for U.S. tax purposes, 
State P considers it as a taxable entity. State P applies a general WHT on 
interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 36: Example 4– Domestic partnership with U.S. owners 
As well as in the other cases before, the issue here is given by the different 
characterization of USP, which is a tax transparent entity in the United 
States while it is considered a taxable entity in State P. Likewise, the 
solution given by Article 1(6) US Model to this case is simple: USP is a 
pass-through entity receiving interest from the other Contracting State. 
Thus, the income is allocated to the partners A and B, who are also U.S. 
citizens. Therefore Article 1(6) US Model acts clarifying that these persons 
are the ones who should claim the relief of double taxation under Article 23 
of the United States/State P tax treaty and who could also enjoy the reduced 





USP is regarded tax opaque USP is regarded as fiscally transparent 





WHT at source. The solution seems to be satisfactory from the point of view 
of the State of residence, i.e. the United States. 
From the point of view of the State of source, however, the application of 
Article 1(6) US Model might not solve all the conflicts as regards to the 
application of the treaty. Indeed, the fact that Article 1(6) US Model 
clarifies that A and B should be granted the benefit of the treaty, does not 
change the fact that State P still considers USP, and not partners A and B, as 
the beneficial owner of the interest income.
978
 In other words, the reduced 
WHT at source as per Article 11 of the United States/State P tax treaty could 
still not be granted if State P considers that A and B are not the beneficial 
owners of the interest. The above might also generate conflicts as regards to 
the application of Article 23 of the United States/State P tax treaty, because 
the double taxation relief might in that case cover only the amount of 
reduced WHT and not the full amount of WHT, if State P decides not to 
apply the reduced WHT at source.  
4.2.2. Application of Article 1(6) US Model in triangular situations 
This Section turns now to analyze the application of Article 1(6) US Model 
to specific triangular situations. It is assumed in all cases that the 
intermediary entity is not a conduit company, agent or nominee. All the 
remaining assumptions used in the bilateral cases above, i.e. that no PE is 
constituted in the State of source, that all treaties include Article 1(6) US 
                                                          
978  See also, infra Section 4.3.1. 
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Model and in all cases the anti-abuse restrictions within domestic law and 
tax treaties are accomplished in order to apply Article 1(6) US Model, 
remain the same. 
4.2.2.1. Example 5: Foreign intermediary entity with U.S. owners 
Let us assume that YCo is an entity incorporated in State Y, which has two 
partners, A and B, who are U.S. citizens. Accordingly, YCo has a subsidiary 
in State Z, ZCo, which is financed by a loan granted by YCo and because of 
which it receives interest payments back from State Z.
979
 YCo is considered 
as a taxable entity in State Y and in State Z. However, the U.S. partners A 
and B have elected to treat YCo as a fiscally transparent entity. Country Z 
applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30% of the gross amount 
paid. It is also assumed that the treaty United States/State Z provides a 
reduced WHT of 15% while the treaty State Y/State Z provide for a reduced 
WHT of 10%.  
 
                                                          
979  The example assumes that the loan and interest are arm’s length. 






Figure 37: Example 5–Foreign intermediary entity with U.S. owners 
According to the treaty between State Y and State Z, which it is assumed it 
follows the OECD Model; State Z should reduce its WHT to 10% as per 
Article 11 of the State Y/State Z tax treaty. Likewise, State Y should grant a 
relief of double taxation as per Article 23 of the State Y/State Z tax treaty. 
This result is achieved by the sole fact that both States coincide in 
characterizing YCo as a taxable entity. Therefore, the income and the 
benefits of the treaty are allocated to YCo.
980
 
                                                          
980  Even in the case State Y/State Z tax treaty would include a provision similar to Article 
1(6) US Model (e.g. Article 1(2) OECD Model), it would not apply, because none of the 
Contracting States treat YCo as a fiscally transparent entity. 
 
Interest 
State Y State Z United States 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While for U.S. tax purposes Yco is tax transparent, State Y and Z consider it as tax opaque. Likewise, State 
Z applies a general WHT of 30% on the payments of interest abroad. Likewise, the treaty United States/
State Z provides for a reduced WHT of 15% while the treaty  State Y/State Z provide for a reduced WHT of 
10%.  
A 
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As regards to the treaty between the United States and State Z, and in 
particular with respect to Article 1(6) of the United Sates/State Z tax treaty, 
there is income received through an entity considered as tax transparent by 
one of the Contracting States, and which allocated to the partners A and B, 
who are U.S. citizens. Therefore, in principle, State Z (State of source) 
should accomplish with both treaties, which under the principles of the 
OECD Partnership Report would mean that State Z must apply the lower 
WHT rate (10%) as regards to both treaties. This solution would be, 
however, not only misaligned with the concept of beneficial owner,
981
 but 
also it would leave open a potential double taxation issue.
982
 
                                                          
981  The application of Article 1(6) US Model in this case would not change the fact that the 
source State still considers YCo as a taxable entity, and thus, as the beneficial owner of 
the interest payments. Thus, for purposes of applying Article 11 United States/State Z 
tax treaty, State Z could still argue that the interest are not beneficially owned by A and 
B in the United States.  
982  If the United States does not have a treaty with State Y, or if having a treaty, YCo is not 
regarded as a PE, there will be no double taxation relief for the taxes imposed at the 
level of YCo in State Y.  A similar example was discussed at supra Section 3.3.2.1, 
referred to the unresolved conflicts of allocations under the principles of the OECD 
Partnership Report. Likewise, as well explained by Danon, if the same situation is 
analyzed as regards to a trust, being the trust and the settlor residents in State Y (using 
our example) and the beneficiary being resident in the United States, and having both 
the United States and State Y treating the trust as transparent, the relief of double 
taxation becomes impossible. See Danon, supra n. 882, pp. 198-199, Diagram 7. Yet, it 
is interesting to note, e.g. that the exchange of notes of 24 July 2011 as regards to the 
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom expressly provides double tax 
relief in such a situation. As stated in the exchange of notes: “In the case the same item 
of income, profit or gain derived through a trust is treated by each Contracting State as 
derived by different persons resident in either State, and a) the person taxed by one State 
is the settlor or grantor of a trust; and b) the person taxed by the other State is a 
beneficiary of that trust, the tax paid or accrued by the beneficiary shall be treated as if it 
were paid or accrued by the settlor or grantor for the purposes of determining the relief 
from double taxation to be allowed by the State of which that settlor or grantor is a 
resident (or, in the case of the United States, a citizen) […]”. US: United States response 





4.2.2.2. Example 6: Foreign entity receiving U.S sourced income 
Let us assume the same basic facts than in the example 5, with the 
difference that the United States is now the State where the interest are 
sourced and State X is the residence State of the partners A and B. Likewise, 
let us assume that YCo is treated as fiscally transparent for U.S. tax 
purposes while it is regarded as a taxable entity in State Y and State X. 
Finally, we will assume that all applicable treaties provide similar reductions 
of WHT of 15% at source. 
 
Figure 38: Example 6–Foreign entity receiving U.S. sourced income 
If we first analyze the treaty between the United States and State Y, it is 
easy to figure out that Article 1(6) of the State Y/United States tax treaty 
applies as to deny A and B the benefits of the treaty. In other words, as there 
                                                                                                                                       
to United Kingdom note setting forth additional agreements regarding the U.S.-U.K 
Double Taxation Convention, signed July 24, 2001, London. 
Interest 
State Y United States State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 
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is an item of income received through an entity considered in this case tax 
transparent in the United States (State of source), but the income is not 
allocated to U.S. residents, Article 1(6) of the State Y/United States ensures 
that the benefits are not allocated to A and B, but rather to YCo. This is to 
say, it is YCo, which may claim the reduced WHT under Article 11 of the 
State Y/United States and the relief from double taxation under Article 23. 
However, there is still an issue, because the application of Article 1(6) US 
Model in this case does not prevent the fact that, from a U.S. perspective, 
the beneficial owner of the interest might be A and B and not YCo, which is 
still a tax transparent entity from a U.S. perspective. In simple words, it 
could still be arguable that the United States limits its taxing rights and 
reduces its WHT to 15%, because for the United States the preconditions of 
Article 11 of the State Y/United States would not be met.
983
  
State X, on the other hand, i.e. the State where the partners of YCo are 
residents, has also a treaty with the United States. In this case, Article 1(6) 
of the treaty State X/United States applies also as to deny the benefits of that 
treaty to A and B, because these two are not residents of the State treating 
the entity a tax transparent, i.e. the United States. The application of Article 
1(6) of the State X/United States, however, does not solve the question as 
regards to who is the beneficial owner of the interest. In this case, it seems 
to be clear that the United States will still consider A and B as the beneficial 
owners of the interest and not YCo. Thus, the United States might still 
decide to apply Article 11 of the State X/United States as regards to A and 
                                                          
983  See also infra Section 4.3.1. 





B, even though by application of Article 1(6) of the State X/United States, 




Figure 39: Ex. 6 – Art. 1(6) v. Beneficial Owner (Art. 11) 
By other side, even in the hypothetical that A and B were U.S. residents, the 
preconditions of Article 11 of the State X/United States would not be met, 
i.e. there would not be a payment of interest arising in a Contracting State 
and being beneficially owned in the other Contracting State.
985
 On the 
contrary, in this case, interest would arise and would be paid to residents of 
the same State. This situation would be thus a mere domestic one. 
                                                          
984  Id. 
985  Article 11(1) of the US Model states: “Interest arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed only in that 
other State” (emphasis added). US: 2006 United States Model Income Tax Convention 
of 15 November 2006, Article 11(1). 
Interest 
State Y United States State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 
Article 11 State X-United 
States may still be applicable, 
since A and B are the 
beneficial owners. 
Article 1(6) would deny 
A and B the benefits of 
the treaty State X-
United States. 




Figure 40: Ex. 6– Variation: A and B are U.S. owners 
4.2.2.3. Example 7: U.S. intermediary partnership 
Let us assume now that a U.S. partnership P has two foreign owners, A and 
B, who are residents of State X. Accordingly, it receives interest payments 
from ZCo, an entity organized in State Z. While the U.S. partnership P is 
fiscally transparent in the United States, it is considered as a taxable entity 
in both State X and State Z. Country Z has a general WHT on interest paid 
abroad of 30% of the gross amount paid. It is also assumed that both the 
treaty United States/State Z and the treaty X- Z provide for a similar reduced 
WHT of 10%. 
Interest 
United States State Y 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity 
A 
B 






Figure 41: Example 7–U.S. intermediary partnership 
Article 1(6) US Model works in this case as denying A and B the access to 
the benefits of the treaty United States/State Z. Indeed, only to the extent A 
and B were U.S. residents or citizens could access to the benefits of such 
treaty as per Article 1(6) of the United States/State Z tax treaty. 
Nevertheless, as the tax characterization of U.S. partnership P in the United 
States has not changed, the treaty is not applicable from a U.S. perspective 
anyway, because P is not a resident for purposes of the treaty.
986
 From State 
Z’s perspective, however, the treaty might still perfectly applicable, because 
P is for its tax purposes a taxable entity. The tax characterization of YCo has 
not changed by reason of Article 1(6) of the United States/State Z tax treaty. 
Therefore, it might be that State Z still decides to limit its taxing rights and 
reduces its WHT to 10%. This would not be, however, an optimal result for 
State Z. 
                                                          
986  Article 4 of the 2016 US Model. 
Interest 
United States State Z State X 
P ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 
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The treaty X-Z, on the other hand, is clearly not applicable in this case, 
because both Contracting States consider P as a taxable entity. This is to say, 
neither of them consider that the interest payments are being paid to A and 
B. This conclusion does not change at all if a provision similar to Article 
1(6) US Model is introduced within the treaty State X/State Z, because in 
such a case the precondition for the application of the provision that income 
is received through a fiscally transparent entity, regarded as such by at least 
for one of the Contracting States, is not met.
987
 
4.3. The interplay of Article 1(6) US Model with other tax treaty and 
domestic provisions 
As noted in the illustrations above, Article 1(6) US Model provides a 
practical solution as regards to the question of who should be granted the 
benefits of a treaty when income is received through a transparent entity. 
Nevertheless, this provision cannot be analyzed in isolation. 
This Section provides some examples where the interplay between Article 
1(6) US Model and other tax treaty and domestic provisions are either not 
entirely clear or they simply conflict with each other.
988
  
                                                          
987  Compare the analysis at infra Section 5.2.2.3 (Example 7) as regards to Article 1(2) 
OECD Model. 
988  Although some of these issues have been already mentioned in the illustrations of supra 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 (e.g. the interplay with the concept of beneficial owner) they are 
systematically analyzed in this Section. 





4.3.1. The (still missed) interplay with the concept of Beneficial 
Owner  
As stressed already, the solution provided by Article 1(6) US Model as 
regards to who should enjoy the benefits of a tax treaty when income is 
received through an entity considered as tax transparent at least for one of 
the Contracting States, is not always aligned with the requirement of 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 US Model, that income should be beneficially owned 
by a resident of the other Contracting State.
989
 
Although the concept of beneficial owner is not defined within the US 
Model, it is stated that its determination is made under the law of the State 
imposing the tax, i.e. the State of source.
990
 For example, as provided in the 
Technical Explanations regarding Article 11 US Model used in the 
illustrations above:“[t]he beneficial owner of the interest for purposes of 
Article 11 is the person to which the income is attributable under the laws of 
the source State”.
991
 Thus, if a person receiving the interest is acting as an 
agent or nominee, regardless of being resident, it will not be considered the 
                                                          
989  Although the author recognizes that the concept of beneficial owner is indeed 
conflictive, it is not the intention of this work to provide an exhaustive analysis of it. 
That would certainly exceed the purpose of this work. For a further study of the concept, 
however, see the references at supra n. 326. Likewise, the analysis of the concept of 
beneficial owner as regards to its interpretation as avoiding DNT within the OECD 
Model can be found at supra Chapter II, Section 3.2.  
990  US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 
November 2006, p. 33 referred to paragraph 3, Article 10 US Model (Dividends) and p. 
42 referred to paragraph 1, Article 12 (Royalties). 
991  Id., p.39 referred to paragraph 1, Article 11 (Interest).  
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beneficial owner of them.
992
 Therefore, the beneficial ownership 
requirement should still be relevant as to determine the application of 
Article 11 US Model, regardless the results achieved of Article 1(6) US 
Model. 
The conflictive interplay between the results of Article 1(6) US Model and 
the beneficial ownership requirement was illustrated in some examples 
analyzed in the previous Section of this Chapter.
993
 For instance, in Example 
4 above, it is evident that the solution of Article 1(6) US Model in order to 
grant the benefit of the treaty United States/State P to A and B, the partners 
of USP (a U.S. partnership), does not prevent the State of source (State P) to 
consider USP (a taxable entity under the domestic laws of State P) as the 
beneficial owner of the interest.
994
  In other words, State P could perfectly 
deny the reduced WHT to A and B, who are residents but not beneficial 
owners as per the rule of the State of source.
995
 Similarly, e.g. the strict 
application of Article 1(6) US Model in example 5 reveals again the 
misalignment between the provision and the beneficial owner requirement 
of Article 11 US Model.
996
 In this case, the entity receiving the interest is 
considered a taxable entity both in the State of source (State Z) and the State 
of organization of the entity (State Y).
997
 Thus, A and B, U.S. partners, 
obtain the benefits of the treaty United States/State Z, even with a more 
                                                          
992  Id. 
993  Supra Section 4.2. 
994  Supra Section 4.2.1.4. 
995  Id. 
996  Supra Section 4.2.2.1. 
997  Id. 





reduced WHT of 10% because of the application of the OECD partnership 
solution when the two applicable treaties provide for different rates of 
reductions of WHT, regardless the fact that the State of source might still 
consider YCo as the beneficial owner.  
The US Model does not provide any hints as to solve this conflictive 
position between the solution of Article 1(6) US Model and the concept of 
beneficial owner in Articles 10, 11 and 12 US Model. 
4.3.1.1. Alternatives approaches within the U.S. tax treaty 
practice  
Despite the US Model does not directly assume the interplay between 
Article 1(6) and the concept of beneficial owner in Article 10, 11 and 12 US 
Model, some solutions to this conflictive position between the two 
provisions might be found within the U.S. tax treaty practice. As follows the 
author stresses two different solutions. The first one is found within the 
Poland/United States Tax Treaty (2013) and implies the non-application of 
Article 1(6) under some circumstances. Although this rule seems to be 
oriented for a different purpose, it indirectly helps solving the conflictive 
position between Article 1(6) and the beneficial ownership’s requirement. 
The second one is found within the Canada/United States Tax Treaty (1980 
as amended in 2007), and attempts directly to solve the conflict through a 
rule that deems who should be the beneficial owner.  
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4.3.1.1.1. Poland/United States Tax Treaty  
The treaty between the United States and Poland contains a provision, which 
provides that Article 1(6) US Model is not applicable if certain conditions 
are met. As stated in Article 1(6)(b) of the treaty United States-Poland: 
“Subparagraph a) shall not apply to an item of income, profit or gain if the 
entity described in subparagraph a) is not fiscally transparent under the laws 
of the State in which the income, profit or gain arises, is organized in a third 
state, and is eligible for benefits under a convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation between the third state and the State in which the income, 
profit or gain arises with respect to that item of income, profit or gain that 
are more favorable than the benefits provided by the provisions of this 
Convention with respect to that item”.
998
 Therefore, at least three 
preconditions should be met in order to disallow the application of the 
general rule contained in Article 1(6)(a) US-Poland treaty: (i) that the entity 
is considered as tax opaque under the law of the State where the interest 
payments are sourced; (ii) that the entity receiving the interest payments is 
organized in a third State (i.e. neither the United States nor Poland), and (iii) 
that the entity in this third State is eligible for the benefits of a treaty with 
the State of source, and which are more favorable than the benefits provided 
by the United States-Poland tax treaty. 
                                                          
998  US/PL: Article 1(6)((b) of the Convention between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Poland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income of 13 Feb. 2013. 





Let me illustrate the application of this rule using an example similar than 
Example 5 above, although with some modifications.
999
 Let us assume that a 
U.S. Corporation (USCo), resident in the United States, is the sole owner of 
FCo, an entity organized in State F. Accordingly, FCo receives interest 
payments from Poland. While for U.S. tax purposes, FCo is regarded as a 
tax transparent entity, for Polish and State F tax purposes is considered as a 
tax opaque entity. Likewise, while the treaty State F/Poland provides for a 
reduced WHT of 0%, the treaty United States/Poland provides for a reduced 
WHT of 5%. 
 
                                                          
999  This example is inspired in the one used within the Technical Explanations of the treaty 
United States/Poland. US/PL: Department of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the 
Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income of 13 Feb. 2013, pp. 6-7. For example 5, supra Section 4.2.2.1. 
Interest 
State F Poland United States 
FCo USCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
The preconditions of Article 1(6)(b) US-Poland tax treaty are met. Thus, Article 1(6)(a) US-Poland tax 
treaty [Article 1(6) US Model] does not apply in this case. In other words, USCo is not deemed as deriving 
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Figure 42: Article 1(6)(b) United States/Poland double tax treaty 
All the preconditions for the non-application of Article 1(6) US Model are 
thus met, i.e. FCo is considered by Poland as a taxable entity; FCo is 
organized in State F (a third State), and FCo, as a taxable entity in State F, is 
eligible to the benefits of the treaty between State F and Poland, which also 
provides for a more beneficial reduction of WHT when compared with the 
treaty United States/Poland. In this case, therefore, USCo is not deemed as 
deriving the interest payments, and thus, it is not entitled to the benefits of 
the treaty United States/Poland.  
The solution given within the United States/Poland tax treaty is unique, 
since it is not included in other tax treaties signed by the United States, 
which also include Article 1(6) US Model within their texts.
1000
 Likewise, 
the solution aligns in a better manner the allocation of the benefits of the 
treaty and the concept of beneficial owner, since it is evident that for the 
State of source (Poland), the beneficial owner of the interest payments is 
FCo and not USCo, since FCo is regarded in this country as a taxable 
entity.
1001
 Therefore, if the application of Article 1(6) of the United 
States/Poland tax treaty would imply that a reduced WHT is also granted to 
USCo, this would most probably conflict with the fact that Poland would not 
consider USCo as the beneficial owner of the interest. Accordingly, and to 
certain extent, the solution seems to be more beneficial for the State of 
                                                          
1000  Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that this provision seems to be the result of a 
bilateral negotiation and it is not included within the US Model. 
1001  Although it is arguable to say that this solution was created for that exclusive purpose. 
In fact, it seems to be more connected with the idea of avoiding double benefits obtained 
from treaties in triangular cases. 





source, which must not limit its taxing rights just because of a different 
characterization of an entity given in the State of residence of the partners of 




4.3.1.1.2. Canada/United States Tax Treaty 
Another solution can be found within the Technical Explanations to the 
Protocol 2008, referred to the 2007 amendment to the Canada/United States 
tax treaty (1980), which specifically clarifies the interaction between Article 
IV(6) and IV(7) of the Canada/United States tax treaty [Article 1(6) US 
Model]  and the concept of beneficial owner in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the 
same treaty.
1003
 According to the Technical Explanations to the Protocol 
2008: “Special rules apply in the case of income, profits or gains derived 
through a fiscally transparent entity, as described in new paragraph 6 of 
Article IV.  Residence State principles determine who derives the income, 
profits or gains, to assure that the income, profits or gains for which the 
source State grants benefits of the Convention will be taken into account for 
tax purposes by a resident of the residence State.  Source country principles 
of beneficial ownership apply to determine whether the person who derives 
the income, profits or gains, or another resident of the other Contracting 
                                                          
1002  The characterization of the entity in State F seems to be completely irrelevant, as it is 
also confirmed today within the U.S. Technical Explanations of the 2006 U.S. Model. 
US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 
November 2006, p. 6. 
1003  US/CA: Convention between Canada and the United States of America with respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital of 26 Sep. 1980 (As amended through 2007), Articles 
IV (6) and IV (7).  
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State, is the beneficial owner of the income, profits or gains. The source 
State may conclude that the person who derives the income, profits or gains 
in the residence State is a mere nominee, agent, conduit, etc., for a third 
country resident and deny benefits of the Convention.  If the person who 
derives the income, profits or gains under paragraph 6 of Article IV would 
not be treated under the source State’s principles for determining beneficial 
ownership as a nominee, agent, custodian, conduit, etc., that person will be 
treated as the beneficial owner of the income, profits or gains for purposes 
of the Convention”.
1004
 In simple words, the State of source should 
determine whether the partner(s) of a fiscally transparent entity, considered 
as such by the State of residence, is an agent, nominee, custodian or conduit 
or not, i.e. whether this is or not the beneficial owner. If the State of source 
considers that the partner deriving the income under Article IV (6) of the 
Canada/United States tax treaty is indeed an agent, nominee, custodian or 
conduit for a non-resident of the other Contracting State, then it may deny 
the benefits of Article 11 Canada/United States tax treaty.  However, if the 
State of source still considers that the partner deriving the income under 
Article 1(6) is indeed an agent, nominee, custodian or conduit, but for a 
resident of the other Contracting State, then it should grant the benefits of 
the treaty anyway.
1005
 The solution seems thus to assimilate the concept of 
                                                          
1004  US/CA: Technical Explanation of the Protocol done at Chelsea on September 26, 2007 
amending the Convention between the United States of America and Canada with 
respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital done at Washington on September 26, 1980, 
as amended by the Protocols of June 14, 1983, March 28, 1994, March 17, 1995 and 
July 29, 1997, p. 9. 
1005  Id. 





resident and beneficial owner, at least for purposes of application of Article 
1(6) US Model.  
The above might be illustrated using the same example provided within the 
Technical Explanations.
1006
 Let us assume a Canadian entity CanLP, which 
is considered as fiscally transparent in Canada, but as a taxable entity in the 
United States, and which receives interest payments sourced in the United 
States. Accordingly, CanCo, a company resident in Canada, wholly owns 
CanLP. 
 
Figure 43: Example from the Technical Explanations to the Protocol 2008  
According to Article IV (6) of the Canada/United States tax treaty [Article 
1(6) US Model], it is CanCo which derives the interest payments and which 
should enjoy the reduced WHT of Article 11 of the Canada/United States 
                                                          
1006  Id. 
Interest 
Canada United States 
CanLP CanCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity 
Even if the United States considers CanCo to be a nominee, agent, custodian or conduit, i.e. not a beneficial 
owner, it should allocate the benefits of Article 11 of the Canada/United States tax treaty if CanCo is a 
nominee, agent, custodian or conduit of a Canadian resident.  





 Likewise, the United States, the source State in this case, 
should consider CanCo as the beneficial owner of the interest, unless this is 
found to be a nominee, agent, custodian or conduit for a person who is not a 
resident of Canada.
1008
 However, and even if the United States considers 
CanCo to be a nominee, agent, custodian or conduit, i.e. not a beneficial 
owner, it should allocate the benefits of Article 11 of the Canada/United 




Even though this author recognizes that the solution given by the 
Canada/United States treaty is practical and solves the conflictive position 
between the two provisions under analysis, it might rarely be used within the 
US Model as a standard solution, because in fact it represents an exception 
to the rule that the beneficial owner is determined exclusively under the 
domestic laws of the State of source. Indeed, nothing within Article 1(6) US 
Model provides that the characterization of the entity by the State of source 
should be changed by application of this provision. Thus, it is still expected 
that the State of source (in absence of the explanation included within the 
Technical Explanations above) keeps considering a tax opaque entity as the 
beneficial owner of the interest paid. The success of the solution provided is 
thus tied to the commercial relations between the States negotiating the 
treaty, i.e. the United States and the other Contracting State. A solution such 
as the one found within the Canada/United States tax treaty certainly 
                                                          
1007  Id. 
1008  Id. 
1009  Id. 





responds to that pattern of close economic connections. In spite of the 
above, this rule has been recently proposed as a solution that might be 
applicable within the OECD Model as regards to the conflict between 
Article 1(2) OECD Model and the beneficial ownership’s requirement of 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model.
 1010
  
4.3.2. The interplay with the “saving clause” [Article 1(4) US 
Model] 
Article 1(6) US Model must also be analyzed as regards to its interplay with 
Article 1(4) US Model. This provision contains the traditional “saving 
clause” found in all the tax treaties signed by the United States, which 
basically establishes that the Contracting States reserve their rights to tax 
their residents and citizens as provided in the internal laws, notwithstanding 
any tax treaty provision to the contrary.
1011
 As provided within paragraph 4, 
Article 1 US Model: “Except to the extent provided in paragraph 5, this 
Convention shall not affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its 
residents (as determined under Article 4 (Resident)) and its citizens. 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a former citizen or 
former long-term resident of a Contracting State may, for the period of ten 
years following the loss of such status, be taxed in accordance with the laws 
of that Contracting State”.
 1012
 A simple example of the saving clause’s 
                                                          
1010  This proposal is analyzed at infra Sections 5.3.1.1; 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3. 
1011  McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 181. 
1012  Article 1(4) of the 2016 U.S. Tax Treaty Model. 
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application would be a person resident in the other Contracting State, and 
also U.S. citizen, who renders services in the United States without 
constituting a PE. Under normal circumstances, and in application of Article 
7 of the US Model, the United States would be prevented from taxing this 
income, because in fact there is no PE in the United States. However, as the 
resident of the Contracting States is also a U.S. citizen, the United States 
reserves the right to tax this citizens and resident on his worldwide income, 
overriding the application of the treaty.
 1013
   
 
 
Figure 44: Example of the saving clause’s application 
                                                          
1013  Example taken from the US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income 
Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, p. 3.  The application of the saving clause was 
also a key issue in: UK: CA, 23 Mar. 2011, Bayfine UK v. Commissioner for H M 
Revenue and Customs, [2011] EWCA Civ 304, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. In this case, 
while the United Kingdom claimed exclusive rights to tax since no PE was constituted 
in the United States, the United States applied taxation according to Article 1(3) of the 
U.K-U.S. tax treaty [saving clause]. For a more detailed analysis, considering all the 
other factors involved within the case, see B. Arnold, Tax Treaty News, 64 Bull. Intl. 
Taxn. 10 (2010), Journals IBFD, pp. 495-496. See also, Cleave, supra n. 321. 
Services 







In principle, there are a no profits attributable to a PE in 
the United State. Thus, the United States should refrain 
from taxing the payment from services. However, as the 
State X resident is also a U.S. citizen, Article 1(4) US 
Model applies disregarding the treaty. 





With respect to the specific interplay between Article 1(4) US Model 
[saving clause] and Article 1(6) US Model [transparent entities], it might be 
illustrated as follows. Let us assume the case of a U.S. LLC owned by a 
resident of State X and receiving royalties sourced in the United States. The 
sole owner of the LLC decides to treat the LLC as a U.S. Corporation 
according to the CTB election, although this is still considered as fiscally 
transparent in State X.
1014
 In this scenario, the United States will tax the 
LLC on its worldwide income on a net basis, regardless of whether the other 
Contracting State (State X) views the LLC as fiscally transparent. In other 
words, under a strict application of Article 12 US Model, the royalties 
should be taxed exclusively in State X, at the level of resident X, who is the 
sole owner of the LLC receiving the income and being entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty United States/State X according to Article 1(6) US 
Model.  Nonetheless, the United States reserves its right to tax the LLC on 
its worldwide income, which includes the royalties sourced in the United 
States. 
                                                          
1014  The example is inspired in the explanation of the interplay in the US: United States 
Model Technical Explanation accompanying the United States Model Income Tax 
Convention of 15 November 2006, p.7. The example also mirrors example 17 of the 
OECD Partnership Report. See OECD (1999), supra n. 1, p. 47. 




Figure 45: Saving clause and Article 1(6) US Model 
The application of the saving clause, therefore, raises concern as regard to 
the double taxation relief in State X (Article 23), because unless an indirect 
tax credit is provided, the partner X will be taxed in State X on the same 
income already taxed in the United States, but with no double taxation relief 
under the treaty.
1015
 Yet, the interpretation of Article 23 US Model as to 
grant an indirect tax credit is still arguable.
1016
 
                                                          
1015  In practice some countries grant an indirect tax credit. See J. Lüdicke, Exemption and 
Tax Credit in German Tax Treaties: Policy and Reality, 64 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2010), 
Journals IBFD, p. 615; W. Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best 
World (Part II), 2 World Tax J. 1(2010), Journals IBFD, p. 67. See also, Kollmann,  
Roncarati and Staringer, supra n. 954, p. 24.  
1016  In contrast, if e.g. a USCo is the sole owner of a foreign entity receiving royalties from 
the same State where this is a resident, and considered as tax transparent for U.S. tax 
purposes, an indirect tax credit would be granted to the extent the USCo owns at least 
10% of the foreign subsidiary and receives dividends from this latter. US: IRC Sec. 902. 
This indirect tax credit is, nonetheless, granted under domestic law and it does not imply 
United Sates State X 
Royalties 
LLC X 
Regardless that Article 1(6) US Model grants the benefits of the treaty 
to Resident X, as the LLC is treated as non-fiscally transparent in the 
United States, the United States reserves its right to tax the LLC on its 
worldwide income, because of Article 1(4) US Model.  
Tax transparent Taxable entity 





4.3.3. Article 1(6) US Model and the CTB regulations 
As already analyzed in Chapter III, the CTB regulations allow certain 
foreign business entities to be classified in a manner different from that 
provided in their countries of incorporation so long they are not regarded as 
per se Corporations for U.S. tax purposes.
1017
 These entities, denominated 
eligible entities, may elect their tax treatment for U.S. tax purposes.
1018
 
Therefore, if a U.S. LLC is generally consider as a disregarded entity, the 
foreign owner may elect to treat it as a taxable entity for U.S. tax purposes. 
Accordingly, if a foreign partnership is regarded in its country of 
organization as fiscally transparent, the U.S. partners might elect to treat it 




The possibility to re-characterize foreign entities for U.S. tax purposes does 
not only increase the number of possible disparities in the tax 
characterization of entities, giving rise to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, 
but also it might condition, to certain extent, the application of Article 1(6) 
US Model. For example, in Example 1 above, the CTB election seems to be 
the true reason to trigger the application of Article 1(6) US model.
1020
 
Indeed, in absence of the election, the treaty between the United States and 
State P should not be applicable at all and the interest payment received by 
                                                                                                                                       
to interpret Article 23 US Model as to granting an indirect tax credit. This interpretation 
of the Article 23 would be certainly very extensive. 
1017  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(b)(8) states the list of per se Corporations.  
1018  Supra Chapter III, Section 4.3. 
1019  Id. 
1020  Supra Section 4.2.1.1. 
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entity P should not go beyond of being a domestic concern.
1021
 Thus, the 
domestic CTB election in this case is the cause of the application of the 
treaty and the allocation of the benefits to A and B, U.S. owners of entity 
P.
1022
 The same situation might occur in the other way around. As noted in 
Example 3 above, it is the election to treat entity P, a foreign fiscally 
transparent entity, as tax opaque for U.S. tax purposes, which conditions the 
application of Article 1(6) US Model, in this case as to deny the benefits of 




In some triangular situations, the benefits of treating a foreign entity as tax 
transparent might give rise to the application of a more beneficial tax treaty 
under Article 1(6) US Model. Let me recall Example 5 above, where by the 
sole fact that A and B, U.S. owners of a foreign entity organized in a third 
country and treated as fiscally transparent under the CTB election in the 
United States, might benefit from a reduced WHT under a tax treaty 
different from that between the United States and the State of source of the 
income.
1024
 This situation, however, as already stressed, is elegantly solved 
within the U.S. treaty practice, making a “switch-off” in the application of 
Article 1(6) US Model where the entity receiving the interest is considered 
as tax opaque under the law of the State of source; the entity is organized in 
a third State and it is eligible for the benefits of a treaty with the State of 
                                                          
1021  Id. 
1022  Id. 
1023  Supra Section 4.2.1.3. 
1024  Supra Section 4.2.2.1. 





source, which are more favorable than the benefits provided by the treaty 




All in all, the possibility of electing the tax treatment of a given entity 
organized within or outside the United States, should be considered as an 
important tool to determine the application of Article 1(6) US Model, and 
thus, the application or not of the benefits of a tax treaty to certain residents. 
In this case, unlike the tax planning opportunities analyzed in Chapter III 
with respect to the application of CFC rules or the use of a FTC,
1026
 which 
also depend on the design features of these domestic rules (i.e. CFC rules 
and FTC), the CTB election seems to play a more direct role when 
analyzing the application of Article 1(6) US Model and the access or not to 
the benefits of a tax treaty.  
4.3.4. Article 1(6) US Model and I.R.C. Sec. 894(c) 
As well as Article 1(6) US Model, domestic I.R.C. Section 894(c) addresses 
the issue of hybrid entities, and thus, should be considered when analyzing 
the scope of application of Article 1(6) US Model. This domestic provision 
specifically states that a foreign person shall not be entitled to a reduced 
WHT granted by a treaty to the extent income is not attributed to that 
                                                          
1025  US/PL: Article 1(6)(b) of the Convention between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Poland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income of 13 Feb. 2013. See also the analysis at supra 
Section 4.3.1.1.1. 
1026  Supra Chapter III, Section 4.4. 
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foreign person in the foreign country, the treaty does not contain a provision 
addressing the cases of income received through a transparent entity, and the 
foreign country does not impose a tax on the distribution of that income 




The U.S. Treasury Regulations under Section 894(c) adopt different 
approaches depending on whether there is a “domestic reverse hybrid” 
involved or not.
1028
 As per the definition in the Treasury Regulations, a 
domestic reverse hybrid entity is a domestic entity that is treated as not 
fiscally transparent for U.S. tax purposes and as fiscally transparent under 
the laws of the person holding the interest in the entity in the other State.
1029
 
For example, a U.S. LLC whose non-resident sole proprietorship elected to 
treat as a Corporation in the United Sates (i.e. a taxable entity), while it is 
considered as fiscally transparent in his State of residence.
1030
 A “non-
reverse domestic hybrid” entity is exactly the opposite, i.e. an entity 
considered as fiscally transparent in the United States and/or any other 





                                                          
1027  US: I.R.C. Sec. 894(c) 
1028  McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 85.  
1029  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(i). The reference to “reverse hybrid entity” should 
not be thus confused with the traditional distinction between hybrids and reverse hybrid 
entities. Supra Chapter III, Section 3. 
1030  See example at supra Section 3.2.3.2. 
1031  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(i). 





As regards to domestic reverse hybrid entities, a distinction must be made 
with respect to payments received by a domestic hybrid entity or payments 
made by a domestic hybrid entity.
1032
 With respect to payments received by 
a domestic hybrid entity, a tax treaty cannot reduce the tax applied to such 
payments that are from U.S. sources.
1033
 Thus, even though another country 
might tax a foreign holder of interest in the entity as regards to the US 
sourced income; the United States will not apply the tax treaty rates to such 
person.
1034
 In simple words, the foreign interest holders of a domestic 
reverse hybrid entity are not entitled to the benefits of a reduction of U.S. 
income tax according to a tax treaty in which the United States is part, when 
items of income received by such entity and sourced in the United States. 
Let me illustrate the above with the example from the Section 4.3.2 above 
assuming the case of a U.S. LLC owned by a resident of State X and 
receiving royalties sourced in the United States. The sole owner of the LLC 
decides to treat the LLC as a U.S. Corporation according to the CTB 
election, although this is still considered as fiscally transparent in State X. 
We will also assume that there is no Article 1(6) US Model included within 
the treaty United States/State X. 
 
                                                          
1032  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(ii)(A) and Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(ii)(B). 
1033  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(i). 
1034  McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 85. 




Figure 46: I.R.C. Sec. 894(c)’s illustration 
In this case, I.R.C. Section 894(c) provides that the interest holder X will not 
enjoy a reduced WHT, regardless that according to State X, the royalties are 
received by him. This provision might thus be interpreted as a protection of 
the base erosion at source and acts indeed as a complementary rule when 
Article 1(6) US Model has not been included within a tax treaty signed by 
the United States.
1035
 Nonetheless, from a point of view of treaty 
obligations, the provision is indeed arguable, since basically operate as a 
treaty override.
1036
 For example, if we assume that State X does not include 
                                                          
1035  This is interpreted from the wording of I.R.C. Sec. 894(c), which requires that “the 
treaty does not contain a provision addressing the cases of income received through a 
transparent entity […]”. US: I.R.C. Sec. 894(c). 
1036  The above practice should not be, however, a surprise since Article VI of the United 
States Constitution provides that international treaties and domestic legislation are in 
equal footing. Therefore, where tax treaties and legislative provisions conflict with each 
other, domestic legislation prevails. See McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 
United Sates State X 
Royalties 
LLC X 
I.R.C. Section 894(c) provides that the interest holder X will not enjoy 
a reduced WHT, regardless that according to State X, the royalties are 
received by him. 
Tax transparent Taxable entity 





Article 1(6) US Model, but it recognizes strictly the principles of the OECD 
Partnership Report, introduced within the OECD Commentaries, the result 
should be the same as if the provision were introduced within the tax treaty 
with the United States. In such a case, however, this domestic provision will 





As regards to payments made from a domestic reverse hybrid entity, these 
payments will be characterized for tax treaty purposes as being paid by a 
non-transparent entity.
1038
 Therefore, in the example above, if a payment is 
made from the U.S. LLC to its sole proprietorship in State X, it will be 
considered as a payment made from a tax opaque entity in order to apply the 
                                                                                                                                       
178. However, the courts in the United States have also been clear that when legislative 
provisions override tax treaty obligations, this must be expressly stated within the 
domestic provision. See, e.g. US: Cook v. United States, 288 US 102 (1933). See also, 
US: Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), Sec. 
114(1). The issue as regards to the relation between treaties and domestic legislation was 
expressly addressed in US: I.R.C. Sec. 7852(d)(1), which provides: “For purposes of 
determining the relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United 
States affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by 
reason of its being a treaty or law”. Likewise, US: I.R.C. Sec. 894(a) states: “The 
provisions of this title shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty 
obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer” (emphasis added). Yet, 
as provided by McDaniel et al.: “The extent to which these legislative changes will in 
fact affect the relation between treaties and statutes remains for the courts to decide in 
the context of particular situations of conflict that may arise in the future”. McDaniel, 
Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 179. 
1037  Thus, the application of this domestic provision as to deny the benefits of a treaty for 
certain payment received through hybrid entities will be prevented only to the extent that 
the other Contracting State agrees in introducing Article 1(6) US Model within its treaty 
with the United States and accomplishes also with the other preconditions of US: I.R.C. 
Sec. 894(c).  
1038  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(ii)(A). 
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United States/State X tax treaty.
1039
 Likewise, the Treasury Regulations 
provide special rules when the domestic reverse hybrid entity has received a 
tax-free dividend from a domestic subsidiary.
1040
 In such a case, the payment 
from the domestic reverse hybrid to its interest holder abroad is considered 





On the other hand, the Treasury Regulations provide that in case of a “non-
reverse domestic hybrid” entity, i.e. an entity considered as fiscally 
transparent in the United States and/or any other jurisdiction, an item of 
income shall be eligible for a reduced WHT under the treaty in which the 
United States is part of, only to the extent that an item of income is 
considered as derived by a resident for purposes of the treaty.
1042
 Thus, the 
income might be derived by an entity receiving the income if this is 
considered as tax opaque in its jurisdiction, or if the entity is considered as 
fiscally transparent, it will be considered derived by the persons holding an 
interest in that entity to the extent the interest holder is not considered as 
fiscally transparent in its jurisdiction.
1043
 Thus, it is possible to conclude that 
the taxing jurisdiction exercised over the item of income controls the 
                                                          
1039  Id. 
1040  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(2)(ii)(B). 
1041  Id. 
1042  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(1). 
1043  Id. 










Yet, if all countries around the world decided to implement, bilaterally or 
multilaterally, Article 1(2) OECD Model, it seems to be, in principle, 
unnecessary that a domestic provision such as I.R.C Sec. 894(c) exists. 
Indeed, because of Article 1(2) OECD Model income would be attributed to 
a foreign person in the foreign country, because of a specific treaty 
provision addressing the cases of income received through a transparent 
entity, and the foreign country would most probably impose a tax on the 
distribution of that income from the entity to such person. Nevertheless, the 
wording of I.R.C. Sec. 894(c) seems to requires not only a provision similar 
to Article 1(6) US Model as to grant a reduced WHT, but also that income 
received by a foreign person through a tax transparent entity is allocated to 
that person and taxed there.
1045
 This latter requirement leaves open the 
possibility that in absence of effective taxation, I.R.C. Sec. 894(c) might still 
be applicable. Paradoxically, however, if all countries around the world start 
introducing similar domestic provisions to protect their tax bases at source, 
Article 1(2) OECD Model (or similar provisions), might become completely 
irrelevant.  
 
                                                          
1044  McDaniel, Ault and Repetti, supra n. 688, p. 85. 
1045  US: I.R.C. Sec. 894(c)(1)(C). 
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5. The OECD Model’s proposal: A Residence State’s perspective 
Chapter 14 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2 contains a detailed proposal 
based on the conclusions achieved within the 1999 OECD Partnership 
Report, and which calls for the inclusion of a positive norm within the 
OECD Model dealing with cases in which one or two of the Contracting 
States treat an entity or arrangement as fiscally transparent.
1046
 Unlike the 
OECD Partnership Report, however, the proposed Article 1(2) OECD 
Model addresses not only cases of partnerships, but also any other entities 
considered as fiscally transparent.
1047
 Likewise, and as provided within the 
proposal, it attempts to ensure not only that the benefits of tax treaty are 
granted in appropriate cases, but also that these are not granted in cases 
where neither Contracting State treats the income received through a fiscally 
transparent entity as the income of one of its residents.
1048
 This provision is 
analyzed as follows. 
                                                          
1046  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 139 et seq. See also the recently released draft contents of 
the 2017 update to the OECD Model and the public comments received as regards to the 
draft. See OECD (2017) and OECD (2017a), supra n. 462. 
1047  As provided by the OECD: “The Partnership Report (OECD, 1999), however, did not 
expressly address the application of tax treaties to entities other than partnerships. In 
order to address that issue, as well as the fact that some countries have found difficult to 
apply the conclusions of the Partnership Report, it was decided to include in the OECD 
Model Tax Convention (OECD, 2014), the following provision, which will ensure that 
income of transparent entities is treated, for the purposes of the Convention, in 
accordance with the principles of the Partnership report”. Id., p. 139. 
1048  Id. This reference would also clarify that Article 1(2) OECD Model may also be aimed 
as denying treaty benefits. See also in this opinion: Kollman, Roncarati and Staringer, 
supra n. 954, pp. 23-24; A. Schnitger and M. Oskamp, Empfehlungen der OECD zur 
Neutralisierung von “Hybrid Mismatches” auf Abkommensebene, 23 IStR 11 (2014), p. 
390. 





5.1. General Interpretation of Article 1(2) OECD Model 
The proposal establishes the inclusion of a new paragraph 2 of Article 1 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention, which reads as follows: “For the 
purposes of this Convention, income derived by or through an entity or 
arrangement that is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the 
taxation law of either Contracting State shall be considered to be income of 
a resident of a Contracting State but only to the extent that the income is 
treated, for purposes of the taxation by that State, as income of a resident of 
that State”.
1049
  Unsurprisingly, the wording used in the OECD proposal is 
very similar to that one already utilized in the 2006 US Model and it is 
almost identical to the 2016 US Model.
1050
 The wording of the OECD 
provision, and the preconditions for its application are subsequently 
analyzed. 
5.1.1. The reference to “income” (only) 
The proposed paragraph 26.9 of the Commentary on Article 1 states: “The 
word ‘income’ must be given the wide meaning that it has for the purposes 
of the Convention and therefore applies to various items of income that are 
covered by Chapter III of the Convention (Taxation of Income), including, 
for example, profits of an enterprise and capital gains”.
1051
 Therefore, it is 
                                                          
1049  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 139. This wording is ratified in the recently released draft 
of the 2017 update to the OECD Model. See OECD (2017), supra n. 462. 
1050  Supra Section 4.1. 
1051  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 141, Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.9. 
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clear that all the range of income between Article 6 and 21 OECD Model 
are included within the meaning of “income”, including profits business 
profits, income from services, dividends, royalties, rental income, etc.
1052
 
Likewise, the proposed wording of the Commentaries allows us to conclude 
that “capital” (Article 22 OECD Model) is not included within the scope of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model.
1053
 In the same order of ideas, it is possible to 
sustain that the reference to “income” and not to “income, profit or gain” 
within Article 1(6) US Model does not represent thus a substantial 
difference, because in both cases it is clear that the provision applies only as 
regards to taxes on income.
1054
  
Another important issue is that Article 1(2) OECD Model applies separately 
to each item of income. As provided within the proposed Commentaries: 
“As with other provisions of the Convention, the provision applies 
separately to each item of income of the entity or arrangement”.
1055
 The 
above is connected with the partial transparency treatment that some entities 
receive at a domestic level.
1056
 Using the example of trusts, the proposed 
                                                          
1052  Id. This argument is based on the idea that the term “income” within the OECD Model 
should have an autonomous interpretation. In this sense, the allocation rules of Articles 6 
to 21 OECD Model should govern the taxation of income and should provide guidance 
as regards to the meaning of the term “income”. See Ismer/A. Blank, in: Reimer & Rust 
(eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Article 2 at m.no. 36.  
1053  Kollmann, Roncarati and Staringer, supra n. 954, p. 19. Also in this opinion: E. 
Schaffer, Chapter 5: Implications of BEPS Action 2 and its Relevance for the 
Application of Article 17 of the OECD Model in: Domestic Attribution of Income and 
Taxation of International Entertainers and Sportspersons: Theory and Practice of Art. 
17 OECD Model Convention (M. Lang ed., IBFD 2017), Online Books IBFD. 
1054  Supra Section 4.1.1. See also, Schaffer, supra n. 1053.  
1055  Id. 142, Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.12. 
1056  Infra Section 5.1.4. 





Commentaries state that, e.g. if within a trust it is established that all 
dividends received by the trust will go directly to the beneficiaries during 
the lifetime, but they will be accumulated afterwards. If one of the 
Contracting States considers that the beneficiary is taxable on the distributed 
dividends that will be accumulated, Article 1(2) OECD will apply then to 
the dividends as to different categories, independently that they were 
received in the same month.
1057
   
5.1.2. Income derived “by or through”  
Article 1(2) OECD Model requires that income is derived “by or through” 
an entity or arrangement. However, there are no hints within the proposed 
Commentaries as regards to the distinction that the wording of the Article 
attempts. Indeed proposed Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model 
simply state: “The reference to ‘income derived by or through an entity or 
arrangement’ has a broad meaning and covers any income that is earned by 
or through an entity or arrangement, regardless of the view taken by each 
Contracting State as to who derives that income for domestic tax purposes 
and regardless of whether or not that entity or arrangement has legal 
personality or constitutes a person as defined in subparagraph 1 a) of Article 
3”.
1058
 In principle therefore the wording seems to be redundant.
1059
 
                                                          
1057 Supra n. 1055.  
1058 OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 141, Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.8. 
1059  In the case of the wording of Article 1(6) US Model 2016, the reference to “by or 
through” seems to be also irrelevant since the 2006 US Model only refers to “income 
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Regardless the above, some authors have suggested that the reference to “by 
or through” would have the purpose of ensuring the application of Article 
1(2) OECD Model, on one hand, in cases where the source State treats the 
entity X as transparent, and thus, considers that the income is “derived 
through” that entity, and, on the other hand, in cases where the source State 
treats the entity X as non-transparent (being regarded as transparent by the 
State of residence), and thus, that the income is “derived by” such entity.
1060
 
This interpretation has logic if one considers that Article 1(2) OECD Model 
does not attempt to affect the determination of persons or events in the State 
of source.
1061
 Therefore, in other words, the wording of Article 1(2) OECD 
attempts to ensure that the State of source grants the benefits of a treaty to 
the partners of an entity (to the extent they are residents of the other State) 
that this State considers as tax opaque, and which in absence of this 
provision, would not be granted. Likewise, if the State of source sees the 
entity as tax transparent, it would grant the benefits of the treaty to the 
partners of it (in absence of Article 1(2) OECD Model). Thus, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model in this case ensures that these benefits, which would 
otherwise be granted, are denied. The wording “derived by or through” 




                                                                                                                                       
through” (not “by”) and the 2006 Technical Explanations uses the terms in an 
interchangeable manner. Infra Section 4.1.2. 
1060  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 303. See also, Schaffer, supra n. 1053. 
1061  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p.303. 
1062  These two functions are separately stated within the United States/Canada Tax Treaty, 
Articles IV(6) and IV(7). See United States-Canada Income and Capital Tax Treaty (as 





5.1.3. The reference to “entities or arrangements” 
The inclusion of the term “arrangements” within the wording of Article 
1(2) OECD Model, which is not part of the wording of Article 1(6) US 
Model, is one of the most evident differences between from two provisions 
that, in principle, seem to mirror each other, also with respect to their 
personal scopes. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear definition of the term 
“arrangements” has left a wide shadow of uncertainty as regards to what 
the proper the interpretation of the OECD provision should be, and 
therefore, to which extent the scope of Article 1(2) OECD Model is indeed 
wider than the correspondent provision in the US Model. 
The reference to “arrangements” might be interpreted, on one hand, as 
covering all those cases of transparent vehicles other than partnerships. As 
stressed already, one of the main limitations of the 1999 OECD Partnership 
Report was the impossibility to extent the application of the conclusions 
achieved to entities other than partnerships.
1063
 Therefore, the reference to 
“arrangements” would attempt to cover all those alternatives businesses 
                                                                                                                                       
amended through 2007), Tax Treaties IBFD. This distinction is, nevertheless, unusual. 
Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 1060, p. 304. Although the justification above is convincing, 
one should not forget that the problem with the use of the expression “derived by” 
within the OECD Model is that normally other attributive rules using similar 
expressions, require a connection between the income and the taxpayer receiving the 
income, which might be misinterpreted as regards to “income derive by a fiscally 
transparent entity”. Regardless the above, the author agrees that the clarification as 
regard to the two functions of Article 1(2) OECD Model is appropriate. 
1063  Supra Section 3. 
Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
 
 396 
beyond the concept of partnerships, including e.g. CIVs and trusts.
1064
 
Although this interpretation seems to be logic since the OECD recognizes 
that the Partnership Report did not properly address the application of tax 
treaties to entities other than partnerships, it is evident that non-corporate 
entities in general, and the only two examples of vehicles used within the 
proposed Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model, might be perfectly 
fitted within the term “entities” without need of referring to 
“arrangements”.
1065
 Therefore, the intention of the OECD proposal seems 
still to be different.  
As argued somewhere else already, the inclusion of the term 
“arrangements” reveals, to certain extent, the intention to set up a flexible 
concept that anticipates the appearance of future vehicles treated as fiscally 
transparent and to which income is allocated, but which are not regarded as 
entities.
1066
 In other words, there is an intention to extent the personal scope 
of Article 1(2) OECD Model beyond Article 1(6) US Model. This exercise 
is, however, very risky. On one hand, it affects the certainty required within 
a treaty provision that should be very clear as regards to whom a treaty 
benefit is being granted. On the other hand, it leaves a wide shadow over the 
interpretation of a notion that lacks of a clear explanation within the 
Commentaries. In this regard, and to the extent no specific examples of 
“arrangements” are provided, or a definition of the term is included within 
                                                          
1064  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 140, Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.4 and 
26.5 
1065  Schaffer, supra n. 1053. 
1066  Id. 





the Commentaries, this author agrees with the conclusion that the 
interpretation of the personal scope of the provision remains exactly as it is 
with respect to Article 1(6) US Model.
1067
 
5.1.4.  “Wholly and partial” fiscal transparency 
Another precondition for the application of Article 1(2) OECD Model is that 
the entity or arrangement be considered “wholly or partly” as fiscally 
transparent. The above involves, on one hand, the issue of determining what 
is a “fiscally transparent entity”, and, on the other hand, what are the cases 
of “partial fiscal transparency” that the provision refers to.  
 
As regards to “fiscal transparency”, the proposed Commentaries offer the 
following definition: “The concept of ‘fiscally transparent’ used in the 
paragraph to situations where, under the domestic law of a Contracting 
State, the income (or part thereof) of the entity or arrangement is not taxed 
at the level of the entity or arrangement but at the level of the persons who 
have an interest in that entity or arrangement”.
1068
 The OECD provides an 
example within the proposed Commentaries, which covers the situation in 
which the amount of taxes payable is determined separately at the level of 
the entity, but with respect to the personal characteristics of the persons 
liable to tax. As regards to this example, it states: “The fact that the income 
                                                          
1067  Also in this opinion: Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 335. For the authors, the 
reference to “arrangements” should also be clarified.  
1068  Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.10 in: OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 141. 
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is computed at the level of the entity or arrangement before the share is 
allocated to the person will not affect that result”.
1069
 In addition, the 
proposed Commentaries state that countries are, nevertheless, free to clarify 
this definition of “fiscally transparent” within their bilateral conventions. 
Although this latter solution is indeed valuable since bilateral tax treaties are 
the best place where countries might clarify the doubts as regards to specific 
transparent forms existing in each of the Contracting State, it might also be 
risky to have so many different definitions of “fiscal transparency”, which 
might derive in ambiguous interpretations of the term, deteriorating the 
required legal certainty as regards to allocation conflicts, and thus, affecting 




Despite the fact that the concept of “fiscal transparency” clearly refers to 
cases in which an entity is not taxable at its level, but rather the owners of 
that entity, regardless in which levels the taxes where calculated, some 
authors have suggested a broader interpretation of the concept, and thus, a 
potential broader application of Article 1(2) OECD Model due to these other 
potential conflicts of transparency.
1071
 These authors have illustrated the 
above through the following example involving CFC rules. Let us imagine a 
company (ACo) incorporated in State A, which has 100% of the ownership 
of another company incorporated in State B (BCo). This latter company 
                                                          
1069  Id. 
1070 M. Lang, Dreifache Nichtbesteuerung als Ergebnis der Anwendung von 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, 25 SWI 5 (2015), pp. 198-208. 
1071  See Kollmann, Roncarati and Staringer, supra n. 954, pp. 17-18. 











Figure 47: Illustration using CFC rules 
For these authors, this case might imply a “conflict of transparency”, even 
though all countries agree that BCo is a taxable entity.
1073
 In other words, 
CFC rules would deem BCo to be transparent, and thus, attribute the 
undistributed profits to ACo. It is evident, however, that Article 1(2) OECD 
Model does not apply in this case, because none of the countries involved 
consider BCo as “tax transparent”.  
 
                                                          
1072  Id. 
1073  Id. 
Royalties 
State B State C State A 
ACo 
Taxable entity Taxable entity 
BCo 
Because of the application of Article 12 treaty B-C, the royalties are taxed in State B exclusively. State A 
also taxes the royalties as “deemed dividends”, because of the application of CFC rules. However, the treaty 
A-C is not applicable, because the royalties are not attributed to ACo. Indeed, State A considers BCo as a 
taxable entity as well. 
Taxable entity 
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This author certainly disagrees with this interpretation. On one hand, this 
case does not represent a conflict of attribution of income for tax treaty 
purposes, because the royalties, for purposes of the treaty B-C, are clearly 
attributed to BCo, who is most probably also the beneficial owner according 
to the application of Article 12 OECD Model. State B, therefore, has the 
exclusive right to tax those royalties. The treaty A-C, on the other hand, is 
not applicable at all since State A considers BCo as tax opaque. Therefore, 
the second attribution, i.e. the “deemed dividend” by which State A also 
taxes the undistributed profits of BCo is due to a different legal fiction, 
which has nothing to o with the characterization of BCo. On the contrary, 
this legal fiction operates by the sole fact that ACo controls BCo and this 
latter receives passive income (royalties). In simple words, there is no 
“deemed transparency” as regards to this second attribution, but rather a 
different legal fiction that allows exceptionally taxing non-residents (BCo) 
on foreign source income in order to avoid tax deferral. To sum up, Article 
1(2) OECD Model has nothing to do with this potential case of double 
taxation, which could (and perhaps should) be solved strictly at a domestic 
level.
1074
 Moreover, it would be completely unfair for the State of source in 
this case (State C) to apply the treaty A-C, by extending the interpretation of 
the concept of fiscal transparency under Article 1(2) OECD Model, which 
would also oblige this State to limit its taxing rights as regards to State A.     
                                                          
1074  Another option would be modifying Article 23 OECD Model to exceptionally grant 
relief of double taxation at the level of State A under the treaty A-C. However, this 
could imply also that State C has also to limit its taxing rights due to the application of 
the treaty, and solely because of the CFC rule in State A. 





By other side, it is also interesting to note that the precondition that the 
entity or arrangement is considered as fiscally transparent applies not only 
with respect of cases of full transparency, but also to cases of “partial 
transparency”. The concerns about “partial transparency” are, 
nevertheless, not novel. They were indeed originally raised within the 1999 
OECD Partnership Report, which stated: “The Committee first discussed 
cases where domestic tax laws create intermediary situations where a 
partnership is partly treated as a taxable unit and partly disregarded for tax 
purposes. While this may create practical difficulties with respect to a very 
limited number of partnerships, it is a more important problem in the case of 
other entities such as trusts. For this reason, the Committee decided to deal 
with this issue in the context of follow-up work to this report”.
1075
 Likewise, 
the proposed Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model specifically 
addresses the issue establishing that: “In case of an entity or arrangement 
which is treated as partly fiscally transparent under the domestic laws of one 
of the Contracting States, only part of the income of the entity or 
arrangement might be taxed at the level of the persons who have an interest 
in that entity or arrangement as described in the preceding paragraph whilst 
the rest would remain taxable at the level of the entity or arrangement”.
1076
 
As noted within the Commentaries, this is particularly the case of LLPs and 
trusts. The above reinforces the idea that the personal scope of Article 1(2) 
OECD Model is indeed not different from Article 1(6) US Model, which 
although in its 2016 Model includes the wording “partially transparent”, it 
                                                          
1075  OECD (1999), supra n. 1 , para. 37. 
1076  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 141, Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.11. 
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was clear since 2006 that the provision was applicable not only to 
partnerships, but also to others transparent entities in general, including 
common investment trusts under I.R.C. Section 584 and grantor trust and 
LLCs.
 1077
   
5.2. Illustrations as regards to the application of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model 
The application of Article 1(2) OECD Model is illustrated through a series 
of examples that are divided in two groups: (i) strict bilateral cases and (ii) 
triangular cases. All the examples follow more or less the same facts used in 
the examples that analyzed the application of Article 1(6) US Model both 
referred to bilateral and triangular situations. The above allows us to 
compare results and to analyze the differences and similitudes between the 
two provisions. Likewise, and as well as in the examples regarding Article 
1(6) US Model, all the examples below assume that no PE is constituted in 
the State of source and all treaties include Article 1(2) OECD Model. 
Accordingly, all the examples also assume that all the anti-abuse restrictions 
within domestic law and tax treaties are accomplished in order to apply 
Article 1(2) OECD Model. 
 
 
                                                          
1077  US: Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 
November 2006, p. 5. 





5.2.1. Application of Article 1(2) OECD Model in strict bilateral 
situations 
This Section contains four illustrations of strict bilateral situations analyzing 
the implication of Article 1(2) OECD Model. Whilst example 1 and 2 refer 
to income received by or through a hybrid entity, example 3 and 4 refer to 
income received through a reverse hybrid entity.  
5.2.1.1. Example 1 
Entity P is organized and resident in State P and has two owners: A and B, 
who are residents of State R. Accordingly, Entity P receives interest 
payments from a debtor in State P. While State P considers the entity as a 
taxable entity, State R considers the same entity as tax transparent, and thus, 
that the income is allocated to the partners A and B. State P applies a 
general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross 
amount of payments. 




Figure 48: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 1 
Unlike this is a pure domestic situation from the perspective of State P 
(State of source), Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P allows the application of the 
treaty between the two countries, granting to A and B the benefits of that 
treaty. In other words, the preconditions of Article 1(2) OECD Model are 
met, since there is an entity considered as fiscally transparent by one of the 
Contracting State, which is receiving income from the other Contracting 
State and that income is allocated to the partners, who are residents of the 
State considering the entity as tax transparent.  
Although the solution is practical, it might be arguable since the point of 
view of the State of source (State P). Indeed, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P 
makes the treaty applicable by the sole fact that entity P is characterized as 





P is regarded as fiscally 
transparent  
P is regarded as a taxable 
entity 





fiscally transparent in the State of residence, obliging the State of source to 
apply the treaty, and thus, to limit its taxing rights. Likewise, the solution 
does not consider the proper interplay with the concept of beneficial owner 
required in Article 11 of the treaty R-P to apply the reduction in the WHT at 
source. Indeed, it might be very difficult for the State of source to consider 
A and B as the beneficial owners of the interest paid in this case.
1078
  
From the perspective of the State of residence, the solution also presents 
some problems. If entity P is subject to taxation in State P due to the rights 
that State P reserves to tax its own residents, it is arguable that State R 
grants a relief from double taxation under Article 23B OECD Model when 
A and B have paid no taxes in State P. This is to say, granting a relief in this 
case might be interpreted as if Article 23 may provide for an indirect tax 
credit, which, in the opinion of some commentators, it is indeed a very 




5.2.1.2. Example 2 
Let us assume now that Entity R is organized in State R and has two owners, 
A and B, who are also residents of State R. Accordingly, some interest 
payments are paid from State P. While State R considers entity R as tax 
opaque, State P considers it as tax transparent. State P has also a general 
                                                          
1078  This issue is further on analyzed in this Chapter at infra Section 5.3.1. 
1079  Infra Section 5.3.2. 
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WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross amount of 
payments. 
 
Figure 49: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 2 
As per Article 1(2) OECD Model, there are interest payments received 
through an entity that one of the Contracting States considers as tax 
transparent. However, the income is not allocated to the partners of that 
entity who are also residents in the State treating the entity as tax 
transparent. Therefore, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P acts in this case as 
denying A and B the benefits of the treaty and ensuring that the benefits of 
this are allocated to entity R. 
In the same order of ideas, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P clarifies who is 
entitled to claim the double tax relief in the State of residence under Article 
23 of the same treaty. However, the solution of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P 





R is regarded as a taxable 
entity 
R is regarded as fiscally 
transparent  





possesses a bit more uncertainty as regards to the proper application of 
Article 11, because it is doubtful that State P considers entity R as the 
beneficial owner of the interest payments, and thus, decides to reduce its 
WHT at source.  
By other side, if A and B were residents of State P, the application of Article 
1(2) of the treaty R-P would be redundant, because the preconditions of 
Article 11 would not be met anyway, i.e. there would not be interest 
payments arising in a Contracting State and paid to residents in the other 
Contracting State. The interest payments in this case would arise in the same 
State where the recipients of the payments are residents; therefore, it would 
not go beyond of being a domestic situation. However, nothing would 
prevent State R to tax entity R, which is, in its perspective, a taxable entity. 
Thus, double taxation might arise and be unavoidable in this case.
1080
 
                                                          
1080  Unless a double taxation relief is provided domestically, i.e. in State P. 




Figure 50: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 2 (variation) 
5.2.1.3. Example 3 
Let us assume now that entity P is organized and is resident in State P and 
has two owners: A and B, who are residents of State R. Accordingly, Entity 
P receives interest payments from a debtor in State P. State R considers the 
entity as tax opaque while State P considers the same entity as fiscally 
transparent. Entity P is thus a reverse hybrid entity. State P applies a general 
WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross amount of 
payments. 





R is regarded as tax 
opaque 
R is regarded as fiscally 
transparent 
Article 1(2) OECD Model is irrelevant in this case, because the 
preconditions for application of Article 11 OECD Model are not met. 
Likewise, interest will be taxed both in State R, at the level of entity R, 
and in State P, at the level of A and B as the share of income in the 
foreign partnership. Double taxation might thus arise. 







Figure 51: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 3 
As regards to the application of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P, the interest 
income is received through an entity (P) considered as fiscally transparent in 
State P, but it is not allocated to residents of this State. Therefore, Article 
1(2) OECD Model applies in this case as to deny the benefits of the treaty to 
A and B and to confirm that the payments of interest in this case is a mere 
domestic situation. Yet, nothing prevents State R to also tax the interest 
through the application of CFC rules. Double taxation might be avoided in 
this case only to the extent a domestic relief is granted in State R.
1081
 
                                                          
1081  This is the case, e.g. of the United States. US: I.R.C. Sec. 960 and 902. See the 
explanation in a similar example referred to the US Model provision at supra Section 
4.2.1.3. 





P is regarded tax opaque P is regarded as fiscally transparent 
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Likewise, the solution of Article 1(2) does not prevent that State P still 
considers A and B as the beneficial owners of the income.  
5.2.1.4. Example 4 
Let us assume now that entity R is organized and is resident in State R. 
Entity R has two owners, A and B, who are also residents of State R. 
Accordingly, interest payments are paid from State P. While State R 
considers entity R as tax transparent, State P considers it as a taxable entity. 
State P applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on 
the gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 52: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 4 
According to Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P, entity R is a fiscally transparent 
entity receiving interest from State P, which are allocated to the partners A 
and B, who are also residents of State R. Therefore, Article 1(2) of the treaty 





R is regarded tax opaque R is regarded as fiscally transparent 





R-P clarifies that the partners A and B are the ones who should claim the 
benefits of the treaty between State R and State P. This solution seems to be 
satisfactory from the point of view of the State of residence. 
From the State of source’s perspective, however, the application of Article 
1(2) of the treaty R-P might still leave open some uncertainty as regards to 
the application of the treaty between State R and State P. Indeed, the fact 
that Article 1(2) clarifies that A and B should be granted the benefit of the 
treaty, does not change the fact that State P still considers entity R, and not 
A and B, as the beneficial owner of the interest income. In other words, 
State P might still deny the reduced WHT at source, because A and B are 
not the beneficial owners of the interest. The above might also generate 
conflicts as regards to the application of Article 23, because the double 
taxation relief might cover only the amount of reduced WHT under the 
treaty and not the full amount of WHT, if the State of source does not 
reduce its WHT under Article 11.  
5.2.2. Application of Article 1(2) OECD Model in triangular 
situations 
This Section turns now to analyze the application of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model to specific triangular situations. For this purpose, the previous 
assumptions that no PE is constituted in the State of source and all treaties 
include Article 1(2) OECD Model remain the same. Likewise, in all cases is 
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assumed that the intermediary entity is not a conduit company, agent or 
nominee. 
5.2.2.1. Example 5 
Let us assume that YCo is an entity incorporated in State Y, which has two 
partners, A and B, who are residents of State X. Accordingly, YCo has a 
subsidiary in State Z, i.e. ZCo, which is financed by a loan granted by YCo 
and because of which it receives interest payments back from State Z.
1082
 
YCo is considered as a taxable entity in State Y and in State Z. However, it 
is regarded as a fiscally transparent entity in State X. Likewise, although 
Country Z applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30% of the 
gross amount paid, the treaty State X/State Z provides for a reduced WHT 
of 10% while the treaty State Y/State Z provides for a reduced WHT of 5%. 
 
                                                          
1082  The example assumes that the loan and interest are arm’s length. 






Figure 53: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 5 
According to the treaty Y-Z, State Z should reduce its WHT to 5% 
according to Article 11 and State Y should grant a relief of double taxation 
as per Article 23. It is clear that the income and the benefits of the treaty are 
allocated to YCo. Likewise, Article 1(2) treaty Y-Z does not apply, because 
YCo is considered as a taxable entity in both Contracting States. 
The treaty X-Z is, nevertheless, also applicable. According to Article 1(2) 
treaty X-Z, there is income received by or through an entity or arrangement 
considered as fiscally transparent by one of the Contracting States, and 
which is allocated to the partners A and B, who are also residents of the 
State treating the entity as tax transparent, i.e. State X. Therefore, in 
principle, State Z should accomplish with both treaties, which under the 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While Yco is regarded as tax transparent in State X, State Y and Z consider it as tax opaque. Likewise, State 
Z applies a general WHT of 30% on the payments of interest abroad, although the treaty State X/State Z 
provides for a reduced WHT of 10% while the treaty  State Y/State Z provide for a reduced WHT of 5%.  
A 
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principles of the OECD Partnership Report would mean that State Z must 
apply the lower WHT rate (5%) as regards to both treaties.
1083
 This solution 
is, however, not only misaligned with the concept of beneficial owner,
1084
 
but also it would leave open a potential double taxation issue.
1085
 
5.2.2.2. Example 6 
Let us assume the same basic facts than in the example 5, with the sole 
difference that YCo is treated as fiscally transparent in State Z while it is 
regarded as a taxable entity in State X and Y. Likewise, this hypothetical 
also assumes that all applicable treaties provide similar reductions of WHT 
of 10% at source. 
                                                          
1083  OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the Convention, 
para. 6.5. 
1084  Infra Section 5.3.1.  
1085  If State X does not have a treaty with State Y, or if having a treaty, YCo is not regarded 
as a PE, there will be no double taxation relief for the taxes imposed at the level of YCo 
in State Y. For an alternative manner to solve this issue, see the explanation regarding 
the treaty between the United States and Poland, which provides for the non-application 
of Article 1(6) US Model if certain requirements are met. Supra Section 4.3.1.1.1. 






Figure 54: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 6 
If we first consider the treaty Y-Z, it is easy to figure out that Article 1(2) 
treaty Y-Z applies in this case as to deny A and B the benefits of the treaty 
and to ensure that these benefits are allocated to YCo. In other words, as 
there is an item of income received through an entity considered in this case 
tax transparent in State Z, but the income is not allocated to residents of that 
State, Article 1(2) treaty Y-Z ensures that the benefits are not allocated to A 
and B, but rather to YCo. The application of Article 1(2) OECD Model, 
however, does not prevent the fact that State Z still considers A and B, and 
not YCo, as the beneficial owners of the interest. In other words, the 
reduced WHT of 10% at source could still be arguable under State Z’s 
perspective, because the preconditions of Article 11 treaty Y-Z would not be 
met.  
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 
Both the treaty State X/State Z  and the treaty  State Y/State Z provide for a reduced WHT of 10%.  
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As regards to the treaty X-Z, Article 1(2) treaty X-Z also applies as to deny 
the benefits of that treaty to A and B, because these two are not residents of 
the State treating the entity a tax transparent, i.e. State Z. Thus, A and B 
could get neither the reduced WHT at source under Article 11 nor the 
double taxation relief under Article 23 of the treaty X-Z.  
The application of Article 1(2) of the treaty X-Z, however, does not solve 
the question as regards to who is the beneficial owner of the interest. In this 
case, it seems to be clear that State Z will still consider A and B as the 
beneficial owners of the interest and not YCo. Thus, State Z might still 
consider applying Article 11 as regards to A and B, although by application 
of Article 1(2), these two are not entitled to the benefits of the treaty. 
 
Figure 55: Article 1(2) v. Article 11 (beneficial owner) 
On the other hand, even in the hypothetical that A and B were residents of 
State Z, the preconditions of Article 11 of the treaty X-Z would not be met, 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 
Article 11 State X/State Z 
treaty may still be applicable, 
since A and B are the 
beneficial owners. 
Article 1(2) would deny 
A and B the benefits of 
the treaty State X/State 
Z. 





i.e. there would not be a payment of interest arising in a Contracting State 
and being paid to residents in the other Contracting State. In contrast, in this 
case, interest would arise and would be paid to residents of the same State. 
This situation would thus remain as a domestic one. 
 
Figure 56: Ex. 6 (variation) 
5.2.2.3. Example 7 
Let us consider the same facts as example 6 above, with the sole difference 
that YCo is considered as fiscally transparent in State Y while as a taxable 
entity in State X and State Z.  
Interest 
State Z State Y 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity 
A 
B 




Figure 57: Article 1(2) OECD Model–Ex. 7 
As regards to the treaty Y-Z, Article 1(2) works denying the benefits of the 
treaty to A and B, which are not considered residents of the State regarding 
YCo as tax transparent, i.e. State Y. This solution, however, does not 
prevent that State Y still considers YCo as tax transparent. In other words, 
Article 1(2) of the treaty Y-Z does change the characterization of the entity 
receiving the income, neither at the State source nor at the State of 
residence. Therefore, from the strict perspective of State Y, the treaty Y-Z is 
not applicable, because YCo is not a resident for purposes of the treaty. 
Nonetheless, State Z might still apply a reduced WHT under Article 11 of 
the treaty Y-Z, because State Z considers YCo as a taxable entity. This 
would not be, however, a desirable outcome from State Z’s perspective.  
As regards to the treaty X-Z, on the other hand, this is evidently not 
applicable. Since neither State X nor State Z considers that the income is 
paid to and received by A and B, the preconditions of Article 11 of the 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 





treaty X-Z are not met. Accordingly, both States agree that YCo is a taxable 
entity. Therefore, the introduction of Article 1(2) within the treaty State X-Z 
does not change the result, because the precondition of having at least one 
Contracting State treating the entity as fiscally transparent would not be met.  
5.3. Other Issues as regards to the application Article 1(2) OECD 
Model 
As noted in the illustrations above, Article 1(2) OECD Model might solve 
many issues as regards to whom income, for purpose of a tax treaty, should 
be (or should not be) allocated, and thus, the benefits of the treaty should be 
granted (or not). This is especially troubling in cases where Contracting 
States do not agree on how to treat an entity for tax purposes. Nevertheless, 
the solutions provided by Article 1(2) OECD Model are not always 
desirable. The above is especially evident in cases where the application of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model puts the State of source in an unfavorable 
position as regards to the State of residence, or when the application of this 
provision conflicts with other attribution rules within tax treaties, in 
particular, with the concept of beneficial owner of Articles 10, 11 and 12 
OECD Model. These issues are analyzed in the subsequent subsections. 
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5.3.1. The (repeated missed) interplay with the concept of 
Beneficial Owner 
As stressed already, the principles of the OECD Partnership Report are not 
necessarily aligned with the special requirement of Article 10, 11 and 12 
OECD Model, which states that for purposes of the State of source to reduce 




The proposed OECD Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model seem to 
partially address the issue when states in paragraph 22.14: “Whilst the 
paragraph ensures that the various allocation rules of the Convention are 
applied to the extent that income of fiscally transparent entities is treated, 
under domestic law, as income of a resident of a Contracting State, the 
paragraph does not prejudge the issue of whether the recipient is the 
beneficial owner of the relevant income”. (Emphasis added).
1087
  
Nevertheless, a closer look at the Commentary brings us a different insight. 
Let us take Example 5 used in supra Section 5.2.2.1 above and assume that 
YCo is an entity incorporated in State Y, which has two partners, A and B, 
who are residents of State X. Accordingly, YCo has a subsidiary in State Z, 
i.e. ZCo, which is financed by a loan granted by YCo and because of which 
                                                          
1086  Supra Section 3.1.3.2.3. This was also discussed as regards to Article 1(6) US Model 
and that is why the author refers to it as the “repeated missed” interplay with the concept 
of beneficial owner. See supra Section 3.2.3.1. 
1087  Proposed Commentary on Article 1, para. 26.14 in: OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 142. 





it receives interest payments back from State Z.
1088
 YCo is considered as a 
taxable entity in State Y and in State Z. However, it is regarded as a fiscally 
transparent entity in State X. Likewise, although Country Z applies a general 
WHT on interest paid abroad of 30% of the gross amount paid, the treaty 
State X/State Z provides for a reduced WHT of 10% while the treaty State 
Y/State Z provides for a reduced WHT of 5%. 
 
Figure 58: The interplay between Article 1(2) OECD Model and the beneficial owner 
Following the proposed OECD Commentaries in this case, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model should not prejudge the issue of whether or not YCo is the 
beneficial owner of the dividends paid.
1089
 Although the term ‘beneficial 
                                                          
1088  The example assumes that the loan and interest are arm’s length. 
1089  Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.14 in: OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 142. 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While Yco is regarded as tax transparent in State X, State Y and Z consider it as tax opaque. Likewise, State 
Z applies a general WHT of 30% on the payments of interest abroad, although the treaty State X/State Z 
provides for a reduced WHT of 10% while the treaty  State Y/State Z provide for a reduced WHT of 5%.  
A 
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owner’ is indeed obscure and elusive,
1090
 it is clear in this case that State Z 
will consider YCo, a taxable entity, as the beneficial owner of the 
dividends.
1091
 In other words, State Z could still deny the application of the 
lowest WHT of 5% (treaty Y-Z) to A and B, because in fact A and B are not 
the beneficial owners of the interest. Nevertheless, according to the 
principles of the OECD Partnership Report, recognized within the OECD 
Commentaries, State Z should indeed accomplish with both treaties (Y-Z 
                                                          
1090  See the references at supra n. 326 as regards to the discussion about the meaning of 
beneficial owner. 
1091  The debate regarding which State, residence or source, should determine the beneficial 
owner, seems to be redundant in this case. On one hand, both countries consider YCo as 
a taxable entity, i.e. as a taxpayer and resident in State Y. On the other hand, the 
example assumes that YCo is not a conduit company, agent or nominee, that might 
affect its consideration as the beneficial owner. Therefore, either from the point of view 
of the State of source or the State of residence, it is expectable that the YCo is regarded 
as the beneficial owner of the interest. The above would indeed accomplish with the 
OECD Commentaries on Article 11 OECD Model, which states: “The requirement of 
beneficial owner was introduced in paragraph 2 of Article 11 to clarify the meaning of 
the words “paid to a resident” as they are used in paragraph 1 of the Article. It makes 
plain that the State of source is not obliged to give up taxing rights over interest income 
merely because that income was immediately received by a resident of a State with 
which the State of source had concluded a Convention”. OECD Commentary on Article 
11 concerning the taxation of interest, para. 9. Accordingly, it states: “The term 
‘beneficial owner’ is not used in narrow technical sense, rather, it should be understood 
in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention, including 
avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance”. Id.   In a 
similar triangular example, Sanghavi arrives to the same conclusion. His example 
considers a company SCo, resident in State S, which pays dividends to HCo, resident of 
State H. HCo is wholly owned by RCo, a company established in State R. While State S 
and H consider HCo as a taxable entity, State R considers it as a fiscally transparent 
entity, because of an option given in State R. As stated by Sanghavi: “However, article 
10(2) restricts the source state’s taxing rights only if the beneficial owner of the 
dividends is a resident of the other contracting states […] it is clear that the ‘beneficial 
owner’ generally refers to a singular entity [HCo]”. D. Sanghavi, BEPS Hybrid Entities 
Proposal: A Slippery Slope, Especially for Developing Countries, 85 Tax Notes Int’l 4 
(2017), p. 360, Fig. 1. 





and X-Z), applying the lower WHT rate (5%) to both treaties.
1092
 This 
solution is certainly not aligned with the concept of beneficial owner,
1093
 and 
might also contradict the purpose of the treaty itself leaving open a potential 




                                                          
1092  OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the Convention, 
para. 6.5. However, if YCo is regarded as tax transparent in State Y, it is obvious that 
State Z must not grant any benefit of the treaty to State Y. For an alternative solution, 
see the treaty United States/Poland, analyzed in supra Sections 3.2.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1.  
1093  The application of Article 1(2) OECD Model in this case would not solve the conflict 
that YCo might still be the beneficial owner of the interest payments. Thus, for purposes 
of applying Article 11 OECD Model, State Z could still argue that the interest are not 
beneficially owned by A and B in State X.  
1094  For example, if State X does not have a treaty with State Y, or if having a treaty, YCo is 
not regarded as a PE, there will be no double taxation relief for the taxes imposed at the 
level of YCo in State Y. Moreover, if the same situation is analyzed as regards to a trust, 
being the trust and the settlor residents in State Y (using our example) and the 
beneficiary being resident in State X, and having both State X and State Y treated the 
trust as tax transparent, the relief of double taxation becomes impossible. See Danon, 
supra n. 882, pp. 198-199, Diagram 7.  




Figure 59: Solution as per the Commentaries on Article 1(2) OECD Model 
The second part of the Commentary does not help to clarify the interplay 
either. As provided in the second part of paragraph 24.16: “Where, for 
example, a fiscally transparent partnership receives dividends as an agent or 
nominee for a person who is not a partner, the fact that the dividend may be 
considered as income of a resident of a Contracting State under the domestic 
law of that State will not preclude the State of source from considering that 
neither the partnership nor the partners are the beneficial owners of the 
dividend” (emphasis added).
1095
 The example is straightforward and clear in 
terms that no nominee or agent, partnership or partner of it, is indeed the 
beneficial owner of the dividends. However, it does not clarify which of the 
                                                          
1095  Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.14, in: OECD (2015), supra n.6, p, 142. 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While Article 1(2) OECD Model provides that the recipient of the interest, and thus who gets the benefits of 
the treaty X-Z, are the partners A and B, this solution does not coincide with the fact that for State Z, Yco is 
the beneficial owner of the interest payments. Therefore, there would not be reasons for State Z to apply a 
reduced WHT of 5% at source as per the treaty X-Z. 
A 









two, i.e. partners or partnership, should be considered as beneficial owners. 
Interestingly, nevertheless, is that the paragraph emphasizes that it is in 
accordance to the domestic laws of the State of source, how the 
determination of who is the beneficial owner should be made.
1096
 Although 
some commentators might criticize this statement,
1097
 the author agrees with 
the fact that, by logic, it is the State of source, i.e. the State whose taxing 
rights are limited by a tax treaty, who should determine to whom interest, 
dividends or royalties are “paid to”, independently of the residence Status 
as per the domestic laws of the State of residence. Of course this idea does 
                                                          
1096  Id. 
1097  For example, Sanghavi states as regards to this second part of paragraph 26.14 of the 
Commentary on Article 1: “It is also strange that the commentary suggests that the 
beneficial owner should be determined exclusively in accordance with the tax principles 
of the source state. A situation in which the source state considers a partnership to be the 
beneficial owner of dividends, but the other state treats that partnership as transparent 
would, absent unilateral relief, likely result in unrelieved double taxation because the 
partnership will not qualify as a treaty resident”. Sanghavi, supra n. 1091, p. 361. This 
author disagrees with Sanghavi’s statement in the sense that, in practice, the partnership 
will not be subject to tax in the State of residence, but rather its partners, but only to the 
extent they are also residents in that State. If they were residents of a third State, there 
should be analyzed what is the tax treatment that this State gives to the partnership and 
whether this tax treatment coincide or not with the one given in the State of source. 
Thus, if this third country, i.e. where the partners are residents, treats the partnership as a 
taxable entity, there will be no double taxation issue, because the partners will not be 
allocated the income derived through the partnership. However, if this State considers 
the partnership as fiscally transparent, the State of residence of the partners will exercise 
its taxing rights. In this case, double taxation will arise, but only to the extent the State 
of residence does not grant double taxation relief under Article 23 OECD Model at all, 
or it grants double taxation relief, but only up to the amount of taxes at source limited by 
the treaty. The above, however, does not mean to proceed again with ad-hoc solutions 
giving also the State of residence the possibility to determine who is the beneficial 
owner of the income, or to establish exception as regards to the determination of the 
beneficial owner by the State of source. Instead, it is perhaps the design or the scope of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model, which should be questioned. This is indeed what this author 
assumes in the proposal at infra Chapter VI.  
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not solve the dichotomy between beneficial owner and the persons who 
benefit from a treaty as per Article 1(2) OECD Model either. 
The issue is slightly differently addressed within the proposed UN 
Commentary on Article 1(2) UN Model, addressing the application of tax 
treaties to payments made through hybrid entities.
1098
 The UN Commentary 
in this case states: “As first step in applying the benefits of the Convention, 
paragraph 2 identifies the resident of a Contracting State that derives an item 
of income for which treaty benefits are sought. In order to be entitled to such 
benefits, such resident must also satisfy any additional requirements that 
are set forth in the applicable treaty, such as beneficially owning the item if 
income under the tax principles of the source State, any applicable requisite 
ownership thresholds (such as those found in subparagraph 2(a) of Article 
10 (Dividends), and either a principle purpose test or a limitation on benefits 
provision”. (Emphasis added).
1099
 Although in this case it is clearer that in 
order to obtain the benefits of the treaty, it is not only necessary to be a 
resident for purposes of the treaty, but also to accomplish with the beneficial 
ownership requirement of Article 10, 11 and 12 UN Model, the solution 
again crushes with Article 1(2) UN Model. Using the same example as 
                                                          
1098  UN: Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, 11th session, 
Item 3 (a)(i) of the provisional agenda, Application of treaty rules to hybrid entities, 
New provision for the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries to address the application of tax treaties to 
payments made through hybrid entities, Geneva 11-14 October 2016, Annex I: United 
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries: proposed changes to address the application of tax treaties to payments made 
through hybrid entities, pp. 4 et seq. 
1099  UN: Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2) UN Model, para. 6. Id., p. 5. 





above, we would conclude that State Z would consider YCo as the 
beneficial owner. Indeed, in this case there is no doubt that this 
determination is made exclusively “under the tax principles of the source 
State” (emphasis added), which considers YCo as a taxable entity. On the 
other hand, however, Article 1(2) UN Model will consider A and B as the 
person receiving the dividends and who benefit from the treaty X-Z, but 
who, nevertheless, are not the beneficial owners of the dividends according 
to State S. Once again thus the solution of Article 1(2) UN Model crushes 
with the beneficial ownership requirement, providing an inconsistent 
outcome.  
 
Figure 60: Solution under the Commentaries on Article 1(2) UN Model  
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While Article 1(2) UN Model provides that partners A and B are granted the benefits of the treaty X-Z, this 
solution does not coincide with the fact that for State Z, YCo is the beneficial owner of the interest 
payments, and not A and B. Once again, the solution of Article 1(2) UN Model crushes with the beneficial 
owner requirement of Article 10, 11 and 12 UN Model. 
A 
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5.3.1.1. A “deemed” Beneficial Owner: An alternative solution 
It results evident from the examples above that the dichotomy between the 
solution provided by Article 1(2) OECD Model as regards to whom should 
enjoy the benefits of a tax treaty when income is received by or through an 
entity (or arrangement, whatever that means) and the concept of beneficial 
owner in Article 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model, is very difficult to solve.
1100
 
Indeed, if one gives priority to the beneficial owner’s determination by the 
State of source, the Article 1(2) OECD Model remains ineffective in many 
cases. On the contrary, if one gives priority to the determination of who 
should get the benefits of a treaty when income is received by or through a 
fiscally transparent entity under Article 1(2) OECD Model, the beneficial 
ownership’s requirement crushes again and might deny those benefits. In 
simple terms, one remains in the circular effect created by the 
incompatibility of the two provisions. 
In light of the above, a recognized bunch of academics have recently 
proposed an alternative to solve this dichotomy between Article 1(2) OECD 
Model and the beneficial ownership requirement, which is based on the 
common agreement of these authors that, beyond the discussion on 
prevalence between one provision and the other, all agree that the benefits of 
a treaty should not fail to be granted where the application of a provision 
such as Article 1(2) OECD Model would result in income being attributed to 
                                                          
1100  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, pp. 333-334. These academics include: A. Nikolakakis, 
S. Austry, J. Avery Jones, P. Baker, P. Blessing, R. Danon, S. Goradia, J. Hattingh, K. 
Inoue, J. Lüdicke, G. Maisto, T. Miyatake, K. van Raad, R. Vann and B. Wiman. 





a resident of the other Contracting State, assuming no relevant party is 
acting as an agent or nominee or other intermediary for a third party from 
the source State’s perspective.
1101
 Having this in mind, the proposal is 
divided in two steps.  
The first step suggests that the State of source should determine if the entity 
is an agent, nominee or other intermediary. If so, the Source State should 
skip the entity and go to the next person, i.e. the member(s) of the entity. If 
this person (or entity) for which the entity is a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary is considered as tax opaque,
1102
 then Article 1(2) OECD Model 
is not in play.
1103
 If this person (or entity) is a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary for another fiscally transparent entity, then Article 1(2) OECD 
Model is in play as regards to that other fiscally transparent entity.
1104
 
                                                          
1101  Id. 
1102  It is not specified in the proposal, but this author assumes that the consideration of tax 
opaque or fiscally transparent refers to the consideration of the State of residence, even 
though the determination of nominee, agent or other intermediary is done from the 
perspective of the State of source. 
1103  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 336. 
1104  Id. The wording is confusing, but it seems to state that Step 2 of the proposal must be 
applied. 




Figure 61: Step One –“Deemed” Beneficial Owner’s proposal 
The second step applies only to the extent that the entity is considered as a 
fiscally transparent entity and it is not a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary, or where it is a nominee, agent or other intermediary for 
another fiscally transparent entity.
1105
 For this purposes, we must distinguish 
if the entity is considered as fiscally transparent from the perspective of the 
State of source or from the perspective of the State of residence. If the entity 
is regarded as fiscally transparent from the State of source perspective, but it 
is considered as opaque by the State of residence, then the State of source 
                                                          
1105  Id. 
STEP ONE 
YES 
The entity is a nominee, 
agent or other 
intermediary 
Fiscally transparent for 
the State of residence or 
source  
NO 
Skip the entity and go to 
the next person 
Tax Opaque Art. 1(2) is not in play 
Fiscally transparent 
Art. 1(2) applies as 
regards to this fiscally 
transparent entity 
STEP TWO 





must consider the entity as the beneficial owner.
1106
 On the other hand, if the 
State of residence also considers the entity as fiscally transparent, then one 
should take a look at the members of the entity. If the members are residents 
of the State of residence, then the Source State must consider those residents 
as the beneficial owners, unless the resident is considered a nominee, agent 
or other intermediary.
1107
 If the resident is indeed a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary, then the step calls to look at the principal. If the principal is a 
resident of the State of residence and also an opaque entity [it seems to be 
also from the State of residence’s perspective], then the State of source 
should consider satisfied the beneficial owner requirement. On the contrary, 
if the principal is not a resident of the State of residence and considered as 
tax opaque [from the State of residence’s perspective], then the beneficial 
owner requirement is not satisfied.
1108
   
                                                          
1106 “[…] the source state should be required to apply the treaty as if the beneficial owner is 
the entity, regardless of the legal nature of the entity or the effect of that in the source 
state’s normal application of the beneficial owner principles”. Id. It is thus clear that a 
“deemed” beneficial owner has been created in order to solve the discrepancies with 
Article 1(2) OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1107  It is correct to affirm in this case that if the resident is not regarded as a nominee, agent 
or other intermediary, it will coincide with the State of source’s determination of the 
beneficial owner. However, this is the result of the tax characterization of the entity by 
both States as fiscally transparent. If residence and source treat the entity as fiscally 
transparent, it is almost impossible that they conflict as regards to who is the beneficial 
owner and also the person being entitled to the benefits of the treaty. 
1108  This is exactly the same solution within the treaty Canada/ United States analyzed some 
Sections above. Supra Section 4.3.1.1.2. In that treaty it is provided that if State of 
source considers that the partner deriving the income under Article IV (6) of the 
Canada/United States tax treaty [Article 1(6) US Model] is an agent, nominee, custodian 
or conduit for a non-resident of the other Contracting State, then the State of source may 
deny the benefits of Article 11 Canada/United States tax treaty.  However, if the State of 
source still considers that the partner deriving the income is an agent, nominee, 




Figure 62: Step Two–“Deemed” Beneficial Owner’s proposal 
In the same order of ideas, if the entity were not considered as a nominee, 
agent or other intermediary and the State of source considers the entity as 
tax opaque, this step two would apply as follows.
1109
 If the State of residence 
                                                                                                                                       
custodian or conduit, but for a resident of the other Contracting State, then it should 
granted the benefits of the treaty anyway. The concepts of residence and beneficial 
ownership are merged in order to get a practical solution.  
1109  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 337. 
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the State of residence 
Members are residents in 
the State of residence 
However, if the members 
are nominee, agents or 
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Look at the nature and 
residence of the principal 
If the principal is 
resident & tax opaque 
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If the principal is non-
resident & tax opaque 
= NO beneficial owner 
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the State of residence = 
repeat Step Two 





also considers the entity as opaque, Article 1(2) OECD Model does not 
apply.
1110
 On the contrary, if the State of residence considers the entity as 
fiscally transparent, then the State of source must apply the treaty as if the 
beneficial owner were the entity’s member, unless they are regarded as 
nominee, agent or other intermediary by the State of source.
1111
 If the 
members are considered as nominee, agent or other intermediary, then one 
should look at the residence of the principal. If the principal is a resident in 
the State of residence and a tax opaque entity, then it should be considered 
as the beneficial owner for purposes of the treaty. On the contrary, if the 
principal is a residence in the State of residence, but fiscally transparent, 
then step two is repeated. If the principal is not a resident in the State of 









                                                          
1110  Id. It is clear that the precondition of having at least one of the Contracting States 
treating the entity as fiscally transparent would not be met in order to apply Article 1(2) 
OECD Model. 
1111  Id. 
1112  Id. 





Figure 63: Step Two –“Deemed” Beneficial Owner’s proposal 
5.3.1.2. Testing the Proposal for a “deemed” Beneficial Owner 
If we test the proposed solution with the illustrations given in supra Sections 





                                                          
1113  This is an interpretation of this author and might not necessarily coincide with the one 
sustained by the authors of the proposal. 
STEP TWO 
Source State applies 
the treaty as if the 
beneficial owner(s) is 
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Principal is non-resident 
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In this example, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P makes the treaty between 
these two States applicable by the sole characterization of entity P in State 
R, i.e. the State of residence, generating a conflict with the concept of 
beneficial owner in Article 11 of the treaty R-P. Let us thus apply now the 
proposed solution. 
If entity P is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State P’s 
perspective, but State R considers the entity as fiscally transparent, the 
solution would be that State P should apply the treaty R-P, granting a 
reduced WHT under Article 11, deeming A and B as the beneficial owners. 
Although the proposed alternative solves the dichotomy between Article 
1(2) and Article 11 (beneficial owner) in a pragmatic way, the question why 
the State of source (State P) should apply the treaty R-P by the sole 
characterization of the entity in State R remains unanswered.  
On the contrary, if entity P is as a nominee, agent or other intermediary (i.e. 
not the beneficial owner), State P should skip the entity and look at the 
members, i.e. A and B. In such a case, Article 1(2) is not in play, because 
partners A and B are not tax transparent (they are individuals). In other 
word, A and B are now deemed to be the beneficial owner by State P and 
they are also the persons receiving the benefits of the treaty under State R’s 
perspective, which considers the entity as fiscally transparent. Although the 
                                                          
1114  Supra Section 5.2.1.1. 
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solution completely disregards the tax characterization of the entity in the 
State of source, this seems to be irrelevant since the State of source 





In this example, Article 11 of the treaty R-P applies as to reduce the WHT at 
source. However, Article 1(2) OECD Model denies the benefits of the treaty 
to A and B (beneficial owners under the State P’s perspective) and provides 
that the benefits of the treaty should be allocated to entity R. Once again, 
State P might not agree in reducing its WHT with respect to entity R, but 
rather with respect to A and B, who are the beneficial owners. Let us thus 
apply now the proposed solution. 
If entity R is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State P’s 
perspective, and this State treats the entity as fiscally transparent, being 
rather opaque for the State of residence (State R), the proposed solution 
provides that State P should deem entity R as the beneficial owner. Again, 
the solution is pragmatic and solves the conflict, although it limits the 
exclusivity of the State of source to determine under its domestic law who is 
the beneficial owner. 
On the contrary, if entity R is a nominee, agent of other intermediary under 
State P’s perspective, this State should look at the members of the entity, i.e. 
                                                          
1115  Supra Section 5.2.1.2. 





A and B. As both are individuals (not fiscally transparent), Article 1(2) 
OECD Model is not in play. The author understands in this case that Article 
11 should apply as to reduce the WHT at source with respect to A an B, who 
are the beneficial owners, regardless the tax characterization of entity R in 
State R. In other words, Article 1(2) might not apply as to deny the benefits 




In this example, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P acts as to deny the benefits of 
the treaty to A and B and to confirm that this is indeed a domestic situation. 
Nevertheless, the treaty might be still applicable from the perspective of 
State P, which consider entity P as fiscally transparent, and A and B as the 
beneficial owner of the interest. Let us thus apply now the proposed 
solution. 
If entity P is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State P’s 
perspective, but it is regarded as fiscally transparent by the State of source 
(State P) and as a taxable entity by the State of residence (State R), then 
State P should deem entity P as the beneficial owner, solving the conflict 
with Article 1(2). 
On the contrary, if entity P is considered as a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under State P’s perspective, then State P must look at the 
members, A and B. Both are individuals (non-transparent); therefore, Article 
                                                          
1116  Supra Section 5.2.1.3. 
Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
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1(2) is not in play. Thus, State P will consider to reduce its WHT under 
Article 11 with respect to A and B, and they should, in principle, get a relief 
under Article 23, regardless the tax characterization in its State of residence 
(State R). In other words, Article 1(2) might not apply as to deny the 




In this example, Article 1(2) grants the benefits of the treaty R-P to A and B. 
However, State P considers that the beneficial owner is entity R and not A 
and B. Let us thus apply now the proposed solution. 
If entity R is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State P’s 
perspective, but it is considered as fiscally transparent by the State of 
residence (State R), then State P should deem A and B as the beneficial 
owners. The proposed solution works as to solve the conflictive position 
between Article 1(2) and the beneficial ownership requirement of Article 11 
of the treaty R-P. 
On the contrary, if entity R is a nominee, agent or other intermediary under 
State P’s perspective, then State P must look at the members A and B. Both 
are individual persons (non-transparent); therefore, Article 1(2) is not in 
play. Namely, A and B would be granted the benefits of the treaty and 
                                                          
1117  Supra Section 5.2.1.4. 





would be also considered as the beneficial owners for purposes of Article 11 






Let us analyze now the application of the rule in a triangular case. In 
example 5, the relevant treaty is X-Z, because in the treaty Y-Z both States 
considers YCo as a taxable entity, and thus, Article 1(2) does not apply. 
If YCo is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State Z’s 
perspective, but State X (State of residence) considers YCo as fiscally 
transparent, being opaque in State X  (State of source), then State Z must 
deem A and B as the beneficial owners of the interest. This pragmatic 
solution solves the dichotomy between Article 1(2) and the concept of 
beneficial owner, and grants A and B the reduced WHT of 5% (from the 
treaty Y-Z). Accordingly, it creates two beneficial owners for the same 
income: one is YCo (the real one), as regards to the treaty Y-Z, and the other 
ones are A and B (a “deemed” one), as regards to the treaty X-Z. This author 
does not really see a reason how this solution might be accepted without 
hesitation from a strict State of source’s perspective. 
On the contrary, if YCo is considered as a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under State Z’s perspective, this State should look at the 
                                                          
1118  Indeed, the fact that entity is considered as a nominee, agent or other intermediary under 
State P’s perspective, means that it cannot be the beneficial owner for purposes of 
Article 11 of the treaty R-P. 
1119  Supra Section 5.2.2.1. 
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members A and B. As both are individuals (non-transparent), Article 1(2) is 
not in play. Therefore, A and B are the beneficial owners of the interest 
under State Z’s perspective and they are also the residents who receives the 
income and are granted the benefits of the treaty in State X. However, one 
could still question whether the fact that YCo is considered a nominee, agent 
or other intermediary under State Z’s perspective changes or not the 
consideration of who is the beneficial owner under the treaty Y-Z. In other 
words, if YCo is considered as a nominee, agent of other intermediary by 
State Z, the expectable result is that now Article 11 of the treaty Y-Z does 




In example 6, both applicable treaties are relevant. In both treaties Article 
1(2) applies as to deny the benefits of the treaty to A and B.  However, in 
both cases A and B are indeed seen as the beneficial owners of the interest. 
Let us thus apply now the proposed solution. 
As regards to the treaty Y-Z, if YCo is not a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under State Z’s perspective, but it is considered as fiscally 
transparent by this country (State of source), although as tax opaque by State 
Y (State of residence), the source State (Z) should deem YCo as the 
beneficial owner. Therefore, the treaty Y-Z is now fully applicable, and 
State Z should limit its taxing rights based on a “deemed” beneficial 
                                                          
1120  Supra Section 5.2.2.2. 







 Considering the same situation as regards to the treaty X-Z, i.e. 
YCo is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under State Z’s 
perspective; the solution is the same as above: YCo is deemed to be the 
beneficial owner. Thus, the treaty X-Z would not longer be applicable.
1122
 
As regards to the treaty Y-Z, if YCo is considered a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under State Z’s perspective, this State should look at the 
members of the entity. As A and B are both individual (not fiscally 
transparent), Article 1(2) is not in play. Accordingly, since YCo is just a 
nominee, agent or intermediary, State Z might clearly deny a reduced WHT 
under Article 11 of the treaty Y-Z. On the other hand, State Z will consider 
to reduce its WHT under Article 11 with respect to A and B (treaty X-Z), 
and they should, in principle, get a relief under Article 23, regardless the tax 
characterization in its State of residence (State R). In other words, Article 




In this example, the relevant treaty is between States Y-Z, because the treaty 
X-Z is not only not applicable, but also consider that both the State of 
residence (State X) and State of source (State Z) treat the entity as a taxable 
entity. Therefore, Article 1(2) does not apply. Let us thus focus on the treaty 
Y-Z. From the strict perspective of State Y, the treaty Y-Z is not applicable, 
                                                          
1121  However, State Z keeps considering YCo as a transparent entity.  
1122  This is consistent with the solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model, which in this case 
denies the benefits of the treaty X-Z to A and B. 
1123  Supra Section 5.2.2.3. 
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because YCo is not a resident for purposes of the treaty. Nonetheless, State 
Z might still consider applying a reduced WHT under Article 11 OECD 
Model, because State Z considers YCo as a taxable entity, and thus, most 
probably the beneficial owner of the interest. Let us thus apply now the 
proposed solution. 
If YCo is not considered as a nominee, agent or other intermediary under 
State Z’s perspective, but the State of residence (State Y) considers YCo as 
fiscally transparent while the State of source (State Z) considers it as a 
taxable entity, State P (the State of residence) must apply the treaty as if the 
beneficial owners were the partners of YCo, i.e. A and B. In other words, 
the “deemed” beneficial owner in this case allows State Z to confirm that the 
reduced WHT at source under Article 11 Y-Z treaty does not apply. In other 
words, both State Y and State Z will not apply the treaty Y-Z.  
On the contrary, if YCo is considered as a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under State Z’s perspective, State Z must skip the entity and 
look at the members A and B. As both are individual persons (not fiscally 
transparent in their State of residence), Article 1(2) is not in play. In simple 
words, neither the treaty X-Z (originally not applicable) not the treaty Y-Z 
will be applicable now. 
5.3.1.3. The pragmatism of “deemed” rules: Critisism 
The pragmatic solution proposed by these known commentators seems to 
rely in some basic ideas. On one hand, while the tax characterization of the 





entity in the State of residence seems to be absolutely relevant to solve the 
dichotomy between Article 1(2) OECD Model and the beneficial ownership 
requirement of Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model, the tax characterization 
of the entity at source lacks of complete relevance. In other words, it is 
assumed by these authors that the tax characterization of the entity at source 
seems to play no role in the determination of the beneficial owner.  For 
example, if the entity is not a nominee, agent or other intermediary under the 
State of source’s perspective and also is considered as a taxable entity by 
this country, although as fiscally transparent by the State of residence, the 
solution simply proposes to treat the members of that entity as “deemed” 
beneficial owners to the extent that they are also not considered as nominee, 
agents or other intermediary. But even if these latters are regarded as 
nominees, agents or other intermediaries, it is the tax residence of the 
principal, which decides the conflict. Indeed, if the principal is a residence 
and also tax opaque in the State of residence, it is deemed as the beneficial 
owner. In simple terms, the concepts of beneficial owner and resident for 
purposes of the treaty are merged in order to solve the dichotomy. Likewise, 
if the entity is originally not considered as a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary under the State of source’s perspective, and it is treated as 
fiscally transparent by the State of source, but as tax opaque by the State of 
residence, the State of source should deem the entity as the beneficial 
owner. 
The above, on the other hand, brings us to the second characteristic of this 
proposal: even though it relies initially in the State of source’s approach to 
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determine the beneficial owner, which is in line with the proposed OECD 
Commentaries on Article 1(2),
1124
 this idea is rapidly disregarded limiting 
the exclusivity of the State of source to carry out this determination, without 
contingencies in the State of residence. In the case of this proposal, it results 
evident that even though the State of source considers an entity as tax 
opaque and not a nominee, agent or other intermediary, and thus, most 
probably the beneficial owner of the income, it must make this decision 
contingent to the fact the State of residence also considers that entity as tax 
opaque.
1125
 Otherwise, the proposed solution provides that the members of 
the entity are the “deemed” beneficial owners.
1126
 In the same order of ideas, 
even though the State of source considers an entity as tax transparent and 
not a nominee, agent or other intermediary, the determination of the 
beneficial owner is still contingent to the fact that the State of residence also 
considers that entity as tax transparent to finally say that the members of the 
entity are most probably the beneficial owners, regardless the fact that this 
solution would have been indeed achieved before looking at the tax 
characterization of the entity in the State of residence. Indeed, if this latter 
State would consider the entity as opaque, then the State of source must 
again “deem” the entity as the beneficial owner. It is therefore not a secret 
that the whole proposal relies on the tax characterization of the entity in the 
                                                          
1124  Proposed Commentary on Article 1(2), para. 26.14, OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p, 142. 
1125  Although in such a case, Article 1(2) OECD Model is not applicable at all. 
1126  Unless, these latters are also considered as nominee, agents or other intermediary, where 
the solution is even more straightforward and calls for looking at the residence of the 
principal. See Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 337. 





State of residence, even though no justifications for this approach are 
provided. 
As regards to the outcomes derived from the test of the proposed solution in 
the Section above, this author recognizes that, as per his personal 
interpretation of the rule, the proposed solution results, in most of the cases, 
pragmatically effective to solve the dichotomy between Article 1(2) OECD 
Model and the application of the beneficial ownership requirement of 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model, even sometimes bringing desirable 
results from the point of view of the State of source,
1127
 there are still some 
very arguable outcomes. For instance, in example 5 (triangular case), the 
application of the proposed solution does not only create two beneficial 
owners, one real and one “deemed”, but it puts the State of source in the 
position of applying again the two treaties involves, i.e. the treaty Y-Z and 
the treaty X-Z.
1128
 In this particular case, however, the two treaties provides 
for different reductions in their WHT, being the State of source obliged to 
apply the lower reduction as regards to both treaties, and now also under the 
confirmation that both the entity and the owners of its must be considered as 
the beneficial owners of the interest.
1129
 The above does not mean that the 
authors necessarily agree with this outcome, but as this rule is inspired in the 
treaty practice between Canada and the United States, some exceptions 
might also be applied considering the U.S. tax treaty practice, in this case 
                                                          
1127  For example, the results in examples 2 and 3, where the State of source consider initially 
that the entity is a nominee, agent or other intermediary. Supra Section 5.3.1.2. 
1128  Supra Section 5.3.1.2. 
1129  Id. 
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attending to the already stressed treaty between Poland and the United 
States.
1130
 As provided already, in a very similar situation (as example 5) 
and if some preconditions are met, Article 1(6) US Model (i.e. Article 1(2) 
OECD Model) is directly not applicable.
1131
 These preconditions are: (i) that 
the entity is considered as tax opaque under the law of the State of source; 
(ii) that the entity receiving the interest payments is organized in a third 
State (not the treaty partners’ States), and (iii) that the entity in this third 
State is eligible for the benefits of a treaty with the State of source (i.e. it is a 
taxable entity there), and which are more favorable than the benefits 
provided between the treaty partners (i.e. the State of residence of the 
members of the entity and the State of source).
1132
  
In spite of the fact that a dichotomy between Article 1(2) and 10, 11 and 12 
OECD Model (as regards to the beneficial ownership requirement), seems to 
be addressed only through the use of “deeming rules”, or exceptions to the 
general principles, this author still believe that this conflict might be solved 
perhaps in a more simple manner, without attending perhaps to the 
implementation of deeming rules to the deeming rules of the already 
existing deeming rules within tax treaties. In other words, a step towards 
simplicity is crucial at this point. This step should start from the basis that 
perhaps Article 1(2) OECD Model is not the ideal solution to the problem of 
hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. a domestic problem with tax treaty 
                                                          
1130  US/PL: Article 1(6)((b) of the Convention between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Poland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income of 13 Feb. 2013. Supra Section 4.3.1.1.1. 
1131  Id. 
1132  Id. 





implications. This author thus still argues in favor of a simpler domestic 
rule, which might also positively impact the application of tax treaties.
1133
  
5.3.2. “Saving clause” and Relief from Double Taxation 
According to the released draft contents of the 2017 update to the OECD 
Model, paragraph 3 of Article 1 OECD Model will read as follows: “This 
Convention shall not affect the taxation, by a Contracting State, of its 
residents except with respect to the benefits granted under paragraph 3 of 
Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and Articles 19, 20, 23 [A] [B], 24, 25 
and 28”.
1134
. This provision, which resemblances Article 1(4) US Model 
(saving clause),
1135
 is aimed at ensuring the Contracting State’s right to tax 
its own residents, regardless the application of the treaty, being relevant thus 
for the State of source when a limitation under the treaty prevents it to tax its 
own residents. Le me illustrate the above with example 1 of Section 
3.3.2.1.1 of this Chapter, although with some minimal variations.  
                                                          
1133  Supra Chapter VI, referred to the proposal for a “reactive coordination rule”. 
1134  OECD (2017), supra n. 462, Article 1(3) OECD Model. The OECD BEPS proposal on 
Action 2, as regards to tax treaties, came originally with a phrase in brackets saying: “[In 
no case shall the provisions of this paragraph to be construed so as to restrict in any way 
a Contracting State’s right to tax the residents of that State]”. OECD (2014), 
Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 
86. Similarly, paragraph 26.16 of the proposed Commentary on Article 1 provided: “The 
last sentence of the paragraph clarifies that the paragraph is not intended to restrict in 
any way a State’s right to tax its own residents”. Id., p. 91. Although the final draft of 
the OECD BEPS Action 2 deleted this phrase, it kept paragraph 26.16 of the 
Commentaries on Article 1, which now provides: “As confirmed by paragraph 3, 
paragraph 2 does not restrict in any way a State’s right to tax its own residents”. OECD 
(2015), supra n. 6, p. 143. 
1135  Supra Section 3.2.3.2. 
Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
 
 448 
Let us assume that an entity P is organized and resident in State P and has 
two owners: A and B, who are residents of State R. Accordingly, Entity P 
receives royalties from the same State P. While State P considers the entity 
as a taxable entity, State R considers the same entity as fiscally transparent. 
State P applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on 
the gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 64: Article 1(2) OECD Model, Ex. 1 
As per to Article 1(2) OECD Model, partners A and B are entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty R-P, because indeed State R is treating the royalties as 
being received by two of its residents. However, according to the saving 
clause, State P can still tax entity P (a taxable entity), regardless the 
application of the treaty. In practice, however, A and B might still claim a 
double taxation relief under Article 23 in State R.  





P is regarded as fiscally 
transparent  
P is regarded as a taxable 
entity 





Paragraph 26.16 of the Commentaries states as regards to the saving clause: 
“This [referred State’s right to tax its own residents], however, does not 
restrict the obligation to provide relief of double taxation that is imposed on 
a Contracting State by Articles 23A and 23B where income of a resident of 
that State may be taxed by the other State in accordance with the 
Convention, taking into account the application of the paragraph” (emphasis 
added).
1136
 Although the wording of the Commentary suggests that A and B 
in the case under analysis should be entitled to double taxation relief, it is 
difficult to figure out in practice how that relief will be provided. For 
example, if State R provides a tax credit to relief double taxation, it is clear 
in this case that no taxes where paid directly by A and B as regards to the 
taxation of entity P in State P. Thus, unless an extensive interpretation of 
Article 23 OECD Model is accepted, i.e. as including a potential indirect tax 
credit, the relief of double taxation in State R would not be possible.
1137
 
Nevertheless, this issue seems to be definitely clarified in the proposal of 
paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6, which provides the following 
modification on Article 23 OECD Model (referred in this case to Article 
23B–tax credit): “Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or 
owns capital which may be taxed in the other Contracting State in 
                                                          
1136  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 143. 
1137  As regard to this situation, Lang raises doubts: “I am not convinced about the legal basis 
for such an indirect tax credit, even though it eliminates double taxation. It might be 
difficult to interpret article 23 so extensively that an indirect credit has to be granted”. 
Opinion of M. Lang in the conference “Practical Problems of Tax Treaty Interpretation 
and Application”, held in Vienna on 21 Oct. 2013, and summarized in: K. Dziurdz, D. 
Fuentes and E. Pinetz, Case Studies on Partnerships and Other Hybrid Entities, 68 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 3 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 153. 
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accordance with the provisions of this Convention (except to the extent that 
these provisions allow taxation by that other State solely because the income 
is also income derived by a resident of that State), may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State, the first mentioned State shall allow […] (emphasis 
added)”.
1138
 This may be exactly the case where income (e.g. royalties) are 
taxed by each Contracting State, because one of the Contracting States taxes 
the worldwide income of an entity, which is considered a resident (i.e. entity 
P in our example above), and the other State considers the same entity as 
fiscally transparent and taxes its members (i.e. A and B in our example), 
who are also residents of that other State.
1139
 
As regards to the phrase except to the extent that these provisions allow 
taxation by that other State solely because the income is also income 
derived by a resident of that State, the proposed text of paragraph 11.1 to the 
Commentary on Article 23A and 23B OECD Model clarifies that: “[…] in 
such cases, both States are not reciprocally obliged to provide relief for each 
other’s tax levied exclusively on the basis of the residence of the taxpayer 
and that each State is therefore only obliged to provide relief of double 
taxation to the extent that taxation by the other State  is  in accordance with 
provisions of  the Convention that allow taxation of the relevant income as 
the State of source or as a State where there is a permanent establishment to 
which that income is attributable, thereby excluding taxation that would 
                                                          
1138  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, para. 64 (replacement of Article 23B OECD Model), p. 88. 
1139  Text of paragraph 11.1 to the Commentary on Article 23A and 23B. Id., p. 89. 





solely be in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article1”.
1140
 Therefore, there 
are no doubts that, in our example above, if State P taxes entity P just 
because it is a resident in its State (i.e. because of the saving clause), there is 
no obligation to State R to provide a double taxation relief under Article 23 
OECD Model in such a case. Although this author agrees that this 
conclusion might also be achieved by the sole interpretation of Article 23 
OECD Model, it recognizes that the inclusion of paragraph 11.1 in the 
Commentary on Articles 23A and 23B, helps in avoiding misinterpretations.  
 
Yet, the proposal of paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6, if finally 
implemented, raises some questions as regards to the inclusion of a saving 
clause.
1141
 On one hand, because paragraph 64 already clarifies that taxation 
of income derived by a resident, and exercised exclusively because of the 
resident status, might exist. On the other hand, because it clearly states that 
no relief of double taxation must be provided by the other Contracting State 
when the taxation was carried out solely because the income is also income 
derived by a resident of that State and not because taxation by the other 
State is in accordance with provisions of the Convention. The above avoids 
the uncertainty regarding the interpretation of Article 23 OECD Model. 
Such a solution, however, might still create problems in some countries 
                                                          
1140  Id. 
1141  This was also recognized in the OECD Action 2 (deliverable 2014), which provides: “A 
proposal included in the Treaty Abuse Discussion Draft would make that paragraph 
unnecessary”. OECD (2014), supra n. 1134, p. 91. Interestingly, however, the provision 
(saving clause) is recommended again in Article 3(3) MLI. Infra Section 6.2. It is also 
part of paragraph, Article 1 of the proposed UN Model. UN (2016), supra n. 1098, 
Annex I.  
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where, based on specific provisions or the tax treaty practice, use to grant 
double taxation relief in those cases. For example, the treaty Germany-
Australia (2015) provides in its Protocol with respect to Article 1(2): “If, in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 1, income is taxed in a Contracting 
State in the hands of an entity or arrangement that is treated as wholly or 
partially fiscally transparent under the laws of the other Contracting State 
and is also taxed in the hands of a resident of that other State as a participant 
in such entity or arrangement, and this results in double taxation, the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall consult each other 
pursuant to Article 25 to find the appropriate solution” (emphasis added).
1142
 
Thus, the tax authorities in this case might perfectly find that double 
taxation relief should be granted in one of the Contracting States, even if the 
taxation by the other Contracting State was due solely because the income 
was considered as derived by a resident of that State. In simple words, the 
solution might be exactly the opposite as the one provided in paragraph 64. 
Similarly, the United Kingdom has the practice of providing for a tax credit 
where the same income is taxed by the other State, even when it is taxed in 




                                                          
1142  Protocol to the Agreement between Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany for 
the elimination of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital and 
the prevention of Fiscal Evasion and Avoidance, of 12 Nov. 2015, Article 2 of the 
Protocol with reference to paragraph 2, Article 1 of the Convention.  
1143  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 347. However, see in contrast the decision in UK: 
CA, 23 Mar. 2011, Bayfine UK v. Commissioner for H M Revenue and Customs, [2011] 
EWCA Civ 304, where the Court of Appeal held that both Contracting States are not 
reciprocally obliged to provide double taxation relief. See also, Arnold, supra n. 1013 
and Cleave, supra n. 321. See also the decision in UK: Anson (Apellant) v. 





5.3.2.1. A “reverse saving clause” as an alternative solution 
It is perhaps interesting to note that some countries have also the treaty 
practice of including a provision known in doctrine as “reverse saving 
clause”, which basically precludes residence-based taxation of an entity by 
the State in which this is a resident, and preclude the taxation by the State of 
distributions by that entity.
1144
 A good example of the above is the treaty 
between the Netherlands and Belgium (2001), where in the Protocol states: 
“Where a company is subject to tax as such in a Contracting State but the 
income or capital of this company is, in the other Contracting State, taxed as 
income or capital of the participants in this company, the provisions of this 
Convention shall not be allowed to result in a double taxation or a total or 
partial exemption of such income or capital. In order to avoid such effect, 
the tax, the income and the capital of the company shall be considered as 
the tax, income and capital of the participants in this company in proportion 
to their entitlement to the company’s capital. To the extent necessary, the 
participants in the company should be allowed, each for their part, to credit 
the tax levied on the company in respect of this income or this capital 
(including any tax withheld at the source in third States) against the tax for 
which they are liable in respect of the same income or the same capital, and 
                                                                                                                                       
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 44 
on appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 63, 1 July 2015. See also, Lemos, supra n 591; Popa, 
supra n. 592; Rogers, Cassidy and Mace, supra n. 611. In this case, however, the relief 
was granted on the view that the income of the entity should be attributed to the 
members as such (as the “same income”), even though the member did not have a direct 
or indirect proprietary interest in the any of the entity’s property income. Nikolakakis et 
al., supra n. 955, p. 358. 
1144  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 353. 
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that the State of residence of the company waives possible taxation of the 
participants in this company who are residents of the other Contracting State 
in respect of the profits distributed by this company to such participants”.
1145
  
Accordingly, as provided in the Protocol: “Where a company is not subject 
to tax as such in a Contracting State and is subject to tax as such in the other 
Contracting State, the other Contracting State shall apply, at the request of 
the company, the provisions of Chapters III, IV and V of this convention 
insofar as these provisions would have had to be applied if the persons 
having rights in the company’s capital had directly received or possessed, 
each proportionally to its share in that company, the income or capital of 
said company. The application of the preceding sentence shall in no way 
affect that the other Contracting State shall determine pursuant to its 
domestic laws the taxable base of the company and shall reduce this base 
only insofar as such reduction results from the preceding sentence”. 
1146
 
Although the solution presented above is practical and certainly solve the 
double taxation risk, is contrary to the idea of paragraph 64 of the OECD 
BEPS Action 6.
1147
 The above, however, does not mean that it should be 
discarded. Instead, it should be considered as a consistent alternative to 
address the same issue, but from a different perspective. 
                                                          
1145  Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital and its Protocol I of 5 June 2001, Article 2 of the 
Protocol with respect to Article 3(1)(c) of the Convention.  
1146  Id., Article 4(b) of the Protocol with respect to Article 4 of the Convention. 
1147  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 347 (fn. 183) and 354. 





5.3.3. Article 1(2) OECD Model and the Base Erosion of 
Developing Countries: A UN Model’s proposal 
All the illustrations as regards to the application of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model allow us to see its preferential results for the State of residence. It is 
interesting thus that developing countries, normally acting as States of 
source in bilateral relations, might be willing to include such a provision 
within their tax treaty network. Contrary to this logic though, however, the 
U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matter has 
agreed in including within the U.N. Model a provision similar to Article 
1(2) OECD Model.
1148
 This idea is not only contradicting the historic 
position of the U.N. Committee of Experts as to recognize the principles of 
the OECD Partnership report,
1149
 but it might negatively impact the tax base 
of developing countries. 
Let me illustrate the economic impact of a provision similar to Article 1(2) 
OECD Model introduced within the UN Model, as follows:
1150
 let us 
imagine a company R residents in State R, which is the sole proprietorship 
                                                          
1148  UN (2016), supra n. 1098. 
1149  The principles of the OECD Partnership Report were never acknowledged. This idea is 
not derived from the official minutes of meetings sustained by the Committee of Experts 
discussing the principles of the OECD Partnership Report, but by the sole lecture of 
paragraph 5 and 6 of the Commentary on Article 1 UN Model. See UN: United Nations 
Model Tax Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, UN, New York, 
2011, p. 42. 
1150  Regardless that the analysis is focused on the impact in the tax base of developing 
countries, the legal concern raised by the author as regard to the interplay between 
Article 1(2) OECD Model and the concept of beneficial owner can be indeed reproduced 
in the case of a provision within the UN Model. 
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of an entity H, resident in State H, and which provides services to its client 
in a third country S, a developing country, constituting a PE in this country. 
Likewise, while State H and State S consider entity H as a taxable entity, 
State R considers it as a fiscally transparent entity. It is also assumed that the 
treaty between State R and State S follows the OECD Model and does not 




Figure 65: Article 1(2) OECD Model and developing countries 
According to the treaty between State H and State S, the business profits 
generated by entity H are attributable to its PE in State S. Thus, State S has 
exclusive taxing rights to tax those profits attributable to the PE according to 
Article 7 of the treaty H-S. However, as per Article 1(2) R-S treaty, the 
                                                          
1151  This example is extracted from Sanghavi to explain what he calls the “economic 
anomalies” of Article 1(2) OECD Model. See Sanghavi, supra n. 1091, pp. 361-362, 
Fig. 2. 
Profits 
State H State S State R 
H PE 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
R 
Under the treaty H-S, there is a service PE in State S. Thus, State S has the exclusive right to tax the profits 
attributable to that PE. However, by application of Article 1(2) R-S treaty, those profits are indeed income 
of R. The treaty R-S also does not consider that a PE is constituted in State S. 





income is attributed to company R, which is also entitled to the benefits of 
the treaty. This result is given by the sole fact that State R treats entity H as 
fiscally transparent, and the income is allocated to a resident of State R.  
Likewise, and considering that the treaty R-S does not contain a service PE 
provision, i.e. there is no a PE as per the understanding of the treaty R-S, 
Article 7 of the R-S treaty prevents State S from taxing any of the profits 
associated to the services rendered in State S. Moreover, double taxation 
might occur since State H will anyway tax the profits of entity H in State H, 
and these profits will be taxed again in State R, at the level of company R. 
Thus, unless under the treaty R-H, entity H is regarded as a PE, there will be 
no relief from double taxation in State R. The same results if States R and 
State H do not have a treaty.  
It is surprising that the outcome above-explained in which the State of 
source (State S, a developing country) must give up its taxing rights just 
because the State of residence of the partner (company R) considers entity H 
as fiscally transparent, is indeed accepted by State S when the erosion of its 
tax base and the negative economic impact is evident. This situation 
resemblances also the example analyzed in supra Section 5.3.1, where the 
State of source should give the benefits of its reduced WHT not only to the 
country where the intermediary entity was established, which was correct 
since both countries treated the entity as a taxable entity, but also to the 
State where the partners of this entity were residents, since this country 
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treated that entity as fiscally transparent.
1152
 The above certainly benefited 
the State of residence of the partners, since the reduction of the WHT was 
lower within the treaty between the State where the entity is established and 
the State of source, in comparison with the treaty between the State of 
residence of the partners and the State of source. Once again, however, the 
sole fact that the State of residence of the partners considers the 
intermediary entity as fiscally transparent granted the partners a more 
beneficial tax treaty and jeopardized the position of the State of source. 
6. Transparent entities and the MLI: Some brief remarks 
This last Section has the purpose of briefly stressing some issues as regards 
to Article 3(1) MLI and some other related provisions within the MLI 
dealing with transparent entities.
1153
 As most of the provisions resemblance 
or directly refer to the interpretation of the OECD Model proposal on 
Article 1(2), this Section will stress only the most important commonalities 
and differences, avoiding thus repetition.  
                                                          
1152  The “deemed” beneficial owner proposal reaffirms this conclusion as well. Supra 
Section 5.3.1.1. However, the alternative stated within the United States/Poland tax 
treaty seems to be a suitable and fairer alternative from a State of source’s perspective. 
Supra Section 4.3.1.1.1. 
1153  OECD (2016), Text of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax treaty Related 
Measures to prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, adopted on 24 Nov 2016, Part II-
Hybrid Mismatches (hereinafter also, “MLI text”); OECD (2016), Explanatory 
Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris (hereinafter also, 
“MLI Explanatory Statements”). For a critical analysis of the MLI, see J. Zornoza, 
Acción 15. El instrumento multilateral y el plan de acción BEPS, in: J. Ramos (coord.), 
Erosión de la Base Imponible y Traslado de Beneficios: Estudios sobre el plan BEPS de 
la OCDE, Aranzadi, Navarra (2016), pp. 425-452. 





6.1. Article 3(1) MLI: A mirror of Article 1(2) OECD Model 
Article 3(1) MLI states as follows: “For the purposes of a Covered Tax 
Agreement, income derived by or through an entity or arrangement that is 
treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the tax law of either 
Contracting Jurisdiction shall be considered to be income of a resident of a 
Contracting Jurisdiction but only to the extent that the income is treated, for 
purposes of taxation by that Contracting Jurisdiction, as the income of a 
resident of that Contracting Jurisdiction”.
1154
 
As it can be easily noted, both the text of Article 1(2) OECD Model, already 
analyzed, and the text of Article 3(1) MLI are exactly the same. Indeed, the 
MLI Explanatory Statements notes that Article 3(1) replicates the text of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model “with changes made solely to conform the 
terminology used in the model provision to the terminology used in this 
Convention”.
1155
 Therefore, since the MLI Explanatory Statements do not 
elaborate further on the interpretation of Article 3(1) MLI, one might 
presume that the intention is to give relevance to the OECD Commentaries 
on Article 1(2) in this regard.
1156
 In this order of ideas, therefore, the 
analysis and conclusions achieved as regards to the interpretation and 
                                                          
1154 OECD (2016), MLI Text, supra n. 1153, Article 3(1). 
1155 OECD (2016), MLI Explanatory Statements, supra n. 1153, para. 40. 
1156  For example, the MLI Explanatory Statements establish: “The commentary that was 
developed during the course of the BEPS Project and reflected in the Final BEPS 
Package has particular relevance in this regard”. Id., para. 12. In the same opinion: 
Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, pp. 298-299. 
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application of Article 1(2) OECD Model can also be extended to Article 
3(1) MLI without need of a further analysis.
 1157
 
Finally, it is perhaps important to note that Article 3(1) MLI is not required 




6.2. “Saving clause” and Relief from Double Taxation 
As well as the OECD Model, the MLI includes expressly two provisions 
dealing with the rights of the Contracting States to tax their own residents. 
These provisions are optional and they can be selected in a detailed version, 
i.e. Article 11 MLI, or in a simplified one, i.e. Article 3(3) MLI as regards to 
Article 3(1) MLI.
1159
 In both cases, it is clear that the final purpose of the 
provision is to ensure that Contracting States within a tax treaty are not 
precluded from taxing their own residents.
 1160
 However, while the version 
of Article 11 MLI seems to retain the obligations to provide double taxation 
relief under provisions such as Article 7(3), Article 9, Article 19, Article 20, 
Article 23A and 23B, Article 24, Article 25 and Article 28 OECD Model, 
Article 3(3) MLI does not expressly preserve treaty obligations as regards to 
                                                          
1157  Supra Section 5.  
1158  OECD (2016), MLI Explanatory Statements, supra n. 1153, para. 46. 
1159  Article 3(3) MLI states that, with respect to Covered Agreements for which one or more 
parties have made the reservation of Article 11(3) MLI, the following sentence must be 
added to Article 3(1): “In no case shall the provisions of this paragraph be construed to 
affect a Contracting State Jurisdiction’s right to tax the residents of that Contracting 
Jurisdiction”. OECD (2016), MLI Text, supra n. 1153, Article 3(3). 
1160  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 345. 







 Therefore, the inclusion of one provision or the other 
might not have the same effect.
1162
 
There are also other two provisions within the MLI dealing with tax credits 
and exemption obligations that should be considered. The first one is Article 
3(2), which provides: “Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that require 
a Contracting Jurisdiction to exempt from income tax or provide a deduction 
or credit equal to the income tax paid with respect to income derived by a 
resident of that Contracting Jurisdiction which may be taxed in the other 
Contracting Jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Covered Tax 
Agreement shall not apply to the extent that such provisions allow taxation 
by that other Contracting Jurisdiction solely because the income is also 
income derived by a resident of that other Contracting Jurisdiction”.
1163
 As 
noted, the wording mirrors the already analyzed paragraph 64 of the OECD 
BEPS Action 6, which introduces a new paragraph 11.1 to the 
Commentaries on Articles 23A and 23B.
1164
 In that modification, it is clearly 
stated that both States are not reciprocally obliged to provide relief for each 
other’s tax levied exclusively on the basis of the residence of the taxpayer. 
In contrast, they are only obliged to provide relief of double taxation to the 
extent that taxation by the other State is in accordance with provisions of the 
Convention that allow taxation of the relevant income as the State of source 
or as a State where there is a permanent establishment to which that income 
                                                          
1161 OECD (2016), MLI Text, supra n. 1153, Article 11 and Article 3(3). 
1162  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 345. 
1163  OECD (2016), MLI Text, supra n. 1153, Article 3(2). 
1164  Supra Section 5.3.2. 





 Similarly, Article 5 MLI–Option C, which applies only to 
credit-based relief along the lines of Article 23B OECD Model, would limit 
the obligation of the State of residence to the extent that the treaty allows 
taxation by the other Contracting State solely because the income is also 
income of a resident of that other Contracting State.
1166
 Indeed, as provided 
by the Article: “Where a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction derives 
income or owns capital which may be taxed in the other Contracting 
Jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement 
(except to the extent that these provisions allow taxation by that other 
Contracting Jurisdiction solely because the income is also income derived 
by a resident of that other Contracting Jurisdiction), the first-mentioned 
Contracting Jurisdiction shall allow […]”.
1167
  
 As well as stressed with respect to paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan 6, introduces a new paragraph 11.1 to the Commentaries on Articles 
23A and 23B, the approach adopted within the MLI might create problems 
in some countries where double taxation relief as a matter of treaty practice.  
 
 
                                                          
1165  OECD (2015), supra n. 200, p. 89, text of paragraph 11.1 to the Commentary on Article 
23A and 23B. 
1166  Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 347. These authors stress that, curiously, there is no 
such an option as regards to the exemption-based relief along the lines of Article 23A 
OECD Model, regardless that paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan 6 provides 
such a proposal. 






7. Final Remarks 
The allocation of taxing rights between countries due to the application of a 
tax treaty is not an easy task, because in fact it assumes to renounce part of 
the sovereignty of a State to tax. This task becomes even more complex 
when countries do not agree on the tax treatment that a foreign entity should 
have for domestic tax purposes. Such a decision is also crucial for tax treaty 
purposes since tax treaties do not deal with the characterization of entities, 
being the above a strict domestic tax issue. 
 
Since the OECD Partnership Report in 1999, the solutions provided have 
been, intentionally or not, designed in a manner in which winners and losers 
seem to appear clearly established: the States of residence certainly enjoys a 
more favorable outcome when compared with States of source. The above 
can be clearly noticed in the materialization of those principles both in 
Article 1(6) US Model and Article 1(2) OECD Model. The above, 
nevertheless, does not rest merit to these provisions that mirror one each 
other, although it must be recognized that perhaps this is precisely the 
problem.  
 
Article 1(6) US Model is a provision created to protect the position of the 
United States both as a resident and source State, which, as noted, can be 
found even before 1999. When the provision is analyzed being the United 
States the State of residence, it fits perfectly to the intention that the benefits 
of a treaty signed by the United States are not allocated to persons other than 
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U.S. persons. Therefore, when an item of income is received through an 
entity that the United States considers as fiscally transparent, the income and 
the benefits of the treaty are allocated to the U.S. partners only. In contrast, 
being the United States the State of source, the application of the “saving 
clause” protects again the position of the United States, disregarding the tax 
treaty obligation in order to tax its own residents. Article 1(2) OECD Model, 
on the other hand, follows the same patterns,
1168
 regardless that the OECD 
Model is used by developed and developing countries, being these latter 
countries remarkably relying on source taxation. In this regard, it results at 
least curious that Article 1(2) OECD Model does not propose a more 
equilibrated balance between the interests of residence and source States, 
appearing, in principle, as an inadequate strategy to address all the concerns 
that arise in this context.
1169
 The above idea is reinforced when the text of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model is simply replicated within Article 3(1) MLI. 
 
An special legal concern as regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model, it is its 
almost inexistent interplay with the beneficial ownership requirement in 
case of payments of dividends, interest and royalties under Articles 10, 11 
and 12 OECD Model. Indeed, the reduced WHT at source in those cases 
depends not only on the fact that a resident in the other State receives the 
income, but also that this resident is considered as the beneficial owner of 
those items of income. In all the illustrations used in this Chapter, it was 
                                                          
1168  Except that a saving clause is not necessary since the proposed modification of 
paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2 that includes a modification on Article 
23 OECD Model. Supra Section 5.3.2. 






demonstrated that the two provisions are indeed permanently in conflict or 
not properly aligned. A recent attempt to solve this dichotomy has been, 
however, elaborated by a bunch of recognized tax academics. The proposal 
is simple in terms of principles: it uses a “deeming rule” to provide who is 
the beneficial owner when Article 1(2) OECD Model does not coincide 
giving the same person the benefits of a treaty. Nevertheless, and although 
the rule initially attends to the fact that no relevant party is acting as an 
agent or nominee or other intermediary for a third party from the source 
State’s perspective, it is strictly designed to give prevalence to the tax 
characterization of the entity in the State of residence.
1170
 As such, this 
author does not see how States of source might fully agree with this 
pragmatic solution without hesitation.   
 
Another concern as regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model and also Article 
3(1) MLI is the interplay between a “saving clause”, which ensures 
Contracting States the taxation of their own residents regardless the 
application of a treaty, and the relief of double taxation’s obligations under a 
treaty. The solution adopted by paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6, 
which introduces a new paragraph 11.1 to the Commentaries on Articles 
23A and 23B is clear in this regard: the Contracting States are not 
reciprocally obliged to provide relief for each other’s tax levied exclusively 
on the basis of the residence of the taxpayer. Therefore, relief of double 
taxation remains only to the extent that taxation by the other State is in 
                                                          
1170  Supra Section 5.3.1.3. 
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accordance with provisions of the Convention that allow taxation of the 
relevant income as the State of source or as a State where there is a 
permanent establishment to which that income is attributable. This solution 
is replicated in Article 3(2) and Article 5–Option C MLI. Both Articles refer 
expressly refer to paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6. However, 
when dealing with the optional saving clauses within the MLI, it seems to 
be that opting for one or another might not bring the same results. For 
example, while the detailed saving clause of Article 11 MLI seems to retain 
the obligations to provide double taxation relief under provisions such as 
Article 7(3), Article 9, Article 19, Article 20, Article 23A and 23B, Article 
24, Article 25 and Article 28 OECD Model, the simplified version of Article 
3(3) MLI does not expressly preserve treaty obligations as regards to those 
Articles. Likewise, a solution such as the one proposed in paragraph 64 of 
the OECD BEPS Action 6 might still create issues in some countries where, 
based on specific tax treaty provisions, e.g. the tax treaty 
Germany/Australia, or by treaty practice, e.g. the United Kingdom, use to 
grant double taxation relief in those cases, and other analogous ones, by an 
extensive interpretation of Article 23 OECD Model. In other words, the 
inclusion of a saving clause is perhaps not strictly necessary for all States. 
 
All in all, it seems to be that after a deeper look at Article 1(2) OECD Model 
and Article 3(1) MLI, and the proposed saving clauses in Article 1(3) 
OECD Model and Articles 3, 5 and 11 MLI, they are not necessarily the 






entities within the treaty context.
1171
 It is perhaps time to think on a different 
solution, which truly targets the disparities in the characterization of entities, 
and which should not necessarily be implemented within tax treaties.
1172
 As 
this author proposes in Chapter VI, a domestic coordination in the tax 
characterization of entities might achieve better results, on one hand, 
reducing the scope of application of Article 1(2) OECD Model only to those 
cases in which both the State of residence and source treat the entity as 
fiscally transparent, and, on the other hand, might provide more consistent 
tax treaty outcomes, indirectly balancing the position between residence and 
source States, at least when compared with a pure application of Article 1(2) 





                                                          
1171  Also in this opinion: Nikolakakis et al., supra n. 955, p. 358 and 360. 
1172  See the proposal for a “reactive coordination rule” in infra Chapter VI. 
1173  The tax treaty implication of the domestic proposal of coordination (reactive 
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Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements and Linking Rules: Creating 
Artificial (Mis)Matches 
1. Introduction 
The international tax world and the manners to deal with hybrids and 
reverse hybrid entities have certainly changed after the issuance of the 
OECD BEPS Project.
1174
 Since then, the trend has been especially inclined 
to match transactions involving hybrid and reverse hybrid entities with the 
outcomes derived from those transactions, i.e. specially “deduction/non-
inclusion” (D/NI) outcomes or DNT. This approach has been proposed and 
designed within the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2 and attempts to recognize a 
new single category of (international) problems denominated “hybrid 
mismatch arrangements” (HMA).
1175
 Likewise, and as a remedy to those 
problems, the OECD proposes the implementation of domestic rules that 
primarily deny a deduction if the respective income is not included in the 
hands of the recipient in the other country, i.e. a primary response, or to tax 
the income that originally was not taxed in the hand of the recipient, i.e. a 
                                                          
1174  OECD (2013), supra n. 2. 
1175  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 16. However, the OECD already used the concept of HMA 
in 2012 when it elaborated a report on “hybrid mismatch arrangements”. This report is 
with no doubts the anteroom of the proposals included within the BEPS Action Plan 2. 
See OECD (2012), supra n. 6. 






 Both rules are recognized under the single denomination 
of “linking rules”, as their design also suggests.  
 
This Chapter attempts to demonstrate that both the notion of HMA and the 
solutions created to counteract them (“linking rules”) are indeed ad-hoc 
constructions that artificially attempt to match transactions involving hybrid 
entities and reverse hybrids with the DNT outcome (i.e. D/NI), disregarding 
the core of the issue with respect to hybrids, which is the uncoordinated 
characterization of entities by two different countries.
1177
 Moreover, this 
matching practice has the risk of creating a presumption of abusive practices 
in all those cases in which a transaction involving hybrid entities derives in a 
D/NI outcome, which certainly deviates from a proper understanding of the 
notion of DNT and restrict the ability of the taxpayers to efficiently manage 
their businesses.
1178
 Likewise, this Chapter suggests that the implementation 
of domestic linking rules, i.e. the domestic remedy suggested by the OECD, 
might generate important concerns both from a tax policy and from a legal 
perspective. This latter issue will be particularly tested in light of the 
application of double tax treaties and the application of Article 24 OECD 
Model (Non-discrimination) and with EU primary and secondary law.
1179
 A 
                                                          
1176  Chapter 3, 4 and 5 of the OECD Action Plan 2 refer specifically to the recommendations 
with respect to payments made by a hybrid entity and payments received by a reverse 
hybrid entity and which result in D/NI. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, pp. 49-66. 
1177  Supra Chapter III. 
1178  Supra Chapter I. 
1179  Testing the implementation of linking rules as regards to the non-discrimination clause 
of Article 24 OECD Model has special relevance, because it is indeed the only provision 






similar analysis will be made with respect to the interaction between linking 
rules and interest limitation and CFC rules, respectively.  
Section 2 analyzes the concept of HMA and the elements required for its 
formation, specifically referred to hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities: 
(i) the ‘hybrid element’; (ii) the existence of a payment and (iii) D/NI 
outcome (DNT). It also illustrates with examples the cases in which the use 
of hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities might derive in a D/NI outcome 
in order to demonstrate that in both situations this outcome is more temporal 
than permanent. The illustration includes the cases of a D/NI outcome using 
a hybrid entity, a reverse hybrid and the case of “imported mismatches”. 
Section 3 turns the analysis into the specific domestic measures 
recommended by the OECD to counteract HMA, i.e. linking rules. This 
Section also stresses the tax policy and legal concerns associated with the 
implementation of linking rules, particularly with respect to the application 
of tax treaties and EU law. Section 4 analyzes the interaction between 
linking rules and the application of other domestic anti-abuse and anti-base 
erosion rules, especially with respect to interest limitation rules and CFC 
                                                                                                                                       
Likewise, the use of EU law as a subject of analysis is also justified. On one hand, 
because of the less restrictive notion of “discrimination” elaborated within the CJEU 
when compared to the one of Article 24 OECD Model, and, on the other hand, because 
the EU has been particularly involved in the implementation of the OECD BEPS 
measures, including the ones counteracting hybrid mismatches. This task has been 
materialized with the approval of the EU ATAD I, which opted for including linking 
rules to deal with hybrids (both as regards to entities and financial instruments), and the 
recent development included within the EU ATAD II, which covers HMA with third 
countries. All these developments were previously analyzed in this work. See supra 
Chapter III, Section 5.3. 




rules that might affect transactions involving hybrid and reverse hybrid 
entities, respectively. Section 5 provides some final remarks. 
2. The Concept of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (HMA)  
The final OECD report on Action 2 refers to HMA as arrangements that 
“exploit differences in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the 
laws of two or more jurisdictions to achieve double non-taxation, including 
long term deferral”.
1180
 A similar definition was proposed in the first draft 
on Action 2 in 2014, which provided that a HMA is “an arrangement that 
exploits a difference in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the 
laws of two or more tax jurisdictions to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes 
where that mismatch has the effect of lowering the aggregate tax burden of 
the parties to the arrangement”.
1181
 Likewise, this work follows the direction 
already settled in the previous OECD report on hybrid mismatch 
arrangements (2012), which referred to them as “arrangements exploiting 
differences in the tax treatment of instruments, entities or transfers between 
two or more countries […] They often lead to  ‘double non-taxation’ that 
                                                          
1180  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 11 
1181  OECD (2014), supra n. 1134, p. 29. Before the issuance of the 2014 Report, the OECD 
opened the discussion to the public issuing two documents of 19 March 2014: (i) OECD 
(2014a), Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements (Recommendations for domestic Laws) and (ii) OECD (2014b), 
Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements (Treaty Issues). The comments received are summarized in a document of 
7 May 2014: OECD (2014c), Comments Received on Public Discussion Drafts, BEPS 
Action 2: Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, available online at 
www.oecd.org.  





may not be intended by either country, or may alternatively lead to a tax 




Therefore, exclusively referring to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, it is 
possible to argue that, in the OECD view, there will be a “hybrid entity 
mismatch arrangement” when an entity organized in a determined country 
is regarded either as transparent or taxable entity in that country, while in 
the other country is characterized exactly in the opposite manner, and whose 
result is therefore a mismatch in the payments made under that arrangement, 
which is normally traduced in a D/NI outcome, i.e. DNT or a DD.
1183
 In 
other words, at least three elements will be required in order to determine 
that a hybrid entity mismatch exists: (i) an ‘hybrid element’, i.e. a disparity 
in the characterization of the same entity by two or more countries involved 
in the transactions; (ii)  the existence of a ‘payment’ between the two parties 
involving in the hybrid structure, and iii) a mismatch in that payment, 
namely, a D/NI outcome or DNT. These elements are subsequently analyzed 
as regards to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. 
                                                          
1182  OECD (2012), supra n. 6,  p. 1 
1183  O. Popa, Hybrid Entity Payments–Extinct Species after the BEPS Action Plan?, 59 Eur. 
Taxn. 9 (2014), Journals IBFD, p. 408.  




2.1. The ‘hybrid element’  
As already stressed in Chapter III, hybrid entities and reverse hybrids are the 
result of the different characterization of entities in two jurisdictions.
1184
 In 
this regard, a hybrid entity is an entity regarded as a taxable entity in the 
country of its organization while in the other country the same entity is 
regarded as fiscally transparent. In other words, the entity under analysis is 
subject to taxation at the level of the entity in its country of organization 
whilst in the country of the shareholders is considered ‘tax transparent’, i.e. 
non-taxable at the level of the entity but rather at the level of the 
shareholders. A reverse hybrid, on the other hand, supposes the opposite 
situation. This is to say, an entity considered as a tax transparent entity in its 
country of organization while as a taxable entity in the other country, i.e. 
where the shareholders are residents.
1185
  
The ‘hybrid element’, as described within the OECD BEPS Action 2, seems 
to be thus a simple recognition of an obvious reality in taxation: domestic 
rules among different jurisdictions are not necessarily coordinated, less 
harmonized.
1186
 Indeed, one should start from the basis that disparities, 
including disparities in the characterization of entities, are the general rule 
and not the exception within cross-border transactions. The above was 
demonstrated in Chapter III, where dealing with the domestic rules on 
                                                          
1184  Supra Chapter III, Section 3.1. 
1185  Id. 
1186  Supra Chapter III, Section 6. 





characterization of entities concluded, on one hand, that there is no a perfect 
system to characterize entities for tax purposes, which can be used 
homogeneously by States, and, on the other hand, that the distinction of 
systems to characterize entities, i.e. resemblance test; elective system, etc., 
do not go beyond of being an interesting academic exercise, although in 
practice the different systems are normally interconnected, namely, they 
present elements of each other.
1187
 For example, as already stressed in 
Chapter III, the resemblance test applied in the United States before the 
CTB regulations were not less elective than the current elective system, 
because in fact taxpayers could achieve certainty in the characterization of a 
foreign entity in advance involving themselves in costly tax advisory. This 
is what this author has called a ‘de facto elective system’.
1188
  
Regardless the above, the “hybrid element” is indeed a fundamental factor 
(if not the real reason of the disagreement between States) whose presence 
determines the first step to confirm the existence of a HMA with respect to 
entities. On the contrary, the absence of this element implies also the 
absence of a HMA (or the impossibility of its formation), and thus, makes 
the OECD recommendations inapplicable. The above is especially relevant 
considering the cases of countries that might remotely or never face issues 
with respect to hybrid entities or reverse hybrids either because of a 
coordination in their characterization of a foreign entity, by statute or 
administrative practice, as per the rule in the foreign country where the 
                                                          
1187  Id. 
1188  Supra Chapter III, Section 4. 






 or simply because they do not provide the 
alternative for tax transparency within their domestic law or specific rules to 
characterize a foreign entity as transparent.
1190
 Whilst the former, i.e. the 
coordination in the characterization of entities as per the foreign rules, 
reduces the probabilities of originating hybrid entities, the latter reduces the 
probabilities of reverse hybrid entity mismatches to zero. 
Another issue of particular relevance with respect to the ‘hybrid element’ is 
the fact that countries might treat some entities as only “partially” tax 
transparent, as it is the case of some trusts and LLPs.
1191
 Although this 
                                                          
1189  See, e.g. the case of Spain with respect to the characterization of foreign entities for tax 
purposes. As stressed in Chapter III, the administrative practice of the DGT (Spanish tax 
administration) is to follow the characterization in the foreign country, regardless that by 
statute the Spanish domestic law provides for a resemblance test. Supra Chapter III, 
Section 5.1. 
1190   Although many developed countries provide the alternatives of tax transparent entities, 
e.g. partnerships or trusts, this is indeed not the case in developing countries. For 
example, Brazil and Colombia do not provide for domestic tax transparent partnerships. 
In Uruguay, a partnership whose partner is a company also resident in Uruguay is not 
regarded as tax transparent either. Likewise, e.g. Brazil, Colombia and South Africa do 
not have rules that allow treating a foreign subsidiary as a tax transparent entity. For a 
full analysis with respect to problematic of HMA and developing countries (particularly 
with respect to Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and South Africa), see B. Kuzniacki et al., 
Preventing Tax Arbitrage via Hybrid Mismatches: BEPS Action 2 and Developing 
Countries, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2017-03, of 31 March 
2017, available online at www.ssrn.org.  
1191  In the Netherlands, e.g. an “open commanditaire venootschap” is always transparent for 
the general partners, while it is taxed at the level of the entity with respect to the limited 
partners. Similarly, the “société en commandite simple” in France, provides for tax 
transparency with respect to the general partners, while the limited partners are not taxed 
within the regime of transparency. Baker distinguishes at least four levels of 
transparency: 1) complete transparency, where the entity has no existence, e.g. a 
contractual joint venture, or where the entity is completely disregarded for tax purposes; 
2) transparency with reporting obligations, where the entity has still the obligation to 
report income or gains, but the tax liability remains on the participants; 3) optional 





issues is not directly treated within the OECD report on Action 2 referred to 
domestic recommendations, it is indeed analyzed within the tax treaty 
recommendations and the access to tax treaty benefits.
1192
 As provided 
within the proposed paragraph 26.11 of the commentaries on Article 1(2) 
OECD Model: “In the case of an entity or arrangement which is treated as 
partly fiscally transparent under the domestic law of one of the Contracting 
States, only part of the income of the entity or arrangement might be taxed 
at the level of the persons who have an interest in that entity or arrangement 
[…] whilst the rest would remain taxable at the level of the entity or 
arrangement”.
1193
 In the same order of ideas, therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that a “partial hybridity” could exist. In such cases, only the part of 
the entity treated as tax transparent by one country and taxable by the other 
country could give rise to the “hybrid element” that is necessary to originate 
a HMA. In other words, if the country of establishment of an LLP, e.g. treats 
the entity as fiscally transparent only with respect to the general partners, 
while the other country considers the LLP as taxable in full, only the part of 
the income or payments associated to the general partners could originate 
the hybrid element that subsequently might give rise to a HMA. 
                                                                                                                                       
transparency, where the entity or participants may elect for transparency; 4) Partial 
transparency, where part of the income of the entity is taxed in the hands of the entity 
and part in the hand of the participants. See Baker, supra n. 884, pp. 22-23. 
1192  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, pp. 133 et seq. See also the discussion regarding “wholly and 
partially” fiscally transparent, referred to the wording of Article 1(2) OECD Model at 
supra Chapter IV, Section 5.1.4. 
1193  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 141. (Proposed paragraph 26.11 of the Commentaries on 
Article 1(2) OECD Model). 




2.2. The existence of a ‘payment’ 
The second element that constitutes the notion of HMA refers to the 
existence of a payment between the parties involved in the hybrid entity 
structure.
1194
 In this regard, Action 2 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan states 
that a payment means: “any payment of money (which includes money’s 
worth) made under the financing instrument and includes a distribution, 
credit or accrual. It includes an amount that is capable of being paid and 
includes any future or contingent obligation to make a payment. The 
definition of payment includes notional amounts that accrue in respect of a 
future payment obligation even when the amount accrued does not 
correspond to any increase in the payment obligation during that period”.
1195
 
Accordingly, a payment is considered as such when the relevant payment 
obligation is incurred under the laws of the payer jurisdiction or the payment 
is derived under the laws of the recipient jurisdiction.
1196
 The report, 
however, expressly excludes a unilateral deduction for invested equity that 
does not require a payment from the taxpayer, such as the case of “deemed 
interest deductions for equity”
1197
 and differences in the value with respect 
                                                          
1194  As provided within the OECD report: “The extent of a mismatch is determined by 
comparing the tax treatment of the payment under the laws of each jurisdiction where 
the mismatch arises”. Id., p. 17. 
1195  A payment should also include a part of a payment where the context requires. Id., p. 
130. 
1196  Id. 
1197  These payments would be “economically closer to a tax exemption or similar taxpayer 
specific concessions and do not produce a mismatch in tax outcomes in the sense 
contemplated by Action 2”. Id., p.18 









The concept of payments used within the report, however, has not been 
exempt of criticism.
1199
 In fact, if one considers e.g. an allowance for 
corporate equity such as a “deemed interest deduction for equity” (i.e. a 
fictional deduction), it is clear that this would be immune to the OECD 
recommendations, although it treats equity like debt in one country
1200
 and 
could perfectly derive in DNT (i.e. the main target of the HMA concept and 
the proposed linking rules), considering that the majority of these notional 
                                                          
1198 “The hybrid mismatch rules are not generally intended to pick-up mismatches that are 
attributable to differences in the value ascribed to a payment. For example, gain and 
losses from foreign currency fluctuations on a loan can be said to give rise to 
mismatches in tax outcomes but these mismatches are attributable to differences in the 
measurement of the value of payments (rather than its character) and can generally be 
ignored for the purposes of the hybrid mismatch rules”. Id. 
1199  Cooper e.g. states that it is interesting that the concept and the rules in question [linking 
rules] refer only to “payments”. Indeed, he gives the example of a “double dip” lease 
where two taxpayers claim the entitlement to depreciation deductions or investment tax 
credits, and he argues: “There are certainly ‘payments’ being made, i.e. the price paid by 
the financier for the equipment and the rent and residual paid by the user, but these are 
not the same payment, and the tax-relevant item for the user or financier is not itself a 
“payment”, but, rather, the depreciation deduction created by law. While depreciation is 
derived from the amount of a payment, it is not itself a payment. What does appear to be 
clearer is that both parties could claim any additional investment allowance or tax credit 
that might to be given to the “owners” without being affected by these rules”. In the 
same order of ideas, Cooper sustains that, e.g. a duplication of FTC, i.e. where two 
parties enjoy the same credit, can occur without the need of a “payment” between the 
two claimants. See, G. Cooper, Some Thoughts on the OECD’s Recommendations on 
Hybrid Mismatches, 69 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6/7 (2015), Journals IBFD, p. 342.  The 
conclusion of Cooper is correct if we consider that the OECD states that “payments that 
do not involve the creation of economic rights between the parties” are not regarded as 
“payments. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 123, in reference to the definition of 
“payment”.  
1200  Cooper, supra n. 1199. 




interest deductions will be regarded as equity in the country of the payee and 
subject to a participation exemption.
1201
 Moreover, if one also considers the 
differences among the regimes on NID, the determination of what is a 
“deemed interest deduction” or whether there was a “payment” becomes 
even more complicated. Let us take as example the “Juros sobre o capital 
propio” (or Juros) in Brazil to illustrate the issue.
1202
  
                                                          
1201  In Germany, e.g. it is clear that “interest on equity” are to be treated as dividends under 
German Tax Law (DE: Sec. 20(1) No. 1 of the Income Tax Act 
[Einkommensteuergesetz–EStG]), and thus exempted from taxation in a 95% according 
to Sec. 8b(5) of the Corporate Income Tax Act [Körperschaftsteuergesetz–KStG]. See 
C. Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-Taxation: An Analysis of Cross-Border 
Financing from German Perspective, 43 Intertax 3 (2015), p. 222. See also, e.g. DE: 
BFH, 6 Jun. 2012, I R 6, 8/11; Federal Tax Gazette II 2012, 111, which refers 
specifically to the treatment of the “Brazilian juros” and confirming the application of 
the participation exemption. 
1202  Similar examples of “fictitious interest deductions for equity” can be found, e.g. in the 
“NID regime” under Belgian law. In brief, Belgian law provides the possibility for any 
company subject to CIT in Belgium, to deduct from its taxable base a so-called 
“notional interest deduction” (deduction pour capital à risqué). The amount of NID is 
calculated by multiplying a fictitious interest rate with the relevant equity, which is 
determined by adjusting certain deductions and based on the non-consolidated annual 
accounts of the previous accounting year. Likewise, the interest rate is determined 
considering the interest rate of medium long-term linear government bonds (“OLO 
bonds”). For further analysis on the Belgian NID see, e.g. W. Heyvaert and D. 
Deschrijver, Belgium Stimulates Equity Financing, 33 Intertax 10 (2005); M. Gérard, 
Belgium moves to dual allowance for corporate equity, 46 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2006), Journals 
IBFD. It is arguable, however, that the Belgian NID is indeed a “deemed interest 
deduction” when, on one hand, it is calculated on a function of net equity invested and, 
on the other hand, it does not refer at all to effective loan transactions entered into with 
related or unrelated parties. See A. Bax and S. Claes, The new Belgium-US tax treaty-an 
analysis, 47 Eur. Taxn. 7 (2006), Journals IBFD, p. 353. Other European countries have 
also introduced similar regimes. See, e.g. the cases of Latvia (2008), Portugal (2008), 
Lichtenstein (2011) and Italy (2011). For further references in the case of Latvia, see Z. 
Kronbergs, Latvia-2014 Corporate Tax Changes, 54 Eur. Taxn. 11 (2014), Journals 
IBFD; in the case of Portugal, see G.J. Oliveira Everaert, Portugal - Corporate 
Taxation sec. 1., Country Surveys IBFD (accessed 31 May 2017), para. 1.7.1.7.; in the 





In 1995 Brazil introduced an option for Brazilian companies to deduct from 
their taxable base the remuneration of net equity as “notional interest”.
1203
 
The deduction is calculated on a daily basis, multiplying relevant net equity 
by a legal rate of interest: “taxa de juros de longo plazo”, which is quarterly 
published by the Brazilian Central Bank and whose basis is the inflation 
rate, increase by a risk premium.
1204
 Likewise, the existence of current 
profits or accumulated earnings in certain amount is pre-condition to allow 
the company to make the distribution and to consider the deductibility of 
those payments.
1205
 One of the unique features of the Brazilian notional 
interest deduction is, however, that they have to be paid or credited to 
                                                                                                                                       
case of Lichtenstein, see B. Büchel, Liechtenstein - Corporate Taxation sec. 1., Country 
Surveys IBFD (accessed 31 May 2017), para. 1.3.3. and, finally, in the case of Italy, see 
F. Leone and E. Zanotti, Notional Interest Deduction Regime Introduced, 52 Eur. Taxn. 
8 (2012), Journals IBFD. A comparative analysis of these regimes can also be found in: 
F. Massimi and C. Petroni, Real-World ACE Reforms and the Italian Experience. 
Towards a General Trend?, 40 Intertax 11 (2012). 
1203  BR: Article 9 of Law No. 9.249/95 of 26 Dec. 1995. See also, R. Tavares, J. Womack 
and D. Wilson, New Brazilian Equity Interest Rules: Efficient Financing for U.S.-Owned 
Subsidiaries, Tax Notes Int’l, January 6,1997, p. 45 et seq. ; J. Malherbe and G. Vettori, 
Deducting Interest on Equity Capital: Brazilian and Belgian Tax Rules Compared, 1 
Eur. Tax Stud. 28 (2010). For an updated analysis in reference to the conflicts of 
qualification derived from the Brazilian juros, particularly within the context of the tax 
treaty Brazil–Spain, see F. Martinez Laguna, Institutional Hybrid Financial Instruments 
and Double Non-Taxation under Domestic Rules and Tax Treaty Law: The Example of 
Spain, 44 Intertax 6/7 (2016). 
1204  BR: Law No. 9.365; Law No. 10.183 and Central Bank Resolution No. 2.654/99, cited 
in: Massimi and Petroni, supra n. 1202, pp. 636-637, footnote 45; Martinez Laguna, 
supra n. 1203, p. 450.  
1205  Martinez Laguna, supra n. 1203, p. 451. Originally, the payments were dependent on 
current benefits or retained earnings in the amount of two times the juros paid. 
However, as noted by Akie Utumi, the limit of 50% of the accumulated profits from 
previous years does not longer exist due to the adoption of IFRS. Thus, profits from 
previous years must have a specific destination and such accounts do not exist anymore. 
See A. Akie Utumi, Brazil, in: Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 97b, The Debt 
Equity Conundrum (IFA 2012), p. 140. 




residents and non-residents shareholders.
1206
 Thus, if credited, interests do 
not need to be paid to shareholders in order to be deducted.
1207
 Finally, once 
paid or credited, the notional interest is subject to a 15% WHT,
1208
 which is 
indeed final in case of individuals.
1209
 
Considering thus the features of the Brazilian Juros and the definition of 
payments provided by the OECD report, one could in principle conclude 
that these amounts are indeed payments as they are an amount capable of 
being paid, which also “includes notional amounts that accrue in respect of a 
future payment obligation even when the amount accrued does not 
correspond to any increase in the payment obligation during that period”.
1210
 
Nevertheless, the special features of the Brazilian Juros can also drive us to 
a different conclusion. Indeed, the pre-condition of the existence of current 
profits or accumulated earnings to make the distribution and to consider the 
deductible amounts, on one hand, and the fact that a shareholder is not 
entitled to claim a payment in the same way that in a contractual obligation, 
i.e. the company is not liable for any payments derived from the equity 
                                                          
1206  Massini and Petroni, supra  n. 1202, p. 636. 
1207  Id. 
1208  The distribution of dividends out of profits to residents and non-residents is not subject 
to WHT in Brazil. Accordingly, since 2015, dividends are determined based on IFRS 
rules. See E. Salomao and J. Prada, Corporations and partnerships in Brazil, Kluwer 
Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011, p. 118-120, Sec. III.  
1209 The WHT tax is final in the case of individuals, because the interest received or credited 
is not included in the payee’s taxable income. In contrast, shareholding corporations 
include the payments in their taxable income, and thus, the WHT is credited against the 
corporate tax owed by the payee. Id., p. 637. The WHT increases to 25% if the payee is 
resident in a tax heaven. Id. 
1210  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p.130. 





participation with the shareholders,
1211
 on the other hand, reinforces the idea 
that if a payment is made (or accrued), it does not correspond to a future 
payment obligation, because there is indeed no obligation to pay off interest, 
but an option to distribute benefits to the shareholders.
1212
 This latter feature 
would situate the Brazilian Juros closer to “a unilateral deduction for 
invested equity that does not require a payment from the taxpayer”,
1213
 even 
though it will most probably generate a conflict of qualification in the 
country of the shareholder. This issue was indeed recently subject to judicial 
scrutiny in Spain.
1214
 In brief, the issue referred to the tax treatment of the 
Brazilian Juros and whether or not they could be subject to the Spanish 
participation exemption under Article 21 of the Spanish CIT.
1215
 In this 
regard, the Spanish National High Court, on one hand, stated that the 
Brazilian Juros share the same legal nature than dividends, and thus, they 
could perfectly be subject to the exemption under Spanish domestic law.
1216
 
                                                          
1211  “The company is not liable for any payment derived from equity participation vis-à-vis 
any shareholder right”.  See Martinez Laguna, supra n. 1203, p. 451. 
1212  “The shareholder is not entitled to claim a payment in the same way as it is in a 
contractual obligation”. Id.  
1213  Indeed, the Brazilian regime gets closer to Belgian NID where the interest is calculated 
on a function of net equity invested and it does not refer at all to effective loan 
transactions. See Bax and Claes, supra n. 1202. See also, OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p.18 
1214  ES: Judgment of the Spanish High National, SAN 27.2.2014, r. 4. For a more extensive 
analysis on this matter, see also Martínez Laguna, supra n. 1203. A Reference can also 
be found in: M. Cencerrado and M. Soler, Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deduction 
and Others, 43 Intertax 1 (2015), pp. 64-65. 
1215  Martinez Laguna, supra n. 1203, p. 456;  
1216  “The Court focused on the relevant provisions of the relevant Tax Treaty between Brazil 
and Spain, specially the concept of dividend (Article 10) and interest (Article 11) which, 
according to the Court shall be interpreted following the rule in Article 3.2, which meant 
in this case, according to the Brazilian legislation. Following this reasoning, the Court 
considered that the payments corresponding to the juros qualify as dividends and 




Likewise, the Court dismissed the argument that such an interpretation 
would result in DNT and considers that the application of a tax benefit in the 
source country shall not denature the Spanish tax benefits once the payment 




In spite of the above, the recognition of the existence of a payment in order 
to determine the existence of a HMA might, implicitly, be referring to the 
fact that in absence of a payment, the disparity in the characterization of 
entities, i.e. the hybrid element, is irrelevant for tax purposes, which indeed 
makes sense. In fact, in the alternative proposal provided by this author, he 
emphasizes also that the concept of “tax relevance” is important for the 
application of the reactive coordination rule.
 1218
 In most of the cases, a 
payment makes the characterization of the entity relevant.
1219
 
                                                                                                                                       
therefore, the exemption granted by Article 21 CTA applied in this case”. See 
Cencerrado and Soler, supra n. 1214, p. 64. 
1217  ES: Judgment of the Spanish High National, SAN 27.2.2014, r. 6. See also, Martinez 
Laguna, supra n. 1203, p. 457. Perhaps it is also interesting to note that the Spanish 
High National Court referred expressly to the judgment of the German Federal Fiscal 
Court [Bundesfinanzhof] of 6 June 2012, where the German Court achieved also the 
conclusion that the Brazilian juros should be considered in Germany as “dividends” for 
purpose of applying the participation exemption. See DE: BFH, 6 Jun. 2012, I R 6, 8/11, 
and Kahlenberg, supra n. 1201. 
1218  Infra Chapter VI, Section 2.2. 
1219  For example, a characterization of a foreign entity under U.S. tax law is relevant when 
U.S. income was paid to the entity. See US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(d)(1)(i). 





2.3. A D/NI outcome (Double Non-Taxation) 
More importantly, however, the existence of a payment is not enough to 
raise concern or to constitute a HMA that triggers the application of the 
rules recommended by the OECD.
1220
 Indeed, it is necessary that the 
payment is deductible in one country while not recognized as income or 
disregarded in the other country.
1221
 In other words, there must be a 
“mismatch in the payments”, namely, a D/NI, or, which is the same, double 




2.3.1. Deduction and Inclusion as Ordinary Income 
The OECD report states that a: “Deduction (including deductible), in respect 
to a payment, means that, after a proper determination of the character and 
treatment under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, the payment is taken into 
account as a deduction or equivalent tax relief under the laws of that 
jurisdiction in calculating the taxpayer’s net income”.
1223
 Therefore, a 
payment will be taken as a deduction when under the laws of the payer 
jurisdiction; this is part in the calculation of the taxpayer’s net income. An 
immediate question arises in this regard: should that “deduction” (or 
                                                          
1220  Infra Section 3. 
1221  “The hybrid mismatch rule focuses on payments and whether the nature of that payment 
gives rise to a deduction for the payer and ordinary income for the payee”. OECD 
(2015), supra n. 6, p. 17 
1222  Infra Section 3. 
1223  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 121 




deductible payment) be considered before or after the application of general 
rules limiting the deductibility of certain payments? In particular, a conflict 
should arise with respect to domestic rules limiting the deductibility of 
interest (e.g. interest limitation rules or thin cap rules). The OECD position 
seems to be clear in this respect when it says: “[…]the jurisdiction specific 
details of the taxpayer’s net income calculation should not generally affect 
the question of whether a payment is deductible for tax purposes”.
1224
 
Similarly, the OECD report provides that in case of application of hybrid 
mismatch rules (linking rules) and interest limitation rules, the former have 
priority over the latter. Nevertheless, as this author argues further on in this 
this work, there are strong practical reasons to follow the opposite approach, 
mostly considering the possibility of indirectly solving hybrid mismatches 
without need of linking rules.
1225
 
As regards to the inclusion of the payment as ordinary income in the country 
of the payee, the OECD considers that a payment will be treated as 
“included in ordinary income” in the country of the recipient “to the extent 
that, after a proper determination of the character and treatment of the 
payment under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction, the payment has been 
incorporated as ordinary income into a calculation of the payee’s income 
under the law of that jurisdiction”.
1226
 Accordingly, ordinary income, for 
these purposes, “means income that is subject to tax at the taxpayer’s full 
                                                          
1224  Id., p. 125 
1225  Infra Section 4.1. 
1226  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 122 





marginal rate and does not benefit from any exemption, exclusion, credit or 
other tax relief applicable to particular categories of payments (such as 
indirect credits for underlying tax on income of the taxpayer)”.
1227
 
Moreover, the OECD provides that “income is considered subject to tax at 
the taxpayer’s full marginal rate notwithstanding that the tax on the 
inclusion is reduced by a creditor other tax relief granted by the payee 




At least two questions arise with respect to inclusion of income as “ordinary 
income” as per the concept used within the OECD report. The first question 
has to be with the use of losses in the payee jurisdiction, which have been 
carried-forward from previous taxable years. In other words, may the 
taxpayer entity consider the income as “included as ordinary income”, 
regardless the fact that this income has been offset against carried-forward 
losses? The logic answer should be yes, considering that the use of losses to 
offset income does not change the fact that a determined taxpayer is subject 
to tax at the taxpayer’s full marginal rate. Indeed, the use of losses to offset 
the inclusion of income should not vary the conclusion that the income has 
been indeed included as ordinary income. This position seems to be shared 
by the OECD when it provides: “A payment that is offset against deductible 
expenditure or losses that have been carried-forward, on this definition, be 
                                                          
1227  Id., p. 123 
1228  Id. 




treated as having been included in income”.
1229
 The second question refers 
to the role of WHTs at source. Could WHTs vary the conclusion that 
income is not included in the payee jurisdiction when WHTs precisely affect 
the creditor of the loan (payee of the interest) and not the payer? May WHTs 
indeed accomplish a similar role to that of including income in the corporate 
tax base of the payee jurisdiction? Shall, e.g. a denial in the deduction be 
still necessary (primary response) necessary? The OECD adopts a quite 
arguable position in this regard, when it provides: “The function of WHTs 
under the laws of the payer jurisdiction is generally not to address 
mismatches in the tax outcomes and a payment should not be treated as 
included in ordinary income simply because it has been subject to 
withholding at source”.
1230
 Nevertheless, the reality on taxation seems to 
show the opposite result. As provided by Cooper, e.g. in Australia, a 
dividend on a non-equity share paid by an Australian company is likely to 
be subject to WHT at source, which means that the fact the same payment 
was deductible from the taxable base of the Australian company is to certain 
extent offset with the application of the WHT.
1231
 In other words, if the final 
OECD “evil” is the DNT outcome, the issue seems to be solved with the 
application of WHTes at source.
1232
 This interpretation seems to be also 
coherent in case of inbound payments. Indeed, if e.g. due to the different 
characterization of the payer entity, the country of the payee disregard a 
                                                          
1229  Id., p. 127 
1230  Id. 
1231  Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 348. 
1232  Id.  





payment (i.e. consider the income as not included as ordinary income) and 
the payer jurisdiction denies the deduction, but applies a WHT, that WHT 
will most probably not be credited in the payee jurisdiction, because of the 
non-inclusion of income, and it will become a real cost for the whole 
transaction.
1233
 The D/NI outcome could be avoided if WHTes are regarded 
as “inclusion of income”, even though this is not formally made within the 
tax base of the payee jurisdiction.  
Another argument to support this interpretation is the fact that, economically 
speaking, a WHT refers exclusively to the position of the payee jurisdiction, 
namely, where e.g. the creditor of a loan (or the recipient of the interest) is 
located. In other words, regardless the fact that a WHT is applied at source 
(payer’s jurisdiction), it is the taxpayer in the country of the payee who 
economically suffers the WHT. Therefore, if a deductible payment is not 
included in the taxable base of the payee entity, but rather is assumed 
through a WHT on the payment at source, economically speaking should not 
be any difference, because in both cases will be the payee entity the only 
one economically affected. In other words, the WHT will have the effect of 
offsetting the non-inclusion of the income at the hands of the payee. 
                                                          
1233  In Australia, e.g. the fact that a company receives interest on a loan that is equity for 
Australian tax purposes (not assessable in Australia) changes to the extent a WHT 
applied at the border, because in such a case the WHT will not be creditable in Australia. 
Id. That is also the reason why denying a deduction and maintaining a WHT at source 
may transform this WHT in a permanent cost, i..e. as there will be no inclusion of 
income in the country of the payee, there will be no credit. See also, Lüdicke, supra n. 
840, p. 315, who referring to the explanation of Fig. 4 at p. 314, arrives to the same 
conclusion.  




2.3.2. Is a D/NI outcome a presumption of base erosion; a 
presumption of abusive practices or both? 
As noted already, an important characteristic of the HMA concept is its 
restricted application, which involves hybrid entity mismatches whose result 
is a D/NI.
1234
 Nevertheless, it is evident that other outcomes can come into 
play when cross-border transactions are involved, not even including 
hybrids. For example, a non-inclusion/non-inclusion outcome could be 
achieved in case of a sale of shares held in a non-land-rich company made 
by a resident in a State that applies a participation exemption.
1235
 This 
outcome is, however, out of the scope of the concept of HMA. Similarly, 
and as noted already, a deduction might rarely be a presumption of base 
erosion in the payer jurisdiction when that country also applies a WHT at 
source.  
More arguable is, however, the use of the concept of HMA (limited to D/NI 
outcomes) and the proposed remedies to counteract them strictly within a 
context of anti-abuse or anti-avoidance measures. The above can be seen in 
the recently approved EU ATAD and the inclusion of an Article 9 dealing 
with hybrid mismatches.
1236
 As noted somewhere else by this author, 
however, the absence of a satisfactory explanation to focus an anti-hybrid 
                                                          
1234  As already stressed somewhere else in this work, the outcome of DD is also included. 
However, its analysis is out of the scope of this work. Supra Introduction, Section 2. 
1235  Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 339. 
1236  Article 9 includes a primary response and a defensive rule as proposed by the OECD 
within the Action Plan 2. See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 
(ATAD I). 





rule on the result of a transaction (i.e. D/NI) and not on the purpose of it, 
distinguishing e.g. between abusive or artificial transactions, not only 
distorts the aim of an “anti-abuse” measure and reinforces the idea that the 
anti-hybrid mismatches rule at stake creeps closer to a mechanism designed 
exclusively to generate more revenues rather than to combat abuse,
1237
 but it 
certainly contradicts the jurisprudence of the CJEU with respect to domestic 
measures implemented in order to target abusive transactions.
1238
 In simple 
words, the fact of assuming that a transaction involving hybrid entities or 
reverse hybrid entities should be counteracted just because its outcome is a 
D/NI (i.e. DNT), regardless the existence or not of abusive elements in that 
transaction, creates indeed a true presumption of abuse that might finally 
negatively impact upon many companies that use legitimate tax planning 
structures to minimize costs.
 1239 
Furthermore, the reference of D/NI outcomes as an exclusive factor to 
originate a HMA, included as a kind of “holy grail” in the design of 
domestic anti-hybrids measures, increases even more the presumptions 
above mentioned when other important factors, which are part of the 
                                                          
1237  Navarro, Parada and Schwarz, supra n. 455, p. 130. 
1238  EU: Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112. 
1239  Tax planning is certainly a legitimate practice whose ultimate goal is to achieve double 
non-taxation. See Eicke, supra n. 166. See also OECD (1987), supra n. 162. In the 
United States, e.g. this idea is widely accepted. See, e.g. Helvering v. Gregory, supra n. 
159. In the same direction see, e.g. Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112. By other 
side, there is no doubt that the persons called to manage a company are legally bound to 
involve in tax planning in order to minimize costs. As provided by Schön: “[T]he 
minimization of the corporate tax burden [is] an integral part of the managers’ duty of 
care …Therefore, they – i.e. the directors themselves – are legally bound to engage in 
tax strategies”. See Schön, supra n. 164. 




transaction involving hybrids, are not taken into consideration. In particular, 
the mechanic of group taxation and the fact of considering more than one-
year approach should be at least included.
1240
 The analysis of these two 
factors is, nevertheless, analyzed in the illustrations below. 
2.4. Illustrations of HMAs with respect to hybrid entities and 
reverse hybrid entities  
2.4.1. Example 1: D/NI using a hybrid entity 
Let us assume the hypothetical where XCo, a taxable entity incorporated in 
country X, grants a loan to Y Sub, an entity organized in country Y. YSub 
pays back interest in the amount of 100i connected to that loan. Let us 
preliminary assume that country Y does not apply a WHT at source. Whilst 
country X considers YSub as tax transparent, country Y considers the same 
entity as a taxable entity.  
 
                                                          
1240  Lüdicke, supra n. 840, pp. 313-317. 






Figure 66: Example 1– D/NI using a hybrid entity 
 Under this scenario, the interest paid (100i) by Y Sub can be deducted from 
the gross income of YSub, because Y Sub is considered as a taxable entity 
in country Y.  Accordingly, the interest paid will not be included as an item 
of income by XCo, because under the tax law of country X, Y Sub is 
considered as a tax transparent entity. In other words, the loan and the 
interest are completely disregarded for tax purposes. The result is a D/NI 
derived from the different characterization of the same entity.  
 
However, let us now include the factors of group taxation and multi-year 
taxation.
1241
 For this purposes, we will assume that YSub has also a 
subsidiary in country Y (YSub1), which together with YSub form a tax 
group. We will also assume two different scenarios. The first scenario is that 
YSub1, in year 1, has income of 100i and YSub pays interest of 100i, but 
has no income. In year two, however, YSub has income of 100i, but pays no 
                                                          




YSub is considered as a 
fiscally transparent entity 
for country X tax purposes.  
YSub is considered as a 
taxable entity for country Y 









interest. YSub1 has no income. Thus, in year one and year two together, the 
combined income of the group is 200i.  
 
 
Figure 67: D/NI analysis and group taxation (first scenario) 
The result in the first scenario, without considering the second year, is 
exactly as appeared in the Figure above. This is to say, the income of the 
group is offset against the interest deduction and the interest are not 
included as income in country X, because the loan is disregarded. In other 








YSub has no income and pays 100i of interest. 





YSub has income of 100i and pays no interest. 




















Nevertheless, if we consider now year one and two together, and we assume 
that no FTC is granted by country X in year two, then the result in year two 
is that 100i will be included in the tax base of both country Y and X, which 
indeed reflects the combined income of the group.  
 
Two important conclusions can be extracted from the above. On one hand, it 
demonstrates that if the problem is that income is not taxed at all in year 
one, this can easily be solved considering the double inclusion of income in 
year two, without a FTC in country X. In other words, the fact that the 
income remains untaxed in year 2 will depend of the design of the FTC in 
country X. On the other hand, it shows that more than DNT, the real 
outcome here, when considering the two years together, is a “one-year 
deferral”, but not properly a permanent DNT outcome.
1242
 This coincides 
with what this author already stated in Chapter I of this work: DNT and tax 
deferral are not equivalent concepts.
1243
 Therefore, as well stated by 
Lüdicke, a deduction of a payment raises policy concerns only when the 
income is not included in the tax base of the other country, which only 
happens in the example above, when a single-year of taxation is considered. 





                                                          
1242  Id. 
1243  Supra Chapter I, Section 2.2. 
1244  Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 314. 




The second scenario is that YSub has no income or expenses in year two. 
YSub1 pays dividends of 100i to YSub. Thus, the economic burden of the 





Figure 68: D/NI analysis and group taxation (second scenario) 
Similarly, in this second scenario, the dividend distributed from YSub1 to 
YSub will be taxable in country X, but not in country Y, because the 
                                                          
1245  These assumptions are taken from the analysis that Lüdicke makes with respect to 
hybrid entities and D/NI outcomes in order to demonstrate that the assumption that a 








YSub has no income and pays 100i of interest. 





YSub has no income and pays no interest. 























underlying income was already attributed to and taxed in country Y in year 
one (i.e. the 100i of income that YSub1 had in year one). There will be no 
FTC in country X in year one, because income and expenses were offset due 
to the group taxation in country Y. Therefore, the overall result considering 
year one and year two is the taxation of the combined income of the group 




Some important conclusions derive from the example above. Firstly, and as 
already stressed, the consideration of the mechanics of group taxation 
should be taken into account in order to reflect a consistent result. Secondly, 
the D/NI outcome is only temporal, i.e. it is a short-term outcome. Thus, if a 
rule denying a deduction in country Y applies in year one (primary 
response), this rule will be targeting most properly a one-year deferral, but 
not a true D/NI. Indeed, if under the circumstances described in the example 
above, such a rule applies; the final outcome will be economic double 
taxation. Thirdly, if we add to the examples above that a WHT might also be 
applied in country Y, regardless the denial of the deduction, such a WHT 





                                                          
1246  Lüdicke explains that the same is true if, e.g. in the absence of a dividend, a capital gain 
upon the disposal of the shares in YSub1 in our example in a later year is taxable in 
country X, at the level of XCo. Id. 
1247  Lüdicke proposes that in case a deduction is denied in the country of the payer, the 
potential WHT that country Y can also apply should be prevented. Id., p. 315 




2.4.2. Example 2: D/NI using a reserve hybrid 
Let us assume the same facts as the first example above, with the difference 
that YSub is regarded as a reverse hybrid entity. This is to say, under the tax 
law of country Y, YSub is considered as a transparent entity while country 
X and country Z considers YSub as a taxable entity. Accordingly, we will 
assume that YSub receives interest from YSbub1, which is established in a 



















Under these circumstances, the interest received by YSub are deducted in 
country Z and not included as ordinary income in country Y, because YSub 
is regarded as a tax transparent entity there. They are also not included as 
ordinary income in country X, unless dividends are distributed to XCo, 
because country X considers YSub as a taxable entity. In simple words, the 
interest payments remain untaxed and the general outcome is a D/NI. 
 
The example above, however, assumes that country X does not have proper 
CFC rules to tax the interest income received by YSub in country B. 
Accordingly, it assumes that YSub is indeed a holding company, which will 
never distribute dividends to XCo. If both assumptions are, nevertheless, 
disregarded, i.e. country X has indeed strong CFC rules and YSub sooner 
than later will distribute dividends, the evil D/NI outcome disappears.
1248
 A 
counterargument thus could be that in case YSub is not a controlled 
company of XCo, e.g. due to a minority of shares owned or because XCo 
                                                          
1248  As provided by Cooper: “Similarly, for the payments to reverse hybrids, the obvious 
remedy is to amend the CFC rules in the jurisdiction in which the parent is resident. If 
that jurisdiction treats the foreign hybrid as an entity and it is deriving passive income or 
base company income, the CFC rules are well understood and perfectly acceptable 
mechanism that should define the scope of tax on the foreign hybrid”. Cooper, supra n. 
1199, p. 348 In the same order of ideas, the OECD BEPS Action 2 acknowledges that 
the hybrid mismatch disappears if proper CFC rules or similar anti-deferral regimes are 
applies when it states: “Payments made through a reverse structure will not result in 
D/NI outcomes if the outcome is fully taxed under a CFC, foreign investment fund (FIF) 
or a similar anti-deferral rule in the investor jurisdiction that requires the investor to 
include its allocated share of any payment of ordinary income made to the intermediary 
on a current basis […[ Treating income allocated by a reverse hybrid as taxable under 
the laws of the investor jurisdiction would have the effect of neutralizing any hybrid 
mismatch under a payment to a transparent entity”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 64. 




and YSub are indeed unrelated, CFC rules will be ineffective.
1249
 That is 
indeed correct. However, as it will be explained later, the type of hybrid 
mismatches that derive from transactions between unrelated parties (not 
being part of an structured arrangement either) are indeed out of the 
international concern.
1250
 In addition, it should be remark that the OECD 
proposes in this case, i.e. payments to reverse hybrid entities, an alternative 
remedy, which is to “switch-off” the tax transparency treatment in the 
country of establishment of the reverse hybrid entity, ensuring the taxation 




Finally, and as well as with respect to hybrid entities, two important 
conclusions can be extracted from this example on reverse hybrids. On one 
hand, the D/NI outcome is not necessarily a permanent outcome. The above 
will rather depend of the design of the CFC rules in country X as well as the 
fact that YSub distributes dividends to country X. On the other hand, it 
confirms the fact that in a group transaction (i.e. between related parties) in 
                                                          
1249  Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 316.  
1250  Infra Section 3.3. 
1251  As stated by the OECD: “Tax transparency proceeds on the assumption, however, that 
the income allocated to the investor will be taxable in the hands of the investor. In the 
cross-border context, this is not always the case”. Thus, the recommendation 5.2 
(Limiting the tax transparency for non-resident investors) “encourages jurisdictions to 
turn off their transparency rules when those rules are primarily used to achieve hybrid 
mismatches”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 64, Recommendation 5.2. The OECD also 
states that the recommendation only applies under the following circumstances: a) a 
person [entity] is treated as tax transparent under the laws of the country where it is 
established; b) that person receives income not subject to tax in that country, and c) all 
of part of that income is allocated to non-resident investors that are part of the same 
control group. Id. 





which a reverse hybrid receives a payment that results in a D/NI outcome, it 
is presumed that either an abusive practice or base erosion arises. 
1252
 
2.4.3. Example 3: Indirect D/NI: ‘Imported Mismatches’  
One of the peculiarities of the OECD BEPS proposal on Action 2 refers to 
the possibility of “indirectly” achieving a D/NI outcome, namely, when a 
deduction in certain country is on balance not accompanied by an inclusion 
of income in another country, using a hybrid arrangement between two other 
countries.
1253
 This is so-called imported mismatch and the rule proposed 
calls for denying a deduction in the payer jurisdiction to the extent that the 
payee treats the payment as set-off against a hybrid deduction in the payee 
jurisdiction.
1254
 As provided by the OECD: “The policy behind the imported 
mismatch rule is to prevent taxpayers from entering into structured 
arrangements or arrangements with group members that shift the effect of an 
offshore hybrid mismatch into the domestic jurisdiction through the use of a 
non-hybrid instrument such as an ordinary loan”.
1255
 Accordingly, they rely 
on the absence of rules (i.e. linking rules) counteracting the mismatch in the 
offshore jurisdiction in order to generate the mismatch in tax outcomes, 
which is later imported into the payer country.
1256
 In this sense, some 
                                                          
1252  Infra Section 2.3.2. 
1253  R. de Boer and O. Marres, BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements, 43 Intertax 1 (2015), p. 29. 
1254  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 83. 
1255  Id. 
1256  Id., p. 85. 




authors consider justifiable that arrangements producing an “indirect D/NI 
outcome” are addressed separately within the OECD BEPS report.
1257
 
Although almost all the examples within the report refer to HFI, an 
illustration of an imported mismatch considering exclusively hybrid and 
reverse hybrid entities could be as follows: 
 
Figure 70: Imported Mismatch 
                                                          
1257  De Boer and Marres consider that otherwise “[…] they lead to a proliferation of 
























Let us assume three given countries (Fig. above): A, B and C. Accordingly, 
ACo has a subsidiary in country B, BCo, which is for purposes of country 
A, tax transparent, whilst it is a taxable entity in country B (i.e. BCo is a 
hybrid entity). Consequently BCo has a subsidiary in the same country, BCo 
Sub. This latter entity is regarded as a tax transparent entity in country B, 
but for country A’s tax purposes is a taxable entity (i.e. a reverse hybrid). 
Finally, there is another entity in country C, Borrower Co, which is not 
related to BCo Sub or BCo. Likewise, there are two different debtor-creditor 
relationships. On one hand, Borrower Co borrows money to BCoSub and 
pays interest back to country B. On the other hand, BCo borrows money to 
ACo and pays interest payments back.
1258
  
As regards to the interest payments from Borrower C to BCo Sub, these are 
not taxed at the level of BCo Sub, because this is a tax transparent entity in 
country B. The interest payments, however, flow through BCo Sub and are 
taxed at the level of BCo. As a result, this loan does not generate a HMA, 
because interest are deducted in country C and included as income in 
country B.  On the contrary, the loan and the interest payments between 
ACo and BCo are disregarded, because of the different tax treatment of 
BCo. In this case, therefore, there is a D/NI outcome.  
The example above, however, does not consider two important issues. On 
one hand, country A might apply its CFC rules and then claim the right to 
tax the income that, under its view, is attributed to BCo Sub as CFC income. 
                                                          
1258  Originally, De Boer and Marres provide this example. Id., p. 30, Fig. 8 




If we consider that many countries provides for indirect ownership, BCo 
Sub might perfectly be considered owned indirectly by ACo. In addition, 
interest paid from Borrower Co to BCo Sub will be generally regarded as 
CFC income. As a result, double taxation might certainly arise, because 
interest might be tax as CFC income in country A and they will definitely be 
taxed at the level of BCo.
1259
 Thus, unless a tax credit is granted in country 
A, double taxation will be a reality. This situation can be perfectly assumed 
in the real world. For example, let us assume that ACo is a USCo that owns 
100% of BCo, and this latter subsequently owns 100% of BCoSub. ACo 
would be deemed to own BCoSub because of the indirect ownership rules in 
the United States.
1260
 Accordingly, no tax credit would be granted 
considering that BCo and not BCoSub paid the respective taxes in country 
B. The double taxation in this case remains as a permanent effect.
1261
 On the 
other hand, the example does not consider, e.g. the possibility that BCo and 
BCo Sub are part of a “tax group”. In such a case, the interest received and 
interest paid at the level of the group will be set-off. It would be thus 
arguable that a mismatch is imported to country C. 
The justification for imported mismatches is rather clear: it pretends to avoid 
that linking rules become useless by using countries that do not introduce 
                                                          
1259  Although it can be just an interest spread on balance. Id. 
1260  The indirect ownership consists of stock beneficially owned by a U.S. person through a 
foreign corporation, partnership, trust or state. Thus, ACo would be deemed to indirectly 
own BCo Sub. Bitter and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-10. 
1261  An indirect tax credit would not apply either, because the indirect tax credit gives double 
tax relief for the cases of a U.S. Corp. that owns at least 10% of the foreign subsidiary 
and receives dividends from this latter. US: IRC Sec. 902. 







 Nevertheless, it is undeniable also that they 
increase the level of complexity to determine cases of HMA. Indeed, they 
require looking at beyond the transaction between two members of a control 
group (or a structured arrangement) to identify possible mismatches. The 
above sets up an important burden both to taxpayers and tax administrations, 
an issue that it is in part recognized by the OECD as well.
1263
 
3. Linking rules and the new era of BEPS 
The mechanical process of matching transactions related to the different 
characterization of the same entity by two different jurisdictions and the 
outcome of DNT (i.e. D/NI) –hybrid mismatch arrangements– has certainly 
given rise to also ad-hoc or mechanical solutions. Indeed, Action 2 of the 
BEPS Action Plan recommends a two level solution to deal with the issue. 
On one hand, a primary response, which is applied at the level of the payer. 
On the other hand, a defensive rule, which is applied at the level of the 
recipient of the payment part of the transaction. Both rules are subsequently 
analyzed. 
 
                                                          
1262  “Imported Mismatches rely on the absence of effective hybrid mismatch rules in 
offshore jurisdictions in order to generate the mismatch in tax outcomes which can then 
be imported into the payer jurisdiction”. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 85. 
1263 As provided by the OECD: “While these rules involve an unavoidable degree of 
coordination and complexity […]”. Id., p. 84. See also, De Boer and Marres, supra n. 
1253, p. 30. 




3.1. Primary Response 
The primary response consists in a recommendation to introduce a rule at a 
domestic level, which denies the deduction of interest payments if these 
payments are not included as ordinary income in the recipient country.
1264
 In 
other words, and particularly with respect to hybrids and reverse hybrid 
entities, means to deny the deductibility of certain payments in all those 
transactions in which those payments made by a hybrid entity or received by 
a reverse hybrid, resulted in a D/NI outcome, because of the different 
characterization of the same entity.
1265
 Therefore, as it can be noted, the 
domestic deductibility in this case is contingent to the inclusion or 
recognition of income in a foreign country, which in both cases, i.e. hybrid 
entities and reverse hybrids, will not occur because the two countries 
involved in the transaction considers the payer (in the case of payments 
from a hybrid entities) or the payee (in the case of payments made to a 
reverse hybrid entities) differently for tax purposes, being thus the payment 
and the whole transaction either disregarded, as it is the case of payments 
made by hybrid entities,  or simply not recognized in the country of the 
investors until they are distributed as dividends, as it is the case of reverse 
                                                          
1264  As stated by the OECD: “Both payments made under hybrid financial instruments and 
payments made by and to hybrid entities can give rise to D/NI outcomes. In respect of 
such hybrid mismatch arrangements this report recommends that the response should be 
to deny the deduction in the payer jurisdiction”. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 17. 
1265 In reference to the concept of “deduction” and recognition of income as “ordinary 
income”, supra Section 2.3.1. 







 Likewise, it results obvious that a payment must be originally 




Unlike the primary response remains as a recommendation to be introduced 
at a domestic level by the countries around the globe, there are countries that 
have already started introducing it within their domestic legislations, 
particularly with respect to counteract HMA related to hybrid financial 
instruments. For example, Section 12(1) No. 10 of the Austrian Corporate 
Income Tax Law (Austrian CITL) provides for a denial of the interest paid 
to a foreign corporation if the receiving corporation belongs to the same 
group and the payment is exempted at the level of the foreign receiving 
corporation or the income is subject to an effective tax rate of less than 
10%.
1268
  Similarly, Article 15(j) of the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Law 
(Spanish CITL) introduced a rule applicable to hybrid instruments, which 
provides that expenses of a transaction between related parties will not be 
                                                          
1266 The application of the primary response with respect to cases of hybrid financial 
instruments is slightly different, because implies, in most of the cases, the application or 
not of the exemption system to relieve double taxation in the country of the payee. In 
most of the countries, the participation exemption will apply regardless the taxation of 
the income in the other countries. At least this is a pure interpretation of the exemption 
system. However, there are countries that have included switch-over clauses that allow 
not applying the exemption to the extent the payment was deducted in the country of the 
payer.   
1267  As provided by the OECD: […] the disregarded hybrid payments rule should only 
operate to the extent that the payer is entitled to a deduction for a payment under local 
law”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 51. The interaction of the primary response and other 
domestic rules denying the deductibility of interest, in particular “interest limitation 
rules”, is analyzed in infra Section 4. 
1268  M. Jann, J. Schuch and G. Toifl, Austria - Corporate Taxation sec. 1., Country Analyses 
IBFD, sec. 1.4.10 (accessed 6 June 2017). 




considered as deductible if, due to a conflict of qualification, they do not 
generate income or generate exempted income or income subject to a 
nominal tax rate below 10% at the level of the recipient.
1269
 For this 
provision to apply therefore the following three circumstances must be met: 
(i) the transaction must take place between related parties, as defined by 
Article 18 Spanish CITL; (ii) the Spanish taxpayer must incur in expenses 
that are, in principle, tax deductible under the Spanish law, and (iii) the 
expenses do not give rise to corresponding taxable income in the associated 
non-resident taxpayer due to a conflict in the characterization of the 
payment.
1270
 Likewise, it was discussed in Germany the introduction of a 
similar provision disallowing an interest to the extent the recipient does not 
characterize the income received as interest.
1271
 However, this provision has 
not yet entered into force.
1272
  
                                                          
1269  ES: Article 15(j) of the Corporate Income Tax Law [Ley del Impuesto sobre 
Sociedades], as introduced by the Royal Law Decree  [Real Decreto Legislativo] No. 
4/2004 of 5 March 2014. See also, Á. de la Cueva González-Cotera and C. Morlán 
Burgasé, Spain - Corporate Taxation sec. 1., Country Analyses IBFD (accessed 6 June 
2017). 
1270  S. López Ribas, Financing Activities: Hybrid Mismatches and the Tax Deductibility of 
Interest in Spain, 70 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 8 (2016), Journals IBFD, p. 455. The provision is 
written in a neutral way avoiding to refer to income received “by a non-resident”. 
However, it appears to be clear that this is the only situation in which a different 
characterization might arise.  
1271  The draft stated that payments should not be deductible if such payments are not 
included in the tax base of the direct or indirect recipient or subject to an exemption at 
the level of it due to a qualification mismatch between the two legal systems: the payer 
and payee. Accordingly, the payments shall only be deductible as business expenses in 
Germany provided they are not deductible from the tax base of the payer in another 
jurisdiction. See D. Gutmann et al., The Impact of the ATAD on Domestic Systems: A 
Comparative Survey, 57 Eur. Taxn. 1 (2017), Journals IBFD, p. 17. 
1272  Id. 





At the EU law level, a primary response was also introduced within the final 
text of the EU ATAD, which could certainly fill out the gap of all those EU 
countries that do not have reacted so far to the OECD recommendations.
1273
 
Indeed, one particular characteristic with respect to the rule introduced 
within the EU ATAD is that it applies to both hybrid instruments and hybrid 
entities, which extents the scope of the existing domestic rules that were 
launched mostly targeting hybrid financial instruments. As read within the 
text of Article 9 of the EU ATAD: “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch 
results in a deduction without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall 
deny the deduction of such payment”.
1274
 Similarly, the text of the recently 
approved EU ATAD II, dealing with hybrid mismatch arrangement with 
third countries, provides that:” To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results 
in a deduction without inclusion: a) the deduction shall be denied in the 
Member State that is the payer jurisdiction […]”.
1275
 The above, however, 
does not mean to recognize that the solution adopted is necessarily the 
correct one. As this author argues further on in this work, a more direct 
manner to counteract HMA with respect to hybrid entities and reverse 
hybrid shall be constructed targeting the real reason of the mismatch, i.e. the 
disparity in the characterization of entities, and not indirectly affecting the 
deductibility of payments.
1276
 Interestingly, this approach was originally 
                                                          
1273  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3. 
1274  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). 
1275  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
1276  Infra Chapter VI. 




supported by the European Commission, but later on abandoned perhaps due 
to the political pressure that the whole OECD BEPS proposal involves.
1277
  
3.2. Defensive Rule  
The defensive rule consists in recognizing the payment as ordinary income 
in the country of the recipient, being a mirror image of the primary 
recommendation above-mentioned.
1278
 The defensive rule, therefore, as its 
name suggests, applies only to the extent the payer country did not disallow 
the deduction of the payment and thus there is still a risk that this remains 
untaxed.
1279
 From a tax policy perspective, it makes sense to leave the 
source country, i.e. country of the payer, to give the first bite to the apple, 
after all it is where the payment is issued and the mismatch is originated by 
the characterization of an entity in its home country (payer country) by the 
payee country. The above, however, also embodies a practical reason: to 
avoid the simultaneous application of the proposed countermeasures. 
Nevertheless, as it will be argued later on in this work, this aim if far of 
being accomplished and the circular effect of linking rules, i.e. the 
contingent application of primary response and defensive rule, is one of the 
main negative characteristics of the OECD proposals that may carry States 
                                                          
1277  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.2. 
1278  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 52 
1279  The contingent application of the defensive rule is clearly stated by the OECD when it 
provides: “If the payer jurisdiction does not neutralize the mismatch then the payee 
jurisdiction will require such payment to be included in ordinary income to the extent 
the payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome” (emphasis added). See OECD (2015), supra 
n. 6, p. 49. 





to confuse themselves in terms of who is entitled to react, affecting thus the 
final effectiveness of the rules.
1280
 Last but not least, the defensive rule 
applies only with respect to cases involving hybrid entities and not with 
respect to reverse hybrids, where the primary response, the improvement of 
offshore investment regimes (e.g. CFCs) and the restrictions to tax 





As well as the primary response, some countries have already introduced a 
defensive rule, also in most of the cases dealing with HMA derived from 
hybrid financial instruments. This is, e.g. the case of Austria, which 
introduced Section 10(1) and 7 within the CIT, and which provide that the 
general exemption of dividends does not apply if those dividends were 
treated as tax-deductible expenses at the level of the payer (source State).
1282
 
Accordingly, Spain introduced Article 21(1)(b) within the Spanish CIT, 
which provides that dividends received, which derives from profit 
participation that have generated a deduction at the level of payer, will not 
                                                          
1280  Infra Section 3.4.1. 
1281  The exclusion of a defensive rule with respect to cases of reverse hybrid receiving 
payments is, however, very clear. Indeed, in most of those cases the D/NI outcome 
targeted by the rules can easily be solved with the application of CFC rules in the 
country of the investors. See also with respect to turning off the tax transparency 
treatment in the country where the reverse hybrid entity is established, supra Section 
2.4.2, supra n. 1251. As regards to the interaction between the primary response and the 
CFC rules, infra Section 4.2. 
1282  Jann, Schuch and Toifl, supra n. 1268, Sec. 7.2.6.2. 




be exempted in Spain.
1283
 As noted, therefore, the rule has no other link that 
the deductibility at the level of the payer, without reference e.g. to the 
characterization of the payments.
1284
 Likewise, Germany also enacted a 
provision that intended to deal with the application of the domestic 
exemption method with respect to payments considered equity in 
Germany.
1285
 The rule states that the domestic exemption of remuneration 
payments from dividend-generating equity is not granted insofar as the 
payment are deducted in the country of the payer, demonstrating again that 
exemption on dividend is contingent to the tax treatment of those dividends 




                                                          
1283  The Law No. 27/2014 of 27 Nov. 2014 introduced different rules tackling D/NI 
schemes, including a defensive rule with respect to hybrid financial instruments. 
However, prior to this reform in 2014, the exemption method applied to the extent the 
following requirements were met: i) the resident company has, directly or indirectly, 
maintained for one year a participation of, at least, 5% ownership in the subsidiary; ii) 
the subsidiary must have been subject to a tax equivalent to the Spanish CIT, and iii) the 
distributed profits derive necessarily from business activities running abroad. The 
requirement of bullet “ii)”, however, is considered fulfilled if the subsidiary is a resident 
of a country with which Spain had signed a tax treaty containing an exchange of 
information provision. See Martinez Laguna, supra n. 1203, p. 453 and 458. See also, D. 
Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois, Double (no) imposición e híbridos 
financieros: tendencias internacionales y reforma del Impuesto sobre Sociedades, in: La 
Reforma del Sistema Tributario Español (2a parte), Encuentro de Derecho Financiero y 
Tributario (3a Ed.), Doc. No. 10/2015, Institutos de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2015. 
1284  Martinez Laguna, supra n. 1203,p. 458. 
1285  DE: Section 8b(1) of the German CIT. The provision, however, does not deal with the 
application of the exemption method by reason of a tax treaty. See S. Bärsch and C. 
Spengel, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: OECD Recommendations and German 
Practice, 67 Bull Intl. Taxn. 10 (2013), Journals IBFD, p. 526. 
1286  Id. 





The defensive rule has also been introduced within EU law through a series 
of modifications of it. In particular, I refer to the modification of the PSD in 
2014 that basically provided that MS should refrain from taxing profits to 
the extent that such profits are not deductible at the level of the subsidiary, 
or to tax them if a deduction was indeed granted.
1287
 This provision that 
originally applied only with respect to hybrid financial instruments, is now 
also extended to cover HMA related to hybrid entities and reverse hybrid 
entities with the introduction of Article 9 of the EU ATAD
1288
 and the recent 
issuance of the ATAD II, applied with respect to the mismatches with third 




The mechanic of the defensive rule as regards to hybrid entities is quite 
interesting and deserves special attention. Indeed, if one looks closer into the 
application of the rule, one could conclude a priori that the effect is no other 
than providing, at the level of the payee State, an implicit recognition of the 
characterization of the entity at the level of the payer State, which is the 
same than providing that the defensive rule establishes a de facto rule of 
                                                          
1287  EU: Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU. 
1288  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). Also infra Chapter 
III, Section 5.3.2. The compatibility of the defensive rule considered before and after the 
introduction of this Directive is discussed in infra Section 3.5.2.1.2 of this Chapter. 
1289  Following the OECD proposal in terms of having a defensive rule that applies 
contingently to the prior application of a primary response in the payer country, the final 
text of the EU ATAD II states: “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a 
deduction without inclusion: b) where the deduction is not denied in the payer 
jurisdiction, the amount of the payment that would otherwise give rise to a mismatch 
outcome shall be included in income in the Member State that is the payee jurisdiction”. 
EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), Article 9. 






 Nevertheless, this statement is not entirely 
correct. On one hand, the defensive rule provides that income should be 
recognized as “ordinary income” in the State of the payee entity (i.e. taxed 
there), which is not the same than providing that the characterization of the 
entity at source should prevail. In fact, if the rule were to target the HMA 
considering the different characterization in both countries, i.e. the core of 
the issue, neither primary response nor defensive rule would be needed. On 
the other hand, the taxation of income at the level of the payee would never 
be mandatory if a rule coordinating the characterization of entities is 
applied. The above would finally depend on the specific rules in the country 
of the payee. In other words, the outcome of the transaction (i.e. D/NI) 
would not be the basis for the application of the rule, as it is in the case of 
the defensive rule, which only applies if a HMA occurs and to the extent the 
primary response did not apply first. On the contrary, the outcome would be 
relegated to the background, renouncing to the consequentialist approach 
adopted by the OECD.
1291
  
3.3. “Limitations” within the scope of the linking rules 
The primary response and the defensive rule apply with certain limitations. 
This is to say, not every single hybrid entity mismatch giving rise to a D/NI 
                                                          
1290  Accordingly, and with respect to hybrid financial instruments, one could argue that the 
defensive rule acts also in a similar way than a “switch-over clause” that permits to 
switch off the application of the exemption method.  
1291  A deeper analysis is developed further on in this work, which finally opts for proposing 
a domestic rule coordinating the characterization of entities. Infra Chapter VI. 





outcome may trigger the application of the rules, but rather only hybrid 
entity mismatches that are within the context of either a “control group” or a 
so-called “structured arrangement”.
1292
 Nevertheless, as demonstrated 
below, both concepts are not necessarily limitations to the application of 
linking rules, but rather an excessive extension of these rules, which leaves 
almost no space for cases in which they would not be applied. 
3.3.1. Control Groups and ‘Acting Together’ test 
The concept of “control group”, as defined within the OECD BEPS Action 
plan 2 is rather wide.
1293
 Indeed, it includes at least four different scenarios: 
a) when there is a consolidation for accounting purposes under IFRS or local 
GAAP; b) when a person can “effectively control” the second person 
                                                          
1292  As provided by the OECD with respect to the rules applicable in case of payments made 
by a hybrid entity: “This rule only applies if the parties to the mismatch are in the same 
control group or where the payment is made under a structured arrangement and the 
taxpayer is a party to that structured arrangement”. OECD, supra n. 6, p. 49. In the same 
order of ideas, and with respect to the recommended rules applied with respect to 
payments received reverse hybrid entities, the OECD states: “The recommendation only 
applies where the investor, the reverse hybrid and the payer are members of the same 
control group or if the payment is made under a structured arrangement and the payer is 
party to that structured arrangement”. Id., p. 55. Similarly, hybrid mismatches derived 
from a HFI and whose outcome is a D/NI, are also limited to “related parties” and 
“structured arrangements”. The concept of “related parties” and “controlled groups”, 
however, are slightly different, starting from the consideration of different percentages 
of ownership required.  
1293  The final report of the OECD BEPS Action plan 2 states: “Two persons are in the same 
control group if: i) they are consolidated for accounting purposes; ii) the first person has 
an investment that provides that person with effective control of the second person or 
there is a third person that holds the investments which provides that person with 
effective control over both persons; iii) the first person has a 50% or greater investment 
in the second person or there is a third person that holds a 50% or greater investment in 
both; or iv) they can be regarded as associated enterprises under Article 9 [OECD 
Model]”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 113. 




through an investment in that person or there is a third person that has 
sufficiently significant investment in both persons giving rise to an effective 
control;
1294
 c) when a person holds, directly or indirectly,
1295
 50% or more of 
the voting rights or value of equity interests
1296
 of a second person or a third 
person holds 50% or more of the voting rights or value of equity interests in 
both, and d) when two persons are regarded, for purposes of Article 9 
OECD Model, as “associated enterprises”.
1297
  
While some authors have argued that the reasons to restrict the scope of 
HMA would have been to avoid an undue complexity in the application of 
                                                          
1294  The OECD gives the example of a substantial shareholder in a widely held company and 
that participation gives him the effective control over the appointment of directors. Id., 
p. 116. 
1295 The understanding of indirect participation is rather clear. The OECD illustrates this 
giving the example of a person (A), who holds the 50% of the shares in BCo, and this 
latter holds also 50% of CCo. Thus, A would be indirect owner of CCo in a 25% of 
indirect ownership. Id. The concept of indirect ownership coincides with the one used 
within U.S. law with respect to CFC rules, where the stock held by foreign entities is 
considered as indirectly owned proportionally by its shareholders or partners. See Bitter 
and Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-10. See also the explanation of “indirect ownership” 
under the U.S. tax law at supra n. 686. 
1296  The reference to voting rights “or” equity interest has the clear purpose of avoiding the 
circumvention of the rule, e.g. issuing shares without voting rights. Similar rules are 
applied, e.g. in the United States with respect to CFC rules. In fact, before 1987 the 
control was measure only by voting power and the alternative of total value was added 
to avoid manipulation. See US: Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1989, p. 988, cited in: Bittker and 
Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-8. 
1297  It is not entirely clear the reason of this inclusion, because the meaning of “control” for 
purposes of the application of Article 9 OECD Model is left to the domestic laws of the 
countries. The OECD Model does not give any hints with respect to thresholds or 
criteria to consider two enterprises as “associated enterprises”. Nevertheless, the OECD 
justifies this reference as to clarify that linking rules should apply even in the case a 
transaction is subject to transfer pricing’s adjustments. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 117. 
Perhaps it would have been enough to state this reference without complicating the own 
definition of control group.  







 or implicitly constrains the application of the rules to 
transactions that might be abusive,
1299
 this aim seems to contradictory with 
the extremely wide concept of control group provided by the OECD.
1300
 
Indeed, what seems to be clear instead is that there is a strong attempt to 
include as many situations as possible within the concept of control group in 
order to avoid the manipulation of the rules. For example, if control groups 
would include only the participation of a person over another in certain 
percentage or voting rights or equity interest, as it happens with other rules 
tax rules that require control, e.g. CFC rules, it would be very easy to 
circumvent the application of linking rules by the taxpayers.
1301
 
Nevertheless, the fear with respect to the circumvention of the rules should 
not be a basis for an unnecessary extension of concepts that finally increase 
the level of complexity in the application of the rules, rather than reducing 
it.  
The above can specially be seen with respect to the concept of “Acting 
Together”, which extends even more the interpretation of the own concept 
of control group. As provided by the OECD: “For purposes of the related 
                                                          
1298  De Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 19 
1299  See, e.g. Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 342. 
1300  The intention of the OECD to limit the scope of the rule to control groups might be 
regarded as a small attempt to affect only those hybrid transactions that might be 
considered ‘abusive’, presuming that this will happen more likely with transactions 
within control groups. Nonetheless, the wide construction of the concept of control 
groups is contradictory and it does not give the impression of any limitation within the 
scope. In contrast thus the proposal of this author does not contemplate the limitation of 
the “reactive coordination rule” to transactions within control groups. The above has to 
be with the main tax policy reason behing the design of the proposed rule, which is the 
simplicity in its application. Infra Chapter VI, Section 2.2. 
1301  De Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 19 




party rules a person who acts together with another person in respect of 
ownership or control of any voting rights or equity interests will be treated 
as owning or controlling all the voting rights and equity interests of that 
person”.
1302
 The purpose of the “acting together” rule is thus, on one and, to 
prevent taxpayers from avoiding the control group requirement by 
transferring their voting interest or equity interests to another person, who 
continues to act under their direction.
1303
 On the other hand, it aims to 
prevent that, e.g. a group of minority shareholders enter into an arrangement 
that allow them to act together and benefit from the outcome of a HMA, 
avoiding again the application of linking rules.
1304
 Accordingly, and as well 
as with the concept of “control group”, the “acting together” test considers 
at least the following scenarios with respect to two persons that act together 
in respect of the ownership or control of any voting right or equity interest: 
a) they are member of the same family; b) one person acts as per the wishes 
of the other person; c) they have entered into an arrangement that has 
materially impacted the value or control of the voting rights or equity 
interests, or d) the ownership or control of any such rights or interests are 
managed by the same person or group of persons.
1305
  
As regards to the first scenario, the OECD provides that a “a person will be 
deemed to hold any equity or voting interests that are held by the members 
                                                          
1302  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 113. 
1303 Id., p. 117. 
1304  Id. 
1305  Id., p. 113, Recommendation 11. 





of that person’s family”.
1306 This requirement resembles the concept of 
“constructive ownership” in the United States, which means that a person is 
regarded to be the owner of stock owned by certain relatives, e.g. a 
spouse.
1307
 The second scenario includes the situations where a person is 
required or expected by another person to act in accordance to the wishes of 
another person in respect of the voting rights or equity interest of the 
latter.
1308
 The OECD clarifies, however, that a person is acting in accordance 
to the wishes of another only when the person is “legally bound to act”.
1309
 
The distinction seems to be very straight forward, although it can represent 
problems in countries (mostly civil law countries), where an indirect 
representation is possible.
1310
 Indeed, in many civil law countries the 
concept of ‘commissionaire’ implies that a person acts in its own name, but 
for the account of the principal.
1311
 Therefore, before third parties, the only 
relationship is with the commissionaire, but never with the principal.
1312
 
Therefore, since the commissionaire acts in its own name, it is difficult to 
sustain that he acts on behalf of another or that he is “legally bound to act” 
by another person, when in fact the representation is only indirectly with 
                                                          
1306  Id.  
1307  See US: IRC Sec. 318 and explanation of the concept of “constructive ownership” at 
supra n. 687. 
1308  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 117, para. 370, letter a). 
1309  Id. This author assumes that this would cover basically all the situations in which two 
parties have, e.g. an agency agreement. 
1310  Avery Jones and Ward, supra n. 346, p. 345. See also, Parada, supra n. 346. 
1311  This is not the same as the “undisclosed agency” in common law countries, where even 
thought the name of the principal is not disclosed, the only relationship is always with 
the principal, because no distinction is made in common law with respect to direct and 
indirect representation. See Parada, supra n. 346, p. 63. 
1312  The principal is not legally bound with third parties, who may e.g. not initiate a legal 
action against the principal. Id. 




respect to the principal, being perhaps these type of arrangement outside the 
scope of the concept of “acting together”. This interpretation, however, 
could be refuted because of the reference that a person “[…] can be 
expected to act”, and also because the contract between the principal and the 
commissionaire exists regardless the lack of relationship between a third 
party and the principal.
1313
 The third scenario assumes that the arrangement 
must have a material impact on the value of those interests or rights. In other 
words, they must have a material impact on the ability of a holder to 
exercise control or ownership over its equity or voting rights.
1314
 For 
example, if a shareholder is part of a shareholder’s agreement by which he is 
obliged to offer his shares to the existing shareholders at a FMV, before 
selling them to third parties, would not generally create a material impact in 
the value of the shares.
1315
. This seems to be a restriction on the test itself, 
which is also restricted in term that this is intended to capture only 
arrangement with other investors and it does not cover arrangements that are 
part of the term of the equity or voting interests or those which operate 
exclusively between the holder and the issuer, e.g. an arrangement between 
a partnership and one of the partners would not be included.
1316
 Finally, the 
fourth scenario treats investors as “acting together” when they are managed 
by the same person or group of persons, e.g. the case of a group of partners 
                                                          
1313  The commissionaire arrangement is still legally bound for the principal. Id., p. 62. 
1314  Id. 
1315  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 451, Ex. 11.4. 
1316  Id., p. 118. 





(investors) within a partnership, who are managed by the general partner.
1317
 
This element is, however, constrained by the fact that it does not apply to 
investors that are CIV.
1318
  
In spite of the above, the “acting together” test also attempts to catch 
situations between unrelated parties, even when the common control has not 
played any role in the transaction giving rise to the mismatch.
1319
 The above 
is illustrated in example 11.4 of the OECD Action Plan 2, which in brief 
refers to a company (BCo), which is owned by a majority shareholder 
(ACo), which holds 40% of the shares. The remaining ownership is 
represented by a 55% owned by different shareholders and 5% owned by C, 
a minority shareholder. C acquires a financial instrument, and even though 
is not a “related party” with BCo (he does not meet the requirement of being 
in the same control group and does not hold at least 25% of the shares by 
value or voting rights), the sole fact of being part of an agreement with the 
other shareholders that provides the majority shareholder with the first right 
or refusal on any disposal of shares, brings him within the scope of 
application of the linking rules.
1320
 Although the example is not illustrated 
using the concept of control group, but rather the concept of “related 
parties” (applicable to hybrid financial instruments), it is interesting to 
remark that the sole fact that the investor has entered into an agreement with 
                                                          
1317  Id. 
1318  It is important to remark in this case that the “investors” are who must rely on the 
exception for CIV and not, e.g. the partnership where they are investing and who is 
related to the entity with whom the mismatch was generated. Id., p. 453, Ex. 11.5.   
1319  Id., p. 118. 
1320  Id. 




a majority shareholder puts him under the umbrella of the “acting together” 
test, and therefore, under the application of linking rules.
1321
 Indeed, in the 
author’s view, the above simply reaffirms what has already been stressed 
before with respect to the (unnecessary) extension of the concept of “control 
group”, mostly when other concepts are also coming into play, such as the 
concept of structured arrangements analyzed below. 
3.3.2. Structured Arrangements 
The OECD defines a structured arrangement as “any arrangement where 
the hybrid mismatch is priced into the terms of the arrangement or the facts 
and circumstances (including the terms) of the arrangement indicate that it 
has been designed to produce a hybrid mismatch”.
1322
 As such, therefore, an 
structured arrangement is intended to capture transactions that are structured 
or based on hybrid outcomes, e.g. D/NI, or that depend on these outcomes in 
order to produce a commercial profit.
1323
  
As per the definition above, there are at least three main elements that are 
required to conclude that a structured arrangement exists, and thus, to 
confirm the application of linking rules: (i) the existence of an arrangement; 
(ii) a hybrid mismatch priced into the terms of that arrangement, or facts and 
circumstances of the arrangement that indicate that the arrangement was 
                                                          
1321  Id. 
1322  Id., p. 105. 
1323  Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 342. 





designed to produce a hybrid mismatch, and (iii) a person being party to this 
arrangement.
1324
 As regards to the existence of an arrangement, the OECD 
states that an arrangement “will include a number of separate arrangements 
that all form part of the same plan or understanding and will include all the 
steps and transactions by which that plan or understanding is carried into 
effect”.
1325
 The above also confirms the idea that tax administrations should 
not only look at the specific transaction (or contract) generating the hybrid 
mismatch, e.g. the loan agreement, but to the whole structure or tax planning 
in order to determine the existence of a structured arrangement. This makes 
the concept of arrangement certainly very wide.  
Accordingly, it is required that the hybrid mismatch is “priced into the 
arrangement” or that the “facts and circumstances” surrounding the 
arrangement suggest that this was designed to produce a hybrid mismatch. 
These two requirements represent two different realities. On one hand, the 
former, i.e. the “priced into the agreement” test, is the intention to 
objectivize the test. Indeed, as per the OECD a hybrid mismatch will be 
“priced into the terms of the arrangement if the mismatch has been factored 
into the calculation of the return under the arrangement”.
1326
 The test 
therefore focuses only on the terms of the arrangement itself, without paying 
                                                          
1324  Although the report does not mention it, this author believes that these three elements 
are interconnected, and therefore, the absence of any of them supposes the failure in 
passing the test to confirm the existence of a structured arrangement, and subsequently, 
the application of linking rules. 
1325  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 106. 
1326  Id. 




attention to other factors, such as the relationship between the parties.
1327
 In 
other words, it represents an honest intention to establish an objective 
criterion. On the other hand, however, the “fact and circumstances” test is 
not only a wider test, as recognized by the OECD,
1328
 but certainly a more 
subjective one.
1329
 The OECD provides a non-exhaustive list of facts and 
circumstances that would suggest that an arrangement should be treated as 
structured, including e.g. arrangements designed, or part of a plan, to create 
hybrid mismatches; arrangements that incorporate a term, step or transaction 
used to create hybrid mismatches; marketed arrangements where all the 
advantages, or some of them, are based on the hybrid mismatch, among 
others.
1330
 All these factors, that includes to look at e.g. the relationship 
between parties; the circumstances under which the arrangement was made; 
the steps and transactions involved, or the economic and commercial 
benefits derived from it, must be considered under the view of an “objective 
and well informed observer”, who will conclude that the arrangement was 
                                                          
1327  Id., p. 107 
1328 Id. 
1329  The OECD, however, argues that both tests are created to determine whether a 
structured arrangement exists are indeed “objective”. Id., p. 106, para. 319. 
1330  The full non-exhaustive list includes: “a) an arrangement that is designed, or is part of a 
plan, to create a hybrid mismatch; b) an arrangement that incorporates a term, step or 
transaction used in order to create a hybrid mismatch; c) an arrangement that is 
marketed, in whole or in part, as a tax-advantaged product where some or all the tax 
advantage derives from the hybrid mismatch; d) an arrangement that is primarily 
marketed to taxpayers in a jurisdiction where the hybrid mismatch arises; e) an 
arrangement that contains features that alter the terms under the arrangement, including 
the return, in the event that the hybrid mismatch is not longer available; or f) an 
arrangement that would produce a negative return absent the hybrid mismatch”. Id., p. 
105, Recommendation 10.2. 





designed to produce a hybrid mismatch.
1331
 Similarly, e.g. an arrangement is 
considered marketed not only by written or electronic manners, but also 
“orally”.
1332
 However, who else, beyond the persons who were part of a 
meeting, could certainly prove that the arrangement was indeed marketed in 
absence of written and electronic support? And if witnesses do it, what is the 
legal value of their statement? After all, what is clear so far is that the 
structured arrangement test, as designed, will generate an important extra 
burden not only for the tax administrations, but also for the taxpayers who 
decide to counter argue the reasoning of the tax administrations in 
determining the existence of a structured arrangement, not avoiding, and 




In the same order of ideas, and at least referring exclusively to structures 
involving hybrid entities and reverse hybrids, it is almost impossible not to 
consider any arrangement involving these types of structures as structured 
arrangements. Let us assume, e.g. a simple tax planning structure involving 
the financing of some subsidiaries through simple loans and the use of CTB 
to avoid CFC rules in the parent companies in the United States due to 
                                                          
1331  Id., p. 107. 
1332  Id., p. 109. 
1333  In this opinion, de Boer and Marres argue: “This complexity may be mitigated by the 
limitation in scope, but complexity is not avoided, not in the least because the scope is 
extended to structured arrangements, which is a rather vague concept”. De Boer and 
Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 40. 




passive income received at the level of the subsidiaries.
1334
 This planning is 
developed by a law firm, which, nevertheless write a report to the taxpayers 
in a general manner, i.e. as a type of “doing business” report, which includes 
a general explanation of the U.S. tax rules, including CFC rules and CTB 
regulations and the tax treatment of the loan for U.S. tax purposes. Would 
that be considered as “marketed” by an “objective observer”? If not 
marketed, can be affirmed by this “objective observer” that the arrangement 
was made to create a hybrid mismatch? It is evident that the “hybrid 
mismatch” will come up after all, because if a parent company in the United 
States is borrowing money to a subsidiary in Europe, which for U.S. tax 
purposes is regarded as tax transparent while in Europe is considered as a 
taxable entity, will end up in a deduction at the level of the payer and a non-
recognized loan in the United States. In certain manner, that is publicly 
known information.
1335
 Moreover, if it is clear that the use of the CTB rules 
were to avoid CFC legislation and not to disregard the loan,
1336
 it is difficult 
to affirm that the arrangement was directly designed for the purpose of 
generating a hybrid mismatch. Yet, as the “facts and circumstances test” 
also incorporates a term, step or transaction used for the purpose of creating 
a hybrid mismatch and an arrangement that is “part of a plan” to create a 
                                                          
1334  For references to the CTB system and its use to avoid Subpart F income in the United 
States (CFC rule), supra Chapter III, Section 4.4.1. and 4.4.2. 
1335  It is within the law and can be consulted by anybody.  
1336  Let us imagine, e.g. that the report was made based on the necessities of the client to 
simply avoid the anticipation of distributions, and thus recognition of income in the 
United States due to the application of CFC rules, without any other references to tax 
benefits. 





hybrid mismatch, it could still be possible for an “objective observer” to 
consider this planning as a structured arrangement.
1337
 Therefore, it seems 
to be, at least a priori, impossible that a structure involving hybrid entities 
or reverse hybrids not being regarded as a structured arrangement. The 
above only reaffirms an idea already stressed in this work, which is that the 
concept of structured arrangement, more than a limitation to the application 




In spite of the above, the presence of a structured arrangement lacks of 
importance if taxpayers are not being part of that arrangement.
1339
 For this 
purpose, a person is considered to be party to a structured arrangement 
“when that person has sufficient involvement in the design of the 
arrangement to understand how it has been structured and what its tax 
effects might be”.
1340
 In contrast, the OECD clarifies that a person will not 
be party to a structured arrangement if that person does not benefit from the 
mismatch. Likewise, the concept excludes a person who could not 
“reasonably have been expected to be aware of it”.
1341
 According to the 
OECD, the knowledge test is “objective”, i.e. a taxpayer should not have an 
obligation to undertake additional due diligence on a commercial transaction 
                                                          
1337  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 108. 
1338  This is perhaps given by the vague construction of it. De Boer and Marres, supra n. 
1253, p. 40. 
1339  Id., p. 110. 
1340  Id., p. 106. 
1341  Id. 




beyond what “would be expected of a reasonable and prudent person”.
1342
 It 
is, however, difficult to agree that a test requiring such a criterion, i.e. the 
reference to a “reasonable and prudent person” criterion, can indeed be 
regarded as objective.  On the contrary, it is most likely that the 
understanding of what is a prudent and reasonable person varies 
significantly from country to country, becoming a very subjective rather 
than objective test, if not completely vague. In addition, and regardless the 
absence of reference to this matter, it seems to be logic, at least from a 
juridical point of view, that the tax administrations have the burden of the 
proof in this case. In simple words, the tax administrations should prove that 
a taxpayer is sufficiently involved in the design of the arrangement and not 
otherwise. 
Moreover, a person is not regarded as party to the arrangement if this person 
did not benefit from the mismatch or reasonably have been expected to be 
aware of it.
1343
 The reasonable question is again who should prove the 
above. An intuitive answer, at least from a legal point of view, is that the tax 
administration should prove that the taxpayer benefited from the hybrid 
mismatch or that this taxpayer was at least aware of it, considering that in 
many jurisdictions it is not accepted the proof of negative facts, i.e. that the 
taxpayer was not benefited. Nevertheless, the OECD seems to only partially 
recognize the above when it states: “[…] a tax administration should not be 
required to establish that the taxpayer has benefited from the mismatch 
                                                          
1342 Id., p. 111. 
1343  Id. 





before requiring that the adjustment be made”.
1344
 In other words, a 
presumption is created since the taxpayer should first neutralize the 
mismatch, regardless that finally it was not aware or did not benefited from 
it, and then the tax administration might prove its involvement.  
As a result, it is possible to conclude that the whole design of the concept of 
structured arrangements lacks not only of proper objectives criteria, but it is 
also very risky to apply from a legal point of view, particularly when 
referring to ensure legal certainly. It is expected that taxpayers involved in 
transactions with a hybrid entities and reverse hybrids are constantly 
challenged, and in most of the cases, be finally regarded as part of 
structured arrangements, considering the ambiguous nature of this concept. 
Indeed, if the final intention of the OECD was reducing the scope of 
application of linking rules getting perhaps closer to target only abusive 
transactions, it would have been better, at least from a practical point of 
view, to rely more in accepted concepts, rather than introducing new and 
more complex ones.
1345
 Last but not least, it should not be less expected that 
the number of complexities in the application of this concept increase in 
                                                          
1344  Id. 
1345  Although this issue exceeds the purpose of this Chapter and the whole work, it would 
have been perhaps more interesting to follow common criteria, generally accepted, such 
as the concept of “wholly artificial arrangements” widely recognized by the CJEU in 
Europe. Supra Chapter I, Section 4.2. See also, de Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253. 




practice, generating also a negative effect in terms of administrative 
efficiency.
1346
   
3.4. Tax policy concerns 
Beyond the limitations in the scope of application of linking rules, the 
design and introduction of them within domestic laws raises also other 
important tax policy concerns. The author summarizes these general 
concerns as follows: i) the “circular effect”; ii) dependency on foreign laws; 
iii) and economic double taxation issues. All these tax policy concerns are 
analyzed as follows. 
3.4.1. Circular Effect  
Perhaps the most evident deficiency in the proposed linking rules is its 
“circular effect”.
1347
 Indeed, a payment will not be considered deductible in 
the country of the payer to the extent such payment is not included as 
income in the country of the recipient, and vice versa, a payment will be 
taxed to the extent a deduction on such payment was granted.
1348
 Therefore, 
                                                          
1346  Cooper indirectly refers to this when he says: “Clearly, there are practical difficulties in 
applying these rules [control groups and structured arrangements] to widely held 
instruments where the treatment of the payer might be contingent on the treatment of 
holders in many different states” (emphasis added). Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 342.  
1347  See K. Dziurdz, “Circular Linked” Rules Countering Deduction and Non-Inclusion 
Schemes: Some Thoughts on Tie-Breaker Test, 67 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6 (2013), Journals 
IBFD. See also, Marchgraber, supra n. 851, pp. 141-142; Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 313. 
1348  Supra Section 3.1. and Section 3.2. 





if two countries decide to include linking rules to target hybrid entity 
mismatches, they will necessarily become circularly linked since the 
application of the rules will necessarily depend on the tax treatment of the 
entity in the other country, which originated the mismatch in the 
payments.
1349
 The above could drive us to the absurd result that while the 
country of the payer denies the deduction so long as that payment is not 
exempted in the payee country (or the payment is disregarded in case of a 
payment derived from a hybrid entity), the payee country considers that it 
will not apply the exemption only to the extent that the deduction was 




As proposed already in the past, these problems of circularity could be 
solved using “tie-breakers rules”.
1351
 However, the design of such rules is 
                                                          
1349  This issue, however, would not exist if only one of the two approaches is used to 
counteract D/NI outcomes, i.e. either denying a deduction in the country of the payer or 
taxing a disregarded payment (or not granting the exemption in case of HFI) in the 
country of the payee. See Dziurdz, supra n. 1347, p. 307. 
1350  Id. See also, N. Schmidt and K. Binder, Chaos durch doppelten Kampf gegen doppelte 
Steuervorteile, Die Presse (14 Jan. 2013), available at www.dipresse.com  
1351  “It would be hard to say which of the two rules [primary response or defensive rule] 
should have priority, whether both rules apply or both do not apply, or whether the only 
effective solution is to toss a coin. Consequently, a tie-breaker test is needed”. Dziurdz, 
supra n. 1347, p. 310. In 2012 (before the OECD BEPS Project), the OECD also 
recognized this issue when it says: “[c]ountry rules linking the domestic tax treatment to 
the foreign tax treatment do not generally contain a tie-breaker test for cases where the 
other country involved has similar rules”. OECD (2012), supra n. 6, p. 24. See also, 
Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 142.  Nevertheless, the OECD seems to address a 
different position with respect to tie-breaker rules within the OECD BEPS report: “[…] 
these recommendations contain an ordering rule so that one rule is turned-off when the 
counterparty jurisdiction with the same set of rules can neutralize the effect of the hybrid 
mismatch arrangements in a more effective and practical way. This ordering rule avoids 




again not an easy task. For example, the OECD BEPS Action plan 2 
provides for a priority in the application of the rules.
1352
 In this sense, a 
primary response will apply to deny a deduction to the extent that the 
corresponding payment is not included as income in the other country, and a 
defensive rule will apply only to the extent that a primary response was not 
applied.
1353
 This is indeed a tie-breaker rule that provides for the application 
of the respective rule to counter the hybrid entity mismatch only if the other 
country did not apply the rule. However, as it can be seen, the tie-breaker 
rule does not solve the circular problem itself, because the application of the 
rule depends again on whether the other country’s corresponding rule is 
applied.
1354
 In other words, the circularity issue is simply moved from the 
rule counteracting the hybrid mismatch to the tie-breaker rule.
1355 
                                                                                                                                       
the need for an express tie-breaker rule and achieves the necessary degree of co-
ordination without resorting to the competent authority procedure” (emphasis added). 
Id., p. 96. The above, however, would not solve the problem of opportunistic behaviors 
or who is “getting in first” in terms of revenue collection.  
1352  As regards to the linking rules, the OECD states: “The rules apply automatically and 
there is a rule order in the form of primary rule and a secondary rule or defensive rule. 
This prevents more than one country applying the rule to the same arrangement and also 
avoids double taxation”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, pp. 11-12. 
1353  Id. 
1354  As stated by Dziurdz: “One country’s rule countering deduction and non-inclusion 
schemes would apply only if the other country’s corresponding rule did not apply, and 
the other country’s corresponding rule would not apply only if the first-mentioned rule 
applied. This yet again depends on whether or not the other country’s corresponding rule 
applied, and so on”. Dziurdz, supra n. 1347, p. 308  
1355  “[i]f the tie-breaker test considered the fact of whether or not the other country’s 
corresponding rule applies […] there would again be a “circular link”, but this time at 
the level of the tie-breaker test”. Id. 





Authors have also analyzed other approaches that include, on one hand, the 
possibility of disregarding the rule in the other country when it includes a 
“back link” and, on the other hand, to assume an international meaning of 
the concept of debt and equity (as regards to HFI).
1356
 With respect to the 
first approach, it could indeed stop the problem of circularity, although only 
temporarily and perhaps at a much higher cost. Indeed, if both countries 
include the tie-breaker rule, they will nullify each other’s corresponding 
anti-hybrid rule resulting in non-deduction/ non-exemption, or which is the 
same, economic double taxation.
1357
 This result is evident in the case of 
primary response and defensive rule, because both rules involve a “back 
link” to the each other countries’ rules.
1358
 As regards to the second 
approach, it seems more logical, because it targets the real cause of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements: the divergent characterization of financial 
instruments or entities.
1359
 Nevertheless, it is the author’s opinion that such 
an approach in the case of hybrid entities and reverse hybrids should not be 
reduced to a simple tie-breaker rule solving the problems of application of 
                                                          
1356  Id., pp. 308-309, who proposes a “solution (2)” and “solution (3)”. 
1357  Although, it appears that countries are more willing to accepts this result rather than 
economic double non-taxation. For example, in 2007 Denmark introduced a provision 
by which an interest deduction is granted only to the extent that the correspondent 
interest amount is not exempted in the other country. This rule, or the underlying policy 
behind it, was widely criticized, because the same precautions (i.e. avoiding the 
mismatch) are not considered when double taxation, rather double non-taxation, arises. 
See, e.g. Bundgaard, supra n. 793, pp. 202-204. See also (from an Austrian perspective): 
S. Kirchmayr and G. Kofler, Beteiligungsertragsbefreiung und Internationale 
Steuerarbitrage, 10 Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftrecht und angrenzendes Steuerrecht 9 
(2011); M. Stefaner, Konsequenzen der Anwendung von § 10 Abs. 7 KStG, 22 Steuer 
und Wirtschaft International 8 (2012). 
1358  Dziurdz, supra n. 1347, p. 308 
1359  Id., p. 309. 




the complex linking rules, but rather be applied as a separate standard that 
simply replaces the proposed OECD rules.
1360 
3.4.2. Dependency upon Foreign Laws 
Another important feature of the proposed linking rules is the high reliance 
on foreign laws that involves their application.
1361
 One could argue that there 
are plenty of other rules within tax law referring to foreign laws and which 
impose a certain degree of dependency, e.g. rules on tax credit or CFC rules, 
and thus there should not be a problem at all to include rules “linking” the 
outcomes of transactions involving hybrids. Nonetheless, there is a huge 
difference between a certain degree of reliance on foreign law and a full 
dependency, as it seems to be proposed under the linking rules.
1362
 Indeed, it 
is difficult to argue that a country could become contingent or structurally 
dependent on the policies and practices of another country just because the 
former applies CFC rules or calculate a foreign tax credit relying of the 
concept of income in the other country. However, the design of the linking 
rules implies a direct connection to the law of the other country, including 
                                                          
1360  I will go back to this proposal at infra Chapter VI. 
1361  As stressed by Cooper: “It has been clear for a long time that, if these recommendations 
[linking rules] are pursued and properly implemented, a state’s tax law would become 
much more contingent and structurally dependent on the policies and practices of other 
governments”. Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 346. 
1362  To explain this difference, Lüdicke states: “The former [CFC rule] seems easier for 
taxpayers and tax administrations as it requires less technical understanding about 
foreign tax rules and less factual knowledge about the fact and circumstances”. Lüdicke, 
supra n. 840, p. 313.  





its further modifications, which demonstrates indeed a much higher degree 
of dependency.
1363 
A dependency on foreign law in case of tax matters should be carefully 
analyzed from a tax policy perspective, because one should not forget that 
countries attempt to accomplish a basic aim when imposing taxes: to 
generate revenues.
1364
 Thus, even though countries might sometimes act in 
the interest of other countries, they will most probably do that with those 
countries with which they have a deeper affinity given by cultural, economic 
or geographical reasons.
1365
 In all other cases, it is expected that these 
                                                          
1363  An experience from excessive reliance on foreign laws can be taken from the 
modification to the German DCL regime (Dual Consolidated Losses). The German tax 
group of companies (Organgesellschaften), unlike other countries, is also applicable to 
dual residence entities, as it is not required that the legal seat of the members of the 
group is located in Germany, rather it is only required that the place of management of 
the tax group and the controlling company [Organträger]’s participation in the tax 
group is allocated to a German PE. The above implies that, in cases where no double tax 
treaty is applicable, losses from dual residents of the tax group could be set off against 
income in Germany and in the country where the relevant legal seat is located. In order 
to avoid this effect, the German law was modified establishing now that the negative 
income of a controlling company [Organträger] or a controlled company 
[Organgesellschaft] is disregarded for German tax purposes to the extent that it is taken 
also into account by a foreign country in the taxation of the controlling company, the 
controlled company or any other person. However, as argued by Bärsch and Spengel, 
the simultaneous application of DCL rules in Germany and other country and the fact 
that the rule will apply in cases beyond DCL cases, e.g. negative income generated by a 
foreign PE where the foreign income is not tax exempt in Germany due to the 
application of the credit method, might result in no loss set off at all. See Bärsch and 
Spengel, supra n. 1285, p. 527. In the same order of ideas, i.e. in reference to the 
German experience on DCL, Lüducke argues that collateral damage is unavoidable, and 
that there is no doubt in German tax literature that the provision is excessive, 
inappropriately drafted and not administrable. See Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 313, also 
footnote 16. 
1364  To give up revenues is not always an easy task. Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 346. 
1365  Id. 




countries want to act in their own interest, which could generate new issues 
that could make these rules be destined to fail. For example, if two countries 
introduce both a primary response and a defensive rule, will the country of 
the payee accept that the deduction was denied in the country of the payer or 
it will consider a different approach and will decide to apply a defensive 
rule? As noted by Cooper, there is indeed a high risk of “getting in first”, 
which is in fact an expected reaction of countries whose interests are based 
in the generation of revenues.
1366
 Similarly, the risk of extreme dependency 
cannot only derive from the law in the other country, but also from the facts 
and circumstances, which puts countries in a more complicated situation.
1367
 
Following the example of Cooper with respect to HFI, it is clear that if a 
deduction associated to a payment using a HFI is denied in the country of 
the payer, because this is made to a related party or structured 
arrangement,
1368
 but then the instrument is sold to an unrelated party, the 
deduction should be reinstated.
1369
 The above demonstrates that the 
taxpayer’s position in the country of the payer is directly linked in this case 
to the behavior of the foreign taxpayer. In other words, the deduction of the 
payment will finally depend on the behavior of the taxpayer in the foreign 
country. 
                                                          
1366  Id. 
1367  As stressed by Cooper: “It is one thing to accept a constrain on sovereignty, as another 
sovereign state has acted, but it is quite a different matter to accept a constrain on 
sovereignty based on facts and circumstances happening abroad”. Id. 
1368  Supra Section 3.3.2. 
1369  Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 347. 





A different dimension of the same problem is given by the costs associated 
to the reliance on foreign law both from taxpayers and tax administrations’ 
perspective. In fact, it is undeniable that taxpayers will still attempt to 
escape the linking rules in one way or another. The above could indeed 
imply an increase in tax planning costs, given by the most complex set of 
international linking rules and foreign laws that should be taken into 
consideration when preparing a tax planning.
1370
 Accordingly, tax 
administrations will need a further and deeper knowledge of foreign laws in 
order to determine whether a deduction was indeed granted or whether the 
other country “included” the payment as income, even though the concepts 
of deduction, inclusion and income might certainly vary from each other. In 
a nutshell, and once again, linking rules increase uncertainty and transaction 
costs, both negative effects from a tax policy perspective. As argued by 
Lüdicke: “Legislators should not underestimate the theoretical and the 
practical difficulties which arise if the application of the domestic taxation is 
made dependent on the details of foreign tax laws”.
1371 
                                                          
1370  The probabilities for complexities increase considering, e.g. imported mismatches. 
Supra Section 2.4.3. 
1371  Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 317. 




3.4.3. Economic Double Taxation and lack of coherence  
Connected to the circularity issues already discussed, it is undeniable that 
linking rules might generate new situations of economic double taxation.
1372
 
This issue, in principle, should not raise major concerns since there are 
plenty of examples in which economic double taxation is indeed an accepted 
or tolerated outcome.
1373
 Nevertheless, this potential outcome should be 
analyzed in line with the supposed coherence that Action 2 attempts to 
implement.
1374
 Indeed, as noted already in this work, linking rules attempts 
to counteract transactions involving hybrid entities (and hybrid financial 
instruments) in which the outcome of DNT arises in the form of a D/NI, 
although without creating new situations of double taxation.
1375
 However, 
the proposed rules demonstrate a sound preference for the avoidance of 
economic DNT (i.e. D/NI outcome) over the avoidance of economic double 
taxation (i.e. non-deduction/inclusion).
1376
 This idea is reinforced when one 
sees that there is no rule to solve potential issues of economic double 
                                                          
1372  This could perfectly happens when a primary response, denying a deduction in the payer 
country applies simultaneously with a defensive rule, which provides for taxation of a, in 
principle, disregarded payment made by a hybrid entity.  
1373  Supra Section 3.4.1. 
1374  As stated by the OECD: “The recommendations set out in this report are intended to 
operate as a comprehensive and coherent package of measures to neutralize mismatches 
that arise from the use of hybrid instruments and entities without imposing undue 
burdens on taxpayers and tax administrations”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 94. 
1375  Supra Section 2. 
1376  Supra Section 3.4.1. 





taxation if, e.g. the denial of a deduction (i.e. primary response) finally 
results in the inclusion of income in the other country.
1377
  
This situation becomes even clearer when we analyze the interaction of the 
linking rules with other rules denying deductions at a domestic level. Let us 
assume, for example, the application of linking rules and interest limitation 
rules in a given country.
1378
 As a general rule, interest limitation rules, i.e. 
earning stripping rules, are designed in a way that if a taxpayer 
(Corporation) is in a situation of excess of indebtedness, i.e. its amount of 
interest expenses is over the amount of interest income, the amount of 
deductible interest income is limited according to certain criteria, normally a 
percentage of the amount of EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization).
1379
 The above implies that for that given 
                                                          
1377  On the contrary, the pragmatic approach taken by the OECD, in terms of taxing the 
income “no matter where” and “no matter base erosion”, can be seen in the wording 
used to described the policy behind the anti-hybrid rules [design principles], where it 
clearly says: “[…] hybrid mismatch rules apply automatically and without regard for 
whether the arrangement has eroded the tax base of the country applying the rule. This 
approach assures consistency in the application of the rules (and their outcomes) 
between jurisdictions and also avoids the practical and conceptual difficulties in 
distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable mismatches or trying to allocate 
taxing rights based on the extent to which a country’s tax base has been eroded thorough 
the hybrid mismatch arrangement”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 95. 
1378  Interest limitation rules are also part of the proposal in the BEPS Action 4. See 
OECD (2015), Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris. See also, 
OECD (2016), Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2016 Update: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
1379  For example, in Germany, as a general rule, a “business” [Betrieb] is limited to deduct 
net interest expenses, i.e. the amount after offsetting the interest expenses against the 
interest earnings of the business, as business expenses up to 30% of the amount of the 
taxable EBITDA. If there is thus an excess of net interest expenses, this is not deductible 




taxable year, the Corporation will see how its taxable base is increased in 
the same amount of non-deductible interest expenses, which, nonetheless, 
will be included in the country of the recipient, generating thus a situation of 
economic double taxation.
1380
 This effect, however, is normally offset with 
the possibility for the taxpayer to carry forward the non-deductible amount 
and use those non-deductible expenses as per the same limitations already 
                                                                                                                                       
in the fiscal year, although it can be carried forward indefinitely and deducted in the 
subsequent fiscal years subject to the same threshold limitation. This general rule, 
however, has some exceptions. Firstly, it only applies to the extent that the amount of 
net interest expenses exceeds 3 million EUR (“de minimis rule”). This amount was 
increased in 2009. The original amount was 1 million EUR. See DE: Citizen Relief Act 
[Bürgerentlastungsgesetz] of 16 July 2009, BGBl 1, 1959 (2009) and Growth 
Acceleration Act [Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz] of 22 Dec. 2009, BGBl 1, 3950 
(2009). Secondly, it does apply only to the extent a business belongs, even partially, to a 
tax group (“stand-alone clause”). Thirdly, and finally, even in the case a business 
belongs to a tax group, the interest limitation rule does not apply if the business’s equity 
ratio does not fall short of the group’s equity ratio by more than 1% (“escape clause”). 
Generally speaking, the German interest barrier is codified in Sec. 4h of the Income Tax 
Act [Einkommensteuergesetz– EStG], which contains the general rule and the exceptions 
applicable to this rule. Likewise, §8a(2) and §8a(3) of the Corporate Income Tax Act 
[Körperschaftsteuergesetz– KStG] provides some special rules regarding the exceptions 
when applied specifically to corporate entities. The German interest limitation rule 
replaced the former thin capitalization rule previously applied and it is applicable for 
accounting periods starting after 25 May 2007 and not ending before 1 January 2008. 
See K. von Brocke and E. Garcia Perez, Group Financing: From Thin Capitalization to 
Interest Deduction Limitation Rules, 16 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 1 (2009), Journals 
IBFD, p. 31. See also in reference to the German rules, e.g. M. Scheunemann and T. 
Müller-Duttiné, New German Tax Rules on Financing Expenses, 35 Intertax 8/9 (2007); 
A. Fross, Earnings Stripping and Thin Cap Rules: Maintaining an Arm’s Length 
Distance, 53 Eur. Taxn. 10 (2013), Journals IBFD. 
1380  A very simple example could be the following: let us imagine a company, in Year X, 
with a given taxable EBITDA of 2,000, net interest expenses of 1,000, and taxable 
profits of 1,000. The amount of interest expenses is, however, limited to a 30% of the 
amount of EBITDA in that year X. Therefore, the company may only deduct 600, being 
the remaining 400 added back to the taxable income, increasing the tax base of the 
company. Accordingly, however, the full amount of interest paid (1,000) will be taxable 
in the payee country. As a result, therefore, the non-deduction of 400, and its inclusion 
as income in the other country, represents a clear case of economic double taxation.  







 Now, let us imagine that the payment of interest is connected 
with HFI, and thus, we should also apply the primary response. As per the 
OECD report on Action 2, the primary response has priority over the 
interest limitation rule and should apply first, while the remaining part of the 
interest expenses not affected by the linking rule will be subject to the 
interest limitation.
 1382
  Therefore, the country of the payer will deny the 
deduction, because it considers that the income is not taxed in the other 
country. The denial of the deduction, in this case, will not generate 
economic double taxation if the income is not included in the other country. 
However, if for any reason the income is included in the other country (e.g. 
because the other country applies a different criteria for inclusion or a 
timing issue), the effect of economic double taxation will not be solved 
since the primary response does not provide for a non-deductible expense to 
be carried forward. In other words, if this hypothetical happens, the part of 
the interest expenses paid and affected by the primary response, i.e. where 
the interest limitation rule does not apply, will suffer economic double 
taxation if the income is included in the other country, without any chance 
of turning that back. The above thus simply reinforces the idea that when 
putting together economic double taxation and economic double non-
                                                          
1381  In some cases, however, regardless the fact that an unlimited carry-forward is offered, in 
practice such an option is limited. In Germany, e.g. in case of the discontinuance of the 
business or change of control, the non-deductible expenses cannot be used, which in 
other words implies that the economic double tax effect is permanent. DE: Sec. 
4(h)(5)(1) of the Income Tax Act [Einkommensteuergesetz– EStG].  See also, C. 
Knöller, The Efficacy of thin Capitalization Rules and their Barriers: An Analysis from 
UK and German Perspective, 39 Intertax 6/7 (2011), pp. 324-325. 
1382  For a more complete analysis on the interaction of linking rules and interest limitation 
rules, infra Section 4.1. 




taxation in a balance, there is certain inclination to opt for counteracting the 
latter rather than the former, even under the risk of producing new cases of 
economic double taxation.
1383
 This is not only contrary to what the OECD 
attempts to demonstrate, i.e. the coherence within the application of the 
rules, but also an evident proof of lack of consistency when applying the 
rules, at least when the two aims (i.e. double taxation and DNT) are 
confronted.  
3.5. Legal Concerns  
Another issue associated to the implementation of the OECD linking rules 
as a manner to deal with the issues of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities 
refers to the legal compatibility of these rules, specially when they are tested 
against tax treaties (in particular Art. 24 OECD Model/ non-discrimination 
provision) and EU primary and secondary law. This Section provides some 
insights with respect to this analysis. 
3.5.1. Compatibility with Tax Treaties 
Both the primary response and the defensive rule might a priori raise issues 
with respect to the compatibility between these domestic rules and tax 
treaties. In particular, it refers specifically to the possibility that the denial of 
a deduction in the country of the payer, unless a respective inclusion of 
                                                          
1383  Supra Section 3.4.1. 





income occurs in the other country, or the taxation of income (and the 
recognition of a transaction in principle disregarded) at the level of the 
payee, if a deduction of such payment was granted in the other country, 
might be regarded as discriminatory as per the non-discrimination rules 
established in Article 24 OECD Model. 
3.5.1.1. General Structure of Article 24 OECD Model: Non- 
Discrimination 
Unlike other non-discrimination provisions, Article 24 OECD Model is very 
straightforward in terms of its application.
1384
 Indeed, e.g. it covers only 
cases of direct or de jure discrimination, excluding indirect, hidden or de 
facto discrimination.
1385
 Indeed, in order to establish that discrimination 
                                                          
1384  The above also means that the analysis of discrimination if rather restricted. 
1385 See, e.g. A. Rust, in: Reimer & Rust (eds.), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions, 4th ed. (2015), Article 24 at m.no. 5. In a different perspective, e.g. the 
approach to discrimination under WTO covers both de jure and de facto discrimination, 
and it also includes possibilities for justification. See K. Dziurdz, Non-Discrimination 
and Harmful Tax Competition under WTO Law and Article 24 of the OECD Model, in: 
D. Weber and P. Pistone (eds.), Non-Discrimination in Tax Treaties: Selected Issues 
from a Global Perspective, EC and International Tax Law Series Vol. 14, IBFD, 
Amsterdam, 2016, p. 210. Similarly, the EU law approach to non-discrimination both 
types of discrimination (direct and indirect) and provides for justification grounds. See 
F. Vanistendael, Non-Discrimination: Can the EU Learn from the OECD Model 
Convention and Vice Versa?, in: D. Weber and P. Pistone (eds.), Non-Discrimination in 
Tax Treaties: Selected Issues from a Global Perspective, EC and International Tax Law 
Series Vol. 14, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2016, p. 227. As Vanistendael well explains, 
however, the difference is basically because the aim of the EU was to achieve a rather 
stronger level of integration, which included “the establishment of a common market, 
which later would develop into the internal market”. Id., p. 226.  This is certainly not the 
aim of the OECD Model or the international tax treaty network. See also in this opinion, 
e.g. K. Dziurdz and C. Marchgraber, Non-Discrimination in European and Tax Treaty 
Law: An Overview, in: K. Dziurdz and C. Marchgraber (eds.), Non-Discrimination in 
European and Tax Treaty Law, Linde, Vienna, 2015, p. 10. Accordingly, The OECD 




occurs, a strict comparability test is applied: only those domestic provisions 
differentiating by reason of nationality or residence might give rise to 
discrimination.
1386
 Therefore, every other relevant difference in 
circumstances is considered for purposes of preventing comparability.
1387
 
Likewise, Article 24 OECD Model gives no space for ‘justifications’.
1388
 
This latter characteristic is, nevertheless, not absolute, because where a 
grounds for different treatment acts as a substitute or a proxy for nationality 




The non-discrimination situations within Article 24 OECD Model include, 
on one hand, paragraphs 1 and 2 referred to discrimination based on 
                                                                                                                                       
Commentaries on Article 24 clearly state: “The nondiscrimination provisions of the 
Article seek to balance the need to prevent unjustified discrimination with the need to 
take account of these legitimate distinctions. For that reason, the Article should not be 
unduly extended to cover so-called “indirect” discrimination”. See OECD Commentary 
on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 1. 
1386  Rust, supra n. 1385, Article 24 at m.no. 35. 
1387  For example, residence is a relevant comparability for purposes of Article 24(1) OECD 
Model, because everything in the circumstances, except for nationality, must be the 
same. See OECD Commentary on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 7 et 
seq. See also Dziurdz and Marchgraber, supra n. 1385. 
1388  Rust, supra n. 1385, Article 24 at m.no. 4 and 132. Indeed, as explained by Vanistendael 
in reference to the fact that the OECD Model does not contain express grounds for 
justification: “Unlike in the EU treaties, there are no reasons of public policy to make 
exceptions to the non-discrimination rule. Since the rules of the Model Convention are 
to be interpreted by many different national courts, chances that these courts would 
develop any doctrine resembling the rule of reason doctrine of the ECJ, permitting them 
to make exceptions to the non-discrimination principle on the basis of a uniform 
juridical doctrine, are non-existent”. See Vanistendael, supra n. 1385, p. 246. 
1389  For example, as per the OECD Commentaries on Article 24, the requirement of holding 
or being entitled to a passport is regarded as substitute for nationality. See OECD 
Commentary on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 1. See also, Dziurdz, 
supra n. 1385, and Dziurdz and Marchgraber, Id. 







 On the other hand, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, which include 
discrimination based on residence.
1391
 Therefore, and as per the design of the 
proposed linking rules, the analysis will concentrate on paragraphs 4 and 5 
                                                          
1390  Article 24(1) OECD Model, on one hand, prohibits a contracting State from subjecting 
the nationals of another Contracting State, who find themselves in the same 
circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, as the nationals of the first State, 
to a more burdensome tax treatment in comparison with the one imposed on nationals of 
the first State. See Rust, supra n. 1385, Article 24 at m.no. 5. The rule applies both to 
individuals and legal entities. Nevertheless, the importance for individuals is rather 
reduced, considering that nationality is not longer a proxy used to determine tax liability. 
See Y. van Brussel, The Relevance of Residence as a Safeguard in Article 24(1) of the 
OECD Model, in: K. Dziurdz and C. Marchgraber (eds.), Non-Discrimination in 
European and Tax Treaty Law, Linde, Vienna, 2015, p. 354. As an exception, the 
United States still uses nationality to determine the worldwide taxation of individuals. 
This is also stated within the observation made by the United States to the 
Commentaries on Article 24, when they emphasize that “its non-resident citizens are not 
in the same circumstances as other non-residents”, precisely because the United States 
taxes its non-resident citizens on worldwide income. See OECD Observations to the 
Commentary on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 83. For an critical 
analysis regarding the use of citizenship in the United States, see e.g. R. Avi-Yonah, The 
Case of Taxing Citizens, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 10-009 
(2010), available at Michigan Law ELSC Website. See also, R. Mason, Citizenship 
Taxation, Southern California Law Rev. 89, Virginia Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 2015-07, available at SSRN. Accordingly, Article 4 OECD Model, in order to 
allocate taxing rights, uses nationality as a “tie-breaker” when competing claims over 
individual taxpayers result in a jurisdictional collision. See Article 4, para. 2 d) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention (2014). A similar norm is contained in Article 4, para. 3 
d) of the US Model Tax Convention (2016). The practical importance of Article 24(1) 
OECD Model varies with respect to companies, because full tax liability by reason of 
incorporation  under domestic law is often the criterion to determine nationality under 
Artcile 3(1)(g) OECD Model. See K. van Raad, Nondiscrimination in International Tax 
Law, Series of International Taxation No. 6, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer, 1986, p. 75. Article 24(2), on the other hand, applies the same rule with 
respect to discrimination to persons who are regarded as “stateless” who have no 
nationality. There is no equivalent provision under EU law. See Vanistendael, supra n. 
1385, p. 243. 
1391  The scope of Article 24(3), however, is limited to PEs. According to this article, a PE 
cannot be taxed worse than a domestic enterprise. For a further analysis, see e.g. H. 
Bhuta, Progressive Tax Rates in a Profit or Loss Situation under Article 24(3) of the 
OECD Model, in: K. Dziurdz and C. Marchgraber (eds.), Non-Discrimination in 
European and Tax Treaty Law, Linde, Vienna, 2015, p. 377 et seq. 




of Article 24 OECD Model. Whilst the former refers to a specific non-
discrimination rule with respect to the deductibility of expenses paid by an 
enterprise to a resident of the other Contracting State, the latter prohibits a 
more burdensome taxation of an enterprise established in a Contracting 
State by the sole reason of being wholly or partially owned by taxpayers in 
the other Contracting State. 
3.5.1.2. Linking rules and Article 24(4) OECD Model 
Article 24(4) OECD Model provides that “interest, royalties and other 
disbursements paid by an enterprise of a Contracting State to a resident of 
the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable 
profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if the 
had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State”.
1392
 Therefore, in 
principle, a rule denying a deduction of certain deductible payments (e.g. 
interest), which only applies in cross-border situations, might be considered 
against the non-discrimination provision of Article 24(4) OECD Model. In 
contrast, however, it could also be argued that if the rule (hypothetically) 
applies indistinctively to domestic and cross-border situations, and since 
Article 24(4) OECD Model does not cover cases of indirect or hidden 
discrimination, linking rules would be perfectly compatible with the non-
discrimination provision.  
                                                          
1392  Article 24(4) OECD Model Tax Convention (2014). 





The analysis becomes even more complex if we consider the lack of 
comparability between domestic and cross-border situations. Indeed, as 
HMA involving hybrid entities and reverse hybrids may only occur in cross-
border situations, i.e. a country will never disagree with itself with respect to 
the characterization of entities, there is no a pure domestic situation to 
compare with and, in absence of comparability, there is no 
discrimination.
1393
 Additionally, and as stressed somewhere else already, 
linking rules are not designed based on residence, but rather based on the 
existence of a hybrid mismatch, i.e. for purposes of this work, a disparity 
between two countries with respect to the characterization of the same 
entity.
1394
 All of the above would drive us to conclude a priori that a non-
deductibility based on the recognition of income in the other Contracting 
State (i.e. primary response) would be a simple additional condition for the 
deductibility, which may not be regarded as directly discriminatory.  
In spite of the above, it is still relevant to question whether the existence of a 
hybrid entity mismatch that results in a D/NI outcome might be regarded as 
a substitute proxy for discrimination based on residence or nationality.
1395
 
Dzuirdz assumes this question in the hypothetical situation of a country, 
without access to the sea, which provides for a less favorable tax treatment 
                                                          
1393  Dziurdz, supra n. 1385, p. 213. 
1394  As stated by Rust with respect to the design of linking rules: “[…] residence in the other 
Contracting State is neither necessary nor sufficient condition”. See A. Rust, BEPS 
Action 2: 2014 Deliverable–Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements 
and its Compatibility with the Non-Discrimination Provisions in Tax Treaties and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, BTR 3 (2015), p. 312. 
1395  Dziurdz, supra n. 1385, p. 215. 




to the profits of PEs belonging to non-residents enterprises if the respective 
enterprise, in its residence country, is located 50 kilometers to the sea.
1396
 
According to Dzuirdz, this situation mirrors in part what happens with 
HMA, where mismatches will not arise in all circumstances, but rather only 
with respect to certain non-residents where the hybrid mismatch results 
indeed in a D/NI.
1397
 In both situations, however, the less favorable 
treatment might be a relevant criterion for the domestic “anti-sea access” or 
the “anti-HMA” provision, justifying the different treatment.
1398
 Therefore, 
the relevant question is still whether or not the sea access or the HMA 
prevent direct discrimination or they are indeed a mere pretext for 
disadvantaging non-residents.
1399
 If the genuine tax policy were to prevent 
sea access or the occurrence of a HMA, there would not be conflict with 
Article 24(4) OECD Model, because as stressed already, this article only 




If the question above were analyzed within a bilateral context, there would 
certainly be more possibilities to conclude that a discriminatory treatment 
                                                          
1396  The author assumes the case of Austria, which does not have sea borders. Id., p. 214. 
1397 Nevertheless, Dziurdz explains that the fact that only few non-residents are 
disadvantaged does not prevent discrimination under Article 24(3) OECD Model. Id. 
1398  Id., p. 215. 
1399  “Determining the actual reason for different treatment and the background of a rule is 
not merely an issue of subjective intent. It is rather necessary to objectively determine 
the aim of the rule under scrutiny by analyzing its wording, context and systematics as 
well as the historical background”. Id. 
1400  Supra Section 3.5.1.1. 







 For example, if Spain provides for a domestic rule denying the 
deduction of interest paid to a German parent company if due to the 
different characterization of the Spanish entity by Germany, the payment is 
not recognized as income in Germany, it is evident that the rule will affect 
all German residents (as non-residents). However, if Germany were to 
include the same rule, no Spanish parent company with a German subsidiary 
would be affected, considering the Spanish practice to follow the 
characterization of foreign entities according to the rules of the foreign 
country.
1402
 This analysis can be compared with the analogy that Dzuirdz 
makes with respect to the sea-access.
1403
 If the treaty applied were Austria-
Malta, then only Maltese companies with PEs in Austria would be affected, 
but no in the other way around.
1404
 Nevertheless, avoiding the specific 
bilateral context, it is clear hat a rule such as the one introduced by Spain in 
the example above, applicable to all countries, would affect some countries 
and others not. The above, however, would simply mean that an indirect 
discrimination, not covered by Article 24(4) OECD Model, would arise. 
As a result, therefore, it is possible to conclude that a different treatment to 
non-residents may exist when this different treatment is not necessarily a 
substitute for residence or nationality. In the same order of ideas, it is 
arguable that linking rules raise a priori discriminatory issues considering 
mostly the strict comparability sets up in Article 24(4) OECD Model. 
                                                          
1401  Id. 
1402  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.1. 
1403  Dziurdz, supra n. 1385, p. 216. 
1404  Id. 




3.5.1.3. Linking rules and Article 24(5) OECD Model 
The majority of tax treaties around the globe include a provision similar to 
Article 24(5) OECD Model. According to this provision: “Enterprises of a 
Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other 
Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or more 
burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other 




As per the wording of paragraph 5, therefore, it is possible to identify some 
minimum requirements for its application.
1406
 Firstly, the provision applies 
only in case of resident subsidiaries, which are treated in a less favorable 
manner because of being controlled by a non-resident rather than a resident 
company.
1407
 In other words, the rule aims to ensure an equal treatment for 
taxpayer residing in the same State or, which is the same, it prohibits a 
Contracting State from giving a less favorable treatment to a resident 
enterprise, whose capital is owned or controlled by a resident(s) of the other 
                                                          
1405  Article 24(5) OECD Model Tax Convention (2014). 
1406  B. Da Silva, Revisiting the Application of the Capital Ownership Non-Discrimination 
Provision in Tax Treaties, in: D. Weber and P. Pistone (eds.), Non-Discrimination in 
Tax Treaties: Selected Issues from a Global Perspective, EC and International Tax Law 
Series Vol. 14, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2016, p. 74 
1407  OECD Commentary on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 5, m.no. 76. 







 Secondly, the reason for discrimination must rely 
exclusively on the fact that resident enterprises are owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by a resident enterprise in the other Contracting State. 
In other words, and as stressed already with respect to Article 24 OECD 
Model in general, this provision covers exclusively cases of direct 
discrimination.
1409
 Thirdly, the discriminatory treatment refers to “other or 
more burdensome taxation” or “connected requirements”. Whilst the 
reference to a “more burdensome taxation” clearly requires a comparison of 
tax burdens, i.e. quantum of tax,
1410
 the reference to “other taxation” is 
rather unclear.
1411
 Nevertheless, the inclination of some scholars to associate 
the first expression to a comparison of tax rates, while the later as a 
reference to tax base, which would include, e.g. limitation in the 
deductibility of expenses, seems to be a clearer path for interpretation.
1412
 
Finally, and as regards to the object of comparison, the provision refers to 
“similar enterprises”.  Despite the unclear wording of Article 24(5) OECD 
                                                          
1408  See A. Rust, International Tax Neutrality and Non-discrimination–Legal Perspective, 
in: M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch, C. Staringer, A. Storck and M. Zagler (eds.), Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, IBFD, Amsterdam, p. 641. 
Article 24(5) OECD Model does not protect the shareholders, resident in the other 
Contracting State. See also, Rust, supra n. 1385, Article 24 at m.no. 108.  
1409  Supra Section 3.5.1.1. 
1410  J. Avery Jones et al., The Non-discrimination Article in Tax Treaties, 31 Eur. Taxn. 10 
(1991), Journals IBFD, p. 336. 
1411  J. Kostohryz, Ownership Non-Discrimination under Article 24(5) of the OECD Model in 
the Case of Low-Taxed Payments, Linde, Vienna, 2015, p. 542. 
1412  See, e.g. van Raad, supra n. 1390, p. 93.  Indeed, disallowing a deduction in one country 
has the direct effect of increasing the tax base in the country where the restriction is 
carried out. Therefore, the quantum of the tax is also higher. See Da Silva, supra n. 
1406, p. 76.   




Model to ascertain similarity,
1413
 it is entirely clear now that “similar 
enterprises” refers to a comparison with domestic entities owned or 
controlled by residents of the same State of the subsidiary.
1414
  
As regards to linking rules, however, i.e. rules motivated by the prevention 
of HMA that result in DNT, the relevant question remains the same: do 
these rules genuinely aim to prevent DNT resulting from hybrid entity 
mismatches or do they indeed, by reason of a foreign ownership, puts the 
residence enterprise in a more burdensome position? Only in this latter case, 
i.e. a case of direct discrimination, the application of Article 24(5) OECD 
Model could be relevant. 
 
As this author has stressed already, the design of linking rules is rather 
broad.
1415
 In principle, they attempt to cover all situations, domestic and 
cross-border, that might give rise to D/NI, regardless the fact that in practice 
hybrid mismatches involving hybrid entities and reverse hybrids are limited 
or might only arise in cross-border transactions.
1416
 One could argue in 
                                                          
1413  The dispute of interpretation referred basically to consider that the comparison should be 
made either with an enterprise owned by residents of the same State or by residents of a 
third State. See D. Oliver, Differential Treatment of Discrimination? , BTR 6 (1993), pp. 
435-441.  
1414  OECD (2007), Application and Interpretation of Article 24 (Non-Discrimination)-Public 
Discussion Draft, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 27. See also, inter alia, Rust, supra n. 
1390, Article 24 at m.no. 114; van Raad, supra n. 1390, pp. 188-189; B. Arnold, Tax 
Treaty Monitor: Tax Teaty News, 63 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 7 (2009), Journals IBFD, p. 270; 
J. Oliver, Other Similar Enterprises –NEC Semi-Conductors Ltd and others v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, BTR 2 (2004), pp. 80-83. 
1415  Supra Section 3.3. 
1416  See the examples of Spain, Austria and to certain extent Germany at supra Section 3.1. 
and 3.2.  





contrast that, nevertheless, linking rules, as regards to hybrid entity 
mismatches, only apply in case of control groups.
1417
 The above could give 
some hints that the rules provide indeed a limitation based on foreign 
ownership, which could conflict with Article 24(5) OECD Model. Indeed, a 
primary response denying the deduction of a payment in the source country 
will apply only if that payment is not recognized as income (which occurs in 
case of hybrid entities because of the tax treatment of the payer under the 
domestic rules of the payee country) and only to the extent that transaction 
is made within a control group.
1418
 However, the inclusion of the broader 
concept of structured arrangements, which also trigger the automatic 
application of the rules together with cases of control groups, might 
certainly refute this argument.
1419
 The broader interpretation of the concept 
of structured arrangement makes in theory, possible to include all of other 
cases that are not strictly within a control group, refuting the idea that the 
rule is designed as to provide a limitation based exclusively in the foreign 
ownership of entity. Indeed, one should not forget that it is not prima facie 
relevant, for purposes of Article 24(5) OECD Model, whether or not 
interests are paid to a resident or non-resident creditor.
1420
 The 
discrimination must be based exclusively on the foreign ownership or 
control. In other words, paragraph 5 is not concerned about debtor-creditor 
relationship, unless a different treatment is based on the ownership or 
                                                          
1417  Supra Section 3.3.1. 
1418  Id. 
1419  Supra Section 3.3.2 referred to the concept of “structured arrangements”. 
1420  OECD Commentary on Article 24 concerning non-discrimination, para. 79. 






 In this regard, e.g. a primary response denying an interest 
deduction in case the payment is not regarded as income because of the 
different characterization of the payer entity, might arguably be considered 
discriminatory if the rule would apply, indistinctly, in cases of a resident 
entity controlled by a foreign parent company (i.e. control groups) and, at 
the same time, in cases where is considered that an arrangement was 
marketed in order to produce the hybrid entity mismatch, and the DNT 
result (i.e. structured arrangement), independently on the ownership or 
control relationship between debtor and creditor.   
 
Finally, considering that Article 24(5) OECD Model does not prevent 
discrimination at the level of the resident-shareholders, the taxation at the 
level of the payee entity by reason of a deducted payment at the level of the 
payer, i.e. the potential discrimination derived from the application of a 
defensive rule, would not be included within the scope of this article. 
3.5.2. Compatibility with EU law  
As regards to the analysis of the compatibility of linking rules and EU law, 
the author will attend to the classic distinction between EU secondary law 
and EU primary law (fundamental freedoms), as detailed below.  
                                                          
1421  The debtor-creditor relationship might be targeted within the scope of Article 24(4) 
OECD Model. Rust, supra n. 1385, Article 24 at m.no. 107. 





3.5.2.1. EU Secondary Law 
Scholars discussed in the early stage of the BEPS Project the potential 
introduction of linking rules denying a deduction in the payer MS if the 
income were not recognized as such and taxed in the other country, or 
taxing the income at the level of the payee MS, i.e. not applying an 
unconditional exemption, if the deduction in the other MS was indeed 
granted.
1422
 The discussion related basically to the compatibility of the 
proposed linking rules with respect to two EU Directives: (i) the I&R 
Directive 2003/49/EU,
1423
 and (ii) the PSD 2011/96/EU,
1424
 as regard to the 
primary response and secondary rule, respectively. Both rules are, 
nonetheless, included today within the 2016 EU ATAD
1425
 and the EU 
ATAD II of 2017.
1426
 Therefore, as such linking rules are indeed in 
compliance with EU secondary law. 
3.5.2.1.1. Primary Response 
As regards to the primary response, Article 1(1) of the I & R Directive states 
that: “Interest or royalty payments arising in a Member State shall be 
exempt from any taxes imposed on those payments in that State, whether by 
                                                          
1422  Rust, supra n. 1394. 
1423  EU: Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003. 
1424  EU: Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 Nov. 2011 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, 
OJ L345/ 8 (2011), hereinafter “Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 Nov. 2011”. 
1425  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). See also, supra 
Chapter III, Section 5.3.2. 
1426  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 




deduction at source or by assessment, provided that the beneficial owner of 
the interest or royalties is a company of another Member State or a 
permanent establishment situated in another   Member State of a company 
of a Member State”.
1427
 As such, it is clear that the rule attempts to prevent 
the source MS to impose taxation on those payments when these are 
received by a recipient in another MS. Therefore, in principle, denying a 
deduction at the level of the payer MS (i.e. primary response) would not 
infringe the Directive, because the Directive does not refer to the taxation of 
the payer (who owes the interest) but rather to the taxation of the creditor 
(payee).
1428
 This interpretation is based on the decision of the CJEU in 
Scheuten Solar Technology GmBH v. Finanzamt Gelsenkirchen-Süd, which 
concerned a Dutch parent company (Scheuten Solar System BV), which 
wholly owned a German LLC (SST).
1429
 In a period of time, which included 
August 2003 and December 2004, Scheuten Solar System BV granted a 
series of loans and received thus payment of interest back from SST.
1430
  For 
purposes of the tax assessment in Germany, however, SST was allowed to 
deduct only 50% of the interest paid, which generated that the other 50% 
had to be added back to the tax base of the company.
1431
 SST initiated thus a 
proceeding against the decision of the Finanzamt in Germany, arguing that 
the fact of adding back the amount of non-deductible interest expenses was 
                                                          
1427  Article 1(1) of the Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003. 
1428  Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 312. 
1429  EU: Judgment in Scheuten Solar Technology GmBH v. Finanzamt Gelsenkirchen-Süd, 
C-397/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:499. 
1430  Id., para. 14. 
1431  Id., para. 15. 





indeed contrary to Article 1(1) of the I&R Directive, because it constitutes 
taxation on the amount of non- deductible interest.
1432
 The Court, in this 
regard, was clear and provided that: “The scope of Directive 2003/49, as 
defined in Article 1(1) of the directive, thus concerns the exemption of 
interest and royalty payments arising in their source Member State, provided 
that the beneficial owner is a company of another Member State or a 
permanent establishment situated in another Member State of a company of 
a Member State”.
1433
 Accordingly, it stated: “It follows that Article 1(1) of 
Directive 2003/49, read in the light of recitals 2 to 4 in the preamble to the 
directive, aims to avoid legal double taxation of cross-border payments of 
interest by prohibiting the taxation of interest in the source Member State to 
the detriment of the actual beneficial owner. That provision thus concerns 
solely the tax position of the interest creditor”.
1434
 This last statement of the 
CJEU clarifies therefore that denial of a deduction in the source MS do not 
violate the Directive, because indeed the scope of the Directive only 
includes the potential legal double taxation that the creditor could suffer, but 
it cannot be interpreted beyond this scope.
1435
 In other words, the domestic 
rules used to calculate the tax assessment of the taxpayer who paid the 
interest, e.g. rules denying a deduction under certain circumstances, is out of 
the scope of Article 1(1) I&R Directive.
1436
 Therefore, when applying the 
reasoning of the Court to the application of a primary response denying a 
                                                          
1432  Id., para. 18-19. 
1433  Id., para. 25 
1434  Id., para. 28. 
1435  Id., para. 34. See also, Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 312. 
1436  Id. 




deduction at the level of the payer, our conclusion should be similar: it is not 
an infringement of the Directive. 
 
Most of this discussion is, however, completely overcome today due to 
approval of the final of the EU ATAD in 2016.
1437
 Indeed, Article 9(2) of 
the ATAD states: “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in deduction 
without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny the deduction of 
such payment”.
1438
 In other words, the denial of a deduction in the source 
MS is allowed under EU secondary law to the extent that this denial 
attempts to counteract the non-inclusion of income in the other MS, which 
resulted from the use of a hybrid structure, either through the use of a 
financial instrument or an entity.
1439
 Likewise, considering the latest 
development with respect to hybrid mismatches in Europe, a similar rule has 
been extended to situations involving third countries.
1440
 
3.5.2.1.2. Defensive Rule 
With respect to the defensive rule, i.e. the rule imposing the State receiving 
a payment involving a hybrid structure in case that payment was deductible 
in the State of source, one should be aware that this rule was already 
introduced within Article 4(1)(a) of the PSD in 2014.
1441
 Indeed, as provided 
                                                          
1437  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). 
1438  Article 9(2) of the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). 
1439  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.2. 
1440 EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
1441  EU: Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU. 





within the updated text of Article 4(1)(a) of the PSD, a parent company will 
refrain to tax the profits received by a subsidiary: “[…] to the extent that 
such profits are not deductible by the subsidiary, and tax such profits to the 
extent that such profits are deductible by the subsidiary”.
1442
 Currently thus 
MS are obliged to tax, and not to grant unconditionally the exemption 
method to relieve double taxation, if a distribution of profits were deductible 
in the source MS.
1443
 In the other way around, MS would be refrained from 
taxing those payments, to the extent that they were not deductible, which 
includes the possibility that they were not deducted by application of, e.g. a 





The introduction of the secondary rule within EU law, even before the 
issuance of the EU ATAD in 2016, explains why it was not originally 
necessary to include such a rule within the final text of the EU ATAD.
1445
 
However, the inclusion of a secondary rule within the PSD limits by itself 
                                                          
1442  Art. 4(1)(a) of the Council Directive 2011/96/EU as amended by Council Directive 
2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014. 
1443  Originally, however, the exemption had to be granted without conditions as it can be 
interpreted from the original text of the PSD, which provided that the parent company 
should “refrain from taxing such profits”. Art. 4(1)(a) of the Council Directive 
2011/96/EU (original text). 
1444  In this opinion, see also de Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 34. This issue has special 
importance after the approval of the final text of the ATAD (2016), because indeed this 
document contains both an interest limitation and a rule dealing with hybrid mismatches, 
which resemblances the proposal of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. The ATAD does not 
contain any rule of hierarchy to solve this issue. See Art. 4 and 9 of the Council 
Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I). 
1445  EU: Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU, Art. 
4(1)(a). 




the application of the rule. On one hand, the PSD only applies to 
transactions between MS, excluding therefore third countries.
1446
 On the 
other hand, it only applies in case of a relationship “parent-subsidiary”, with 
a minimum participation and other requirements,
1447
 which could e.g. 
exclude cases of hybrid mismatches involving structured arrangements that 




Perhaps recognizing the limitations stated above, the European Commission 
launched in the beginning of 2017 a proposal for amending the EU ATAD 
(2016), which introduces a secondary rule but within Article 9 of the 
ATAD, whose final text was approved on May 2017.
1449
 As regards to D/NI 
outcomes, the new Article 9(2)(b) reads as follows: “To the extent that a 
hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without inclusion: […] (b) where the 
deduction is not denied in the payer jurisdiction, the amount of the payment 
that would otherwise give rise to a mismatch outcome shall be included in 
                                                          
1446  Article 1(1), letters (a) to (d) of the Council Directive 2011/96/EU as amended by 
Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014. 
1447  For example, a minimum holding period of two years can be required in order to apply 
the PSD. See Article 3(2)(b) of the Council Directive 2011/96/EU as amended by 
Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014. 
1448  The proposal for a Directive modifying the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 
July 2016 (ATAD I), provides that a structured arrangement “means an arrangement 
involving a hybrid mismatch where the mismatch outcome is priced into the terms of the 
arrangement or an arrangement that has been designed to produce a hybrid mismatch 
outcome, unless the taxpayer or an associated enterprise could not reasonably have been 
expected to be aware of the hybrid mismatch and did not share in the value of the tax 
benefit resulting from the hybrid mismatch”. EU: Proposal ATAD II (17 Feb. 2017), p. 
17. This text was included also in the finally approved Council Directive EU: Council 
Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
1449  Id. See also, Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.3.  





income in the Member State that is the payee jurisdiction”.
1450
 As noted, 
therefore, the wording and scope of the proposed secondary rule included as 
part of Article 9 of the ATAD is indeed wider than the existing rule within 
the PSD. Firstly, it refers to “payments” rather than just “distribution of 
profits”, as it is the current scope of application of the PSD.
1451
 Secondly, it 
applies to cases that might include third countries outside the EU, which is 
indeed prevented under the pure application of the PSD. Therefore, the 
implementation of a defensive rule would not be in infringement of EU 
secondary law neither before the implementation of the ATAD not after it, 
because it was already part of the PSD since 2014. Nevertheless, it is the 
author opinion that the implementation of Council Directives targeting 
specifically hybrid mismatches both inside and outside the EU (ATAD I and 
II) will create an overlapping rule with respect to the defensive rule included 
within the PSD, which unless modified, will become useless.   
3.5.2.2. EU Primary Law: Fundamental Freedoms 
The EU was created with the purpose of economically binding European 
countries in order to avoid future wars.
1452
 This economic integration 
supposes also the accomplishment with some minimum standards of 
protection, i.e. fundamental freedoms that includes the free movements of 
                                                          
1450  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
1451 Article 4(1) of the PSD provides that: “Where a parent company or its permanent 
establishment, by virtue of the association of the parent company with its subsidiary, 
receives distributed profits […]”. Article 4(1) of the Council Directive 2011/96/EU as 
amended by Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014. 
1452  R. Mason, A Theory of Tax Discrimination, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
09/06 (2006), p. 2. 




goods, person, services and capital, which are rigorously enforced before the 
CJEU.
1453
 In other words, and unlike direct taxation remains as a matter of 
MS’s sovereignty within the EU, this competence must be exercised in 
accordance with the fundamental freedoms.
1454
 Therefore, every national tax 




In order to determine whether a national rule creates or not tax 
discrimination,
1456
 the CJEU carries out an analysis involving different 
phases. In first place, the CJEU determines which of the fundamental 
freedoms is indeed potentially infringed. Once this has been done, it 
proceeds to make comparability analysis, by which it compares the situation 
                                                          
1453  Id. 
1454  The lack of harmonization in direct taxes is due to the unanimity requirement, which 
requires all MS to agree. The above is, nonetheless, a very difficult aim to achieve. Terra 
and Wattel, supra n. 355, pp. 16-17. There are, however, two possible exceptions to the 
unanimity requirement in tax matters. The first one is Articles 107 and 108(3) last 
sentence [State Aid rules] of the TFEU, which forfid granting any aid to undertakings 
without prior Commission approval. The second one is Article 116 TFEU, concerning 
market distortions caused by disparities between national laws or practices, allowing a 
qualified majority for the adoption of directives counteracting those matters. Id. See 
also, e.g A. J. Easson, Taxation in the European Community, European Community Law 
Series: 5, The Athlone Press, London, 1993, pp. 15-16. 
1455  EU: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) of 26 Oct. 2012, OJ C 326/47 (2012). See Art. 258 and 267 TFEU. See also, 
e.g. EU: Judgment in Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, C-80/94, 
EU:C:1995:271 and Judgment in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek 
State), C-311/97, EU:C:1999:216.  
1456  Mason and Knoll argue that: “ […] in common markets, like the EU and the United 
States, the best interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle is that it requires what 
we call “competitive neutrality”, which prevents states from putting residents at a tax-
induced competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to nonresidents in securing 
jobs”. R. Mason and M. Knoll, What is Discrimination?, 121 Yale L.J. 1014 (2012), p. 
1014. 





of the complaining taxpayer (normally a non-resident with economic 
connection with the host country) with a comparable domestic situation in 
order to determine whether or not these two comparable situations are 
treated equally.
1457
 If the result of this second phase is that the national rule 
is discriminatory, there must be still justifications for the discrimination.
1458
 
The analysis between linking rules and EU primary law
1459
, therefore, will 
be made considering this line of analysis. It will also distinguish between 
primary response and defensive rule, and it will finally include a separate 
Section with the analysis regarding proportionality.
1460
 
                                                          
1457  Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 3. 
1458  See J. Di Maria, Comparability in the case of Hybrid Mismatch: In Search of an 
Approach Suitable for the Current European Landscape, in: K. Dziurdz and C. 
Marchgraber (Eds.), Non-Discrimination in European and Tax Treaty Law, Linde, 
Vienna, 2015, p. 70. For purposes of this work, it is interesting to question specifically 
whether or not the “fight against tax abuse” or the DNT outcome itself (i.e. the D/NI 
outcome) might be used as a justification grounds to allow a different treatment between 
domestic and cross-border situations. 
1459  Some scholars have already expressed their concerns with respect to the compatibility of 
linking rules and EU primary law. See, e.g. Rust, supra n. 1422; Marchgraber, supra n. 
851. See also, J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 1, 
53 Eur. Taxn. 11 (2013), Journals IBFD; J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments 
and Primary EU law–Part 2, 53 Eur. Taxn. 12 (2013), Journals IBFD; C. Kahlenberg, 
Extension of the Domestic Correspondence Principle, 54 Eur. Taxn. 1 (2014), Journals 
IBFD; O. Thömmes and A. Linn, The New German DCL and Dividends Matching Rules 
and EU Law, 42 Intertax 1 (2014); J. Becker and T. Loose, Zur geplanten Ausdehnung 
des materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips auf hybride Finanzierungen, 21 Internationales 
Steuerrecht 19 (2012); O. Dörfler, R. Heurung and G. Adrian, Korrespondenzprinzip bei 
verdeckter Gewinnausschüttung und verdeckter Einlage, 45 Deutsches Steuerrecht 12 
(2007). 
1460  The analysis of proportionality is important, because even though a national provision is 
considered discriminatory, but justified, it should be tested whether it is proportionate. 




3.5.2.2.1. Primary Response 
3.5.2.2.1.1. Analysis of Comparability 
As regards to the primary response and whether or not this rule would 
infringe the non-discrimination principle under the TFEU, it should be noted 
that the jurisprudence of the CJEU is unfortunately neither consistent not 
uniform to provide an unequivocal answer.
1461
  
If we consider as a starting point the decision in Schempp (Case C-403/03), 
we could rapidly conclude that rules addressing disparities or 
inconsistencies between MS would not infringe the non-discrimination 
principle under the TFEU, because of the lack of comparability between 
domestic and cross-border situations in those cases.
1462
 In Schempp the 
                                                          
1461  See, e.g. N. Bammens, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International and 
European Tax Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 24, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2012, p. 521. 
1462 The case basically referred to a German taxpayer who intended to deduct some 
maintenance payments paid to his former spouse, an Austrian resident, within the period 
1994 and 1997. The German tax authority [Finanzamt München] required a certification 
from the Austrian tax authority demonstrating that the maintenance payments were 
actually taxable in the hand of his former spouse in Austria. However, considering that 
these payments are generally excluded from taxation under Austrian law and that this 
law does not allow the payments to be deducted, such certification was not provided. 
The German taxpayer was therefore prevented from deducting the maintenance 
payments in Germany. See EU: Judgment in Egon Schempp v. Finanzamt München V 
(C-403/03) [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:446, hereinafter “Schempp case”, para. 7-9.  
Determining comparable situations is indeed the cornerstone in the CJEU’s 
discrimination analysis. This task, however, is very challenging and there is little 
guidance on how to choose a comparable. See Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 22.  Likewise, a 
worse treatment for cross-border situations will be discriminatory only when the cross-
border situation is similar to a pure domestic situation, such that there is no justification 
for treating those situations in a different manner. Id. See also, EU: Judgment in 
Finanzamt Köln-Altsadt v Schumacker, C-279/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31. For an analysis 





CJEU linked the deductibility of maintenance payments at the level of the 
obligor with the payment of taxes at the level of the beneficiary. Therefore, 
the fact that a deduction was denied because there was not a respective 
inclusion of income in the other country was indeed regarded as 
acceptable.
1463
 As provided by the CJEU: “It follows that, contrary to Mr. 
Schempp’s claims, the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in 
Germany cannot be compared to the payment of maintenance to a recipient 
resident in Austria. The recipient is subject in each of those two cases, as 
regards taxation of the maintenance payments, to a different tax system. 
Consequently, the fact that a taxpayer resident in Germany is not able […] 
to deduct maintenance paid to his former spouse resident in Austria does not 
constitute discrimination within the meaning of Article 12 EC”.
1464
 
Nevertheless, a complete different approach was assumed in Eurowings 
(Case C-294/97).
1465
 In this decision, the CJEU concluded hat the 
deductibility of leasing payments for purposes of the German trade tax 
should not be denied based on the contingency that these payments are 
subject to trade tax at the level of the recipient, considering that the tax 
advantage, i.e. the deductibility, and the disadvantage, i.e. the taxation of 
                                                                                                                                       
on Schumacker, see F. A. Garcia Prats, Revisiting “Schumacker”:Source, Residence and 
Citizenship in the ECJ Case Law on Direct Taxation, in: I. Richelle, W. Schön and E. 
Traversa (Eds.), Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union, Springer, 
Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 1-42. 
1463  Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 139. See also, Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 317. 
1464  EU: Schempp case, supra n. 1462, para. 35. Article 12 EC corresponds to Article 18 
TFEU today.  
1465  EU: Judgment in Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, C-294/97, 
EU:C:1999:524, hereinafter “Eurowings case”. 




these payments, concern two different taxpayers.
1466
 As stated by the Court: 
“[…] a merely indirect link between a fiscal advantage accorded to a taxable 
person, such as the absence in the case of German undertakings leasing from 
lessors established in Germany of the obligation to make the add-backs in 
question, an unfavorable tax treatment of another taxable person, such as the 
liability of such lessors to pay trade tax, cannot be used to justify the fact 
that German undertakings are treated differently […]”.
1467
  
As regards to the comparability analysis and the case law of the CJEU, two 
different approaches can be distinguished.
1468
 On one hand, the CJEU 
applies an “overall approach”, i.e. an analysis considering the overall 
position of the taxpayer or a group of taxpayers, taking into account the 
deviating tax advantages in another MS.
1469
 The above can be seen, e.g. in 
                                                          
1466  Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 317. 
1467  EU: Eurowings case, supra n. 1465, para 42. 
1468  Therefore, depending on which CJEU’s approach is finally adopted; a primary response 
could be (or not) regarded as discriminatory. In addition, however, Mason proposes a 
third alternative approach, which has never been applied by the CJEU so far: “the 
internal consistency test”. As stated by Mason: “Under this approach, developed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to analyze state tax discrimination claims under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the ECJ would ask: If all twenty-seven member states enacted the 
challenged rule, would intra-Community commerce bear a burden that purely domestic 
commerce would not also bear?”. R. Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The 
Internal Consistency Test, 49 Boston College Law Rev. 4 (2008), p. 1277. According to 
the author: “ […] the internal consistency test would help prevent two kinds of judicial 
errors in tax discrimination cases. One type of error occurs when the ECJ fails to 
recognize that cross-border disadvantages arise from disparities, not discrimination; 
another type occurs when the ECJ fails to discover discrimination because compensatory 
taxes in one state obscure the cross-border tax disadvantage caused by another state’s 
discrimination”. Id., p. 1325. 
1469  In a critical view on the overall approach, Weber states: “The assumption, which the 
ECJ accepts, that it is only the Member States have the power to define the criteria for 







 where the Court considered that there could not be a comparable 
situation and that the discrimination was the result of a disparity between 
MS, considering also the deviating tax consequences in the other MS to 
conclude that a deduction could be denied because there was not a 
respective inclusion of income in the other MS.
1471
 Nevertheless, it is very 
arguable that the Court had achieved such a conclusion (i.e. lack of 
comparability) on the basis of differences between tax systems, because 
disparities are indeed a consequence of the coexistence of discrete national 
                                                                                                                                       
direct taxation means, in my opinion, under Community law, prohibited restrictions of 
the freedom of movement arise only as the result of the legislation of a single Member 
State and not the legislation of another Member State. Thus, restrictions do not depend 
on disparities between Member States […]”. D. Weber, In Search of a (New) 
Equilibrium Between Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of Movement Within the EC, 34 
Intertax 12 (2006), p. 599. See also, Di Maria, supra n. 1458, p. 76.  
1470  This approach has also been applied in other several decisions of the CJEU, starting 
from the landmark case of Schumacker case, supra n. 1462. See also, e.g. Wielockx case, 
supra n. 1455; EU: Judgment in P.H. Asscher v Staatsecretaris van Financiën, C-
107/94,EU:C:1996:251; EU: Judgment in F.W.L. de Groot v Staatsecretaris van 
Financiën, C-385/00, EU:C:2002:750; EU: Judgment in Arnoud Gerritse v Finanzamt 
Neukölln-Nord, C-234/01, EU:C:2003:340; EU: Judgment in Friederike Wallentin-
Hermann v Alitalia, C-169/03, EU:C:2004:771; EU: Judgment in Pirkko Marjatta 
Turpeinen, C-520/04, EU:C:2006:703; EU: Judgment in Bosal Holding BV v 
Staatsecretaris van Financiën, C-168/01, EU:C:2003:479; EU: Judgment in Marks & 
Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), C-446/03, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:763; EU: Judgment in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-524/04, EU:C:2007:161 and EU: 
Judgment in Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co. v Finanzamt Bielefeld-
Innenstadt, C-298/05, EU:C:2007:754. See also, e.g. opinions of the Advocate General 
Geelhoed in EU: Judgment in Test in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-374/04, EU:C:2006:139, point 39;  in EU: 
Judgment in Denkavit International and Denkavit France, C-170/05, EU:C:2006:266, 
points 33-40; in Thin Cap Group case, Id.; in EU: Judgment in Maragarete Block v 
Finanzamt Kaufbeuren, C-67/08, EU:C:2008:92, para. 31. As noted by Weber: “It has 
become clear that Advocate General Geelhoed does not agree with the per-country 
approach […] and (thus) is a proponent of the overall approach”. Weber, supra n. 1469, 
p. 600.  
1471  EU: Schempp case, supra n. 1462. 






 and they are not equivalent to prohibited discrimination 
under EU law.
1473
 In this regard, it is always worth to remember that, within 
the current EU framework, MSs remain free to design their own tax policies 
and the failure to recognize tax discrimination undermines the economic 
integration of Europe.
1474
 On the other hand, the CJEU has opted for a “per-
country approach”, i.e. determining the existence of a discriminatory 
provision as per the specific jurisdiction under analysis, without considering 
the offsetting tax advantages that might be independently available for the 
taxpayer in another MS.
1475
 In Eurowings, e.g. the CJEU analyzed the 
disadvantage created in isolation, i.e. disregarding the tax burden of the 
lessor in another MS, and concluding that the leasing payments for purposes 
of the German trade tax should not be denied based on the contingency that 
these payments are subject to trade tax at the level of the recipient.
1476
 This 
                                                          
1472  S. Douma, The Three Ds of Direct Tax Jurisdiction: Disparity, Discrimination and 
Double Taxation, 46 Eur. Taxn. 11 (2006), Journals IBFD, pp. 522-533.  
1473  As well provided by Mason: “Only discriminatory tax law, not disparate ones, violate 
the EC Treaty”. See Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 4. In the same order of ideas, Weber 
argues: “ […] disparities do not result in restriction of the freedom of movement because 
that would mean that the sovereignty to levy tax would be endangered […] inherent to 
tax sovereignty to levy taxes is that exercise of this sovereignty does not depend on how 
another Member State taxes”. See also, Weber, supra n. 1469, p. 602. 
1474  Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 1. 
1475  Di Maria, supra n. 1458, p. 72. 
1476  Eurowings case, supra n. 1465. Other decisions in which the CJEU has applied the “per-
country approach” are, e.g. Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112; EU: Judgment in 
Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v Belgian State, C-311/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:26, 
hereinafter “SGI case”; EU: Judgment in Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt 
Steinfurt, C-324/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:749; EU: Judgment in X and Y v Riksskatteverket, 
C-436/00, EU:C:2002:704; EU: Judgment in Deutsche Shell GmbH v Finanzamt für 
Dortmund-Unna, C-294/97, EU:C:1999:524; EU: Judgment in Finanzamt Offenbach am 
Main-Land v Keller Holding GmbH, C-471/04, EU:C:2006:143; EU: Judgment in Rewe 
Zentralfinanz eG v Finanzamt Köln-Mitte, C-347/04, EU:C:2007:194, among others.  





approach seems, in principle, to be more consistent with the current EU 
framework where MSs have exclusive competence on matters related to 
direct taxation and where harmonization is still not achieved.
1477
 In other 
words, considering the sovereignty of MSs on direct tax matters, MSs’ tax 
systems should not be affected by other MSs’ tax systems.
1478
 In the same 
order of ideas, a MS should not be obliged to adapt their own tax system to 
the different systems of tax of the other MS.
1479
 
Finally, it is important to remark that HMA create prohibited discrimination 
because of their very nature, and as such the CJEU should not refrain from 
characterizing linking rules as discriminatory, regardless the good intentions 
behind their proposal.
 1480
 Nevertheless, and considering the EU framework 
                                                          
1477  Weber, supra n. 1469, pp. 601-607. Here the author explains his arguments to support 
the “per-country approach” over the “overall approach”. In the same order of ideas, 
Lang states: “The ECJ should be consistent in taking into account the legal situation in 
one Member State only when deciding whether a Member State has not complied with 
the freedoms (‘per-country approach’). An ‘overall approach’ makes it difficult to 
determine responsibility for infringements of the freedoms”. M. Lang, Recent Case Law 
of the ECJ in Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions, and Contradictions, EC Tax Rev. 3 
(2009), p. 113. See also, Di Maria, supra n. 1458, pp. 81-86. 
1478  Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 59. Likewise, Weber states: “ […] it is inherent to the 
sovereignty to tax that MS may limit their tax jurisdiction (in other words, not levy tax) 
and that taxation in one MS is not linked to taxation in another MS”. Weber, supra n. 
1469, p. 593. 
1479  Id. 
1480  Beyond technicalities, HMA derived from the use of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities 
may only appear in cross-border situations. Therefore, a rule denying a deduction 
because income is not recognized in the other country due to the differences in 
characterizing the same entity will always involve an “indirect” or “hidden” 
discrimination, regardless the neutral manner in which these rules are drafted. In this 
opinion: Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 313 and 320. In an analysis exclusively within the EU 
context, and before the issuance of the BEPS Action Plan in 2013, Fibbe also recognizes 
that conflicts derived from the different classification of an entity are exclusively 
referred to entities involved in cross- border activities. As provided by Fibbe: 




and the uncoordinated existence of direct taxation, it is important that the 
determination on whether particular rules violate the TFEU is made without 
regard to any offsetting tax advantage in another MS, but rather 
independently.
1481
 The above might not only grant more consistency to the 




3.5.2.2.1.2. Justification Grounds for Discrimination 
Assuming that a domestic primary response is regarded as discriminatory, 
there are still grounds for justification to such discrimination.
1483
 In this 
regard, the question is which type of justification must be used in order to 
allow a discriminatory rule. As this task has been already assumed 
somewhere else,
1484
 this author will focus only on whether the “cohesion of 
tax systems”, “the fight against tax abuse” or the “DNT outcome itself” 
                                                                                                                                       
“Classification conflicts due to autonomous classification methods only arise in 
situations where an entity incorporated under the laws of one state is involved (actively 
or passively) in cross-border activities and as a consequence is classified for the tax 
purpose of two or ore MS”. See Fibbe, supra n. 833, p. 176. 
1481  Mason, supra n. 1452, p. 59.  
1482  Id. 
1483  Di Maria, supra n. 1458. 
1484  Bundgaard provides a deeper analysis in this regard, which covers different 
justifications grounds, including: (i) loss of revenues, (ii) the level of taxation and 
prevention of harmful tax competition, (iii) ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, (iv) coherence of the tax system, (v) balanced allocation of the power to 
impose taxes, (vi) prevention of double use of losses and (vii) prevention of tax abuse. 
This author concludes that, at least in respect of these justification grounds, it is highly 
expected that none of them be successfully used considering the case law of the CJEU. 
See Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 
1459, pp. 587-594.   





might be regarded as justification grounds for the imposition of 
discriminatory provisions.  
3.5.2.2.1.2.1. The Cohesion of Tax Systems 
The decision in Schempp is not only important to confirm the lack of 
comparability, as noted above, but also to reinforce the idea of “cohesion of 
tax systems” as a justification ground to allow discrimination. The 
“cohesion of tax systems” is based on the idea that a direct link exists 
between granting a tax advantage and offsetting that tax advantage by a 
fiscal levy.
1485
 This idea was already argued in Bachmann (Case C-
204/09)
1486
 and Commission v. Belgium (Case C-300/09).
1487
 In Bachmann, 
which in brief referred to the deductibility of contributions in Germany 
related to the insurance of individuals and the condition of being subject to 
tax in Belgium, the CJEU sustained: “The cohesion of such a tax system, the 
formulation of which is a matter for each Member State, therefore 
presupposes that, in the event of a State being obliged to allow the deduction 
of life assurance contributions paid in another Member State, it should be 
able to tax sums payable by insurers”.
1488
 Accordingly, in Commission v. 
Belgium, which also referred to the deductibility of contributions being 
offset by the taxation of payments made by insurers pursuant to their 
                                                          
1485  Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 140.  
1486  EU: Judgment in Hans Martin Bachmann v Belgian State (C-204/90) [1992], 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:35, hereinafter “Bachmann case” 
1487  EU: Judgment in Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium (C-
300/90) [1992], ECLI:EU:C:1992:37, hereinafter “Commission v Belgium case”.  
1488  EU: Bachmann case, supra n. 1486, para. 23 




contracts, the Court stated: “The cohesion of such a tax system, the 
formulation of which is a matter for the Belgian State, presupposes, 
therefore, that in the event of that State being obliged to allow the deduction 
of life assurance contributions paid in another Member State, it should be 
able to tax sums payable by insurers”.
1489
 In both cases thus the CJEU 
concluded that a link between the deductibility of those payments and the 
taxation in the other MS would exist, which would also be needed to keep 
the cohesion of tax systems.
1490
 As provided by the Court: “As regards the 
need to preserve the cohesion of the tax system at issue, it should be noted 
that there exists a connection under the Belgian rules between the 
deductibility of contributions and the liability to tax of sums payable by 
insurers pursuant to pension or life assurance contracts”.
1491
  
The “cohesion of tax systems”, however, has not always been successfully 
applied, and when it has been, it did it only when provisions at issue 
concerned the same taxpayer and the same tax.
1492 Moreover, the  
“coherence of tax systems” as a justification for discriminatory domestic 
provisions was expressly restricted in Eurowings.
1493
 In this case law, the 
Court argued that: “[…] a difference of treatment cannot be justified on 
grounds linked to the need for coherency of taxation”.
1494
 Interestingly also, 
                                                          
1489  Id., para. 16. 
1490  Id. 
1491  Para. 14 
1492   Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 1459, 
p. 589. See also, Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 140. 
1493  EU: Eurowings case, supra n. 1465. 
1494  Id., para. 41. 





the Court rejected the idea that “difference of treatment can also not be 
justified by the fact that the lessor established in another Member State is 
there subject to lower taxation”.
1495
 Similarly, the CJEU argued in Cadbury 
Schweppes (Case C-196/04) that any tax advantage given from low taxation 
to a subsidiary in a MS, different from the MS where the parent company is 
incorporated, cannot by itself authorize a MS to offset that tax advantage by 
a less favorable treatment to the parent company, which could happen e.g. 
when a deduction is denied to the extent the income is not recognized in the 
other MS.
1496
 In simple words, a primary response at hand could not be 
justified on the basis of the coherence of the tax systems within the EU. 
3.5.2.2.1.2.2. The Fight Against Tax Abuse 
As regards to the “fight against tax abuse” as a justification ground for 
discrimination, it is highly arguable that a rule denying a deduction in all 
cases involving hybrid entities or reverse hybrids, where the outcome is a 
D/NI, is indeed justified. This rule as such would certainly go beyond 
preventing tax abuse.
1497
 Indeed, the boundaries of tax abuse (avoidance) are 
well settled both in case law and in the EU law doctrine.
1498
 With respect to 
                                                          
1495  Id., para 43. See also, de Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 33. 
1496  As provided by the Court in Cadbury Schweppes: “In that respect, it is settled case-law 
that any advantage resulting from the low taxation to which a subsidiary established in a 
Member State other than the one in which the parent company was incorporated is 
subject cannot by itself authorize that Member State to offset that advantage by less 
favorable tax treatment of the parent company”. Cadbury Schweppes, supra n. 112, para. 
49. See also, de Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, p. 34. 
1497  Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 313.  
1498  Supra Chapter I, Section  4.2.3. 




the former, the CJEU has stated in Cadbury Schweppes: “[…] in order for a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justified on the ground of 
prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a restriction 
must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial 
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality […]”.
1499
 The CJEU has 
already stated that a subjective and objective test that would determine the 
existence of a wholly artificial arrangement. While the subjective test would 
require the intention of the taxpayer to obtain a tax advantage, the objective 
one is determined by the physical existence of an entity in term of premises, 
staff and equipment.
1500
 As provided by the Court: “If checking those factors 
leads to the finding that the CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying 
out any genuine economic activity in the territory of the host Member State, 
the creation of that CFC must be regarded as having the characteristics of a 
wholly artificial arrangement. That could be so in particular the case of a 
‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary […]”.
1501
  Therefore, provisions as the 
primary response, which contain requirements as regards to the level of 
taxation in the other country, would be beyond the understanding of tax 
abuse within the EU, unless they refer exclusively to wholly artificial 
arrangements. In other words, and as well settled by the case law of the 
CJEU, restrictive national provisions that are applicable to every situation 
                                                          
1499  Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112, para. 55. 
1500  Id., para. 67. 
1501  EU: Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112, para. 68.  





and for whatever reason are too general to combat abuse.
1502
 Likewise, the 
CJEU, although with respect to a VAT case, has settled that “tax arbitrage”, 
i.e. using different VAT rules in two MS, is not equivalent to tax abuse.
1503
  
3.5.2.2.1.2.3. The DNT Outcome 
Finally, with respect to the use of DNT (i.e. a D/NI outcome) as a 
justification ground for discrimination, the jurisprudence of the CJEU is also 
very ambiguous.
1504
 For example, since the landmark decision in Mark & 
Spencer (Case C-446/03), it seems to be accepted that the risk of double 
                                                          
1502  D. Weber, Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends 
in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ–Part 2, 53 Eur. Taxn. 7 (2013), 
Journals IBFD, p. 313. See also, e.g. EU: Judgment in Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v 
Ministère de l’Economie des Fianances et de l’Industrie, C-9/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:138; 
Judgment in Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, C-178/05, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:317; EU: Lankhorst-Hohorst case, supra n. 1476; Judgment in Jobra 
Vermögensverwaltungs-Gesellschaft mbH v Finanzamt Amstetten Melk Scheibbs, C-
330/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:685. 
1503  EU: Judgment in HMRC v. RBS Deutschland Holding GmbH, C-277/09, 
ECLI:EU:2010:810. As provided by Bundgaard as well: “In light of the Commission’s 
conclusion that new coordinated solutions need to be developed, tax arbitrage does not 
seem (in view of the EU Commission) to be considered abuse de lege lata”. Bundgaard, 
Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 1459, p. 593. See 
also, Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 313. 
1504  In this opinion: Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 141. De Broe also recognizes that whether 
or not an arrangement leading to DNT abuses EU law remains unanswered. See L. De 
Broe, Some observations on the 2007 communication from the Commission: ‘The 
application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation within the EU and in 
relation to third countries’, 17 EC Tax Rev. 3 (2008), pp. 142 et seq. Nonetheless, De 
Broe also analyzes the issue of compensatory taxation and prevention of DNT, 
concluding that tax jurisdiction shopping is only illegitimate, and thus a compensatory 
taxation permitted, if a taxpayer has set up a wholly artificial arrangement with the 
purpose of avoiding taxation. For this purpose, De Broe gives as example Lasteyrie 
(Case C-9/02), emphasizing that the CJEU did not suggest in this case that there were 
abuse when the French resident moved to Belgium and sold his shares to get a tax-free 
capital gain and then returning to France, but there would be only if that is done in short 
time frame. See De Broe, supra n. 229, p. 921; EU: Lasteyrie case, supra n. 1502. 




utilization of losses can be a justification for a different treatment between 
the domestic and cross-border situations.
1505
As stated by the Court: “As 
regards the second justification, relating to the danger that losses would be 
used twice, it must be accepted that Member States must be able to prevent 
that from occurring”.
1506
 Nevertheless, in Philips Electronics (Case C-18/11) 
the CJEU expressed doubts with respect to the double utilization of losses as 
an independent justification ground.
1507
 This is confirmed in words of the 
Court, when it says: “As regards, secondly, the objective of preventing the 
double use of losses, it must be observed that even if such a ground, 
considered independently, could be relied on, it cannot in any event be 
relied on in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings to justify 
the national legislation of the host Member State”.
1508
 In the same order of 
ideas, Philips Electronics could serve the purpose of confirming, in case of 
hybrid entity or reverse hybrids transactions, that rules denying a deduction 
in one country unless there is a respective inclusion of income in the other 
country would not be justified.
1509
   
                                                          
1505 EU: Mark & Spencer case, supra n. 1470. The comparability between double utilization 
of losses and other situations of double non-taxation is, nevertheless, arguable. See, e.g. 
M. Lang, Direct Taxation: Is the ECJ Heading in New Direction?, 46 Eur. Taxn. 9 
(2006), Journals IBFD, p. 426. 
1506  EU: Mark & Spencer case, supra n. 1470, para. 47. 
1507  EU: Judgment in The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v. Philips 
Electronics UK Ltd, Case C-18/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:532. 
1508  Id., para. 28.  
1509  “It follows that the host Member State, on whose territory the economic activity giving 
rise to the losses of the permanent establishment is carried out, cannot, in a situation 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, use the objective of preserving the 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States as justification for 





Likewise, as regards to the use of DNT as a justification ground for 
discrimination, one should ask whether or not the avoidance of DNT is 
indeed an obligation under EU law. A good starting point for answering this 
question could be the opinion of the CJEU with respect to the obligation to 
prevent double taxation. In this sense, it is worthy to recall what the Court 
just said in Kerckhaert and Morres (Case C-513/04): “Community law […] 
does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of 
competence between Member States in relation to the elimination of double 
taxation within the Community”.
1510
 Accordingly, the Court in CIBA (Case 
C-96/08) stated that: “double taxation […] does not alone constitute a 
restriction prohibited by the Treaty”.
1511
 Therefore, if EU law does not set up 
any obligation to prevent double taxation, it seems, at first glance at least, 
inconsistence that to accept the avoidance of DNT as a justification ground 
for restriction, mostly when both double taxation and double non-taxation 
are identified as incompatible with the internal market.
1512
 Also considering 
                                                                                                                                       
the fact that, under its national legislation, the possibility of transferring, by means of 
group relief and to a resident company, losses sustained by the permanent establishment 
in that Member State of a non-resident company is subject to a condition that those 
losses cannot be used for the purposes of foreign taxation, while the transfer of losses 
sustained in that Member State by a resident company is not subject to any equivalent 
condition”. Id., para. 27. See also, Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and 
Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 1459, p. 590, who provides a similar conclusion with 
respect to HFI. 
1510  EU: Judgment in Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v Belgische Staat, C-513/04, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:713, para. 22. 
1511  EU: Judgment in CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central and Eastern Europe Szolgáltató, 
Tanácsadó és Keresdedelmi kft v Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal (APEH) 
Hatósági Főosztály, C-96/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:185, para. 28. 
1512  Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 141. As provided also by the European Commission: 
“Tax systems must allow cross-border economic activity to develop within the Union. 
However, at the same time, there is a need to ensure that the increased opportunities for 




the above, this author rejects the idea that ensuring single taxation might 
serve as a justification ground.
1513
 
Therefore, neither the cohesion of tax systems within the EU nor the fight 
against tax abuse, or DNT itself, can be successfully serving the purpose of 
justifying a discriminatory measure. The spectrum of justification is thus 
severely reduced and it opens the door for future issues with respect to the 
application of the primary response and linking rules in general. 
3.5.2.2.2. Defensive Rule 
Unlike the case of HFI, the defensive rule in case of hybrid entities works in 
a slightly different manner.
1514
 In fact, in case of hybrid entities, i.e. when 
the MS of the parent company considers the entity as tax transparent for 
domestic tax purposes while the MS of the place where the subsidiary is 
established considers the same entity as a taxable entity, there is no 
                                                                                                                                       
cross-border trade an investment do not lead to an unacceptable loss of tax revenues 
through tax arbitrage, avoidance or fraud.  Just as it is necessary to prevent the double 
taxation of cross-border income flows, transactions within the Union should not be able 
to escape tax altogether”. EU: European Commission, Taxation in European Union, 
Report on the Development of Tax Systems, COM (96) 546 final, OJ C 296/43, 22 Oct. 
1996. 
1513  Bundgaard also recognizes this idea when he states: “Member States may initially argue 
that any anti-arbitrage measure is being put in place simply to ensure single taxation of 
income and to prevent white income  (i.e. non-taxed income). Ensuring single taxation 
can thus be said to align the cross-border situation to the domestic situation or to a cross-
border situation where no tax benefit can be obtained. However, to date, such a 
justification has not been seen in the case law […]”. J. Bundgaard, supra n. 1459, p. 
587. For the analysis of the “single tax principle” and the origin of the idea of ensuring 
single taxation within cross-border transactions, see supra Chapter I, Section 3. 
1514  The defensive rule is not part of the OECD BEPS proposal in the case of payment 
received by reverse hybrid entities.  





discussion with respect to the application or not of the exemption method in 
the MS of the parent entity with respect to the payment received from the 
MS of the payee,
1515
 but rather the issue is with respect to the taxation of 
such payment in the MS of the parent company when, in principle, the 
whole transaction between the parent company and the other entity should 
have been disregarded in the MS of the parent company, because of the 




If one considers that MS have exclusive sovereignty to classify foreign 
entities for domestic tax purposes, there should not be, in principle, a 
problem when a MS, as part of its classification rules, provides for some 
exceptions under which its own classification of the entity will not be taken 
into account or it will be switch in order to follow the one provided in the 
MS where the entity is established.
1517
 In other words, as the defensive rule 
                                                          
1515  On this matter, Rust states that denying the exemption method in case of the application 
of the defensive rule is equivalent to the application of the indirect credit method. He 
considers that the non-application of the exemption ensures that domestic and cross-
border investments are treated equally. See Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 321. Nevertheless, he 
also recognizes that a defensive rule in case of HFI might be regarded as a hidden 
discrimination. Id. 320. 
1516  Supra Section 2.4.1 provides an example of a payment made by a hybrid entity, which 
results in D/NI. The non-inclusion, in this case, derives exclusively to the non-
recognition of the transaction between the payer and the payee due to the different 
characterization of the payee entity in both countries. 
1517  The CJEU clearly held in Columbus Container Services that MS are autonomous in 
classifying foreign entities for domestic tax purposes. As stated by the Court: “ it must 
be recalled that the fiscal autonomy referred to in paragraphs 44 and 51 of this judgment 
also means that the Member States are at liberty to determine the conditions and the 
level of taxation for different types of establishments chosen by national companies or 
partnerships operating abroad, on condition that those companies or partnerships are not 




has an effect similar to a “switch-over clause” in the sense that, to certain 
extent, obliges the MS of the parent company to recognize the 
characterization of the entity in the other MS, taxing a payment, which, in 
principle, should be disregarded because of its own classification of the 
entity in the other MS. Indeed, one could conclude that such an exception, 
i.e. the taxation of the payment, and thus, the recognition of a tax transparent 
entity as taxable under certain circumstances, is part of the sovereignty of 
the MS of the parent company to determine who is a taxpayer.
1518
  
Nevertheless, the design of the defensive rule, as proposed, is rather 
different. On one hand, it does not refer to the characterization of the entity 
at all.
1519
 On the contrary, the contingency relates exclusively to the fact that 
the payment was or not deducted in the payee MS. Therefore, this author 
maintains his conclusions with respect to the primary response, namely, the 
tax disadvantage in this case (i.e. the taxation of a payment in the MS of the 
parent company) should be analyzed in isolation and not considering the 
overall effects in the other MS.
1520
 If analyzed in isolation, there are indeed 
                                                                                                                                       
treated in a manner that is discriminatory in comparison with comparable national 
establishments”. EU: Judgment in Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co. v 
Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, C-298/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:754, para. 53. For an 
analysis on Columbus Container Services, see Fibbe, supra n. 833, pp. 167-177. 
Likewise, as provided by Weber: “In my view, each Member State has the freedom to 
classify whichever taxpayer in whatever way, on the basis of its own tax rules. If this 
were not the case, the Member State’s sovereignty would be at risk”. Weber, supra n. 
1469, p. 593. 
1518  Supra Section 3.2. 
1519  Id. 
1520  Eurowings case, supra n. 1465.  





more probabilities of finding discriminatory features than applying an 
overall approach. 
As regards to the justification grounds for discrimination, I refer to the 
analysis already made with respect to the primary response. 
3.5.2.2.3. Primary Response/ Defensive rule and the Proportionality 
Test 
The final step that the CJEU conducts in order to determine the 
compatibility of a domestic provision with EU law is a test of 
proportionality. Under the proportionality test, the CJEU carries out an 
analysis on whether the domestic legislation that applies is broader than its 
aim and whether its means and ends correspond.
1521
 As per the design of the 
linking rules, it is highly expected that they raise EU law issues, especially 
considering their automatic application
1522
 and the fact that they disregard 
which jurisdiction has the right to tax.
 1523
 
                                                          
1521  Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 1459, 
p. 593. Bundgaard, however, does not carry out the analysis on proportionality, because 
he considers that none of the justifications grounds potentially used to justify a 
discriminatory measure would be indeed successful. Therefore, the analysis on 
proportionality would lack of real interest. 
1522  The OECD states that “[t]he rules apply automatically […]”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, 
p. 11 
1523  The whole premise behind the HMA and the linking rules is indeed to tax “somewhere” 
the income derived from a hybrid mismatch, which does not only deviates from the rest 
of the BEPS project that attempts to tax income in the jurisdiction where the income is 
sourced or the activities are conducted, but also to rely on a sort of unproved certainty 
that income “should be taxed somewhere”. The OECD Action Plan clearly states: 
“Specifically, this Action Plan should provide countries with domestic and international 




As already stressed, the proportionality test will depend on the justifications 
under which the linking rules are implemented domestically. In this regard, 
and if the justification of the rules is, e.g. the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights, it is clear from the CJEU case law that the rules, as proposed, would 
not pass the proportionality test. For example, in National Grid Indus (Case 
C-371/10) the Court stated: “The Member State concerned is exercising its 
power of taxation solely in relation to the capital gains generated in its 
territory […]”.
1524
 Accordingly, it said: “Such a measure [tax on capital 
gains] is intended to prevent situations capable of jeopardizing the right of 
the Member State of origin to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to 
activities carried on in its territory, and may therefore be justified on 
grounds connected with the preservation of the allocation of powers of 
taxation between the Member States”.
1525
 Furthermore, the Court argued: 
“[…] a Member State is entitled to tax the economic value generated by an 
unrealized capital gain in its territory […] (emphasis added)”.
1526
 “It is 
proportionate for that Member State, for the purpose of safeguarding the 
                                                                                                                                       
instruments that will better align rights to tax with economic activity”. See OECD 
(2013), supra n. 2, p. 11. For a critical analysis of the idea that income should be taxed 
somewhere, see supra Chapter I, Section 3, referred to the discussion on the “single tax 
principle”. In a similar opinion with respect to the issues of proportionality with respect 
to linking rules, see P. Benéitez Régil, BEPS Actions 2, 3 and 4 and the Fundamental 
Freedoms: Is There a Way Out?, 56 Eur. Taxn. 6 (2016), Journals IBFD, pp. 242-243. 
She advocates for the inclusion of a “valid economic reasons” test within the BEPS 
measures under analysis, regardless of EU considerations and considering that taxation 
should aim for neutrality. Id., p. 245. 
1524  EU: Judgment in National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, C-371/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:785,  para. 43. 
1525  Id., para. 46. 
1526  Id., para. 49. 





exercise of its powers of taxation, to determine the tax due on the unrealized 
capital gains that have arisen in its territory […] (emphasis added)”.
1527
 
Similarly, in SGI  (Case C-311/08), the Court stated: “First, as regards the 
balanced allocation between Member States of the power to tax, it should be 
recalled that such a justification may be accepted, in particular, where the 
system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardizing 
the right of a Member State to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to 
activities carried out in its territory (emphasis added)”.
1528
 Accordingly, it 
provided: “[…] national legislation which is not specifically designed to 
exclude from the tax advantage it confers such purely artificial arrangements 
– devoid of economic reality, created with the aim of escaping the tax 
normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national 
territory […] (emphasis added)”.
1529
 In the same order of ideas, the CJEU in 
N (Case C-470/04) recognized that the exist taxation regime in the 
Netherlands can be justified by reason of a balanced allocation of the power 
to tax between MS, but in order to be proportionate, such system should 
consider the decrease in value of the assets after the transfer of the 
residence.
1530
 It is arguable thus that linking rules, i.e. rules attempting to 
                                                          
1527  Id., para. 52. 
1528  EU: SGI case, supra n. 1476, para. 60. 
1529  Id., para. 66. 
1530  The case referred to the transfer of residence from the Netherlands to another MS and 
the respective application of exit taxation. In this case, the amount of exit tax was 
calculated without considering the decreased in value occurring after the transfer of the 
residence. Marchgraber, supra n. 851, p. 141. The Court held that such a regime could 
be justified by reason of a balanced allocation of taxing powers between MS. However, 
in order for it to be considered as proportional, such system should take into 
considerations this reduction in value of the assets after the transfer, unless such 




ensure taxation “somewhere” might be suitable to accomplish the role of 
balancing the allocation of taxing rights. In fact, those rules do not 
distinguish between income generated from activities performed in a 
specific jurisdiction or somewhere. As such, they could rarely be considered 
proportional. 
Similar concerns are raised if other justification grounds are accepted. For 
instance, if the fight against tax abuse were the justification ground, it is 
clear that the application of linking rules beyond what is properly considered 
tax abuse and would be disproportionate.
1531
 Indeed, the rules do not include 
any element of “abuse” that should be tested.
1532
 On the contrary, and as 
already stressed in this work, they apply to counteract any D/NI outcome 
derived from the use of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities no matter 
what.
1533
 The above conclusion does not change with the restriction on 
‘control groups’ and ‘structured arrangements’, which, as analyzed already, 
are either an extension of classic concepts of control or are indeed extremely 
vague that it is almost impossible to determine its proper extension, as it 
                                                                                                                                       
reduction has already been taken into account in the host country. EU: Judgement in N v. 
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, C-470/04, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:525, para. 54. See also, H. van den Broek and G.T.K. Meussen, 
Netherlands- National Grid Indus Case: Re-Thinking Exit Taxation, 52 Eur. Taxn. 4 
(2012), Journals IBFD, sec. 5.5., referred to proportionality and the N case. 
1531  Cadbury Schweppes case, supra n. 112. See also, Rust, supra n. 1422, p. 313. 
1532  Following Dourado, HMA in absence of artificiality will amount to aggressive tax 
planning, but not to avoidance of abuse. Dourado, supra n. 179, p. 48. 
1533  The author has already expressed his concern that the limitation of the HMA concept to 
cases of D/NI exclusively, and the respective automatic application of the 
countermeasures, creates a presumption of abuse. Supra Section 2.3.2. 





happens with the case of structured arrangements.
1534
 Moreover, if tax 
avoidance or abuse is accepted and applied as a justification ground, the 
design of linking rules suggests that there is no opportunity for the taxpayer 
to prove otherwise.
1535
 The above would contradict the case law of the 
CJEU, where it has consistently held that for anti-avoidance legislation to be 
considered proportional, it is necessary that the taxpayer can prove, without 
administrative concerns, that the arrangement is commercially or 
economically justified.
1536
 The rules apply automatically.  Using DNT itself 
as a justification ground could, on the other hand, might change the analysis. 
After all, HMA do not cover all cases of DNT, but rather specific cases of 
DNT derived from the used of hybrid entities or HFI, which suppose the 
deductibility of a payment in one country and the non-inclusion of the 
respective income in the other country.
1537
 However, it is hard to believe that 
without any obligation to prevent DNT at the EU law level, DNT be even 
accepted as a justification ground.
1538
  
                                                          
1534  Supra Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2. 
1535  Benéteiz Régil, supra n. 1523, p. 243. 
1536 “National legislation which provides for a consideration of objective and verifiable 
elements in order to determine whether a transaction represents an artificial 
arrangement, entered into for tax reasons, is to be regarded as not going beyond what is 
necessary to attain the objectives relating to the need to maintain the balanced allocation 
of the power to tax between the Member States and to prevent tax avoidance where, 
first, on each occasion on which there is a suspicion that a transaction goes beyond what 
the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the 
taxpayer is given an opportunity, without being subject to undue administrative 
constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may have 
been for that transaction (emphasis added)”. See SGI case, supra n. 1476, para. 71. 
1537  Supra Section 2. 
1538  See references at supra n. 1504 




All in all, it seems that linking rules will suffer serious difficulties when 
passing the proportionality test, at least in the form they have so far, because 
as such, they certainly conflict with most of the case law of the CJEU.  
4. Interaction between Linking Rules and other domestic anti-
avoidance and anti-base erosion provisions 
This last Section analyzes the interaction between the recommendation of 
the OECD Action Plan 2 (linking rules) and the application of domestic 
interest limitation rules and CFC rules that might affect transaction 
involving hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. The analysis demonstrates, on 
one hand, that in both cases the application of interest limitation rules, in the 
case of payments made by a hybrid entity, and CFC rules, in the case of 
payments received by a reverse hybrid, might be highly efficient to mitigate 
cases of hybrid mismatches without the need of applying linking rules. On 
the other hand, it stresses that, for sake of simplification, domestic interest 
limitation rules and CFC rules should be applied with priority over linking 
rules.  
4.1. Linking rules and Domestic Interest Limitation Rules 
Many countries around the globe include within their domestic legislations 
rules limiting the deductibility of interest expenses involving cross-border 
Interaction between Linking Rules and other domestic anti-avoidance and 







 The design of these rules is, generally speaking, 
made either by way of establishing a fixed debt-equity ratio, i.e. thin 
capitalization rules, or by way of limiting the excess of interest expenses to 
a certain percentage of EBITDA, i.e. “earning stripping rules”, being these 
latter rules the most widely applied during these days. Indeed, many 
countries opt today for a limitation in the deduction of net interest expenses 
up to 30% of the amount of EBITDA to the extent that the net interest 
expenses do not exceed a certain threshold, in some cases, and only if the 
entity in excess of indebtedness is part of a tax group, in other cases.
1540
 The 
application of the interest limitation rule implies thus that certain amount of 
interest expenses, normally deductible within a taxable year, will not be 
deductible in this case, although under certain circumstances might be 
carried forward.
1541
 As such, therefore, it is possible to imagine many 
situations in which a hybrid entity taxpayer paying interest abroad will be 
subject to both a domestic interest limitation rule and a domestic linking 
rule, i.e. primary response, limiting the deductibility of the same amount 
interest. The question is therefore which rule should be applied first. 
                                                          
1539  These rules are also part of the BEPS proposal, included specifically in Action 4, supra 
n. 1378. 
1540  See, e.g. the case of Germany and references at supra n. 1379. A mirror rule has been 
also recently introduced as secondary EU law. EU: Council Directive Council Directive 
(EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD), Article 4.  
1541  As noted already, however, even though an unlimited carry-forward is offered under the 
laws of certain countries, its practical application is limited in certain cases. In Germany, 
e.g. the above happens in case of the discontinuance of the business or change of 
control. DE: Sec. 4(h)(5)(1) of the Income Tax Act [Einkommensteuergesetz– EStG]. 
See also, Knöller, supra n. 1381.  




The OECD Action Plan 2 provides that in case of application of an interest 
limitation rule and hybrid mismatch rule, the former has priority, because 
“the hybrid mismatch rule make adjustments in respect of particular items 
that are taken into account for the purposes of calculating taxpayer’s overall 
income or expenses and therefore, as a matter of logic, would generally 
apply before any such general or overall limitation”.
1542
 In the same order of 
ideas, the OECD states: “Rules to address hybrid mismatch arrangements 
should be applied by an entity before the fixed ratio rule and group ratio rule 
to determine an entity’s total net interest expense. Once this total net interest 
expense figure has been determined, the fixed ratio rule and group ratio rule 
should be applied to establish whether the full amount may be deducted, or 
to what extent net interest expenses should be disallowed”.
1543 
 
The position of the OECD is, nevertheless, arguable. On one hand, both 
rules, i.e. interest limitation rules and hybrid mismatch rules, are used to 
calculate the taxpayer’s overall income and expenses. Indeed both rules will 
have the same effect of increasing the taxable base of the payer entity in the 
amount of non-deductible interest in the country of the payer.
1544
 As such, 
therefore, it is not evident that an interest limitation rule accomplishes a role 
                                                          
1542  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 97. 
1543  Id., p. 103. 
1544  See, e.g. the EBITDA example at supra n. 1380. Now, instead of considering the non-
deductibility by an interest limitation rule (400), please consider that the full amount of 
1,000 (deductible interest expenses) is disallowed. The effect is exactly as regards the 
interest limitation rule. In this case, the amount of disallowed interest expenses must be 
added back to the taxable profits of the payer entity, and therefore, they increase the tax 
base for that taxable year. 
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different than helping in determining the taxpayer’s overall income and 
expenses, as suggested by the OECD.
1545
 On the other hand, a primary 
response should be applied only to the extent the taxpayer is effectively 
entitled to deduct interest in the country of the payer. The above, however, 
could not be affirmed in the case of an entity that is being generally 
prevented to deduct interest through an interest limitation rule. This latter 
issue seems to be recognized within the OECD Action Plan 2, which 
provides: “The hybrid entity rule (Recommendations 3 to 7), however, only 
operate to the extent a taxpayer is actually entitled to a deduction for a 
                                                          
1545  For example, it could also be argued that both interest limitation rules and anti-hybrid 
rules attempting to deny deductible payments, equally contravene the “ability-to-pay” 
principle. This idea is also argued by Lüdicke, who states with respect to linking rules 
that: “They contravene the ability-to-pay principle and may hit minority shareholders”. 
Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 317. Although a deeper analysis as regards to linking rules and 
the ability-pay-principle certainly exceeds the purpose of this work (mostly considering 
the lack of an homogeneous concept), it is perhaps interesting to note that issues 
concerning the limitation in the deductibility of payments and ability-to-pay principle 
have even achieved the level of judiciary in some countries, e.g. Germany. In this 
country, the ability-to-pay principle is expressly recognized within Article 3 of the 
German Constitution granting the equal treatment to taxpayers in similar circumstances, 
including corporations through the objectives net principle or objektives Netto Prinzip, 
which means that corporation should consider for their calculation of annual taxes all the 
income and expenses related to the business. Therefore, a limitation in the deductibility 
of ordinary expenses, regardless the policy reasons given for their establishment, would 
be in principle violating the “ability-to-pay” principle. This important debate has been 
considered in a recent landmark decision of the German Federal Fiscal Court 
[Bundesfinanzhof], which confirmed most of the constitutional concerns stressed already 
in the past with respect to the German interest limitation rule [Zinsschranke]. DE: BFH, 
14 Oct. 2015, I R 20/15. The final decision depends of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court [Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), which is still pending. For an 
analysis on the arguments of the BFH, see e.g. S. Lampert, T. Meickmann and M. 
Reinert, Article 4 of the EU Anti Tax Avoidance Directive in Light of the Questionable 
Constitutionality of the German “Interest Barrier” Rule, 56 Eur. Taxn. 8 (2016), 
Journals IBFD, pp. 324-327. 




payment under local law. Accordingly these rules will not apply to the 
extent the taxpayer is subject to transaction or entity specific rules under the 
parent or payer jurisdiction that prevent the payment from being 
deducted”.
1546
 In the author’s view, interest limitation rules accomplish this 
role of preventing that a payment (i.e. interest) is deducted in the country of 
the payer and should therefore be considered before applying a different 
rule, whose aim is also different, but whose result is similar, i.e. limitation in 
the deductibility of certain payments. 
 
By other side, there are also strong practical reasons to support the 
application of an interest limitation rule before the hybrid mismatch rule, 
which can be summarized as follows: i) the possibility of “carrying forward” 
the non-deductible expenses if the interest limitation rules is applied first; ii) 
the control on the application of the defensive rule, which will be applied 
only on the amount of interest effectively deducted in the payer’s country, 
and, in some cases, iii) the possibility of indirectly solving the issue of a 
hybrid mismatch without applying complex linking rules.
1547
 All these 
reasons can be illustrated in the following hypothetical: let us assume a 
company, ACo, incorporated in country A, with a subsidiary, BCo, 
incorporated in country B. ACo grants a loan to BCo and this latter pays 
interest of 200i back to ACo in year X. Country A considers that BCo is tax 
                                                          
1546  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 97. 
1547  In the same opinion: De Boer and Marres, supra n. 1253, pp. 40-41. These authors state 
that “the introduction of a more generic interest deduction limitation, such as the 
limitation of excessive interest deduction through thin cap or earning striping rules, or 
via global allocation of interest expenses by formulary apportionment” could work.  
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transparent, while country B regards the same entity as a taxable entity. 
Accordingly, let us also assume that country B has within its domestic laws 
both an interest limitation rule and a primary response. The domestic 
interest limitation rule in country B, on one hand, provides for a limitation in 
the deductibility of interest up to 30% of the amount of EBITDA, without 
threshold amount and applicable both to single entities and entities being 
part of the same tax group. The primary response, on the other hand, 
provides for a denial in the deductibility of interest in those cases in which 
deductible interest are paid by an entity considered as taxable in its country 
of incorporation, while tax transparent in the country of the recipient of the 
income, and that transaction gives rise to a D/NI outcome. Finally, let us 
assume the following given amounts for BCo: 
 
Interest Expenses 200i 
Interest Income 0i 
Net Interest Expenses 200i 
EBITDA 400i 
 
 Figure 71:Linking rules and Interest Limitation Rules 
In the first scenario, i.e. applying the primary response first, BCo will be 
denied to deduct interest expenses in the amount of 200i, because the loan 
and the respective amount of interest are disregarded in the country of the 
payee, and thus, not included as income by ACo. Likewise, this amount of 




non-deductible interest will not be carried forward to future years. In 
addition the interest limitation rule will not be applicable after all, because 
there are no remaining interest on which to apply the interest limitation rule. 
Indeed, if applied, it would imply a “double non-deduction” affecting the 





On the contrary, in the second scenario, i.e. assuming that the interest 
limitation rule applies first, the outcome is certainly different. In such a case, 
the deductibility of interest is limited first to an amount of 30% of EBITDA. 
This is on our case the amount of 120i. Likewise, the amount of non-
deductible interest is reduced to 80i, which may also be carried forward to 
further years according to the domestic rules of country B. Therefore the 
primary response will be applied only of the amount of “effectively 
deductible interest”, namely, the amount of 120i. This also means that the 
defensive rule in the country of the payee (country A) will be limited to that 
amount. In other words, the payee could be obliged to include only 120i of 
interest as income. Secondly, the amount of 80i of non-deductible expenses 
can be carried forward and used in future years, subject to the same 
limitation of 30% of EBITDA. 
 
                                                          
1548  The OECD is indeed concerned about denying a deduction twice when provides: “The 
mechanism for coordinating the interaction between the two rules [interest limitation 
and hybrid mismatch rule] will depend on how the interest limitation rule operates; 
however, the interaction between these rules should not have the net effect of denying a 
deduction twice for the same item of expenditure”. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 98. 
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In principle, and pragmatically speaking, the outcome of the first scenario 
seems to be more effective, because it simply denies the full amount of 
interest expenses just because a hybrid structure is involved. Nonetheless, 
the above result is indeed disproportionate, mostly considering that the 
denial of the deduction applies as a presumption that the fact of having a 
payment involving a hybrid payer is indeed abusive because of the DNT 
outcome.
1549
 Accordingly, the denial of the interest deduction derived from 
the application of the primary response cannot be used in further years, 
which might conflict with domestic tax principles recognized in some 
countries, e.g. the ability-to-pay principle.
1550
 On the contrary, as noted in 
the second scenario, if the interest limitation rule is applied first, it 
guarantees that at least an amount of interest will be effectively deductible 
in the taxable year in which they arise, giving the possibility to the other 
country to react and to tax the same amount of income using a defensive 
rule. Accordingly, the amount of non-deductible expenses derived from the 
application of the interest limitation rule can, in most of the cases, be carried 




There is, however, one critic that can be made with respect to the application 
of the interest limitation rule before a hybrid mismatch rule (i.e. primary 
                                                          
1549  Supra Section 2.3.2. 
1550  Supra n. 1545. 
1551  This is, however, relative. See, e.g. the case of the German interest limitation rule, which 
although providing a carry-forward of non-deductible interest, they are indeed lost in 
case of a change of control or discontinuance of the business. Supra n. 1379. 




response) and this is the possibility of the taxpayer to manipulate the 
amount of EBITDA in order to obtain a higher amount of deductible 
expenses. The above can certainly be possible if the EBITDA is calculated 
on a whole group of companies. This chance, nevertheless, is diminished if 
the country of the payee has included a defensive rule and tax the amount of 
interest whose deduction was granted. Therefore, if the final aim of the 
BEPS Action Plan 2 is to ensure single taxation, this aim could be anyway 




4.2. Linking rules and CFC rules 
As well as the case of interest limitation rules, countries around the world 
normally include rules to anticipate the taxation in the shareholders’ country 
of undistributed profits generated at the level of the subsidiary, avoiding 
thus a long-term deferral.
1553
 These rules, known as “CFC rules”, generally 
operate in the same manner all around the world:
1554
 they require control 
                                                          
1552  The above, however, does not mean to recognize that the aim pursued by the OECD is 
correct. It simply means that, having “coherence” in mind, it would not really matter to 
apply the interest limitation rule with priority over the anti-hybrid rule proposed (i.e. 
primary response), giving the taxpayer also a fairer result. 
1553  See, e.g. the reference to CFC rules in the United States, supra Chapter III, Section 
4.4.1, which was also the pioneer country to introduce these types of rules in 1962. See 
Parada, supra n. 250, p. 958.  
1554  Perhaps one interesting exception is Brazil, where e.g. the CFC rules apply both to 
passive and active income, not following the international standard of taxing only 
passive income. BR: Article 74 of the Provisional Measure No. 2158-35/2011. See also 
Parada, supra n. 250, p. 964; Freita de Moraes e Castro (2010), supra n. 250, p. 13. 
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from the shareholders and they are applied on undistributed passive income 
generated at the level of the foreign controlled subsidiary.
1555
 This is to say, 
a “deemed dividend” is calculated on the profits of a foreign subsidiary and 
it is taxed then in the country of residence of the shareholders controlling the 
company. 
When analysing the application of linking rules, specially in transactions 
involving deductible payments to reverse hybrids, it is easy to figure out that 
CFC rules can be very effective to accomplish a role similar to that provided 
under a defensive rule.
1556
  Let us assume the following hypothetical: ACo is 
a Corporation incorporated in country A, which wholly owns BCo, an entity 
established in country B. This latter entity receives deductible interest from 
a subsidiary established in country C, CCo. Likewise, BCo is regarded as 
tax transparent in its country of establishment, while as an opaque entity in 
country A and C. We will also assume that interest payments are fully 
deductible in country C and that country A possesses CFC rules, which 
applies on passive income holds by foreign subsidiaries. The transaction, 
therefore, gives rise to a deduction in country C, without inclusion of 
income in country B and A.  
                                                          
1555  Bittker & Lokken, supra n. 530, p. 69-3. 
1556  This is reinforced and recognized by the OECD BEPS Report on Action 2, when it says: 
“A payment to a reverse hybrid will not be treated as giving rise to a D/NI outcome if 
the mismatch is neutralized by the investor or the establishment jurisdiction adopting a 
specific rule designed to bring into account items of ordinary income paid to a reverse 
hybrid. This includes any rules […] (including under a CFC regime) […]”. OECD 
(2015), supra n. 6, p. 57.  





Figure 72: Linking rules and CFC legislation, Ex. 1 
If also assumed that all the countries introduced linking rules, the question 
is: should country C apply first a primary response denying the deduction of 
interest or should be equally effective to just let country A to apply its CFC 
rules instead? 
It is the author’s view that a coherent and coordinated application of the 
rules is a key issue to avoid compliance costs and extra administrative 
burden.
1557
 Having this in mind, it seems to be rather clear that in a 
                                                          
1557  As stated by the OECD as well: “The recommendations set out in this report are 
intended to operate as a comprehensive and coherent package of measures to neutralize 
mismatches that arise from the use of hybrid instruments and entities without imposing 
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triangular situation as the one described above, it would be a more simpler 
solution to let country A to tax the income according to its own CFC rules, 
rather than obliging country C to deny a legitimate deduction. In other 
words, a primary response in country C should be relegated to the 
background if country A possesses strong CFC rules that may guarantee that 
the income remain untaxed, which is again the goal of Action 2. These ideas 
are indeed recognized by the OECD BEPS Action Plan, when provides: 
“Payments made through a reverse hybrid structure will not result in D/NI 
outcomes if the income is fully taxed under a CFC, foreign investment fund 
(FIF) or a similar anti-deferral rule in the investor jurisdiction that requires 
the investor to include its allocated share of any payment of ordinary income 
made to the intermediary on a current basis”.
1558
 Moreover, the final report 
on Action 2 states: “Treating income allocated by a reverse hybrid as 
taxable under the laws of the investor jurisdiction would have the effect of 
neutralizing any hybrid mismatch under a payment to a transparent 
entity”.
1559
 Finally, and recognizing that a proper application of CFC rules in 
the investor country (country A in our case) could solve the hybrid 
mismatch, the OECD proposes that “ the payer jurisdiction could suspend 
the application of the hybrid mismatch rule insofar as payments were 
allocated to investor in the investor jurisdiction”.
1560
 Accordingly, the report 
clearly states that a defensive rule in country B, in our example, is 
                                                          
1558  Id., p. 64. 
1559  Id. 
1560  Id. 




unnecessary given the fact that a CFC rule will apply in country A. As 
provided by the OECD: “A defensive rule is unnecessary given the specific 
recommendations in Chapter 5 for changes CFC rules and other offshore 
investment regimes that would require payments to a reverse hybrid to be 
included in income in the investor jurisdiction”.
1561
  
Yet, special attention should be taken on the design of the domestic CFC 
legislation that might allow an easy circumvention of the rules. The above 
can be illustrated with the application of the “same-country exception” in 
the United States.
1562
 This exception states that Subpart F income (CFC 
income) will not include dividends, interest, rents and royalties received by 
a related corporation organized under the same laws of the CFC and which 
has a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business located in that 
country.
1563
 Therefore, in our example above, if we assume that country A is 
the United States and CCo were established in country B, instead of country 
C, the same country exception would most probably apply in order to 
exclude the interest received by BCo as CFC income. 
                                                          
1561  Id., p. 56. 
1562  US: IRC Sec. 954(c)(3). Also, supra Chapter III, Section 4.4.1. 
1563  Id. 
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Figure 73: Linking rules and CFC legislation, Ex. 2 
In addition, and contrary to some that could argue that this result could have 
also been achieved because of the elective characterization of entities in the 
United States (i.e. CTB regulations), treating BCo as tax transparent, what 
this example shows is, however, that regardless this characteristic of the 
U.S. tax laws, the avoidance of the rule had nothing to do with the 
possibility of ACo to elect how to treat the BCo for tax purposes, but mostly 


























Finally, one should also consider that if countries will start implementing 
CFC rules around the world, some conflicts might arise with respect to “who 
is entitled” to apply their CFC rules. The OECD opts for giving priority to 
the country where the shareholder chain has a closest relationship with the 
CFC in questions.
1565
 Nevertheless, it is possible that issues will still 
exist.
1566
 For this purpose, it would be perhaps a most interesting and direct 
solution to truly solve the hybrid entity mismatch (indirectly helping also to 
achieve the aim of taxing the income “somewhere”) to provide a rule in the 
country of the investor, which allows in these reverse hybrid mismatch 
situations, to follow the characterization of the country where the entity is 
established (i.e. to treat the entity as tax transparent). In such a case, income 
would flow-through the final investor, where will be recognized as income, 
without the need of relying on CFC rules, avoiding also potential conflicts 
of application of these rules.
 1567 
                                                          
1564  Supra Chapter III, Section 4.4.1. 
1565  OECD (2015), Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 - 2015 
Final Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, P. 67, rec. 130, Fig. 7.1.  
1566  C. Kahlenberg, The Interplay between OECD Recommendations of Action 2 and 3 
Regarding Hybrid Structures, 44 Intertax 4 (2016), pp. 320-322. 






5. Final remarks 
There is no doubt that HMA is an ad-hoc tax notion, as many other ad-hoc 
tax notions internationally used within the international tax context, 
including e.g. the concepts of residence and source. Nevertheless, its 
problem relies particularly on the exacerbated attempt to match transactions 
involving hybrids and reverse hybrid entities with the outcomes derived 
from those transactions, under the assumption that income should be taxed 
‘somewhere’, and interestingly, no matter where. The above does not only 
deviate from the problem of hybrid entity mismatches itself, i.e. the different 
characterization of the same entity by two jurisdictions, but also it creates 
new presumptions of base erosion and potentially abusive transactions just 
because they involve the DNT outcome. This idea is certainly reinforced 
when the concept of imported mismatches, as regards to hybrid entities, 
comes into play. 
 
Linking rules follow a similar pattern. This is to say, once the problem is 
created (i.e. a HMA is recognized), the rules to solve it make indeed sense in 
such a context, i.e. where everything must be matched and income should be 
taxed somewhere, no matter where. Nonetheless, none of these rules truly 
solve the true hybrid entity mismatch. On the contrary, they assume a 
consequentialist role based exclusively on the outcome that the hybrid entity 
transactions generate, i.e. a D/NI outcome (or DNT), targeting just indirectly 




the hybrid entity mismatch.
1568
 It is precisely this consequentialist design of 
linking rules, which generates important issues both from a tax policy and a 
legal perspective. From a tax policy perspective, linking rules tend to be 
circular, namely, if implemented by all countries, will have no other effect 
than nullifying each other, even if a tie-breaker rule gets into force. More 
importantly perhaps, an uncoordinated application of a primary response 
and a defensive rule, i.e. a circular application, might give rise to new issue 
of economic double taxation, which did not exist before the application of 
these rules. Accordingly, it should not be underestimated that linking rules 
are extremely dependent on the functioning and application of foreign laws, 
which, unless a broader and efficient access to information between tax 
administrations, especially between developing countries, might raise 
serious concerns with respect to their effectiveness. 
 
As regards to the legal concerns, it is true, on one hand, that linking rules do 
not raise many concerns with respect to Article 24 OECD Model (non-
discrimination), mostly derived from the restrictive approach that the non-
discrimination provision within the OECD Model has in comparison, e.g. 
with EU law. On the other hand, issues with respect to EU law are restricted 
to primary law, especially after the inclusion of linking rules targeting 
hybrid entity mismatches within the 2016 EU ATAD and the recent EU 
ATAD II, which make these rules applicable to both EU and non-EU 
                                                          
1568  Nevertheless, neither the primary response nor the defensive rule solve the hybrid 
mismatch, they simply make income to be taxed, which is arguable, the true reason for 






mismatches. Unfortunately, however, the jurisprudence of the CJEU is 
neither unequivocal nor consistent to provide a concrete answer with respect 
to the compatibility between linking rules and EU primary law. The above, 
however, as presented during the Chapter, should not prevent us to argue 
that some issues could still raise concern. For this reason, linking rules and 
fundamental freedoms should be thoroughly analyzed with respect to the 
non-discrimination principle within the TFEU, at least, as stated by other 
authors, “before all Member States fall completely in love with such 
provisions in the global battle against tax arbitrage”.
1569
 
All in all, it seems to be clearer now that the idea that “coordination” with 
respect to the characterization of entities for tax purposes seems to be not 
only a more direct manner to face issues with hybrid and reverse hybrid 
entities, but also it might provide a more efficient (and manageable) manner 
to face perhaps the only real problem with respect to hybrid entity 
mismatches: the disparate tax characterization of entities. 
 
 
                                                          
1569  Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU law–Part 2, supra n. 1459, 





VI. CHAPTER  
Hybrid Entities without Double Non-Taxation: An Alternative 
Approach  
1. Introduction 
The assumed interconnection between the use of hybrid and reverse hybrid 
entities and the DNT outcome has derived in a complex set of rules to 
implement both at a domestic and tax treaty level, whose true efficacy is still 
an incognito.
1570
 This set of rules, however, carries not only the problems of 
a potential extra burden for tax administrations and taxpayers, but also, and 
more importantly, it does not truly solve the hybrid entity mismatch, i.e. the 
different tax characterization of the same entity. 
This Chapter follows a different path and proposes a domestic reactive 
coordination rule, which aims to be a domestic alternative to coordinate the 
characterization of entities as per the tax characterization of the entity given 
in the home country, i.e. the country where the entity is formally and legally 
organized. Likewise, the proposal is based on three main tax policy ideas, 
which support its whole design: simplicity, coherence and administrability, 
and it is completely agnostic as regards to the DNT outcome derived from 
the hybrid entity structure. 
                                                          
1570  Supra Chapter IV and Chapter V. 
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Section 2, describes the mechanics of the proposal, including its scope of 
application and the tax policy ideas behind it, i.e. simplicity, coherence and 
administrability. Likewise, it explains with concrete examples, both as 
regards to hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, the functioning of the 
proposal, detailing also its advantages and disadvantages, mostly when 
compared with other current proposals on hybrid entity mismatches. It 
finally provides a comparison between the proposed rule and other existing 
rules addressing the same path of coordination in order to clearly set up the 
common points and deviations that makes the proposed rule in this Chapter 
anyway preferable. Section 3 analyses the implications of the domestic 
reactive coordination rule at a tax treaty level, in particular, as regards to the 
application of Article 1(2) OECD Model. As recognized in Chapter IV, the 
inclusion of a new Article 1(2) OECD Model solves many issues regarding 
the proper allocation of tax treaty benefits when tax transparent entities are 
involved. However, this article if far from being a fair solution for 
developing (source) countries. This issue could, nevertheless, be mitigated 
in the hypothetical that the domestic reactive coordination rule is applied 
worldwide. Indeed, if that occurs, the scope of application of Article 1(2) 
OECD Model will be automatically reduced, providing more consistent tax 
treaty outcomes, and indirectly enhancing the position of source countries in 
those cases where the pure application of Article 1(2) OECD Model 
originated unfair results.  





2.  Reactive Coordination Rule: A Domestic Alternative 
This Section describes the domestic proposal to coordinate the 
characterization of entities according to the legal characterization of the 
entity in the home country, i.e. the country where the entity, whose 
characterization is under debate, is legally and formally established, 
organized or incorporated. It also provides an analysis of the general tax 
policy justification, advantages and disadvantages of its application, mostly 
when compared with the existing OECD linking rules.
1571 
2.1. General Description of the Proposal 
Despite the suggestive wording of this proposal, it is important to remark 
that it has nothing to do with the unrealistic attempt to harmonize the 
characterization of entities all around the world. This idea, which would also 
theoretically eliminate the mismatches derived from the different 
characterization of entities, would not be feasible to implement worldwide 
and it would not go beyond being a very optimistic academic approach 
without practical consequences.
 1572
   
On the contrary, the current proposal attempts a more realistic approach, 
which consists in establishing a reactive coordination rule that aligns the 
                                                          
1571  See analysis at supra Chapter V. 
1572  Although the harmonization in a regional level, e.g. within the European Union is 
indeed an attractive and more direct solution. For a proposal to harmonize the 
characterization of entities in the EU through a mutual recognition of entities in the 
internal market, see Fibbe, supra n. 833. 
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characterization of foreign entities for domestic tax purposes according to 
the characterization given in the country where the entity is established or 
incorporated, i.e. the “home country”. 
A general wording for this rule could be as follows: 
 Where according to the rules of a State, a different tax 
characterization is given to the same entity, the tax 
characterization given to the entity by the State where the 
entity is organized, shall be followed by the other State. 
2.1.1.  “Entity” understood in a broad sense 
As stressed already in Chapter III,
1573
 this work uses the term entity as 
including also any other arrangement, regardless the legal position taken by 
a country on who derives the income from that entity or arrangement and on 
whether this has or not legal personality according to the rules of a specific 
jurisdiction. Similarly, the proposed wording of the reactive coordination 
rule does not refer to “entity” as limited to a legal entity, i.e. a body having 
legal existence separate from its owners or participants, and having its own 
rights and liabilities, but rather to entities in broad sense including legal 
entities and other arrangements. Therefore, no interpretation issues should 
                                                          
1573  Supra Chapter III, Section 2.1. 





arise just because of the fact that one of the States considers an entity as tax 
transparent, and thus, not a legal entity in strict sense.
1574
 
2.1.2. Home country: where the entity is formally/legally organized 
As the wording of the proposed rule suggests, the coordination in the 
characterization of the entity should be done according to the tax 
characterization given in the country where the entity is organized. For this 
purpose, the reference to “where the entity is organized” should be 
understood as the country where all the necessary formalities required for its 
establishment are fulfilled. For example, if a taxpayer decides to carry out a 
business through an LLC in the United States, he will have to accomplish 
with all the formalities required by the specific state governing the 
constitution of the LLC, e.g. Delaware, Florida, etc. Accordingly, if a 
taxpayer wanted to establish a silent partnership in Germany [stille 
Gesellschaft], he would have to accomplish with the formal requirements 
provided under German law. As it can be noted, therefore, in all those cases 
                                                          
1574  Alternatively, the wording may include a specific reference to “entity or arrangement”. 
However, the author considers that the above inclusion might create more interpretation 
problems than limiting the wording to entities and explaining that the concept is used in 
a boarder way, the above does not prevent countries to include such a reference to 
“arrangements” if that, in the country’s view, avoids further interpretation conflicts of 
the rule. The wording “entity or arrangement” is also used within the proposed Article 
1(2) OECD Model. For a critical view on the reference to “arrangements” in thir 
context, e.g. within Article 1(2) OECD Model, see supra Chapter IV, Section 5.1.3. 
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there will be always only one jurisdiction governing the formalities of 
constitution of an entity.
1575
 
The reference to the “country where the entity is formally and legally 
organized” should not represent a problem even in the cases of legal entities 
organized at a supranational level, because even in those cases there is still a 
reference to one jurisdiction in the end. For example, the European 
Company (SE),
1576
 the European Cooperative Society (SCE)
1577
or the 
European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)
1578
 are legal forms that, to a 
large extent, are governed by uniform EU law, but which are still partly 
regulated by the national provisions of the MS of incorporation.
1579
 
2.1.3. Home country v. Source country 
The reference to “home country”, instead of “source country”, has the 
purpose of covering both the cases of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities 
without providing different rules that might complicate the wording and the 
application of the proposal.
1580
 
                                                          
1575  This differs from the criteria to determine the tax residence of entities, in whose cases 
there might be more than one jurisdiction claiming that an entity is resident in its 
jurisdiction. 
1576  EU: EC Regulation 2157/2001, Official Journal L 204/01. 
1577  EU: EC Regulation 1435/2003, Official Journal L 207/03. 
1578  EU: EEC Regulation 2137/1985. 
1579  See Cerioni, supra n. 523. See also,  Korving and Wijtvliet, Id. 
1580  However, a different wording could read as follows: “Where according to the rules of a 
State, a different legal characterization is given to the same entity taxpayer, the legal 
characterization given to the entity by the State where the payment is sourced, in the 





As stressed already in this work, most of the cases of hybrid entities that are 
relevant for tax purposes, i.e. where a cross-border payment comes into 
play, imply that a hybrid entity is making such payment. In other words, in 
all those cases, the source country will coincide with the home country of 
the hybrid entity.
1581
 The above does not mean to disregard the fact that, in 
some cases, a hybrid entity could receive a payment, being the source 
country different from the home country. However, such cases are generally 
not relevant from the OECD perspective and the application of linking rules, 
because such payments will be taxed at the level of the of the hybrid entity 
or at the level investors anyway, which would ensure the single taxation 
policy behind its proposed linking rules.
1582
 In my perspective and the 
application of the reactive coordination rule in those cases, however, it 
would be relevant only in case the rule refers to the source country instead 
                                                                                                                                       
case of hybrid entities, or where the entity is organized or incorporated, in the case of 
reverse hybrids, shall be followed by the other State” (emphasis added). 
1581  This idea is implicitly recognized within the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2, which only 
considers the cases of payments made by a hybrid payer and which result in a D/NI 
outcome (or DD). OECD, supra n. 6, p. 49, Recommendation 3(3). Similarly, the EU 
proposals to deal with hybrid mismatches, both inside and outside the internal market 
(i.e. EU ATAD I and EU ATAD II), also consider only the cases of payments made by a 
hybrid entity. See EU: Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I) and 
Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). The above has to be with 
the design of the countermeasures. In simple words, as linking rules start from the 
assumption that a mismatch in the tax outcomes is what finally determines the 
application of the rules, the payments received by an entity considered as taxable entity 
in its country of organization and tax transparent in the country of the investors, would, 
most probably, not generate a D/NI outcome, because the income would be taxed either 
in the country of the hybrid entity or in the country of the investors, or both. Therefore, 
such payment is irrelevant for purposes of the rules, even though a potential double 
taxation might occur and regardless that the true mismatch, i.e. the different 
characterization of the same entity, remains. For the analysis of HMA and linking rules, 
see supra Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3.   
1582  Id. 
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of the home country if the source country is a third country that also 
considers the entity as tax transparent. In such a case, the hybrid mismatch 
rule proposed would not be effective to solve the mismatch at all.
1583
 This 
concern disappears, however, if the third country (i.e. source country) also 
treats the entity as opaque.
1584
 
Similarly, in most of the cases involving reverse hybrid entities, it is 
assumed a reverse hybrid entity receiving a payment, normally from a third 
country.
1585
 In this case, the source country of the payment and the home 
country of the reverse hybrid do not coincide at all. Moreover, in most of 
those cases, the country of the investors and the source country normally 
characterize the entity in the same manner, i.e. as taxable entity. Therefore, 
in such a case the disparity is given by a characterization of the entity 
different from that in the home country.
1586
 The above, however does not 
mean to recognize that payments from a reverse hybrid might also occur. 
They might, but once again, they would not be relevant from an OECD 
perspective and the application of linking rules, because in such a case, the 
payment will be recognized as income in the country of the investor (i.e. if 
the payee is there), ensuring single taxation.
1587
 For purpose of the 
                                                          
1583  Because the home country would keep considering the entity as opaque and the country 
of the investors would “follow” the characterization of the source country (a third 
country), which also treats the entity as tax transparent. 
1584  In such a case the only concern would be to ensure a double taxation relief for the 
potential double taxation of the income both in the home country of the hybrid entity 
and in the country of the final investors. 
1585  OECD (2015), supra n. 6, pp. 55 et seq. 
1586  Supra Chapter V, Section 2.4.2. 
1587  The same would occur if the payments were made to a third country with which the 
reverse hybrid has, e.g. a loan transaction, that gives rise to the payment. In such a case, 





application of the reactive coordination rule to cases involving payments 
from a reverse hybrid, the distinction between source and home country 
would be irrelevant, because the home and source country in those cases 
will be the same.  
All in all, for purposes of simplicity and as per the arguments already 
stressed, the proposed reactive coordination rule will refer to the 
characterization of the entity in the home country.   
2.2. Scope of the rule 
As stressed within the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2, most of the concerns 
derived from the potential abuse of hybrid entities and reverse hybrid 
entities are given within the context of “control groups”, being thus the 
scope of the OECD proposed rule reduced to those cases.
1588
 The above, 
however, does not coincide with the rather wide concept of ‘control 
groups’
1589
 and “acting together” and the vague concept of “structured 
arrangements”
1590
. All these concepts demonstrate rather the opposite idea, 
i.e. the OECD proposed rules attempt to apply to a wider range of possible 
situations. Needles to say is that the use of these concepts certainly make the 
application of the OECD rules certainly very complex.  
                                                                                                                                       
however, as the entity is transparent in its home country, the payments made are never 
deductible. In other words, even today would be considered a HMA. 
1588  Supra Chapter V, Section 3.3.1. 
1589  Id. 
1590  For a deeper analysis on the concept of “structured arrangements”, see supra Chapter 
V, Section 3.3.2. 
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The reactive coordination rule assumes a simplified and more honest 
approach instead. It proposes an application of the rule to all those cases 
where there are disparities between two countries with respect to the tax 
characterization of the same entity. This is, on one hand, in line with the 
three main policy reasons that sustain this proposal: simplicity, coherence 
and administrablity of the rule,
1591
 and, on the other hand, with the idea of 
designing rules targeting the core of the issue regarding hybrids and reverse 
hybrid entities, i.e. the different characterization of entities for tax purposes. 
The above, however, does not mean that the rule attempts to harmonize the 
domestic characterization of foreign entities for domestic tax purposes at all. 
On the contrary, it attempts to be an alternative, which applies in a simple 
manner and raises more coherent results, avoiding thus unnecessary 
complexities in its design. 
Another issue with respect to the scope of the proposed rule is the fact that 
the rule aims to apply only to the extent the disparity in the characterization 
of entities is “tax relevant”, i.e. if there is a transaction that originate a 
payment that makes the disparity relevant for tax purposes. This idea 
mirrors a U.S. tax rule that applies in the case an eligible entity elects to 
treat a foreign entity in a manner different than the one provided by the U.S. 
default classification rules.
1592
 For this purposes, the U.S. tax law provides 
that “ a foreign entity’s classification would be relevant if U.S. income was 
                                                          
1591  Infra Section 2.3. 
1592  Supra Chapter III, Section 4.3. 





paid to the entity […]”.
1593
 The reference to “tax relevance” thus ensures 
that the rule does not apply automatically, but only when a relevant tax 
payments has been made. A similar idea is behind the construction of the 
concept of HMA, which includes the existence of a payment as a necessary 
element to determine the existence of a HMA.
1594
 
2.3. Tax Policy Justifications  
The proposed reactive coordination rule is based on three main tax policy 
justification grounds: (i) simplicity, (ii) coherence and (iii) administrability, 
which are explained below.  
2.3.1. Simplicity  
Simplicity should be the basis of any tax rule, mostly when it implies the 
regulation of transactions that involve the interaction of tax laws from many 
different jurisdictions. For that reason, the proposed reactive coordination 
rule attempts to be designed and to apply in a very simple manner. This is to 
say, the rule will provide a simple exception to be implemented within 
domestic laws with respect to the rules used to characterize foreign entities 
for tax purposes. When a country does not contemplate these rules, it will 
directly apply as a specific anti-hybrid measure added to the domestic 
legislation. And when the country provides for a similar measure, it will 
                                                          
1593  US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-3(d)(1)(i). 
1594  Supra Chapter V, Section 2.2. 
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apply to the extent not covered by that rule. For example, the Danish anti-
hybrid rules (or anti-CTB regulations) attempt to re-characterize a Danish 
domestic entity when the majority of the shareholders consider the entity in 
a different manner than for Danish tax law.
1595
 These rules could co-exist 
with a rule that provides that when Denmark characterizes a foreign entity 
differently than the foreign country, Denmark should follow the 
characterization of the foreign entity given in its foreign country of 
organization. Similarly, e.g. a reactive coordination rule could be perfectly 
compatible with the administrative practice in Spain, which interprets the 
domestic law as to follow the characterization of the entity in the other 
country.
1596
 Nevertheless, in this case an express inclusion of the rule within 
Spanish domestic law would be more recommendable to avoid contradictory 
interpretations. 
Contrary to the proposed OECD linking rules, therefore, the reactive 
coordination rule does not look at the tax outcomes in one or the other 
country, but rather it focuses directly in the origin and very cause of the 
mismatch, i.e. the different characterization of foreign entities for domestic 
                                                          
1595  For the Danish anti-hybrid rules, see supra Chapter III, Section 5.2. 
1596  For the Spanish administrative practice, see supra Chapter III, Section 5.1. 







 The above does not only avoid complexity, but also it 




From a strict tax policy perspective results at least curious that all the 
proposals to counteract the use (or misuse) of hybrid entities and reverse 
hybrid entities so far either target only the outcome of the transactions, i.e. 
D/NI outcome, e.g. OECD linking rules,
1599
 or they provide for the country 
where the entity is established to accommodate its legal characterization of 
the entity to the one provided in the country of the investors relegating thus 




In a consistent and coherent approach, however, at least from a tax policy 
perspective, it should be the country that creates the hybrid entity mismatch, 
i.e. the country that characterizes the entity in a manner different than the 
home country, which should originally react in this situation. As well 
stressed by Lüdicke: “It is primarily for the state which qualifies foreign 
entities differently from their home state to introduce anti-hybrid mismatch 
                                                          
1597  Interestingly, however, as demonstrated later on in the application of the rule to cases 
involving hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, it also solves issues of DNT and do not 
generate cases of double taxation. As such, the rule should also be well received by 
those supporting the idea that single taxation in cross-border transactions. Infra Section 
2.4.1 and 2.4.2. 
1598  Supra Chapter V, Section 2.3.2. 
1599 Supra Chapter V, Section 3. 
1600  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.3.2. 





 Following this idea, the reactive coordination rule calls for 
the country generating the hybrid mismatch to react accommodating its tax 
characterization of the entity to the one provided in the country where the 
entity whose characterization is relevant, is organized. In other words, it 
avoids that the home country of the hybrid entity or reverse hybrid change 
its own characterization of a domestic entity just because of a legal fiction in 
another country, avoiding an excessive reliance on foreign laws and 
contingencies based on the fact that income was or not deductible in one 
country, or included or not as “income” in the other country.    
2.3.3. Administrability  
Finally, a rule coordinating the characterization of entities is indeed easier to 
administer than one providing for more complex contingencies, such as 
deductibility in one country or inclusion as income in the other country. It is 
evident that under the proposed reactive coordination rule a contingency 
still exists: a country should follow the characterization of the entity in the 
other country. However, this contingency is more or less inherent to the 
hybrid mismatch itself, 
1602
 resulting thus in a more beneficial scenario both 
for tax administrations and taxpayers. 
                                                          
1601  Lüdicke, supra n. 840, p. 317. 
1602  For example, a tax authority in the country of the shareholder will only have to 
determine what is the characterization of the entity in its home country, which is a rather 
clear issue, since domestic laws generally provide certainty on whether an entity is tax 
transparent or tax opaque. 





 For tax administrations, on one hand, it will reduce the complexities of 
determining whether, under foreign laws, an income was deducted or 
included as income, reducing to certain extent the uncertainty on whether 
taxing rights should be given up or not.
1603
 Likewise, a rule providing for 
coordination as per the home country of the entity seems to be more in line 
with other tax rules relying on what happens offshore,
1604
 although without a 
sequence framework as the one proposed within the OECD linking rules. In 
other words, the proposed reactive coordination rule applies more as a 
unilateral measure taken into account the treatment of the entity offshore, 
but without excessively relying on all the movements on foreign laws.  
For taxpayers, on the other hand, a rule providing for coordination in the 
characterization of entities will allow them to be less aware on the domestic 
foreign laws, which should definitely reduce the costs related to tax 
planning and tax compliance.  
2.4. Application of the reactive coordination rule 
Some illustrations might be helpful to understand the application of the 
proposed rule. As follows, some examples are given as regards to hybrid 
and reverse hybrid entities. 
                                                          
1603  “Surrendering sovereignty over tax matters to other states is not something governments 
are used to or are likely to enjoy”. Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 346.  
1604  E.g., rules on foreign tax credit. 
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2.4.1. Application to cases concerning payments made by hybrid 
entities 
As regards to hybrid entities, the application of the rule can be illustrated in 
the following hypothetical: XCo is a taxable entity incorporated in country 
X, which grants a loan to YSub, an entity organized in country Y. YSub 
pays back interest in the amount of 100i. Whilst country X considers YSub 
as tax transparent, country Y considers the same entity as a taxable entity. 
 
Figure 74: Reactive coordination rule and payments made by hybrid entities 
In this scenario, the amount of interest paid (100i) by YSub can be deducted 
from the gross income of YSub, because Y Sub is considered as a taxable 
entity in country Y. Accordingly, the interest paid will not be included as 
ordinary income in country X, because under the tax law of country X, 
YSub is considered as a tax transparent entity. In other words, the loan and 




YSub is considered as a 
fiscally transparent entity 
for country X tax purposes.  
YSub is considered as a 
taxable entity for country Y 










If we now consider that all countries have introduced the proposed reactive 
coordination rule, it would imply, in the example above, that once a 
disparity exists with respect to the characterization of YSub, which is tax 
relevant, i.e. there is a payment of interest and a loan between YSub 
(country Y) and XCo (country X), the taxpayer in country X (XCo) should 
follow the characterization of the entity in the source country: country Y. 
Therefore, once the rule is applied, the loan and the interest payments 
between XCo and YCo must be recognized in both countries, which means, 
on one hand, that there will be no need to limit the deductibility in country 
Y, being also, most probably, taxed in country X.
1605
 More importantly, 
there will be no hybrid mismatch as regards to the entities anymore. The 
potential disparity has therefore been solved. 
2.4.2. Application to cases concerning payments made to reverse 
hybrid entities 
Let us assume the same facts as the example using hybrid entities, with the 
only difference that YSub is regarded as a reverse hybrid entity, i.e. under 
the tax law of country Y, YSub is considered as a transparent entity while 
country X and country Z consider YSub as a taxable entity. Likewise, we 
will assume that YSub receives interest payments from YSbub1, which is 
                                                          
1605  The risk of economic double taxation is also reduced, because of the non-deductibility in 
country Y, when income was included anyway in country X, which is likely to occur 
with the application of the OECD linking rules, despite the existence of a hierarchy in 
the application of those rules. This is discussed at supra Chapter V, Sections 3.4.1 and 
3.4.3 referred to the circular effect of linking rules and economic double taxation.  
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established in a third country Z, which makes the disparity in the 
characterization of YSub as tax relevant.  
 
 
Figure 75: Reactive coordination rule and payments made to reverse hybrid entities 
The interests payments received by YSub are deductible in country Z, but 
not included as ordinary income neither in country Y, where YSub is 
considered as a tax transparent entity. They are also not included as ordinary 




If we now consider the application of the proposed reactive coordination 
rule, country X shall follow the characterization of YSub, i.e. it will treat 
YSub as tax transparent as well. The above implies that the income might be 
taxed in the hands of the investors. More importantly, it would not be 
necessary to establish a limitation in the deductibility of the interest 
                                                          
1606  Unless, of course, dividends are distributed from YSub to XCo or country X effectively 
















payments in country Z to the extent that income is not included in country 
Y, or relying in the effective application of the CFC legislation of country 
X. On the contrary, under the proposed ruled, the right to tax is finally 
granted at the level of the investors and the hybrid mismatch is solved 
through the coordination in the characterization of YSub. 
2.4.3. Advantages 
The reactive coordination rule has some evident advantages, which have 
mostly to do with the simple and direct functioning of the proposed rule 
when compared to the proposed OECD linking rules. 
2.4.3.1. Non-contingent application  
The proposed reactive coordination rule supposes the reaction of only one 
country without the contingency on what is going to happen in the other 
country.
1607
 This is to say, if all countries introduced the rule, it is only the 
country originating the mismatch, i.e. the country that characterize the entity 
differently than the home country, which should react aligning its 
characterization of the foreign entity according to the rules in the home 
country of the entity. The above would eliminate, on one hand, the sequence 
mechanic between primary response and defensive rule, avoiding 
                                                          
1607  As stressed already in this work, one of the main critics to the OECD linking rules is 
their sequencing application. A primary response applies denying a deduction in the 
country of the payer to the extent income has not been included in the country of the 
payee. Accordingly, a defensive rule depends exclusively from the application of the 
primary response, i.e. it applies only to the extent a deduction was granted anyway in the 
country of the payer.  Supra Chapter V, Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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circularity, and the potential economic double taxation issues that might 
arise, and, on the other hand, it would certainly delete the unnecessary 
dependency on foreign laws that the application of linking rules imply.
1608
   
2.4.3.2. Disparities over outcomes 
As stressed already, there is a sound critic with respect to the proposed 
OECD linking rules, which is their excessive focus in the outcomes of the 
hybrid transactions, rather than in the core of the disparities, i.e. the different 
characterization of entities by two or more countries.
1609
  
The proposed reactive coordination rule provides a more direct approach, 
which privileges the origin of the disparities, i.e. the different 
characterization of the same entity, over the tax outcome of the transaction 
in order to design the rule. The above also brings back to the first line the 
core of the problem, which was relegated to the background under the 
proposed OECD linking rules. This is also coherent with was has been 
concluded in this work, which is that DNT should not be used as proxy to 
                                                          
1608  Supra Chapter V, Section 3.4. 
1609  As Cooper well explains: “ […] there is a sense in which constructing the rules around 
outcomes clouds as much as it reveals. The rules for situations (1) to (3) involving 
hybrid entities are all separately constructed, i.e. they have distinct preconditions, only 
one involves changes to domestic law, the exceptions are different and for one there is 
no secondary defensive rule. And yet all the situations identified have the same problem 
at their core, i.e. the states do not agree whether there is an entity” (emphasis added). 
Cooper, supra n. 1199, p. 339. 









2.4.3.3. Complexity is reduced 
This is perhaps the most important advantage of the proposed reactive 




The application of the rule is rather simple, because it attempts to coordinate 
the tax characterization of the entity according to the one given in the 
country where the entity is formally and legally organized, avoiding 
unnecessary complexities, such as establishing whether or not a payment 
was deducted in one country or included in the other country, relying 
excessively on foreign laws.
1612
 Likewise, the rule is easy to administer both 




The proposed rule is, however, far from being perfect and might result in a 
series of disadvantages explained below. 
                                                          
1610  Supra Chapter I, Section 6 and infra chapter VII, Section 2. 
1611  Supra Section 2.3.1. 
1612  Supra Section 2.3.3. 
1613  Id. 
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2.4.4.1. Legal certainty 
Legal certainty might be affected because of the application of the reactive 
coordination rule. Indeed, taxpayers in the investor country might feel 
affected by a rule providing for a characterization of entities according to 
the rules in the other country, affecting therefore the characterization of the 
foreign entity given by their own countries. 
Nevertheless, the legal certainty issue might be more illusory than real, 
because since the rule is implemented, taxpayers will certainly know that in 
all those case involving hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, being this tax 
characterization tax relevant, the rules will apply as to follow the tax 
characterization of the entity in the home country. Therefore, it could 
arguably be sustained that the principle of legal certainty is affected. A 
different situation could be the case in which the rule provides for a re-
characterization of domestic entities as per the characterization of the entity 
in a foreign country, e.g. the Danish anti-hybrid rule. In such a case, there 
could be more arguments to sustain that the legal certainty in terms of the 
domestic characterization of entities might affect taxpayer that decided to 
make business in a country opting for a determined legal entity, e.g. a 
partnership, instead of another, e.g. a corporation.  
2.4.4.2. Some undesirable effects  
Another disadvantage of the rule has to be with some undesired effects 
derived exclusively from the application of the rules. As follows, three 





situations are analyzed: (i) potential double taxation; (ii) tax benefits not 
granted in absence of the rule, and (iii) disregarded transactions for the sole 
application of the rule. 
2.4.4.2.1. Potential double taxation  
Although not so likely to happen, and excluded from the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan 2, a hybrid entity might also receive some payments.
1614
 In such 
a case, the pure application of the reactive coordination rule might derive in 
double taxation.  
Let us assume, e.g. the same example in Section 2.4.1 with the difference 
that YSub has a subsidiary in country Z, from where it receives interest 
payments associated to a loan granted by YSub to YSub 1. 
 
                                                          
1614  This case is, however, not included within the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2, because in 
fact it does not generate a D/NI outcome. As the entity receiving the income is 
considered as tax transparent in the country of the investors, it is assumed that the 
income will be taxed in that country. OECD (2015), supra n. 6, p. 49 et seq. Likewise, 
this case is excluded from the EU ATAD I and EU ATAD II. See EU: Council Directive 
(EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I) and Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 
May 2017 (ATAD II). However, this case might generate double taxation if the country 
of investors does not grant double taxation relief for the taxes paid in the country where 
the entity is organized, i.e. where the entity is indeed a taxable entity. The proposed 
reactive coordination rule, on the contrary, does not start from the assumption of 
matching tax outcomes to avoid DNT, but rather of matching the characterization of 
entities, which is the true core of the issue regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities.  




Figure 76: Potential double taxation 
In absence of the rule, this situation would not raise much concern following 
the OECD tax policy behind the linking rules, i.e. single taxation, because 
the interest payments would flow-through the investor (XCo) and most 
probably would be taxed there. Nevertheless, the hybrid mismatch remains.  
Applying the reactive coordination rule, however, country X would also 
consider YSub as an opaque entity. The above means that country X would 
no longer be able to tax the interest payments (100i), unless CFC rules 
apply. If that happens, however, income might be taxed twice: once at the 
level of country Y, because the entity is taxable, and once at the level of 
country X, because of the application of CFC rules. Therefore, in order to 
avoid such a result, it is recommendable that together with the 
implementation of the reactive coordination rule, CFC rules guarantee a tax 
















2.4.4.2.2. Tax benefits not granted in absence of the rule 
Another good example of cases in which the pure application of the reactive 
coordination rule might bring undesirable results is the case of payments 
made from a reverse hybrid entity. 
If an interest payment is made from a reverse hybrid entity to a third country 
that also consider the entity as tax transparent,
1615
 the outcome of that 
transaction would be a non-deductible interest payment in the payer country, 
whose income will also not be recognized in the country of the payee, which 
considers the payer as tax transparent. Accordingly, the country of the 
investors considers the payer as a separate entity; therefore, it has no impact 
in the transaction between payer and payee. As per the state of the art, this 
transaction does not generate concerns because there is no D/NI outcome 
that might trigger the classification of the transaction as a HMA, and thus, 
the application of linking rules. In other words a non-deduction/non-
inclusion, i.e. DNT outcome, is a perfectly acceptable outcome even under 
the current view of the OECD.
 1616
 
Let assume the same example in Section 2.4.2 above with the only 
difference that YSub pays interest to YSub 1 in country Z, and that this 
latter also considers YSub as tax transparent.  
                                                          
1615  The country of the investors considers the entity as opaque, which becomes the entity in 
a reverse hybrid entity. Supra Chapter III, Section 3.1. 
1616  Because the disparity do not originate a D/NI outcome. See OECD (2015), supra n. 6, 
pp. 55 et seq. It is also not included within the EU ATAD I and II. See EU: Council 
Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 (ATAD I) and Council Directive (EU) 
2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 





Figure 77: Benefits not granted in absence of the rule 
In this scenario, the outcome is a non-deduction/non-inclusion, which is 
certainly out of the scope of BEPS and the concept of HMA.  
However, if we consider now the application of the reactive coordination 
rule to this transaction, it would imply that that the country of the investors 
(country X) should follow the characterization of the entity in the country 
where this is organized (country Y).  Thus, a deduction might be created in 
the country of the investors only because of the application of the rule, 
which could give rise to future abusive situations. Such a result seems to be 
inappropriate, considering that it grants a tax benefit that did not exist before 











Country X and Country Z 
treat YSub as tax 
transparent 





for abusive practices. Therefore, in order to avoid this potential negative 
effect, the author proposes that in those triangular cases in which both the 
payer country (country Y) and the payee country (country Z) treat the 
reverse hybrid as tax transparent, the reactive coordination rule be 
“switched-off”.
1617
 As the outcome without the application of the proposed 
rule did not generated any international tax policy concerns before the 
application of the rule, it might be a perfectly acceptable result if the 
reactive coordination rule is not applied in this case. 
2.4.4.2.3. Disregarded transactions for the sole application of the rule 
Another example might be given when the reverse hybrid entity is making a 
payment to the investors,
 1618
 which by the sole application of the reactive 
coordination rule, might be disregarded for tax purposes.  
Let assume the example in Section 2.4.2 with the sole difference that XCo 
grants a loan to YSub and this latter pays interest back. In such a case, and 
only due to the application of the reactive coordination rule that provides 
for the coordination in the characterization of YSub as per its 
characterization in country Y (i.e. as tax transparent entity), results in 
                                                          
1617  The “switch-off” of the rule does not require a deeper explanation, because it only 
implies that countries might opt to include in their domestic laws, together with the 
wording of the reactive coordination rule, an exception for the application of the rule in 
cases as the one described above, i.e. where a reverse hybrid entity makes a payment to 
a payee in a third country different from the country of the investors. 
1618 This scheme is also out of the scope of the OECD linking rules, because they do not 
generate a D/NI outcome, and thus, there is no HMA 
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disregarding the whole transaction between XCo and YSub, whose outcome 
would not arise in absence of the rule.  
 
 
Figure 78: Disregarded transaction for the sole application of the rule 
The possibility of disregarding the whole transaction just because of the 
application of the reactive coordination rule might, however, gives rise to 
abusive practices. Therefore, the author considers, once again, that a 
“switch-off” rule with respect to the reactive coordination rule might be 
applied. 
Generally speaking, the possibility of “switching-off” the application of the 
reactive coordination rule should not be interpreted neither as a 
contradiction nor a defect of the proposed rule. On the contrary, as stressed 











In order to avoid the non-recognition of the loan and the interest payments as a result of the 
application of the reactive coordination rule, the rule will be switched-off in this case.  





harmonization in the rules used to characterize foreign entities for tax 
purposes, but rather to create a more direct and simple manner to tackle the 
potential misuse of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, when compared with 
the existing linking rules. Likewise, and as its name suggests, a “reactive” 
rule necessarily implies that some cases will remain out of the scope of it, as 
it can be, e.g. with all the cases in which the disparate characterization of the 
same entityby two States has not become tax relevant. 
2.5. Similarities and differences with other examples of coordination  
At first glance, the proposal of this Chapter mirrors perhaps other existing 
proposals of coordination already studied in Chapter III.
1619
 This statement 
is indeed correct since those proposals and the one developed in this Chapter 
attempt to coordinate the tax characterization of entities, rather the tax 
outcome of the transactions involving hybrid or reverse hybrid entities, 
solving thus the core of the hybrid entity mismatch. Nevertheless, there are 
still substantial differences. Both similitudes and differences are analyzed in 
the following sub-sections.   
2.5.1. The Spanish example of coordination and the reactive 
coordination rule 
The Spanish example of coordination is perhaps not the strictest point of 
comparison since the Spanish coordination outcome is exclusively the result 
                                                          
1619  Supra Chapter III, Section 5. 
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of the interpretation of the Spanish law repeatedly sustained by the Spanish 
tax administration, rather than the result of the specific wording of a tax 
provision.
1620
 Nonetheless, more similitudes than differences can be found 
when the outcomes of both, i.e. the Spanish administrative practice and the 
proposed rule, are putted together.  
As stressed already in Chapter III,
1621
 Article 37 of the Spanish NRITL 
provides for a resemblance test as regards to the tax characterization of 
foreign entities.
1622
 In particular, Spanish law attempts to treat foreign 
entities whose juridical nature is identical or analogous to those of the 
entities subject to the income attribution regime in Spain, i.e. a tax treatment 
in which the income of the entity is taxed only in the hands of the owners, as 
if they were subject to that income attribution regime in Spain.
1623
 Although 
the wording of the Spanish law is not entirely clear, many Spanish scholars 
coincide that, as per the Spanish tax administration’s practice, the tax 
treatment given in the foreign country is the central element to determine the 
legal characterization of the foreign entity.
1624
 Like the reactive coordination 
rule, therefore, the Spanish tax administration practice tends to respect the 
tax characterization of the entity in the country in which this is indeed 
organized, i.e. the home country. 
                                                          
1620  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.1. 
1621  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.1. 
1622  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.1.2. See also, ES: Article 37 of the Spanish Non-Resident 
Income Tax Law–NRITL, Royal Legislative Decree No. 5/2004 of 5 March 2004. 
1623  For the different binding rulings issues by the DGT (Spanish tax administration), see 
supra Chapter III, Section 5.1.3. 
1624  See, e.g. Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois and Vega Borrego, supra n. 773. 
See also, Mosquera Mouriño, Id. 





Nevertheless, the Spanish rule cannot be interpreted neither from the strict 
wording of the rule nor one might ensure that the same interpretation might 
be sustained during the time. Thus, a proper rule within the Spanish statute, 
which recognizes the long-standing tax administration practice in Spain, 
would be definitely more recommendable. In this regard, the reactive 
coordination rule may replace such a gap, ensuring also through its 
implementation by other countries, the Spanish characterization of its own 
entities be respected, solving thus also those cases of hybrid entity 




2.5.2. The Danish rule and the reactive coordination rule 
In 2004 and 2008, the Danish tax law was modified in order to include some 
rules attempting to counteract the influence and the use of the U.S. CTB 
regulations with respect to Danish entities.
1626
 In brief, the Danish rules 
provide that if certain requirements are met, a domestic Danish taxable 
entity, considered tax transparent by a foreign country, can be re-
characterized also as a transparent entity in Denmark.
1627
 Likewise, a Danish 
transparent entity can be re-characterized as taxable entity if the foreign 
                                                          
1625  As stated in Chapter III, there is no rule in Spain that guarantees that a Spanish entity is 
considered either transparent or opaque under the laws of a foreign country, which might 
certainly generate a hybrid entity mismatch. Supra Chapter III, Section 5.1. 
1626  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.  
1627  A detailed analysis in supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.1. 
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country considers it also as taxable entity.
1628
 To certain extent, one might 
argue that the Danish rules represent thus an attempt to solve the hybrid 
entity mismatches coordinating the characterization of their own entities as 
per the one provided in the country of the investors, or the majority of them 
at least. 
As per the design of the Danish rules they represent exactly the opposite of 
what it is proposed in this Chapter. The above, however, does not diminish 
the importance of the Danish rules. On the contrary, they make complete 
sense in the context where the rules were launched: to limit the scope of 
application of the CTB regulations in the United States through a unilateral 
response coming from Denmark. Indeed, a “coordination rule” in the 




Another characteristic of the Danish rules is that they attempt to apply 
within a limited scope. For example, one of the requirements under the 
Danish rules referred to hybrid entities is that more than 50% of the 
ownership, by value or votes, is in the hands of a foreign entity.
1630
  
Similarly, for the rules preventing reverse hybrid entity mismatches provide 
that the direct owners/partners holding more than 50% of the capital or 
voting rights must be tax residents in one or more foreign jurisdictions, 
                                                          
1628  A detailed analysis in supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.2. 
1629 In this opinion, e.g. Dell’Anese, supra n. 4, p. 254. See also, Møllin Ottosen and 
Nørremark, supra n. 793, p. 513; Bundgaard, Id., pp. 200-201. All these authors 
coincide that the target of the 2004 and 2008 rules were exclusively the negative impact 
of the U.S. CTB regulations. 
1630  This is referred as the “controlled foreign legal entity”. Supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.1.  





including the Faroe Islands or Greenland.
1631
 The above does not coincide 
with the attempt of the reactive coordination rule, which is to apply the rule 
to all hybrid entity mismatches, regardless whether they were originated 
within ‘control groups’ or not.   
There are, however, other substantial differences. For example, the anti-
hybrid entity rule in Denmark applies to the extent the foreign country is a 
member of the EEA or a tax treaty partner with Denmark.
1632
 This regional 
limitation is not contemplated in the proposal for a reactive coordination 
rule. Accordingly, e.g. the Danish anti-reverse hybrid rule applies not only 
in case the jurisdiction where the owners are tax resident considers the 
Danish entity to be a separate taxable entity, but also in case this country 
does not exchange information with the Danish tax authorities.
1633
 The 
above certainly extends the scope of the rule beyond cases of disparities in 
the characterization of entities, or at least presumes that the foreign 
characterization of Danish transparent entities is opaque by the sole reason 
that information is not available. Although this rule might be practical in 
terms of avoiding uncertainty when information is not available, the author 
estimates that it would not be necessary for purposes of the reactive 
coordination rule, mostly considering the ongoing international scenario in 
which automatic exchange of information seems to prevail.
1634
   
                                                          
1631  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.2.  
1632  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.1. 
1633  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.2.2. 
1634  For a reference on the global tendency towards transparency and automatic exchange of 
information, see supra Chapter I, Section 4.1.2. 
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2.5.3. The EU ATAD I and II and the reactive coordination rule  
As noted already in Chapter III, the reactive coordination rule might also be 
compared with the original proposal for a EU ATAD and the current Article 
9a of the EU ATAD II.  
2.5.3.1. The Proposal on EU ATAD I and the reactive coordination 
rule 
As regards to the original proposal for EU ATAD, it indeed attempted to 
solve the hybrid entity mismatch making the residence country to follow the 
characterization of the “source country”.
1635
 Nonetheless, the rule 
maintained the reference to D/NI outcomes in order to determine the 
existence of a mismatch.
 1636
  In other words, the matching of tax outcomes 
seems to be the final aim, rather than the hybrid mismatch itself. The above, 
e.g. excludes cases in which a hybrid entity is receiving, rather than paying 
interest, or cases where a reverse hybrid is making a payment, rather than 
receiving it, because in both cases there is no D/NI concern.  
Contrary to the above, however, the reactive coordination rule attempts 
exclusively and directly to solve the hybrid entity mismatch, taking into 
consideration even those situations excluded from the proposal for EU 
ATAD.
1637
 For example, since the rule attempts to simply respect the 
characterization of the entity in its home country, it could also avoid 
                                                          
1635  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.1. 
1636  EU: Article 10 of the Proposal for EU ATAD. 
1637  Supra Section 2.4. 





mismatches in which a hybrid entity is receiving a payment from a third 
country, i.e. different form the investors country where the entity is treated 
as tax transparent and the home country where this is tax opaque.  
In spite of the above, the proposed reactive coordination rule must be 
carefully and restrictively applied in cases where a payment is made to a 
hybrid entity from a third country, or the cases where a reverse hybrid entity 
makes a payment to a third country also treating the entity as tax transparent 
or to the country of the investors, mostly to avoid a potential double taxation 
or the creation or tax benefits by the sole application of the rule.
1638
 For the 
first case, i.e. a hybrid entity receiving a payment from a third country, the 
author has proposed to contemplate within the CFC rules in the country of 
the investors, specific rules that grant double taxation relief for the taxes 
paid in the country of the hybrid entity. As regards to the cases of reverse 
hybrid entities, a “switch-off” rule has already been proposed and 
explained.
1639
   
2.5.3.2. Article 9a EU ATAD II and the reactive coordination rule 
As stressed already in this work, Article 9a of the EU ATAD II 
resemblances the Danish anti-reverse hybrid rule, providing for a re-
characterization of a reverse hybrid entity in cases where 50% or more of 
the voting rights, capital interests or rights to a share of profit in that entity 
is maintained by shareholders located in a jurisdiction or jurisdictions that 
                                                          
1638  Supra Sections 2.4.4.2.1, 2.4.4.2.2 and 2.4.4.2.3. 
1639 Id. 
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regard the entity as a taxable person.
1640
 In such a case, the reverse hybrid 
entity will be also treated as a taxable entity.
1641
 Accordingly, the rule 




Although there are elements of connection with respect to the proposed 
reactive coordination rule, e.g. the fact that it does not make any reference 
to tax outcomes, but rather to the disparities in the characterization of the 
same entity, the EU ATAD II rules works exactly in the opposite direction. 
In other words, it attempts to coordinate via re-characterization in the home 
country, i.e. making the reverse hybrid to change its own domestic 
characterization. The above, as argued already, might be justified in order to 
keep the revenues within the EU.
1643
 However, re-characterizing an entity in 
the MS where the entity is organized might also increase uncertainty for 
those taxpayers who originally decided to opt carrying on businesses using a 
certain legal form rather than others.
1644
 Moreover, the rule within the EU 
ATAD II is still ineffective to target payments made to a reverse hybrid 
entity in all those cases when the reverse hybrid is incorporated in a third 
country, outside the EU.
1645
  
                                                          
1640  EU: Article 9a(1) of the Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II). 
For further details, supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.3.2. 
1641  Id. 
1642  EU: Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (ATAD II), rec. 29. 
1643  Supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.3.2. 
1644  See, e.g. McDaniel, McMahon and Simmons at supra n. 628 to see, e.g. why in the 
United States taxpayer prefers transparency rather than opacity.   
1645  This is further explained with examples in supra Chapter III, Section 5.3.3.2. 





The reactive coordination rule works in a different manner, because it 
assumes as a primary tax policy aim that the country that generates the 
mismatch should react coordinating its characterization as per the one 
provided in the country where the entity is formally and legally 
organized.
1646
 The above grants, on one hand, legal certainty for those who 
originally decided to carry out businesses using tax transparent forms and, 
on the other hand, it might also be more effective to target cases in which in 
a reverse hybrid is not organized within the EU, because it simply provides 
for coordination in the home country, regardless where this is located. Yet, 
the disadvantages derived from the application of the proposed reactive 
coordination rule, might be mitigated with the proposed solution already 
explained by the author.
1647
 
3. Implications of the Reactive Coordination Rule within Tax Treaties 
As recognized in Chapter IV, the inclusion of a new Article 1(2) OECD 
Model solves many issues regarding the proper allocation of tax treaty 
benefits when tax transparent entities are involved, avoiding conflicts of 
allocation of income. However, this provision if far from being a complete 
fair solution, mostly for developing (source) countries.
1648
  
Nevertheless, the negative impact of Article 1(2) OECD Model as regards to 
source countries might be indirectly mitigated by the application of the 
                                                          
1646  Supra Section 2.3.2. 
1647  Supra Section 2.4.4. 
1648 Supra Chapter IV. 
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domestic reactive coordination rule. This is to say, once domestic 
coordination in the characterization of entities has been achieved, the 
application of Article 1(2) OECD Model might be restricted exclusively to 
those cases in which the source or residence country, in a bilateral context, 
treats their own domestic entities as tax transparent.  
The analysis of the implications of the application of the reactive 
coordination rule as regards to tax treaties will be performed using study 
cases of hybrids and reverse hybrid entities and involving both pure bilateral 
situations and triangular situations. These study cases are inspired in the 
illustrations already analyzed in Chapter IV with respect to the application 
of Articles 1(6) US Model
1649
 and Article 1(2) OECD Model
1650
, and all of 
them assume that there is no PE in the State of source. Accordingly, all the 
examples also assume that all the anti-abuse restrictions within domestic law 
and tax treaties were overcome.  
3.1. Bilateral cases using hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities 
This Section contains four study cases analyzing the implication of the 
reactive coordination rule within the tax treaty context. Whilst Case A and 
B refer to income received by or through a hybrid entity, Case C and D refer 
to income received through a reverse hybrid entity. All cases assume strict 
                                                          
1649  Supra Chapter IV, Section 4.2. 
1650  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2. 





bilateral situations where interest payments are paid from one Contracting 
State to the other Contracting State. 
3.1.1. Case A 
Entity P is organized and resident in State P and has two owners: A and B, 
who are residents of State R. Accordingly, Entity P receives interest 
payments from a debtor in State P. While State P considers the entity as a 
taxable entity, State R considers the same entity as fiscally transparent, and 
thus, that the income is allocated to the partners A and B. State P has a 
general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross 
amount of payments. 
 
Figure 79: Case A 





P is regarded as fiscally 
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Let us first analyze the solution given by Article 1(2) OECD Model without 
considering the application of the domestic reactive coordination rule.  
As stressed in Chapter IV, the preconditions of Article 1(2) OECD Model 
are met, since there is an entity considered as fiscally transparent by one of 
the Contracting State, which is receiving income from the other Contracting 
State and that income is allocated to the partners, who are residents of the 
State considering the entity as tax transparent. Therefore, according to 
Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P, partners A and B should be granted the 
benefits of the tax treaty R-P. On the other hand, according to Article 11 of 
the treaty R-P, State P should apply a reduced WHT of 10% on the gross 
amount of interest, but only to the extent partners A and B are regarded as 
the beneficial owners of the interest. The conflict between the two 
provisions is thus evident.
1651
 In simple words, if State P limits its taxing 
rights in application of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P, it would be only 




The result is certainly unfair from the State of source’s perspective. If one 
assumes that neither Article 1(2) OECD Model nor the principles of the 
                                                          
1651  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1. 
1652  See as an alternative to the dichotomy between the solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model 
and the beneficial ownership requirement of Article 11, the “deemed” beneficial owner 
proposed by some scholars. Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.1. When applying the 
solution to this hypothetical, the conflict is pragmatically solved deeming A and B as the 
beneficial owners, although it does not justify why the characterization in the State of 
source, i.e. where the entity is organized, should be completely disregarded. Supra 
Section 5.3.1.2. For additional comments from the author to this proposal, see supra 
Section 5.3.1.3. 





OECD Partnership Report apply, the transaction above should remain as a 
domestic transaction, because for State P purposes, the payment is being 
made to a domestic entity, which is considered as taxable in its country of 
organization. Nevertheless, the characterization of the entity by State R is 
the sole factor that determines the application of the treaty R-P, and thus, the 
limitation of taxing rights in the State of source. In simple words, it is the 
characterization in State R that makes the transaction relevant for bilateral 
tax purposes. 
Let us now assume the application of the reactive coordination rule 
implemented domestically both in State R and State P.  
 
Figure 80: Case A after the application of the reactive coordination rule 





State R and State P consider Entity P as tax opaque, because of the application of 
the reactive coordination rule. 
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In such a case, the hybrid entity mismatch would have been solved even 
before the application of the R-P treaty. Indeed, according to the reactive 
coordination rule, State R should follow the characterization of the entity in 
its country of organization, i.e. State P in our case. As State P and State R 
treat the entity as tax opaque, Article 1(2) and the whole treaty R-P are not 
longer applicable. In other words, the interest payments to entity P turns 
back to be a pure domestic concern, which seems to be at least a fairer 
position from the State of source’s perspective, since this treaty applied 
before by the sole different tax characterization of entity P in the State of the 
residence of its partners.  
Nevertheless, the application of the reactive coordination rule in this case 
might potentially generate double taxation if the income is also taxed as 
undistributed profits at the level of the partners of entity P, now regarded by 
States R and P as a taxable entity. For this purpose, it will be necessary that 
the domestic design of the CFC rules in State R ensure a tax credit for the 
taxes already paid in State P,
1653
 or that CFC rules are simply not applied in 
this case. 
3.1.2. Case B 
 Let us assume now that Entity R is organized in State R and has two 
owners, A and B, who are also residents of State R. Accordingly, some 
                                                          
1653  For example, I.R.C. Sec. 960 provides for a FTC with respect to the taxes paid at the 
level of the foreign subsidiaries. If the credit is claim by Corporations, the applicable 
provision is I.R.C. Sec. 902. Likewise, the deemed FTC under Sec. 960 is available for 
taxes paid by subsidiaries until the sixth tier. US: I.R.C. Sec. 960 and I.R.C. Sec. 902. 





interest payments are paid from State P. While State R considers entity R as 
tax opaque, State P considers it as tax transparent. State P has also a general 
WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross amount of 
payments.  
 
Figure 81: Case B 
Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P acts in this case as denying partners A and B 
the benefits of the treaty and ensuring that the benefits of this are allocated 
to entity R.
1654
 Accordingly, Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P clarifies who is 
entitled to claim the double tax relief in the State of residence under Article 
23 of the same treaty.
1655
 However, however, State P will, most probably, 
                                                          
1654  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.1.2. 
1655  Id. 
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not consider entity R as the beneficial owner for purposes of Article 11 of 
the treaty R-P, denying thus the reduced WHT at source.
1656
 
Let us now assume the application of the proposed reactive coordination 
rule at a domestic level first. According to the rule, State P should follow 
the characterization of the entity R in its country of organization, i.e. State 
R. As State R considers the entity as opaque, State P by its own domestic 
law will consider it also as opaque. Therefore, as a result of the pre-
coordination in the characterization of entity R at a domestic level, Article 
1(2) becomes irrelevant, because none of the Contracting States treat the 
entity as tax transparent.  
                                                          
1656  The alternative “deemed” beneficial owner rule analyzed in supra Chapter IV, Section 
5.3.1.1, applies in this case distinguishing two situations: a) if entity R is not considered 
as a nominee, agent or other intermediary as per the analysis of State P, entity R is 
“deemed” as the beneficial owner. However, if entity R is a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary as per the analysis of State P, the rule states that State P should look at the 
members A and B. As both are individuals (not fiscally transparent), Article 1(2) “is not 
in play”. This author understands thus that Article 11 should apply as to reduce the 
WHT at source with respect to A an B, who are the beneficial owners, regardless the tax 
characterization of entity R in State R. In other words, Article 1(2) might not apply as to 
deny the benefits of the treaty to partners A and B. The solution is pragmatic and deals 
in such a manner with the conflict between the two provisions, i.e. Article 1(2) and 11 
OECD Model.  






Figure 82: Case B after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
The application of the reactive coordination rule at a domestic level brings 
thus similar results at a tax treaty level as if Article 1(2) would have been 
applied, although without conflicting with the beneficial ownership 
requirement of Article 11 of the treaty R-P. State P thus, on one hand, will 
grant a reduced WHT of 10% in this case, because it considers entity R as 
tax opaque and the beneficial owner.
1657
 State R, on the other hand, would 
                                                          
1657  If for any reason, State P considers that entity R is a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary, a rule “deeming” A and B as the beneficial owner would be necessary. In 
such a case, Article 11 should apply as to reduce the WHT at source with respect to A an 
B, regardless the tax characterization of entity R in State R. This might be another case 
of “switch-off” of the reactive coordination rule. For a rule deeming the beneficial 
owners, see supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.1. 
R 






There is no need to apply Article 1(2) OECD MC, because after the 
application of the reactive coordination rule, both countries treat Entity  
R as tax opaque.  
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tax the interest at the level of entity R, but granting a relief of double 
taxation according to Article 23 of the treaty R-P.
1658
  
Although the outcomes of the hypothetical are practically the same either by 
application of Article 1(2) OECD Model (without considering the reactive 
coordination rule) or after the domestic application of the reactive 
coordination rule domestically, because in both cases the characterization of 
the entity in its country of organization is followed,
1659
 there are still reasons 
to prefer the reactive coordination rule. On one hand, the pre-coordination 
of the characterization of the entity provides to certain extent more certainty 
as regards to the application of the treaty R-P and the allocation of taxing 
rights. The above is because the analysis of the treaty provisions will start 
from the basis that both Contracting States already agreed, domestically, in 
the characterization of the entity, i.e. as tax opaque in this case. Thus, the 
discussion will remain only on the application of Article 11 OECD Model, 
being perhaps the determination of the beneficial owner for purposes of 
paragraph 2, Article 11 OECD Model the only real issue. Yet, the fact of 
having the source State treating the payee entity as a taxable entity under its 
domestic law might certainly simplify the answer of who is the beneficial 
owner in that case. If not, a deeming rule might apply, which should have 
the effect of switching-off the reactive coordination rule.
1660
  
                                                          
1658  This result is even achieved without the proposed reactive coordination rule and by the 
sole application of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P. 
1659  The home country and the country of residence coincide in this case. 
1660  Supra n. 1657. 





The are however other reasons to prefer a coordinated solution given at a 
domestic level first, rather than relying exclusively on the application of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model in these cases. Let us assume, e.g. that A and B in 
the original example of Case B were residents of State P (source State), 
which considers the entity R as tax transparent. According to the application 
of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P, the owners of entity R, A and B, might now 
be potentially entitled to obtain a reduced WHT. Nevertheless, this result 
seems to be absurd, because according to Article 11(1) OECD Model, the 
requirement that an interest arising in a Contracting State is paid to a 
resident of the other Contracting State would not be met, making the treaty 
anyway inapplicable.
1661
 The interest payments in this case would arise in 
the same State where the recipients of the payments are residents; therefore, 
it would not go beyond of being a domestic situation. However, nothing 
would prevent State R to tax the interest, because entity R is indeed a 
taxable entity there. The double taxation outcome in this case seems to be 
unavoidable. 
                                                          
1661  Article 11(1) OECD Model states: “Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State”(emphasis 
added). 




Figure 83: Case B (variation) 
The risk disappears, however, considering the application of the reactive 
coordination rule. Since the rule applies domestically and prior to the 
application of the treaty, there will be no country treating the entity as tax 
transparent, and thus, there would not be the need to apply Article 1(2) 
OECD Model. The above thus ensures, on one hand, a consistent result as if 
the Article 1(2) OECD Model was applied and, on the other hand, avoids 
potential conflicts. 
3.1.3. Case C 
Entity P is organized and resident in State P and has two owners: A and B, 
who are residents of State R. Accordingly, Entity P receives interest 
payments from a debtor in State P. While State R considers the entity as tax 
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opaque, State P considers the same entity as fiscally transparent, and thus, 
that the income is allocated to the partners A and B. Entity P is thus a 
reverse hybrid entity. State P has a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 
30%, calculated on the gross amount of payments. 
 
Figure 84: Case C 
Article 1(2) OECD Model applies in this case as to deny the benefits of the 
treaty to A and B and to confirm that the payments of interest in this case is 
a mere domestic situation. Therefore, the solution of Article 1(2) OECD 
Model maintains the transaction as a domestic one, which, however, does 
not prevent that A and B might recognize undistributed profits generated at 
the level of entity P, taxed in country R as CFC income. Likewise, the 
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solution of Article 1(2) does not prevent that State P still considers A and B 




Figure 85: Case C before the application of the reactive coordination rule 
If we now consider that State R and P introduced the reactive coordination 
rule at a domestic level, and thus, that the characterization of the entity is 
coordinated before the application of the tax treaty between R-P, the 
solution to the case might be slightly different. 
                                                          
1662  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.1.3. 





According to Article 1(2) OECD Model, the interest payments are not allocated 
to A and B. The transaction remains as a domestic one. The characterization in 
State R prevails. 






Figure 86: Case C after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
Firstly, the reactive coordination rule attempts to coordinate according to 
the characterization rules in the entity in its home country, i.e. where the 
entity is legally organized. Therefore, in this case, entity P is organized in 
State P, where the entity is originally characterized as tax transparent; 
therefore, State R should also treat entity P as tax transparent. The above 
implies that both countries will consider that income flows through entity P 
and it is finally allocated to partners A and B. Secondly, the tax treaty 
between R-P will come into play. For this purpose, and considering that now 
both countries will consider the entity P as tax transparent, Article 1(2) of 
the treaty R-P should apply. The solution of Article 1(2) in this case will be 





State R and State P consider Entity P as fiscally transparent because of the 
application of the reactive coordination rule. Article 1(2) OECD Model is 
anyway applied and allocates the interest payments to A and B. Both receive 
the benefits of the treaty between R-P. 
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to grant A and B the benefits of the treaty R-P, which in this case consists in 
a reduced WHT of 10% applied on the gross amount of interest paid.  
As noted, therefore, the solutions of Article 1(2) OECD Model, ex-ante and 
ex-post the application of the reactive coordination rule at a domestic level, 
are different. While the solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model ex-ante is to 
deny the benefits of the treaty to A and B, making the characterization of the 
entity in the State of residence to prevail and keeping the transaction as a 
domestic one, the solution ex-post goes in the opposite direction: it allocates 
the income to A and B, and thus, it grants them the benefits of the treaty 
between R-P. In other words, it reduces the WHT that A and B might suffer 
in the State of source, and it grants double taxation relief in the country of 
their residence.
1663
   
The solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model ex-post the application of the 
proposed reactive coordination rule seems thus to be preferable. On one 
hand, it solves the disparity in the characterization of the entity, which is the 
core of the issue with regards to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. The 
above is made at a domestic level, which, to certain extent, allows the 
application of the treaty in a more consistent manner. Indeed, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model is not a provision created to deal with hybrid entities and 
reverse hybrid entities purely. On the contrary, it deals with items of income 
                                                          
1663  As both countries are considering Entity P as tax transparent, even though the entity 
withheld the tax and paid it, that WHT would be understood as flowing to the partners A 
and B as if they directly paid that tax. This is indeed the basic principle of tax 
transparency. Therefore, the tax credit or exemption in the country of residence should 
be granted on the WHT paid. 





received by or through an entity that is considered as fiscally transparent by, 
at least, one of the Contracting States in order to avoid conflicts of 
allocation of income. That is its original intend. Indirectly, however, and 
when hybrid or reverse hybrid entities are involved, it makes the 
characterization of the State of residence to prevail. Nevertheless, when the 
solution to the disparities in the characterization of entities was already 
provided within the domestic laws, i.e. when both countries previously agree 
on the characterization of the entity either as tax transparent, the application 
of Article 1(2) OECD Model results more directly connected with the aim of 
preventing conflicts of allocation of income.  
On the other hand, allocating the income to partners A and B seems to be 
more logic since the perspective of State P, the source State, because most 
probably A and B are regarded as the beneficial owners of the interest under 
the source State’s perspective and not entity P, which is seen originally as 
fiscally transparent in State P. In other words, coordinating the 
characterization of the entity as per the one given in its home country, which 
coincides with the source State in this case, and then applying the treaty R-
P, i.e. Article 1(2), brings a solution more coherent from the perspective of 
the State of source, rather than just applying Article 1(2) OECD Model with 
the existing disparity in the characterization of the entity at a domestic level. 
This is because for State P’s perspective, the transaction was never purely 
domestic, as pretended in the solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model without 
considering the application of the reactive coordination rule, but rather a 
bilateral one. The reason is simple: entity P was since its organization in 
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State P regarded as fiscally transparent and considered that income should 
be allocated to A and B.
1664
 
Finally, and although not relevant under the author’s perspective, it might be 
interesting to see also that the solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model ex-post 
the application of the reactive coordination rule might be relevant to ensure 
taxation in at least one country as well. Indeed, if we consider the 
application of Article 1(2) OECD Model without the proposed reactive 
coordination rule, it would imply that the interest payments are not taxed 
neither in State P (entity P is tax transparent) nor in State R (Article 1(2) 
OECD Model considers that income is not allocated to A and B). The only 
option to ensure taxation in this case would be to rely on the application of 
CFC rules in State R. Nevertheless, once Article 1(2) OECD Model is 
applied after the coordination of the characterization of entity P at a 
domestic level in this case, i.e. ex-post the application of the domestic 
reactive coordination rule, income is immediately allocated to A and B, 
which, to certain extent, allows to ensure taxation in State R, without relying 
exclusively in the application of CFC rules. Therefore, the outcome of the 
reactive coordination rule as regards to tax treaties should equally satisfy 
skeptics and less skeptics on single taxation. 
                                                          
1664  This solution is also clearly more consistent than deeming entity P as the beneficial 
owner. See the solution to example 3, supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.2. 





3.1.4. Case D 
Let us assume now that Entity R is organized in State R and has two owners, 
A and B, who are also residents of State R. Accordingly, some interest 
payments are paid from State P. While State R considers entity R as tax 
transparent, State P considers it as a taxable entity. State P has also a general 
WHT on interest paid abroad of 30%, calculated on the gross amount of 
payments. 
 
Figure 87: Case D 
Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P clarifies that the partners A and B are the ones 
who should claim the benefits of the treaty R-P.  However, the application 
of Article 1(2) of the treaty R-P might still leave open some uncertainty as 





P is regarded tax opaque P is regarded as fiscally transparent 
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regards to the application of the treaty between State R and State P, because 
A and B are not regarded as the beneficial owner of the payments.
1665
  
Nevertheless, if the domestic reactive coordination rule is applied first, both 
State R and State P will agree in the tax treatment given to entity R as per 
the characterization in its home country, i.e. State R. The above will not 
prevent Article 1(2) to apply, but it will ensure that the benefits of the treaty 
are allocated to A and B, who should be now also regarded as the beneficial 




Figure 88: Case D after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
                                                          
1665  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.1.4. 
1666  Since State P will domestically consider entity R as fiscally transparent, it will most 
probably look at the owners A and B as to determine who are the beneficial owners of 
the interest payments. This solution coincides with the outcome in case a “deemed” 
beneficial ownership rule is applied. Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.2, ex. 4. 





P is regarded as fiscally transparent in State R and State P after the application of 
the reactive coordination rule. The solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model should 
not thus conflict with any of the countries involved since they both have agreed in 
coordination the characterization of entity R according to the rules of its home 
country. 





In addition, if A or B or both were residents of State P, however, the treaty 
R-P would not be applicable, because in such a case the requirement of 
Article 11(1), which provides that interest arising in a Contracting State and 
paid to a resident of the other Contracting State, would not be met. This 
result should, nevertheless, be considered irrelevant since for both State R 
and P, the entity R is considered as tax transparent.
1667
  
3.2. Triangular cases using hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities 
This Section contains three study cases analyzing the implication of the 
reactive coordination rule within tax treaties, but assuming now exclusively 
triangular situations involving three given countries X, Y and Z. As well as 
in the bilateral cases, Cases E, F and G of this Section demonstrate that the 
effects of the application of the reactive coordination rule might bring more 
positive outcomes increasing simplicity and consistency in the application of 
tax treaties. Likewise, it has an indirect positive impact with respect to the 
position of source States when compared with pure solutions granted by 
Article 1(2) OECD Model, in absence of a previous domestic coordination.  
3.2.1. Case E 
Let us assume that YCo is an entity incorporated in State Y, which has two 
partners, A and B, who are residents of State X. Accordingly, YCo has a 
                                                          
1667  Entity R is just a pass-thru entity. Interest payments will not be subject to tax in State R 
and State P will apply a WHT with respect to the partners A and B.  There is thus not 
even a risk of double taxation.  
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subsidiary in State Z, i.e. ZCo, which is financed by a loan granted by YCo 
and because of which it receives interest payments back from State Z.
1668
 
YCo is considered as a taxable entity in State Y and in State Z. However, it 
is regarded as a fiscally transparent entity in State X. Likewise, although 
Country Z applies a general WHT on interest paid abroad of 30% of the 
gross amount paid, the treaty State X/State Z provides for a reduced WHT 
of 10% while the treaty State Y/State Z provides for a reduced WHT of 5%. 
 
Figure 89: Case E 
As stressed in Chapter IV,
1669
 according to the treaty Y-Z, State Z should 
reduce its WHT to 5% according to Article 11 and State Y should grant a 
                                                          
1668  The example assumes that the loan and interest are arm’s length. 
1669  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.2.1. 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax Transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While Yco is regarded as tax transparent in State X, State Y and Z consider it as tax opaque. Likewise, State 
Z applies a general WHT of 30% on the payments of interest abroad, although the treaty State X/State Z 
provides for a reduced WHT of 10% while the treaty  State Y/State Z provide for a reduced WHT of 5%.  
A 









relief of double taxation as per Article 23. It is clear that the income and the 
benefits of the treaty are allocated to YCo.
1670
 The treaty X-Z, on the other 
hand, is also applicable. According to Article 1(2) treaty X-Z, there is 
income received by or through an entity or arrangement considered as 
fiscally transparent by one of the Contracting States, and which is allocated 
to the partners A and B, who are also residents of the State treating the 
entity as tax transparent, i.e. State X. Therefore, in principle, State Z should 
accomplish with both treaties, which, under the principles of the OECD 
Partnership Report would mean that State Z must apply the lower WHT rate 
(5%) as regards to both treaties.
1671
 This solution is not only in conflict with 
the beneficial owner requirement of Article 11, but it seems to be 
completely arbitrary and unfair for the State of source.
1672
 
Let us now assume the application of the reactive coordination rule. 
According to the proposed rule, State X will apply the same characterization 
that YCo has in its country of organization, i.e. State Y. Therefore, the 
analysis regarding which tax treaty is applicable in this case will start from 
the basis that all three States involved agree in the fact that YCo is indeed a 
taxable entity.  
                                                          
1670  Article 1(2) treaty Y-Z does not apply, because YCo is considered as a taxable entity in 
both Contracting States. Id. 
1671  OECD Commentary on Article 1 concerning the persons covered by the Convention, 
para. 6.5. 
1672  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.2.1 and Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.3. 




Figure 90: Case E after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
Therefore, the application of the reactive coordination rule solves the 
disparity in the characterization of entities before the tax treaty is applied, 
bringing simplicity in the application of tax treaties themselves. For 
example, after the application of the reactive coordination rule, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model is no longer applicable (or necessary) because all three 
countries involved have previously agreed that YCo is indeed a taxable 
entity. Consequently, Article 11 of the treaty Y-Z, the only treaty applicable 
in this case, will determine the allocation of taxing rights. In this case, there 
is almost complete certainty that the beneficial owner is YCo.
1673
 The non-
                                                          
1673  In this regard, this solution seems to be preferable than applying a “deemed” beneficial 
ownership. Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.2, ex. 5. This author does not even see the 
need of a “deeming rule” in case State Z considers the entity as a nominee, agent or 
other intermediary, because if State Z would consider YCo as a nominee, agent or other 
intermediary (i.e. not as the beneficial owner), the treaty Y-Z would be simply not 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Taxable entity Taxable entity Taxable entity 
The effect of the reactive coordination rule is that all three States in this hypothetical consider now YCo as 
a taxable entity, which is the original characterization given in its country of organization. As a consequence 
of the above, Article 1(2) OECD Model is not longer applicable.  
A 
B 





application of the X-Z treaty, on the other hand, is coherent with the object 
and purpose of tax treaties, because since State X does not longer consider 
BCo as tax transparent, it will not consider that any income is allocated to A 
and B, residents of State X, and thus, there will be no longer the risk of 
double taxation. The reactive coordination rule thus helps clarifying the 
application of tax treaties in this triangular case.
1674
 
The solution given by the reactive coordination rule is also fairer with the 
position of State Z, i.e. the source State, when tax treaties come into play. 
Indeed, State Z will no longer be obliged to limit its taxing rights at source 
just because a third country’s characterization of an entity differs from the 
characterization given to that entity where this is organized and with whom 
the source State does not disagree in the characterization of that entity. In 
other words, the domestic coordination in the characterization of the entity 
(YCo) helps avoiding the results of Article 1(2) OECD Model, which, solely 
due to the tax transparent treatment in State X, makes the treaty X-Z 
applicable. 
                                                                                                                                       
applicable. The determination of the beneficial owner is a rather exclusive task of the 
State of source. 
1674  The solution in light of the reactive coordination rule also resemblances the U.S. tax 
treaty practice within the treaty United States/Poland, analyzed in supra Chapter IV, 
Section 4.3.1.1.1. 




Figure 91: Case E and another effect of the reactive coordination rule 
Regardless the above, the result after the application of the reactive 
coordination rule in this case might, however, potentially generate double 
taxation if the income is also taxed as undistributed profits at the level of the 
partners of YCo, which is now regarded by States X, Y and Z as a taxable 
entity. For this purpose, it will be necessary that the domestic design of the 





                                                          
1675  Supra n. 1653, as regards to Case A at supra Section 3.1.1. 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Taxable entity Taxable entity Taxable entity 
The only relevant applicable tax treaty in this case, after the reactive coordination rule, is the tax treaty Y-Z, 
which originally should have been the only treaty applicable, because Y-Z never disagreed in the 
characterization of YCo. The solution given by Article 1(2) OECD Model, in absence of the domestic 
coordination, obliges State Z to limit also its taxing rights with respect to State Y by the sole reason that this 
country treats YCo differently. After the application of the reactive coordination rule, this outcome is 
avoided and the treaty X-Z is not longer applicable.  
A 
B 





3.2.2. Case F 
Case F considers the same facts as Case E, with the sole difference that YCo 
is treated as fiscally transparent in State Z while it is regarded as a taxable 
entity in State X and Y. Likewise, this hypothetical also assumes that all 
applicable treaties provide similar reductions of WHT of 10% at source. 
 
Figure 92: Case F 
As regards to the treaties Y-Z and X-Z, Article 1(2) acts as to deny A and B 
the benefits of the treaties and to ensure that these benefits are allocated to 
YCo. Nevertheless, in both cases Article 1(2) does not solve the dichotomy 
with the beneficial ownership requirement of Article 11. In other words, 
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
While State X and Y considers YCo as a taxable entity, State Z considers it as fiscally transparent.  
A 
B 
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while Article 1(2) grants in both cases the benefits of the treaty to YCo, 
Article 11, in both treaties, considers A and B as the beneficial owners.
1676
 
If we now assume the application of the domestic reactive coordination 
rule, the results seem to be more consistent from a tax treaty perspective. 
Indeed, as noted below, the immediate effect of the application of the rule is 
that State Z would respect the characterization of YCo according to the 
domestic law of State Y, i.e. the home country of the entity. This is to say 
YCo would be regarded as a taxable entity for the three States involved in 
this hypothetical. Therefore, on one hand, there are no doubts that the treaty 
Y-Z will be fully applied in this case. The above means that State Z will 
apply a reduced WHT to YCo, and State Y, subsequently, will tax the 
interest payments, but it will apply also a relief of double taxation for the 
full amount of WHT.
1677
 On the other hand, it confirms that the treaty X-Z 
will not be longer applicable.  
                                                          
1676  Supra Chapter IV, Section 5.2.2.2. 
1677  YCo will most probably be the beneficial owner from State Z’s perspective. In addition, 
no “deemed” beneficial owner rules would be needed, because even if State Z would 
consider YCo as a nominee, agent or other intermediary (i.e. not as the beneficial 
owner), then the treaty Y-Z would be simply not applicable. The determination of the 
beneficial owner is a rather exclusive task of the State of source. Compare the solution 
of the “deemed” beneficial owner rule in supra Chapter IV, Section 5.3.1.2, ex. 6. 






Figure 93: Case F after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
As it can be noted, therefore, after the application of the reactive 
coordination rule domestically, Article 1(2) OECD Model is not longer 
needed. Thus, the scope of the provision is again restricted, although 
justified in the simplicity and consistency of the application of tax treaties. 
As we have seen before, Article 1(2) OECD Model was not able to solve in 
this hypothetical the disparity in the characterization of YCo, which derived 
in an improper or incomplete application of Y-Z tax treaty. This issued is, 
however, immediately disregarded with the application of the reactive 
coordination rule, which does not only solve the disparity ex-ante, but it 
clarifies the bilateral situation and the tax treaty applicable in this case.  
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Taxable entity Taxable entity Taxable entity 
The application of the reactive coordination rule does not only eliminate the hybrid entity mismatch, but it 
clarifies the doubts with respect to which tax treaty is applicable in this case. Since State Z recognizes the 
characterization of YCo given in its country or organization, the interest payments are allocated to YCo and 
the treaty Y-Z is the only one applicable.    
A 
B 
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Finally, and as well as in Case E, the result after the application of the 
reactive coordination rule might generate double taxation of income: once 
by State Y on the interest received, and once again on the attributed amount 
of undistributed profits at the level of A and B (i.e. CFC rules). For this 
purpose, it will be necessary that the domestic design of the CFC rules in 
State X ensure a tax credit for the taxes already paid in State P.
1678
  
3.2.3. Case G 
Case G considers the same facts as Case E, with the sole difference that 
YCo is regarded as a tax transparent entity in State Y, its country of 
organization, while as a taxable or tax opaque entity for State X and Z 
purposes. 
 
                                                          
1678  Supra n. 1653, as regards to Case A at supra Section 3.1.1. 






Figure 94: Case G 
Once again, the solution to this case, without considering the impact of the 
proposed reactive coordination rule, must be analyzed considering first the 
application of the treaty Y-Z. In this regard, as per Article 11 of the Y-Z tax 
treaty, State Z will consider that interest are being paid to a resident of State 
Y. Therefore, in principle, State Z should restrict it WHT from 30% to 10% 
as per the treaty between Y-Z. However, State Y will consider that such 
interest is not received by YCO, which is considered in that country as tax 
transparent. Therefore, it will rarely grant the benefit of the treaty Y-Z to 
YCo. Article 1(2) of the treaty Y-Z works thus denying the benefits of the 
treaty to A and B, which are not considered residents of State Y. 
While State Y considers YCo as a fiscally transparent entity, States X and Z consider it as a taxable or tax 
opaque one. YCo is thus a reverse hybrid entity.  
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 




Figure 95: Case G and its solution before the application reactive coordination rule 
Accordingly, as regards to the treaty X-Z, it is very clear that this treaty does 
not apply at all, because both State Z and State X consider that the interest 
payments are paid to YCo, which is a resident of State Y. 
Let us now assume that the domestic reactive coordination rule applies first 
coordinating the characterization of YCo in the three countries according to 
its original characterization in its country of organization, i.e. State Y.  
The treaty between Y-Z applies in the perspective of State Z. This country would thus, in principle, limit its 
taxation rights. However, from the perspective of State Y, there is no interest payment received by a resident 
of State Y, which means that the benefits of the treaty should not be granted to YCo. Likewise, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model would grant the benefits the treaty Y-Z if A and/or B were residents of State Y. Nevertheless, 
that does not occur in this hypothetical.  
Interest 
State Y State Z State X 
YCo ZCo 
Tax transparent Taxable entity Taxable entity 
A 
B 






Figure 96: Case G after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
As a consequence of the coordination in the characterization of YCo 
according to State Y’s rules, the treaty Y-Z is no longer applicable. The 
reason of the above is that now, both for States Y and Z, consider YCo as 
fiscally transparent, and thus, not a resident for purposes of the treaty. Both 
countries consider now that the income flows through YCo until the final 
partners A and B, residents of State X. The only relevant treaty thus is the 
one between X-Z. 
Accordingly, the requirements of Article 11 of the treaty X-Z, in terms of 
the existence of income arising in one Contracting State and paid to a 
resident of the other Contracting State, are met in this case. Likewise, State 
Z considers that the reduction of WHT at source proceeds, because interest 
Scenario after the application of the reactive coordination rule. 
Interest 
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payments are paid to the beneficial owners of them.
1679
 The application of 
Article 1(2) of the X-Z treaty is also consistent with the above, allocating 
the benefits of the treaty between X-Z to A and B, residents of State X and 
the beneficial owners under State’s Z perspective.   
 
Figure 97: A more consistent tax treaty outcome 
Although the solution after the application of the reactive coordination rule 
seems to be, in principle, a simple switch in the treaty applicable when 
compared with the solution without the proposed rule, it certainly brings a 
more coherent result from a tax treaty perspective. The above can be see, 
e.g. in the fact that State Z, the State of source, limits its taxation rights only 
                                                          
1679  YCo is considered as a fiscally transparent entity in the State of source, and thus, most 
probably as a simple intermediary (not as the beneficial owner). However, A and B, who 
are individuals resident in State X, will be for sure considered as the beneficial owners. 
The only relevant treaty applicable is between X-Z. The solution of Article 1(2) OECD Model in this case, 
is consistent with the treatment that all countries give to the entity, allocating the benefits of the treaty 
between X-Z to A and B, residents of State X.  





Tax transparent Tax transparent 
Interest 
Interest 





with respect to the State of the final beneficiary of the income: A and B, the 
partners of YCo. This idea might coincide with the fact that, under State Z’s 
perspective, partners A and B are the beneficial owners of the interest 
payments since State Z considers now YCo as fiscally transparent.
1680
  
If we assume for a moment that A is resident of State X while B is resident 
of State Y, then both treaties Y-Z and X-Z would be applicable.  
 
Figure 98: Case G (variation) 
Although this solution is legally consistent with the fiscally transparent 
treatment of YCo in all States involved, it might be arguable from a pure 
economic perspective in the State of source. However, the reactive 
                                                          
1680  YCo acts in the hypothetical as a simple conduit company, i.e. the money is just flowing 
through the entity to the final beneficiaries. 
Due to the application of Article 1(2) OECD Model, part of the income would be allocated to A, who could 
claim the benefits of the treaty Y-Z. Likewise, the other part of the income would allocated to B, who could 
claim the benefits of the treaty X-Z. The source State X shall thus limit its taxing rights as regards to State 
Y and X.   
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coordination rule does not attempt the switch the preferences between 
residence and source States, but rather to achieve more balanced outcomes.  
In this case, therefore, this result should be assumed as a simple sunk cost 
since in a global perspective, there are other cases in which the State of 
source’s position is certainly improved. 
3.3. The “switch-off” and Article 1(2) OECD Model 
As already stressed by the author, there might be cases in which tax benefits 
or disregarded transactions might result exclusively from the application of 
the reactive coordination rule.
1681
  
A tax benefit might arise, on one hand, when an entity, considered as 
fiscally transparent in its country of organization, pays interest to a payee 
located in another country, and this country and the country of the investors 
(which are different ones), both consider the payer entity as non-transparent 
or tax opaque.
1682
 Since the proposed rule attempts to coordinate the 
characterization of the according to the rule in its home country, i.e. all 
countries involved will treat the entity as fiscally transparent, a deduction 
might be created in the country of the investors only because of the 
application of the proposed rule.
1683
 Similarly, on the other hand, a 
transaction might be disregarded by the sole application of the proposed rule 
in case, e.g. a reverse hybrid entity pays interest to its sole investors, which 
                                                          
1681  A “switch-off” the rule was also discussed as regards to Case B, supra n. 1657. 
1682  See the example in supra Section 2.4.4.2.2. 
1683  Id. 





after the application of the rule, should also consider the entity as tax 
transparent, and thus, disregard the payment and the loan associated to it.
1684
 
As the situations described above arise by the sole application of the 
proposed rule and might be misused for tax purposes, the author proposed a 
“switch-off” in the application of the reactive coordination rule.  
A “switch-off” of the proposed rule might, however, negatively impact in 
the positive results that the rule brings within tax treaties, especially as 
regards to restrict the application of Article 1(2) OECD Model. Indeed, as 
noted already, once domestic coordination in the characterization of entities 
has been achieved, the application of Article 1(2) OECD Model is restricted 
exclusively to those cases in which the source or residence State, in a 
bilateral context, treat their own domestic entities as tax transparent, which 
could also, indirectly, brings better solutions for source States. Nevertheless, 
this concern lacks of practical considerations due to the reduced scope of 
Article 1(2) OECD Model.  
As the author has already argued in this work, the scope of Article 1(2) 
Model is limited to cases in which an entity or arrangement is treated by one 
or both Contracting States as fiscally transparent, and which has “income 
derived by or through” that entity or arrangement. In other words, Article 
1(2) OECD Model seems not to cover cases in which a tax transparent 
entity, either hybrid or reverse hybrid, does not receive income. These are 
exactly the cases in which the author has proposed a “switch-off” in the 
                                                          
1684 See the example at supra Section 2.4.4.2.3. 
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reactive coordination rule, i.e. cases in which a reverse hybrid entity pays, 
but does not receive income. Therefore, even though the switch-off of the 
reactive coordination rule results in keeping the disparity in the 
characterization of the entity, its application does not impact within tax 
treaties, because Article 1(2) OECD Model does not apply to those cases in 
which the switch-off can be turned on either.  
As a result, in all those cases in which the switch-off might be used, Article 
1(2) OECD Model is also inapplicable. Therefore, the hybrid mismatch will 
remain. This outcome is, however, perfectly acceptable, since the proposed 
rule does not attempt to be a rule that harmonizes the characterization of 
entities for tax purposes in every sense. The above implies thus that there 
will be cases, which are not covered by the rule. Likewise, one could argue 
that the outcome of the transactions in which the switch-off applies did not 
generate any international tax policy concern before the application of the 
reactive coordination rule. Thus, they could rarely be a cause of concern 
now. 
4. Final Remarks 
The reactive coordination rule appears as an interesting alternative to re-
focus the discussion as regards to the design of rules counteracting the 
potential misuse of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. Indeed, and unlike 
other proposals discussed in a global context so far, the reactive 






core of the issue as regards to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the 
disparate characterization of an entity by two or more jurisdictions, and, on 
the other hand, it attempts for a simple application, avoiding, e.g. 
contingencies related to the outcomes of transactions, such as that an item of 
income is deducted in one State while not included in the other, or vice 
versa.  
The above, however, does not make the proposed reactive coordination rule 
neither a perfect nor a non-improvable solution. On the contrary, as 
demonstrated in this Chapter, there are still open questions as regards to its 
application, which are mostly related to some undesirable effects that the 
application of the rule might originate. These cases refer to the potential 
double taxation issues in cases a hybrid entity receives a payment and the 
cases in which a tax benefit is granted or a disregarded transaction results 
solely because of the application of the proposed rule. Nevertheless, and in 
order to mitigate such results, the authors has proposed a coordinated 
application of the rule with other tax measures, such as CFC rules, as 
regards to the potential double taxation cases involving hybrid entities 
receiving payments, and even a “switch-off” of the proposed rule in case of 
tax benefits or disregarded transactions resulting exclusively from the 
application of the proposed rule. Yet, it is still evident that an impartial 
implementation of the rule around the world would rest potential to it.
1685
  
                                                          
1685  There is, however, no need to be completely pessimistic in this regard. On the contrary, 
in many of the latest global tax proposal leaded by the OECD, it has been demonstrated 
the will of countries to work together, even though some of those proposals lack of a 
Hybrid Entities without Double Non-Taxation: An Alternative Approach 
 
 682 
The reactive coordination rule has also demonstrated to have a positive 
impact within tax treaties. On one hand, it solves the disparities with respect 
to the characterization of an entity before a tax treaty comes into play, which 
makes the application of the treaty more straightforward. In other words, 
hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities will not be a tax treaty concern 
anymore, at least not to the extent known before the application of the 
proposed rule.
1686
 On the other hand, it restricts the application of Article 
1(2) OECD Model to those cases where the country in which the entity 
under analysis is organized, treats the entity as fiscally transparent. The 
above is clear, because only in those cases the other countries will follow 
the tax transparent treatment of the entity if the reactive coordination rule 
was also implemented. A similar conclusion might be achieved as regards to 
Article 3(1) MLI whose text mirrors Article 1(2) OECD Model.
1687
 
Likewise, the restriction in the application of Article 1(2) OECD Model, 
indirectly achieved through the previous domestic coordination in the 
entity’s characterization (i.e. through the reactive coordination rule), has a 
positive impact for source States normally affected by the straightforward 
                                                                                                                                       
correct design and focus. Therefore, if a rule attempts to counteract the core and not the 
boundaries as regards to hybrids and reverse hybrid entities, it might be expected at least 
that the proposed rule be received with positive eyes. 
1686  Some could argue that hybrids and reverse hybrid entities were never a tax treaty 
concern, at least not directly, since the moment that domestic laws and not tax treaties 
govern the characterization of entities for tax purposes. That statement is, in principle, 
correct, but it forgets the sole existence of the disparity in the characterization of an 
entity and the absence of a rule within tax treaties dealing with such disparity, might 
impact the proper allocation of taxing rights according to a specific tax treaty. Therefore, 
a coordinated solution at a domestic level is of great relevance for tax treaty purposes.  






application of Article 1(2) OECD Model. As analyzed already in Chapter IV 
and demonstrated in the study cases used in this Chapter VI, Article 1(2) 
OECD Model gives to certain extent prevalence to the characterization of 
the entity in the residence State, indirectly affecting the position of source 
States. This effect is, nevertheless, mitigated in part after the application of 
the reactive coordination rule, as it can be seen in Cases E, F and G.  In 
Case G, however, it might be arguable that the economic position of the 
State of source is better in cases whether the partners of the entity are 
residents in two different countries with a treaty with the State of source. 
Yet, the above, should not be taken as a negative outcome, but as a simple 
demonstration that the reactive coordination rule was not created to switch 
the results of Article 1(2) OECD Model in favor of the position of source 
States, but rather to eliminate the disparities in the characterization of 
entities at a domestic level, which, however, might to certain extent 
indirectly generate a positive outcome as regards to tax treaties, including 
better outcomes for source States when compared with the application of 







Summary and Conclusions 
1. Introduction 
As stressed in the beginning of this work, the present research has attempted 
to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. Is there necessarily an interconnection between the use of hybrid 
and reverse hybrid entities and the DNT outcome? Should the rules 
targeting the use (or misuse) of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities be 
designed based exclusively on the DNT outcome? 
 
2. Is there an alternative approach to deal more directly with the use 
(or misuse) of disparities in the characterization of entities for tax 
purposes, which does not consider the DNT outcome, or should the 
current consequentialist approach prevail? 
 
In answering these questions, some preliminary assumptions have been 
taken into consideration: 
 
a. The sole result of a D/NI outcome, i.e. DNT, should not be 
considered per se a matter of concern in any cross-border 
transaction. Likewise, the use of the DNT outcome as an immediate 
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proxy to determine the existence of practices that might be 
considered abusive when they derive exclusively from the use of 
hybrids or reverse hybrid entities should be prevented.  
  
d. Linking rules, i.e. rules matching deductions with the respective 
inclusion of income in the other country, as the ones proposed within 
the OECD BEPS Action Plan 2, have the risk of setting up strong 
presumptions of abusive practices by the sole reason that the outcome 
of DNT has been achieved. Likewise, these rules are highly complex to 
administer and they do not target the core issue with respect to hybrids 
and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the different tax characterization of 
entities. An alternative should thus be evaluated.  
 
e. Rules regulating the use of transparent entities at the level of tax 
treaties in order to prevent the access to the benefits of a bilateral tax 
treaty by third countries out of that treaty are, in principle, 
recommendable. Nevertheless, the inclusion of an Article 1(2) within 
the OECD Model, resembling Article 1(6) US Model, might generate 
important issues with respect to developing countries, mostly 
considering that these countries generally rely on source taxation. 
Similar concerns are shared as regards to Article 3(1) MLI, which 
mirrors the OECD proposal of Article 1(2) OECD Model. Alternatives 
solutions, including domestic ones, should be analyzed. 
 





As follows, therefore, the author presents the main findings as regards to the 
research questions and hypotheses surrounding this work. 
2. The unnecessary international concern on DNT 
The major part of the debate regarding DNT and the use of hybrid and 
reverse hybrid entities has been contaminated with some assumptions given 
by granted. In particular, this is due to the generalized idea that income 
should be taxed at least once in any cross-border transaction, which a priori 
rejects the DNT outcome in any form.  
 
It is undeniable that the idea of tax systems around the world working in a 
manner to ensure single taxation is attractive. Nevertheless, it is also very 
risky. As stressed in Chapter I, the above can bee seen, e.g. in the common 
confusion between DNT and other traditional, and undesired legal 
consequences, such as tax evasion or tax avoidance. However and perhaps 
more importantly, it can be noted in the appearance of new pseudo-legal 
concepts, such as the notion of ATP, whose consequentialist approach has 
only contributed to increase the level of uncertainty among taxpayers. A 
similar path can be seen in the design of specific anti-hybrid rules (i.e. 
linking rules), which assume as starting point the matching of tax outcomes 
in order to ensure single taxation, disregarding the origin of the issue 
regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the disparate 
characterization of entities for tax purposes. Nevertheless, there is one thing 
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that one should not forget in this whole debate regarding DNT and this is 
that DNT is an outcome, which, absent of any subjective interpretations, 
should not be regarded per se as a cause of concern.  
 
In the same order of ideas, after analyzing the OECD Model provisions and 
the international tax practice, it is possible to conclude that double taxation 
treaties do not aim to prevent DNT either. This conclusion, as demonstrated 
in Chapter II, is maintained even after the inclusion of a reference to tax 
avoidance or tax evasion within the title of some tax treaties. Indeed, what 
the tax treaty practice demonstrates is something completely different: both 
pursuing and avoiding (or preventing) DNT are indeed exceptional aims of 
tax treaties. Therefore, no general tax policy can be interpreted as to argue 
that tax treaties, generally speaking, aim to prevent or to eliminate DNT.  
On the contrary, both the prevention and the concius seek for the DNT 
outcome are given under very specific circumstances within tax treaties. For 
example, the DNT outcome occurs and it is tolerated (if not, conciusly 
intended) when tax treaties include tax sparing or matching credits clauses. 
In the other way around, tax treaties aim to specifically avoid the DNT 
outcome when a subject-to-tax or switch-over clause is introduced within a 
specific tax treaty. This conclusion remains valid even after the 
implementation of the new OECD interpretation of Articles 23A and 23 B 
OECD Model in the OECD Commentaries and the inclusion of a new 
Article 23A(4) OECD MODEL. None of the above mentioned provisions 
are effective enough to solve all the situations of DNT derived from either 
conflicts of qualification or interpretation. 





A different approach could, however, be suggested with the proposal of the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan 6, which includes the modification of the title and 
preamble of the OECD Model and the inclusion of the STR rule, both 
referred specifically to the avoidance of DNT. Nevertheless, the unhappy 
wording of the modified OECD Model preamble could only suggest that the 
aim to prevent DNT is reserved exclusively to the cases where this is the 
result of tax evasion or tax avoidance. Likewise, the STR rule in case of 
Articles 11, 12 and 21 OECD Model does not suggest any obligation to the 
source State to tax the item of income. On the contrary, it is still facultative 
to this State to exercise its taxing right, as demonstrated in the use of the 
word “may be” instead of “is” or “must be”, which could suggest otherwise. 
Therefore, an interpretation of such a rule as preventing that interest, 
royalties or other income, remain untaxed because of being subject to a 
STR, would be simply imprecise.  
 
As a result, in the current international scenario in which no obligation exist 
to prevent or to eliminate DNT, or which is the same, to ensure single 
taxation, both at a domestic and at a tax treaty level, this author concludes 
that the outcome of DNT should remain as such, i.e. as an outcome, neither 
being used as proxy to determine the existence of abusive practices through 
the use of hybrids and reverse hybrid entities nor to assume a crucial role in 
the design anti-hybrid provisions.  
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3. Hybrid Entities: Disparities as the true core of the issue 
As stressed in this work, hybrid entities and reverse hybrids are the result of 
domestic and sovereign tax policy decisions that determine the tax treatment 
of a foreign entity for domestic tax purposes. This outcome, which is not 
surprising at all considering that tax systems around the world are neither 
uniform nor consistent in their tax policies and they normally differ with 
each other in many aspects, simply confirms that the core issue regarding 
hybrid and reverse hybrid entities is no other than the disparities in the tax 
characterization made by two or more jurisdictions on the same entity. This 
issue is of fundamental importnate as regards the design of potential 
proposals delaing with hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. 
With respect to the rules used to characterize foreign entities for domestic 
tax purposes, one can conclude that there are no rules that fit all the 
requirements to be completely inviolable. Therefore, the discussion should 
not be focused on whether a system is more or less elective than the other. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter III, resemblance or comparative tests 
normally fail in creating consistent characterizations of foreign entities due, 
most of the time, to the incompatible characteristics between foreign and 
domestic entities. Likewise, these tests tend to be generally not less elective 
than a formally elective system that relies completely in a taxpayer’s 
election. A good example of the above is the Kintner test in the United 
States, which was in force before the issuance of the CTB regulations. This 
system allowed sophisticated taxpayers, after a proper legal advice, to set up 





the structures that most accurately fit their pretentions, predicting thus in 
advance the desired tax treatment of those entities. The above, however, 
does not mean to recognize the influence of the elective U.S. CTB system to 
circumvent Subpart F Income and to inappropriately claim a FTC. In those 
cases, however, the circumvention does not necessarily attend to the 
electivity of the system used to characterize entities for tax purposes, but 
rather to the poor design of domestic anti-deferral and FTC rules. It is thus 
necessary that the debate regarding systems to characterize entities for tax 
purposes does not dismiss this issue. 
Another important finding within the discussion regarding hybrid and 
reverse hybrid entities was the existence of examples where coordination in 
the characterization of entities, by statute or by administrative practice, is 
beyond being just an academic optimistic idea and could certainly serve to 
re-direct the debate as regards to the design of rules countering abusive 
practices with respect to the use of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. 
Chapter III analyzed three specific cases: 1) the Spanish administrative 
practice; 2) Denmark rules to deal with hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, 
and 3) the proposal for EU ATAD and the specific anti-reverse hybrid rule 
within the EU ATAD II. All these measures and practices showed one thing 
in common: they are all designed starting from the core of the issue 
regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the disparate 
characterization of entities, being also very effective to solve the real 
mismatch.  
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In Spain, e.g. the administrative interpretation of the statute (i.e. Article 37 
of the Spanish NRIT–Income Attribution Regime) is as to follow the 
characterization of the entity given in the foreign country. Therefore, and 
even though this interpretation might be subject to critics mostly considering 
the complete deviation from the strict text of the law, its practical 
implication demonstrates that the probabilities of disparities in all those 
cases in which Spain is the country characterizing a foreign entity 
established in a country from where Spanish residents receives income, are 
reduced to zero. In Denmark, on the other hand, there are rules that allow re-
characterizing domestic entities in cases of disparities with the 
characterization given by the majority of the shareholders owning the entity. 
Unlike interesting in terms of coordination, this approach has also been 
criticized for relying excessively in foreign laws, increasing also the levels 
of uncertainty for taxpayers due to the re-characterization. Likewise, a 
special reference should be made with respect to the Proposal for EU ATAD 
(2016), which, although maintaining the reference to specific tax outcomes, 
provided for a coordination in the characterization of entities where the 
resident MS should follow the characterization given in the source MS. 
Unfortunately, this rule was not longer included in the final text of the EU 
ATAD I (2016), although the recent EU ATAD II (2017) included a rule 
dealing specifically with reverse hybrid entities and third countries (Article 
9a), which provides for a re-characterization of a fiscally transparent entity 
when the entity is regarded by the majority of the shareholders, residents in 
a third country, as a taxable entity, which resemblances the Danish rule 
already stressed. 





The above-mentioned experiences are indeed a very optimistic precedent, 
which allows this author to conclude that the coordination in the 
characterization of entities is indeed a more direct and effective manner to 
deal with hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, rather than indirectly 
attempting to match the tax outcomes derived from the transactions in which 
these hybrid structured are involved. 
4. Hybrid Entities and the Entitlement to Tax Treaty Benefits 
The sole different tax characterization of entities by two Contracting States 
might generate problems as to determine to whom income should be 
allocated, and thus, the benefits of a tax treaty be finally granted. In other 
words, hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities are indeed a tax treaty 
concern since tax treaties are applicable to persons who are also considered 
as residents for tax treaty purposes, i.e. as liable to tax or subject to full tax 
liability based on worldwide taxation, regardless the effective payment of 
taxes. The issue is, however, that most of the non-corporate entities, e.g. 
partnerships and other disregarded entities are granted full or partial tax 
transparency, which is indeed inconsistent with the assertion of full tax 
liability based on worldwide taxation. In principle, therefore, rules dealing 
with the allocation of income received through a fiscally transparent entity, 
considered as such by at least by one of the Contracting States, are desirable.  
A preliminary look at the principles of the OECD Partnership Report 
recognized within Article 1(6) US Model, which is also the precedent of the 
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proposed Article 1(2) OECD Model and Article 3(1) MLI, give us the 
impression of providing a practical solution to the issue: the State of source 
should follow the attribution principles of the State of residence and 
attribute the income accordingly. In other words, the tax characterization of 
the entity in the State of residence prevails, although the above-mentioned 
provisions do not refer at all, at least not directly, to the prevalence of the 
tax characterization in one Contracting State over the other, less to a 
potential coordination in the tax characterization of the entity.  
The pragmatic solution offered by the provisions analyzed in Chapter IV, 
especially as regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model and Article 3(1) MLI, 
has, nevertheless, important inconsistencies. One of the most notorious 
inconsistencies is the complete absence of a proper interplay between the 
transparent entities’ provision and the beneficial ownership requirement of 
Article 10, 11 and 12 OECD Model. Curiously, however, this issue was 
neither addressed within the 1999 OECD Partnership Report nor within the 
normative precedent of Article 1(2) OECD Model, i.e. Article 1(6) US 
Model. Regardless the above, one should not rest merits to some interesting 
isolated examples of rules dealing with this issue, which can be found both 
in the tax treaties between the United States/ Poland and the United 
States/Canada. This latter example is indeed a direct rule dealing with the 
conflict between the transparent entities’ provision and beneficial ownership 
requirement, being also the inspiration for a recent academic proposal based 
on a “deeming rule” (i.e. deemed beneficial owner). Although this author 
recognizes that the proposal initially attends to the fact that no relevant party 





is acting as an agent or nominee or other intermediary for a third party from 
the source State’s perspective, which would demonstrated a more balanced 
provision, it rapidly turns to give prevalence to the tax characterization of 
the entity in the State of residence as a manner to solve the conflict. In other 
words, the conflict between the transparent entities’ rule and the beneficial 
ownership requirement finally depends on deeming a resident in the State of 
residence as the beneficial owner. In other words, the State of source, once 
again, must limit its right to determine exclusively, and based on its 
domestic laws, to whom dividends, interest and royalties are paid. As such, 
therefore, this author does not see how States of source might fully agree 
with this pragmatic proposal without at least a minimum of hesitation.   
Another issue as regards to Article 1(2) OECD Model and Article 3(1) MLI 
is the interplay between the “saving clause”, which ensures Contracting 
States the taxation of their own residents regardless the application of a 
treaty, and the relief of double taxation’s obligations under a treaty. In this 
regard, the solution adopted by paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6, 
introducing paragraph 11.1 to the Commentaries on Articles 23A and 23B is 
rather clear and straightforward, providing that the Contracting States are 
not reciprocally obliged to relief the double taxation caused for each other’s 
tax levied exclusively on the basis of the residence of the taxpayer. In other 
words, relief of double taxation remains available only to the extent that 
taxation by the other State is in accordance with provisions of the 
Convention that allow taxation of the relevant income as the State of source 
or as a State where there is a PE to which that income is attributable. This 
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solution is replicated in Article 3(2) and Article 5–Option C MLI. Both 
Articles refer expressly to paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6. 
However, when dealing with the optional saving clauses within the MLI, it 
seems to be that opting for one or another might not necessarily bring the 
same results. For example, while the detailed saving clause of Article 11 
MLI seems to retain the obligations to provide double taxation relief under 
provisions such as Article 7(3), Article 9, Article 19, Article 20, Article 23A 
and 23B, Article 24, Article 25 and Article 28 OECD Model, the simplified 
version of Article 3(3) MLI does not expressly preserve treaty obligations as 
regards to those Articles. Likewise, a solution such as the one proposed in 
paragraph 64 of the OECD BEPS Action 6 might still create issues in some 
countries where, based on specific tax treaty provisions or the tax treaty 
practice, use to grant double taxation relief in those and other analogous 
cases by an extensive interpretation of Article 23 OECD Model. In other 
words, perhaps the inclusion of a saving clause is not strictly necessary for 
all States. 
As concluded in Chapter IV, therefore, Article 1(2) OECD Model and 3(1) 
MLI, together with the proposed saving clauses, might not necessarily be 
the most adequate manner to address the issue of hybrids and reverse hybrid 
entities within the treaty context. In this regard, the idea of a domestic 
coordination rule, which should not necessarily imply a modification of the 
proposed Article 1(2) OECD Model, but rather a restriction of its scope, 
gains strength.  





5. Avoiding the artificial link between DNT and the use of hybrid 
entities 
The attempt to create a direct link between the DNT outcome and the use or 
hybrid and reverse hybrid entities have derived in the elusive notion of 
HMA. This notion, whose construction is also based on the assumption that 
income should be taxed ‘somewhere’, no matter where, does not only 
deviate from the problem of hybrid entity mismatches itself, i.e. the different 
characterization of the same entity by two jurisdictions, but also creates new 
presumptions of base erosion and abusive transactions just because the 
outcome of D/NI (i.e. DNT) arises. Similarly, linking rules, i.e. the rules 
created to counteract such arrangements, follow the same pattern, although 
none of these rules solve the true hybrid entity mismatch. On the contrary, 
they assume a consequentialist role based exclusively on the outcome that 
the hybrid entity transactions generate, i.e. a D/NI outcome (or DNT), 
targeting just indirectly the hybrid entity mismatch. 
The approach adopted in the design of anti-hybrid rules, as demonstrated in 
Chapter V, raises important questions both from a tax policy and a legal 
perspective. From a tax policy perspective, linking rules tend to be circular, 
namely, if implemented by all countries, they will have no other effect than 
nullifying each other, even if a tie-breaker rule gets into force. More 
importantly perhaps, an uncoordinated application of a primary response 
and a defensive rule, might give rise to new issue of economic double 
taxation, which did not exist before the application of these rules. 
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Accordingly, it should not be diminished the fact that these rules are 
extremely dependent on the functioning and application of foreign laws, 
which, unless a broader and efficient access to information between tax 
administrations, especially between developing countries, might raise 
serious concerns with respect to their real effectiveness. Likewise, and 
although linking rules do not raise many concerns with respect to Article 24 
OECD Model (non-discrimination), mostly derived from the restrictive 
approach adopted within that non-discrimination provision, there are still 
serious doubts as regards to their compatibility with EU law, especially EU 
primary law or fundamental freedoms. Unfortunately, however, the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU is neither unequivocal nor consistent to provide a 
concrete answer with respect to such issue. 
For all of the above, this author concludes that a different approach should 
be taken, which, on one hand, targets in a more direct manner the issues 
with respect to hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, and, on the other hand, 
provides for a simpler and more efficient design of the rules targeting hybrid 
entity mismatches. 
6. The Alternative: The Reactive Coordination Rule 
Against those who argue for a necessary interconnection between DNT and 
the use of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, this work proposes a different 
approach. This approach is based on two fundamental ideas. On one hand, it 
is to propose a simple rule that avoids the complex set of OECD linking 





rules, and which might serve as a valid and more administrable alternative 
to them, both at a domestic and tax treaty level. On the other hand, it is the 
idea to propose a rule that truly focuses on the real issue involving hybrid 
and reverse hybrid entities, i.e. the disparate characterization of entities by 
two or more jurisdictions, rather than being designed based exclusively on 
the outcomes of the transactions involving the use of hybrid entity 
structures. 
 
Chapter VI presented in detail a proposed reactive coordination rule, whose 
mechanic is simple and consists in aligning the characterization of foreign 
entities for domestic tax purposes according to the characterization given in 
the country where the entity is legally and formally organized, i.e. the 
“home country”. The use of the “home country” as aligning factor is 
justified, because although it is true that the home and source country will 
coincide in all those cases in which a payment is made from a hybrid entity, 
they will certainly not coincide in all those cases in which a payment is 
received by a reverse hybrid entity. Therefore, having in mind the simplicity 
of the rule, the author has opted for using a more proper connection, i.e. the 
home country. This is also related to the coherence that this rule looks for. 
Indeed, hybrid entity mismatches are the result of a different 
characterization of an entity when compared to the characterization given in 
its country of legal or formal organization, i.e. the home State. Therefore, 
and at least from a tax policy perspective, the design of a rule aligning the 
characterization of the entity in its home country is at least more coherent in 
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terms of forcing the State producing the mismatch, i.e. the State that applies 
a characterization of an entity different from the one given domestically 
where the entity is organized, to react. Likewise, the reactive coordination 
rule assumes a more honest approach in its scope. Indeed, it applies to all 
those cases where there are disparities between two or more countries with 
respect to the characterization of the same entity. The above is, on one hand, 
aligned to the three main tax policy reasons sustaining the proposal: 
simplicity, coherence and administrablity of the rule,
1688
 and, on the other 
hand, it accomplishes with the idea of targeting the core of the issue 
regarding hybrids and reverse hybrid entities: the different characterization 
of entities for tax purposes. 
 
As stressed in Chapter VI, the proposed rule has the positive impact of 
solving the hybrid entity mismatch, avoiding unnecessary contingencies 
associated to the outcomes of the transactions involved, reducing thus its 
complexity, and more importantly, putting disparities again in the front of 
the discussion regarding hybrid and reverse hybrid entities. In spite of the 
above, the rule is not exempt of further improvement. Indeed, the proposed 
design of the rule leaves open questions as regards to its application, which 
is mostly related to some undesirable effects that the application of the rule 
might originate. These cases refer to the potential double taxation issues in 
cases a hybrid entity receives a payment and the cases in which a tax benefit 
is granted or a disregarded transaction results solely because of the 
                                                          
1688  Infra Section 2.3. 





application of the proposed rule. Nevertheless, and in order to mitigate such 
results, the authors has proposed a coordinated application of the rule with 
other tax measures, such as CFC rules, as regards to the potential double 
taxation cases involving hybrid entities receiving payments, and a “switch-
off” of the proposed rule, in case of tax benefits or disregarded transactions 
resulting exclusively from the application of the proposed rule. Yet, a 
worldwide and uniform implementation of the rule keeps being a 
fundamental issue to ensure its real practical impact. 
It is also interesting to note that the reactive coordination rule might be an 
efficient solution from a tax treaty perspective. In fact, the coordination in 
the characterization at a domestic level ensures a more proper application of 
the proposed Article 1(2) OECD Model, restricting its scope exclusively to 
cases in which the home country treats the entity under analysis as tax 
transparent, which indirectly brings also fairer results for States of source 
when compared with the pure application of Article 1(2) OECD Model, in 
absence of a previous coordination in the tax characterization of entities at a 
domestic level. As analyzed in the study cases in Chapter VI, however, the 
application of the reactive coordination rule does not always derives in 
positive results for the State of source. The above is, however, far from 
being a negative characteristic of the rule, but rather it is the best 
demonstration that the proposed rule aims to eliminate the disparities in the 
characterization of entities at a domestic level, indirectly generating more 
consistent outcomes as regards to the application of tax treaties, but it is not 
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a rule created to switch the balance from the States of residence to the States 
of source.  
All in all, the use and misuse of hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities is 
a challenge that should be adequately addressed, which should starts from 
assuming a less consequentialist approach. At present, we have just 
witnessed an attempt to present issues in a different costume, whose 
pragmatism is sometime difficult to argue against too. However, the above 
should not prevent us to re-orientate the discussion to what really matters in 
the debate regarding hybrid entity mismatches. This challenge should be 
assumed before all countries get truly convinced on who is the evil and that 
matching outcomes is indeed a preferable path. As proven in this work, 
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La Doble No Imposición y el Uso de Entidades Híbridas 
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1. Introducción 
La doble no imposición y el uso de entidades híbridas han estado en la 
agenda de comunidad tributaria internacional durante largo tiempo. Sin 
embargo, su análisis adquiere particular importancia en nuestros días en 
donde las transformaciones a nivel tributario global han alcanzado una 
velocidad, y tal vez un compromiso internacional, no antes visto, el cual se 
materializa en el reciente proyecto de la OCDE sobre erosión de las bases 
imponibles (BEPS). 
La comunidad tributaria internacional, o su gran mayoría, se ha mostrado 
generalmente escéptica tanto con respecto a la doble no imposición como al 
uso de entidades híbridas. La doble no imposición, por una parte, supone la 
completa ausencia de tributación y como tal parece ser tan injusta o 
indeseable como su contrapartida: la doble imposición. Esta idea ha sido 
largamente reforzada bajo el postulado académico de que las rentas 
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derivadas de transacciones transfronterizas debiesen tributar al menos una 
vez en algún Estado. Las entidades híbridas, por otra parte, han sido 
criticadas por abrir una puerta a la creación de ventajas derivadas de las 
diferencias en el tratamiento jurídico dado en dos o más ordenamientos 
jurídicos con respecto a la misma entidad jurídica, lo cual podría ser 
utilizado con el objeto de duplicar beneficios tributarios o de minimizar la 
carga tributaria general  de los contribuyentes. Sin embargo, ni el hecho de 
que las rentas transfronterizas deban tributar al menos una vez en un Estado, 
ni el uso de un tratamiento jurídico distinto en dos o más Estados con 
respecto a la misma entidad jurídica han probado ser, al menos no a priori, 
un objeto de preocupación internacional. A pesar de lo anterior, la influencia 
de las recientes reformas tributarias a nivel internacional, y quizás la 
simplificación que ofrece el uso de conceptos dados por sentados, han 
creado el escenario prefecto para la aparición de puntos de vista más 
pragmáticos, los cuales optan por una simple combinación de ambos 
elementos, esto es, la doble no imposición y la calificación jurídico-
tributaria dispar de la misma entidad jurídica, en un solo elemento que 
debería ser contrarrestado, denominado “hyrbid mismatch arrangements” 
(HMA). Esta idea parece convencer a muchos, siendo también muy difícil 
de argumentar a contrario sensu debido a su construcción compleja y a su 
marcado pragmatismo. A pesar de lo anterior, no debiera encasillarse como 
en ningún caso como incuestionable.   
En este vertiginoso camino de cambios a nivel internacional, este trabajo 
adopta una posición distinta, tomándose el tiempo para descubrir hasta que 





punto la doble no imposición y el uso de entidades híbridas se encuentran 
realmente interconectadas, si es que alguna vez lo han estado realmente, en 
cuanto a servir una a la otra en el diseño de normas anti-híbridos tanto a 
nivel doméstico como a nivel de tratados internacionales, o si bien dicho 
debate debiese ser reorientado. Esta tarea no tiene nada de superficial, 
puesto que sólo una vez que dichas dudas se despejen, será posible 
determinar de manera seria si es que la posición mayoritariamente adoptada 
por la comunidad tributaria internacional, incluyendo las soluciones 
propuestas por la OCDE, debiesen recibir soporte, se debiesen mejorar o 
simplemente descartar en búsqueda de nuevas alternativas. 
2. Objeto y Propósito  
El objeto y propósito del presente estudio es analizar la interacción entre la 
doble no imposición y el uso de entidades híbridas dentro del contexto 
internacional, lo que incluye la aplicación de tratados internacionales para 
evitar la doble imposción. Con este propósito, el trabajo considera las 
siguientes peguntas inciales de investigación: 
1. Existe necesariamente una interconexión entre el uso de entidades 
híbridas y el resultado de la doble no imposición? Deberían las 
reglas  que regulan el uso (o mal uso) de entidades híbridas estar 
diseñadas exclusivamente sobre la base del resultado exclusivo de 
doble no imposición? 
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2. Existe una propuesta alternativa para lidiar más directamente con el 
uso (o mal uso) de las disparidades en la calificación de entidades 
jurídicas para propósitos tributarios, la cual no considere el 
resultado de la doble no imposición, o la posición consecuencialista 
que la mayoría adopta debiese primar? 
De la misma manera, este trabajo toma como punto de partida las siguientes 
hipótesis de trabajo, las cuales serás analizadas y contrastadas durante el 
desarrollo de la presente tesis: 
a. El sólo resultado de una deducción/no-inclusión de renta, esto es,  
doble no imposición, no debería considerarse per se como un objeto 
de preocupación en lo relativo a transacciones transfronterizas. De 
la misma manera, se debiese evitar el uso de la doble no imposición 
como una conexión inmediata para determinar la existencia de 
practicas que podrían considerarse como abusivas cuando derivan 
exclusivamente del uso de entidades híbridas. 
b. Linking rules o reglas que establezcan una conexión o contingencia 
entre una determinada deducción en un Estado con la 
correspondiente inclusión o reconocimiento de renta en el otro 
Estado, como las propuestas por la OCDE en su Plan de Acción 
BEPS No. 2, tienen el riesgo de establecer presunciones de practicas 
abusivas que se dan por el sólo hecho de que el resultado de doble 
no imposición aparece envuelto. De la misma manera, estas reglas 
son altamente complejas de administrar y en ningún caso atacan el 





verdadero meollo del problema con respecto al uso de entidades 
híbridas, esto es, la calificación dispar de una misma entidad por dos 
o más Estados. Alternativas a estas reglas debiesen ser evaluadas. 
c. Las reglas que regulan el uso de entidades transparentes en el 
contexto de tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición, con 
el objeto de prever el acceso a los beneficios de dichos tratados por 
parte de terceros Estados ajenos a los mismo son, en principio, 
recomendables. Sin embargo, la inclusión de un Articulo 1(2) en el 
Modelo OCDE, el cual se inspira en el Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de 
los Estados Unidos, podría generar problemas importantes para 
países en desarrollo, principalmente si se considera que estos países 
descansan en una tributación basada en la fuente de la renta. La 
misma preocupación se extiende con respecto a la inclusión de un 
Articulo 3(1) del nuevo Convenio Multilateral, cuyo texto refleja lo 
ya establecido en el Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE. Soluciones 
alternativas, incluyendo soluciones a nivel de legislación doméstica, 
debieran ser analizadas. 
3. Alcance de la Investigación 
Este trabajo se refiere exclusivamente al estudio de casos en los cuales el 
resultado de doble no imposición deriva exclusivamente de la calificación 
dispar de una misma entidad por parte de dos Estados distintos, esto es, 
cuando dicha calificación dispar resulta en una deducción/no inclusión de 
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renta. Por lo tanto, este trabajo no se referirá a casos de “doble deducción” 
(DD), los que si se incluyen en la Acción 2 del proyecto BEPS, ni tampoco 
analizará casos de “incompatibilidades por doble residencia” [dual resident 
mismatches], ya que tales casos no se relacionan con la calificación de 
entidades, como sucede con los casos de incompatibilidades por doble 
residencia, o simplemente no envuelven el resultado de doble no 
imposición, como sucede con los casos de entidades híbridas en donde el 
resultado es una DD. 
En el mismo sentido, el presente estudio excluye también los casos de doble 
no imposición derivados del uso de instrumentos financieros híbridos, que 
constituyen casos en que un mismo instrumento financiero se le califica de 
manera distinta por dos Estados, esto es, como deuda en un Estado mientras 
que como capital en el otro Estado. Esta exclusión se justifica por dos 
motivos. En primer lugar, las entidades híbridas y los instrumentos 
financieros híbridos son dos problemas distintos. Mientras el primero 
supone la calificación dispar de una misma entidad, el segundo se refiere a 
la calificación del pago (renta) hecho por un contribuyente a otro. Lo 
anterior, sin embargo, no significa reconocer que muchas transacciones 
transfronterizas pueden en la práctica envolver ambas cuestiones al mismo 
tiempo. En segundo lugar, la exclusión tiene por objeto la simplificación del 
análisis respecto a la doble no imposición como un resultado derivado 
exclusivamente del uso de entidades híbridas, de manera de permitir un 
mejor entendimiento respecto a la naturaleza del problema. En la misma 
línea de pensamiento, el estudio no se refiere a casos relativos a 





“transferencias híbridas”, es decir, acuerdos para transferir un instrumento 
financiero híbrido en donde las leyes de dos Estados difieren en relación a si 
el enajenante o el beneficiario ha adquirido la propiedad de los pagos sobre 
los activos subyacentes, por ejemplo, la re-compra (REPO) o transacciones 
de préstamo de valores. 
Finalmente, el presente trabajo no incluye los casos de “Establecimientos 
Permanentes (EP) híbridos”, esto es, los casos en que dos Estados no 
acuerdan con respecto a si una actividad económica esta siendo llevada a 
cabo a través de un EP o no. Las razones con respecto a esta exclusión son 
ciertamente obvias. Por una parte, EP no son estrictamente entidades 
jurídicas, más allá del hecho de que pueden ser parte de una entidad. Por 
otra parte, la incompatibilidad o “mismtach” en este caso se origina con 
respecto a la existencia (o no) de una EP, es decir, una ficción legal en si 
misma creada para gravar las rentas de una negocio (branch) cuando existe 
una presencia económica suficiente en un Estado, y no con respecto a la 
existencia o no de una entidad debido a su calificación dispar en dos 
Estados. Esta es tal vez la razón por la cual la OCDE decidió elaborar un 
informe separado con este objeto. En base a los mismos argumentos 
esgrimidos con respecto a la exclusión de “Establecimientos Permanentes 
(EP) híbridos” en el presente estudio, cualquier referencia a la potencial 
aplicación de la propuesta que se presenta en el Capítulo VI (reactive 
coordination rule) a estos casos, será omitida. 
 




El presente trabajo ha optado por un análisis no estrictamente ligado a una 
jurisdicción particular, lo cual, en principio, no seguiría necesariamente los 
parámetros tradicionales de una tesis de doctorado en derecho, la que 
comúnmente utiliza como punto de partida el estudio de una jurisdicción en 
particular. Sin embargo, la metodología propuesta en este caso encuentra su 
justificación en dos motivos. En primer lugar, en lo relativo a la naturaleza 
de los conceptos bajo análisis, esto es, la doble no imposición y las 
entidades híbridas. Ambas cuestiones representan problemas que involucran 
la interacción de diferentes jurisdicciones, esto es, problemas 
internacionales que no se limitan a un Estado en particular y que muchas 
veces envuelven incluso la aplicación de leyes supranacionales, como el 
caso de la leyes tributarias a nivel de la Unión Europea (EU), y los casos de 
convenios internacionales para evitar la doble imposición. En este sentido, 
resulta más apropiado situar estos problemas dentro de un contexto 
internacional, antes que suscribirlos a un determinado Estado, lo cual 
simplemente limitaría el alcance de los resultados del presente trabajo. Por 
otra parte, un análisis más agnóstico, es decir, no limitado a una jurisdicción 
específica, permite al autor llevar a cabo un estudio más profundo dentro de 
los pilares fundacionales de dichos conceptos en abstracto, ausente de las 
limitaciones de una legislación doméstica específica, permitiendo pensar y 
ofrecer soluciones aplicables a una generalidad de casos. Como tal, por 
tanto, el presente trabajo de investigación podría ser considerado 






Lo anterior, sin embargo, no significa reconocer que este autor renuncia 
completamente a referirse a la legislación particular de ciertos Estados, ya 
sea a modo de ejemplo o bien como soporte al análisis de los temas 
específicos que se desarrollan dentro del presente trabajo. En este sentido, es 
importante destacar que la elección de Estados cuya legislación se utiliza no 
ha sido hecha al azar. Muy por el contrario, ésta atiende estrictamente a las 
directrices dadas por la naturaleza de los temas principales bajo análisis, 
esto es, la doble non imposición y las entidades híbridas, y a la manera en 
que este trabajo ha sido estructurado. Así, el autor ha optado por desarrollar 
un análisis más extenso con respecto a la calificación de entidades 
extranjeras en los Estados Unidos de América (reglas de Check-the-box o 
CTB) en el Capitulo III. Este análisis encuentra su justificación en la 
importancia de estas reglas en cuanto a originar problemas relativos a 
entidades híbridas en el contexto internacional, siendo también un ejemplo 
único a nivel mundial en donde la calificación jurídica de entidades 
extranjeras es dejada a la elección del contribuyente. De la misma manera, el 
Régimen de Atribución de Rentas Español se analiza en el Capitulo III como 
un ejemplo de coordination respecto a la calificación de entidades jurídicas 
extranjeras, aún cuando dicho resultado de coordination es producto de una 
práctica administrativa de la autoridad tributaria española (DGT), la cual no 
guarda necesariamente relación con el texto estricto de la norma. De la 
misma manera, se analiza la legislación Danesa en el Capitulo III como otro 
importante ejemplo de coordinación para resolver cuestiones relativas a 
entidades híbridas. De hecho, la legislación de Dinamarca aparece como una 
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reacción al uso (o mal uso) de las reglas de CTB en los Estados Unidos y ha 
servido como orientación a las recientes reformas relativas a la Directiva 
ATAD II, que regula casos de HMA con terceros Estados fuera de UE. 
Todas las otras referencias a la legislación específica de ciertos Estados se 
realiza acorde a los temas específicos que se tratan durante el desarrollo de 
la presente investigación. En este sentido, por ejemplo, el Capitulo I se 
refiere a la normas de crédito fiscal  y Limitación de Beneficios (LOB) en 
los Estados Unidos como parte de la discusión respecto a la existencia o no 
de un principio internacional que obligue a pagar impuestos en al menos un 
Estado en los casos de transacciones transfronterizas, también conocido 
como “single tax principle”. Ambas normas se utilizan como parte de los 
argumentos en pro y contra para probar o desaprobar la existencia de este 
principio, por lo que difícilmente podrían ser omitidos. Otro ejemplo se 
puede encontrar en uso de la legislación Alemana para ejemplificar los casos 
en los que se utiliza “switch-over clauses” dentro de los tratados para evitar 
la doble imposición, como también con respecto a la práctica del “treaty 
override” en el capítulo II. Asimismo, algunos ejemplos de soluciones 
relativas a la dicotomía entre el Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE y el 
requisito de beneficiario efectivo de los Artículos 10, 11 y 12 del Modelo 
OCDE, son extraídos de los acuerdos bilaterales para evitar la doble 
imposiciónentre Polonia/Estados Unidos y Canadá/Estados Unidos. Todo lo  
anterior ratifica el carácter internacional del presente trabajo de 
investigación y justifica el uso de la legislación tributaria y la jurisprudencia 






Por otro lado, el aparente análisis asistemático con respecto a la legislación 
tributaria de la UE podría también generar preocupación desde un punto de 
vista tradicional. Sin embargo, la utilización de la legislación tributaria de la 
UE sigue la metodología adoptada para esta tesis, esto es, se le analiza como 
parte del contexto internacional, apareciendo y desapareciendo durante el 
desarrollo de la tesis de acuerdo lo requiera la misma. Esta es la razón de 
porqué la legislación tributaria de la UE aparece originalmente en el 
Capitulo I asociada exclusivamente al estudio del concepto de Planificación 
Fiscal Agresiva o Aggressive Tax Planning (ATP), puesto que la noción 
Europea de ATP requiere de una referencia particular. De la misma manera, 
la legislación tributaria de la UE se utiliza como parte del análisis del 
concepto de Regímenes Tributarios Especiales o Special Tax Regimes 
(STR), incluidos en la Acción 6 del proyecto BEPS y analizados en el 
Capitulo II del presente trabajo, ya que dicho concepto podría generar 
preocupación a nivel de legislación Europea primaria y secundaria. En el 
Capitulo III aparece nuevamente una referencia a la legislación tributaria 
Europea  como una manera de ejemplificar la evolución en el tratamiento de 
HMA en el seno de la UE. Esta evolución es ciertamente interesante debido 
al reciente desarrollo en la UE con respecto a HMA, en particular, lo 
referido a las Directivas EU ATAD I y II. Finalmente, una referencia a la 
legislación tributaria de la UE aparece como parte del análisis respecto a las 
linking rules de la OCDE en el Capitulo V y su compatibilidad con el 
derecho primario y secundario de la UE. La utilización de la legislación 
tributaria de la UE con el objeto de determinar la eficacia de las linking 
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rules se justifica por dos motivos principalmente. Por una parte, debido a la 
noción de “discriminación” elaborada por el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE, 
el cual, comparado con el Articulo 24 del Modelo de la OCDE (no-
discriminación a nivel de tratados), analizado también en este Capitulo V, 
deriva en resultados dispares. Por otra parte, debido a que la UE ha 
mostrado un compromiso particular en la implementación del proyecto 
BEPS de la OCDE, incluyendo lo relativo a HMA. De hecho, lo anterior se 
ha materializado con la aprobación de la EU ATAD I, la cual ha optado por 
incluir las recomendadas linking rules de la OCDE para lidiar con híbridos, 
tanto en lo relativo a entidades como instrumentos financieros, y que en su 
reciente desarrollo en la EU ATAD II, también incluye HMA con terceros 
Estados. Todo lo anterior demuestra un análisis metodológico de la 
legislación tributaria de la UE de acuerdo lo requiera el desarrollo de la 
presente investigación, poniendo en evidencia un tratamiento sistemático. 
Un análisis más agnóstico cobra también especial relevancia con respecto a 
los conceptos de doble no imposición y el uso de entidades híbridas en el 
contexto de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición. De la 
misma manera, y aunque cada tratado constituye un mundo en particular, el 
uso de Modelos de tratados para la elaboración de los mismos, 
especialmente el uso del Modelo OCDE, podría ayudar para extraer 
conclusiones aplicables a la generalidad de tratados que utilizan clausulas 
similares. El Capítulo II, por ejemplo, analiza algunas cláusulas específicas 
del Modelo OCDE, las cuales a primera vista podrían interpretarse en post 






analiza el Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de tratado de los Estados Unidos, el cual 
a pesar de no incluirse en todos los tratados finalmente firmados, se puede 
comparar con la actual propuesta de Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE, 
permitiendo extraer nuevamente conclusiones generales con respecto al uso 
de entidades híbridas en el contexto de los convenios para evitar la doble 
imposición. En particular, el uso de casos de estudio en el Capítulo IV, tanto 
para explicar el Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de tratado de los Estados Unidos 
como para explicar el Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE, encuentra su 
justificación en el hecho de que esos mismos casos de estudios son 
nuevamente utilizados para analizar la eficacia de la propuesta entregada en 
el Capítulo VI de la presente investigación, lo cual crea un punto de 
comparación armónico, a pesar de que dicha propuesta no pretende ser 
implementada directamente a través de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la 
doble imposición.  
Finalmente, existe otra importante razón para preferir un análisis no 
estrictamente restringido a una jurisdicción en particular. El presente trabajo 
propone una propuesta alternativa (reactive coordination rule) para lidiar 
con casos de uso de entidades híbridas, el cual no sólo se aleja de lo 
propuesto por la OCDE a través de las linking rules, sino que también tiene 
la característica de que está diseñada sin considerar su aplicación en una 
jurisdicción determinada. Lo anterior tiene la ventaja de ser una regla que, 
en principio, se podría aplicar a cualquier jurisdicción, tomando en 
consideración también que las entidades híbridas son una preocupación 
internacional y no se restringen a un solo Estado.  
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En relación a la propuesta, ésta se basa en alguna ideas fundamentales. En 
primer lugar, pretende ser una regla simple que evite complejidades y que 
sirva también como una alternativa válida y administrable en comparación 
al set de reglas “linking rules” propuesto por la OCDE. En segundo lugar, la 
propuesta pretende enfocarse en el único problema real con respecto al uso 
de entidades híbridas, esto es, la calificación tributaria dispar de la misma 
entidad jurídica por dos o más Estados, obviando cualquier referencia  los 
resultados de las transacciones transfronterizas en las cuales el uso de 
entidades híbridas se puede dar, en particular la doble no imposición. 
Finalmente, la propuesta pretende entregar resultados más consistentes en lo 
referido al uso de entidades híbridas y su impacto en los tratados bilaterales 
para evitar la doble imposición, en particular en comparación al Artículo 
1(2) del Modelo OCDE y el Artículo 3(1) del Convenio Multilateral. Lo 
anterior podría instintivamente entenderse, puesto que una vez que la 
coordinación en la caracterización jurídico-tributaria de una entidad se ha 
alcanzado a nivel doméstico, los conflictos por el uso de entidades híbridas 
en el contexto de los tratados para evitar la doble imposición, simplemente 
desaparecen, dejando espacio para una aplicación restringida del Articulo 
1(2) del Modelo OCDE, la cual se limitaría a los casos en que ambos 
Estados Contratantes en un tratado bilateral consideran a la misma entidad 
como una entidad transparente. Estos resultados se analizan en detalle en el 
Capítulo VI. 





5. Estructura de la Investigación 
El presente trabajo se divide en tres partes. 
Primera Parte 
La primera parte se refiere al estudio de la doble no imposición e incluye 
dos Capítulos.  
El Capitulo I, por una parte, el cual pretende demostrar que la doble no 
imposición no debería ser considerada per se como una causa de 
preocupación en la transacciones transfronterizas. Este Capitulo también 
incluye los argumentos contra aquellos que soportan la idea respecto a la 
existencia de un principio internacional que obligaría a que las rentas 
derivadas de una transacción transfronteriza deban tributar al menos en uno 
de los Estados involucrados. En el mismo sentido, este Capítulo pretende 
demostrar que la noción de doble no imposición no se debería confundir con 
los conceptos tradicionales de evasión y elusión fiscal, lo cual ciertamente 
desvirtúa la naturaleza de la noción de doble no imposición. El análisis en  
abstracto de la noción de doble no imposición en este Capítulo permite, 
ciertamente, evitar a priori ideas negativas de un concepto que no deja de 
ser un simple resultado.  
El Capítulo II, por otra parte, analiza la noción de doble no imposición a la 
luz de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición. Tomando 
como punto de partida ciertas cláusulas del Modelo OCDE y algunos 
ejemplos particulares de tratados bilaterales, este Capitulo busca demostrar 
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que ninguna de estas cláusulas permite extraer una idea general de que los 
tratados para evitar la doble imposición persiguen de la misma manera evitar 
la doble no imposición. Lo anterior no significa reconocer que en algunas 
circunstancias los tratados bilaterales pueden perseguir dicho resultado,  
como pasa, por ejemplo, cuando se incluye expresamente en el tratado 
específico a través de lo que se conoce como “subject-to-tax clauses” o 
“switch-over clauses”. Sin embargo, estos casos son tan excepcionales 
como lo son aquellos en donde los tratados incluyen clausulas que 
directamente buscan o toleran el resultado de doble no imposición, como 
pasa, ejemplo, con las cláusulas “tax sparing” y “matching credit”. 
Segunda Parte 
La segunda parte se concentra en el segundo pilar del presente estudio, esto 
es, las entidades híbridas. Esta parte de la investigación también incluye dos 
Capítulos.  
El Capitulo III, por una parte, el cual se refiere primeramente a algunos 
conceptos claves antes de entrar en el análisis del concepto de entidades 
híbridas. Este Capítulo incluye, asimismo, un análisis general de los 
distintos métodos utilizados a nivel internacional para calificar entidades 
extranjeras con propósitos fiscales, demostrando que no existe un sistema 
que cumpla todas y cada una de las condiciones que impidan su abuso. De la 
misma manera, el Capitulo provee un análisis detallado del sistema 
Norteamericano de “Check-the-box”, el cual es sin lugar a dudas el único 
ejemplo a nivel internacional en donde el contribuyente tiene la libertad de 





elegir la calificación jurídico-tributaria de una entidad. El análisis incluye 
también la comparación con el antiguo sistema utilizado en los Estados 
Unidos, antes de la implementación de la normativas de Check-the-box, esto 
es, el test Kintner. Asimismo, el Capítulo analiza los casos de oportunidades 
de planeación fiscal derivadas de la normativa Check-the-box, especialmente 
en referencia a evitar la normativa anti-diferimiento (CFC rules) y al uso 
inapropiado de crédito por impuestos pagados en el extranjero, demostrando 
que el carácter electivo del sistema Check-the-box es más aparente que real 
cuando se le compara, por ejemplo, con sistemas que utilizan parámetros de 
comparación objetiva (resemblance tests) entre entidades extranjeras y 
domésticas, en lo cuales es igualmente probable predecir la calificación que 
se desea obtener.  Finalmente, el Capitulo trata tres ejemplos concretos de 
coordinación en la calificación jurídico-tributaria de entidades: España, 
Dinamarca y el intento de coordinación en el texto original de la directiva 
ATAD en la UE, y el más reciente intento a través de la inclusión del 
Articulo 9a EU ATAD II, el cual extiende las propuesta a diferencias en la 
calificación de entidades con Estados fuera de la UE. Estos ejemplos 
demuestran que la coordinación en la calificación de entidades no es sólo 
una idea académica utópica, sino que una manera efectiva de lidiar con el 
uso (o mal uso) de entidades híbridas, sirviendo también como antesala a la 
propuesta del Capitulo VI. 
El Capitulo IV, por otra parte, trata el uso de entidades híbridas y el acceso 
a los beneficios de un tratado para evitar la doble imposición. Para este 
propósito, el Capítulo se refiere primeramente a los requisitos generales para 
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acceder a los beneficios de un tratado con respecto a entidades jurídicas y 
analiza los principios establecidos en el reporte de la OCDE sobre entidades 
transparentes en 1999 (OECD Partnership Report). Luego, en relación al 
Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de los Estados Unidos, el Capitulo entrega 
ejemplos concretos de la relación entre esta norma y otras normas dentro del 
Modelo de los Estados Unidos, en particular en lo referido al requisito de 
beneficiario efectivo de los Artículos 10, 11 y 12 de dicho Modelo; la 
conocida “saving clause” (Articulo 1(4) del Modelo de los Estados 
Unidos); la normativa Check-the-box y la Sección 894(c) de la legislación 
doméstica. Asimismo, con respecto al Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE, el 
Capítulo trata cuestiones referidas a su aplicación, que incluyen su relación 
con el concepto de beneficiario efectivo de los Artículos 10, 11 y 12 Modelo 
OCDE; la “saving clause” y las cuestiones relativas a la prevención de la 
doble imposición, en particular, lo referido al párrafo 64 de la Acción 6 del 
proyecto BEPS, y al impacto negativo con respecto a países en desarrollo 
que la inclusión del Articulo 1(2) Modelo OCDE puede generar. 
Finalmente, el análisis y las conclusiones referidas al estudio del Articulo 
1(2) Modelo OCDE se extienden al Articulo 3(1) del Convenio Multilateral, 
el cual contiene prácticamente el mismo texto. A pesar de lo anterior, un 
análisis más en detalle se realiza con respecto a los Artículos 3(3) y 11 del 
Convenio Multilateral, referidos a la “detailed saving clause”. De la misma 
manera, se analizan los Artículos 3(2) y 5–Option C del Convenio 
Multilateral, referido al impacto de la saving clause y las cuestiones 
relativas a la doble imposición.  






Finalmente, la tercera parte del presente trabajo analiza la interacción entre 
la doble no imposición y las entidades híbridas dentro del concepto de 
“hybrdid mismatch arrangements” (HMA). Esta parte consta de tres 
Capítulos, incluyendo el capitulo final con las conclusiones de la presente 
investigación.  
El Capítulo V, analiza primeramente la noción de HMA desde un punto de 
vista crítico, sobre todo en lo relativo a su confusa construcción como 
concepto jurídico. Asimismo, se sostiene en este Capítulo que la intención 
de generar una conexión entre las disparidades en la calificación de una 
misma entidad jurídica por al menos dos Estados y el resultado de la doble 
no imposición puede finalmente generar presunciones de practicas abusivas. 
Esto puesto que el “uso criticable” de entidades híbridas se reduciría 
exclusivamente a los casos en que el resultado de la transacción 
transfronteriza mediante el uso de entidades híbridas es precisamente la 
doble no imposición o una deducción/no inclusión de renta. En otras 
palabras, por el sólo hecho de concurrir la doble no imposición como 
resultado, se presumiría que un tratamiento dispar de una entidad es el 
resultado de una práctica abusiva. En el mismo sentido, el Capitulo refuerza 
la idea de que la deficiente construcción del concepto de HMA se extiende 
también al set de normas creadas para contrarrestar dichos resultados, esto 
es, linking rules. De hecho, el autor plantea que dichas normas podrían 
generar problemas de compatibilidad tanto a nivel de tratado bilaterales para 
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evitar la doble imposición como a nivel de legislación de la UE. Finalmente, 
el Capítulo analiza la interacción entre la aplicación de linking rules y otras 
normas domésticas que podrían limitar su eficacia, o su necesidad de 
aplicación, como son los casos de las normas que regulan la deducción de 
intereses pasivos (interest limitation rules) y las normas anti-diferimiento 
(CFC rules). 
Contrariamente a la tendencia de generar una conexión casi natural entre la 
disparidad en la calificación de una misma entidad jurídica en dos Estados y 
el resultado de doble no imposición, el Capitulo VI de la presente 
investigación adopta una posición alternativa, proponiendo una regla de 
coordinación en la calificación de entidades para efectos tributarios, 
denominada reactive coordination rule. La propuesta tiene como propósito 
presentar una alternativa doméstica al uso de entidades híbridas, la cual 
consiste en respetar la calificación jurídica del Estado en donde dicha 
entidad se ha organizado o ha sido legalmente constituida, esto es, el home 
country. Asimismo, la propuesta tiene como base tres ideas pilares de 
política fiscal: simplicidad, coherencia y administrabilidad. La primera parte 
del capítulo describe la mecánica de la propuesta, incluyendo su alcance de 
aplicación y los objetivos de política fiscal en los que se ampara. De la 
misma manera, se explica el funcionamiento de la propuesta a través de 
ejemplos particulares, detallando tanto sus ventajas como desventajas. 
Finalmente, esta primera parte entrega una comparación entre la propuesta 
de reactive coordination rule y otra propuestas similares que siguen la senda 
de la coordinación en la calificación de entidades, dejando ver las razones 





que hacen preferible a la presente propuesta. La segunda parte de este 
Capitulo analiza las implicancias que la regla propuesta tendría en el 
contexto de tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición. Tal y como 
se reconoció en el Capitulo IV, la inclusión de un nuevo Articulo 1(2) en el 
Modelo OCDE [y Articulo 3(1) del Convenio Multilateral] resuelve 
bastantes cuestiones relativas al acceso a los beneficios de un tratado en 
caso de entidades transparentes. Sin embargo, este artículo esta lejos de 
constituir una solución aceptable para países en vías de desarrollo, los cuales 
descansan mayormente en una tributación basada en la fuente de la renta 
más que en la residencia. Esta cuestión podría, sin embargo, ser mitigada si 
la propuesta de reactive coordination rule se aprueba de manera global. De 
hecho, de ocurrir lo anterior, el alcance del Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE 
se reduciría automáticamente a los casos en que ambos Estados Contratantes 
consideren a la misma entidad como una entidad transparente, luego de la 
aplicación de la reactive coordination rule, indirectamente mejorando 
también la posición de muchos Estados que descansan en una tributación 
sobre la base de la fuente de la renta. No obstante lo anterior, la presente 
propuesta no tiene por objeto ser presentada como una solución perfecta (o 
no mejorable) ni menos definitiva, no obstante pretende servir como un 
aliciente para demostrar de que el debate con respecto al uso de entidades 
híbridas puede ser reorientado. 
El Capitulo VII finalmente resume los principales resultados de la presente 
investigación. 




Tal y como se ha presentado en el comienzo de la presente investigación, 
este trabajo ha pretendido responder a la siguientes preguntas de 
investigación: 
1.  Existe necesariamente una interconexión entre el uso de entidades 
híbridas y el resultado de la doble no imposición? Deberían las 
reglas  que regulan el uso (o mal uso) de entidades híbridas estar 
diseñadas exclusivamente sobre la base del resultado exclusivo de 
doble no imposición? 
2. Existe una propuesta alternativa para lidiar más directamente con el 
uso (o mal uso) de las disparidades en la calificación de entidades 
jurídicas para propósitos tributarios, la cual no considere el 
resultado de la doble no imposición, o la posición consecuencialista 
que la mayoría adopta debiese primar? 
Asimismo, en la búsqueda de respuestas, el presente trabajo a utilizado 
como punto de partida las siguientes hipótesis de trabajo: 
a. El sólo resultado de una deducción/no-inclusión de renta, esto doble 
no imposición, no debería considerarse per se como un objeto de 
preocupación en lo relativo a transacciones transfronterizas. De la 
misma manera, se debiese evitar el uso de la doble no imposición 






practicas que podrían considerarse como abusivas cuando derivan 
exclusivamente del uso de entidades híbridas. 
b. Linking rules o reglas que establezcan una conexión o contingencia 
entre una determinada deducción en un Estado con la 
correspondiente inclusión o reconocimiento de renta en el otro 
Estado, como las propuestas por la OCDE en su Plan de Acción 
BEPS, tienen el riesgo de establecer presunciones de practicas 
abusivas que se dan por el sólo hecho de que el resultado de doble 
no imposición aparece envuelto. De la misma manera, estas reglas 
son altamente complejas de administrar y en ningún caso atacan el 
verdadero meollo del problema del uso de entidades híbridas, esto 
es, la calificación dispar de una misma entidad por dos o más 
Estados. Alternativas a estas reglas debiesen ser evaluadas. 
c. Las reglas que regulan el uso de entidades transparentes en el 
contexto de tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición, con 
el objeto de prever el acceso a los beneficios de dichos tratados por 
parte de terceros Estados ajenos a los mismo son, en principio, 
recomendables. Sin embargo, la inclusión de un Articulo 1(2) en el 
Modelo OCDE, el cual se inspira en el Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de 
los Estados Unidos, podría generar problemas importantes para 
países en desarrollo, principalmente si se considera que estos países 
descansan en una tributación basada en la fuente de la renta. La 
misma preocupación se extiende con respecto a la inclusión de un 
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Articulo 3(1) del nuevo Convenio Multilateral, cuyo texto refleja lo 
ya establecido en el Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE. Soluciones 
alternativas, incluyendo soluciones a nivel de legislación doméstica, 
debieran ser analizadas. 
6.1. La innecesaria preocupación internacional por la doble no 
imposición  
La mayor parte del debate relativo a la doble no imposición y el uso de 
entidades híbridas ha sido contaminado por ciertas suposiciones dadas por 
sentadas. Lo anterior se debe en particular a la idea generalizada de que las 
rentas en una transacción transfronteriza debiesen pagar impuestos en al 
menos uno de los Estados involucrados, lo que a priori rechaza el resultado 
de la doble no imposición en cualquiera de sus formas.  
Es innegable de que la idea en donde los diferentes sistemas tributarios a 
nivel internacional trabajen en conjunto para asegurar que las transacciones 
transfronterizas paguen impuestos en al menos unos de esos Estados, 
independiente donde, es atractiva. Sin embargo, es también muy riesgosa. 
Tal como se señaló en el Capítulo I, lo anterior se puede ver en la confusión 
que existe hoy entre la doble no imposición como resultado y otros 
conceptos tradicionalmente considerados poco deseables como la evasión y 
elusión fiscal. Más importante y claro aún es la aparición y uso de conceptos 
pseudo-legales, tales como la noción de Planificación Fiscal Agresiva 






contribuido a incrementar los niveles de incertidumbre entre los 
contribuyentes. Una senda similar se puede ver en el diseño de reglas anti-
híbridos (linking rules), las cuales asumen como punto de partida el generar 
una conexión entre los resultados tributarios (matching tax outcomes) de 
manera de asegurar la imposición en al menos un Estado, aunque sin tomar 
en consideración el verdadero origen de la existencia de entidades híbridas, 
el cual no es más que la calificación jurídico-tributaria dispar de la misma 
entidad jurídica por dos Estados distintos. Sin embargo, hay un punto crucial 
que no debiera olvidarse en este debate, y es que la doble no imposición no 
es otra cosa que un simple resultado, el cual, ausente de interpretaciones 
subjetivas, no debería ser considerado en si mismo un problema.  
En el mismo orden de ideas, y luego de analizar el Modelo de tratado 
bilateral para evitar la doble imposición de la OCDE y algunas cláusulas 
especificas incluidas en la práctica de los tratados bilaterales, es posible 
concluir que éstos instrumentos en ningún caso se podrían interpretar en el 
sentido de prever la doble no imposición. Esta conclusión, tal y como se 
demuestra en el Capitulo II, se mantiene incluso luego de la inclusión de la 
referencia a la evasión y elusión fiscal en el titulo de algunos tratados 
bilaterales. De hecho, lo que la práctica en cuanto a los tratados bilaterales 
para evitar la doble imposición demuestra es completamente lo contrario, 
esto es, la prevención así como la búsqueda deseada del resultado de doble 
no imposición a través de los tratado bilaterales es, sin lugar a dudas, 
excepcional. Esto es, mal se podría concluir que una regla de política fiscal 
se pueda interpretar de dichos instrumentos en cuanto a prevenir la doble no 
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imposición. Así, por ejemplo, los tratados bilaterales muchas veces toleran 
el resultado de doble no imposición cuando cláusulas de tax sparing o 
matching credits son incluidas en los mismos. En otros casos, dicho 
resultado de doble no imposición se evita a través de normas 
específicamente introducidas en los tratados bilaterales, tales como subject-
to-tax clauses and switch-over clauses. Esta conclusión es válida aún con 
posterioridad a la nueva interpretación de los Artículos 23A and 23B del 
Modelo OCDE incluida en los comentarios al Modelo OCDE, y a la 
inclusión del Articulo 23 A(1) Modelo OCDE. Ninguna de las normas antes 
señaladas resuelve con eficacia todas las situaciones de doble no imposición 
derivadas de conflictos de calificación o interpretación.  
Una tendencia distinta podría, sin embargo, sugerirse con la propuesta del 
Plan de Acción BEPS No. 6, el cual incluye modificaciones al titulo y 
preámbulo del Modelo OCDE, y la inclusión de la norma sobre “Special 
Tax Regimes” (STR). No obstante, la poco feliz redacción del preámbulo 
del Modelo OCDE, solo sugeriría que la prevención de la doble no 
imposición se limita a los casos en que dicho resultado es producto de la 
evasión o la elusión fiscal. Asimismo, la regla sobre STR en relación a los 
Artículos 11, 12 y 21 del Modelo OCDE no sugiere ninguna obligación para 
el Estado de la fuente en cuanto a ejercer una efectiva tributación. Por el 
contrario, sigue siendo facultativo para este Estado el ejercer su tributación, 
tal y como se demuestra en el uso de las palabras en inglés “may be” en vez 
de “must be” u otras similares, que podrían sugerir una obligación implícita. 






intereses, royalties u otra renta permanezca sin tributación debido a estar 
sujeta a un STR, sería simplemente imprecisa.  
Por lo tanto, en el actual escenario internacional en el cual no existe ninguna 
obligación para prevenir o eliminar la doble no imposición, o lo que es lo 
mismo, una obligación para asegurar la tributación en al menos un Estado, 
tanto a nivel doméstico como a nivel de tratados, este autor concluye que el 
resultado de doble no imposición debería permanecer como tal, esto es, 
como un resultado, sin utilizarse como proxy para determinar practicas 
abusivas a través del uso de entidades híbridas, o bien como un elemento 
necesario en el diseño de normas anti-híbridos. 
6.2. Entidades Híbridas: Las disparidades en la calificación jurídica 
como elemento central 
Como se ha ya sostenido en este trabajo, las entidades híbridas son el 
resultado de las políticas fiscales domésticas y soberanas en cuanto a 
determinar el tratamiento fiscal que se le dará a una entidad extranjera para 
efectos fiscales domésticos. Este resultado, el cual no es para nada 
sorpresivo, sobre todo considerando que los sistema tributarios alrededor del 
mundo no son para nada uniformes en la aplicación de políticas fiscales y 
difieren en muchos aspectos, simplemente confirma que el meollo del 
asunto relativo a entidades híbridas no es otro que las disparidades en la 
calificación jurídico-tributaria de la misma entidad por dos Estados 
distintos. Este elemento es crucial para entender propiamente la discusión en 
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cuanto a las entidades híbridas así como respecto a las soluciones que se 
propongan. 
Con relación a la normas utilizadas para calificar entidades extranjeras para 
efectos tributarios domésticos, uno podría concluir que no existen reglas que 
cumplan todos los requerimientos para ser absolutamente inviolables. Por lo 
tanto, la discusión no debería estar enfocada en si un sistema de calificación 
es más o menos electivo que el otro. De hecho, tal y como se ha demostrado 
en el Capitulo III, un test de comparabilidad normalmente falla en cuanto a 
crear una calificación consistente, debido mayormente a las notables 
diferencias entre entidades domesticas y extranjeras. De la misma manera, 
estos test de comparabilidad tienden a ser no menos electivos que un sistema 
electivo puro en cuanto a la calificación de una entidad extranjera para 
efectos fiscales internos. Un ejemplo de lo anterior es el test Kintner, 
utilizado en los Estados Unidos, y el cual estuvo vigente antes de la entrada 
en vigor de las reglas Check-the-box. Este sistema permitía a los 
contribuyentes más sofisticados, y con acceso a mejores asesores, establecer 
las estructuras societarias que más se adecuasen para efectos internos con el 
objeto de obtener la calificación deseada. Lo anterior no significa reconocer 
la influencia del sistema de Check-the-box  en cuanto a generar oportunidad 
para evitar la legislación anti-diferimiento (CFC) o relativa créditos por 
impuestos extranjeros en los Estados Unidos. En dichos casos, sin embargo, 
la evasión de la normativa no atiende necesariamente al carácter electivo del 






normas anti-diferimiento o relativas a créditos por impuestos pagados en el 
extranjero. 
Otro aspecto importante con respecto a la discusión respecto a entidades 
híbridas son las experiencias prácticas de coordinación como herramienta de 
solución al problemas del uso (o mal uso) de entidades híbridas las que, ya 
sea a través de norma positiva o de práctica administrativa, permiten 
concluir que las posibilidades de coordinación en la calificación de 
entidades son más que una idea académica utópica y tienen asiento en la 
realidad. El Capitulo III analizó tres casos en particular: 1) la práctica 
administrativa en España; 2) la ley Danesa sobre entidades hibridas, y 3) la 
propuesta de directiva ATAD y la norma especifica introducida en la 
reciente ATAD II en la legislación de la UE. Todos estos casos demuestran 
un solo elemento en común, y es que todas ellas están diseñadas 
considerando el elemento central en cuanto a las entidades hibridas, que es 
la calificación dispar respecto a la misma entidad por parte de dos o meas 
Estados distintos. En España, por ejemplo, la practica administrativa 
interpreta la norma del Régimen de Atribución de Rentas en el sentido de 
respectar la calificación jurídica de la entidad en el país extranjero. Por lo 
tanto, más allá de las criticas que dicha interpretación por parte de la 
autoridad tributaria Española (DGT) pueda levantar, dicha interpretación 
elimina todas las probabilidades de generar entidades híbridas en los casos 
en que España califica una entidad extranjera desde la cual residentes 
Españoles reciben rentas. En Dinamarca, por otro lado, existen normas que 
permiten la re-calificación de entidades domésticas en casos en que la 
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calificación jurídica hecha por la mayoría de los accionistas de dichas 
entidades en el extranjero, genere una disparidad con la calificación en 
Dinamarca. A pesar de que el estudio de estas normas es interesante como 
ejemplo de coordinación, estas normas han sido criticadas por descansar 
excesivamente en el derecho extranjero, incrementando por tanto los niveles 
de incertidumbre entre los contribuyentes. Asimismo, una referencia 
especial se ha hizo con respecto a la propuesta de directiva ATAD (2016) a 
nivel de la UE, la cual,  a pesar de mantener las referencias al resultado de 
doble no imposición, entregaba un ejemplo concreto de coordinación como 
alternativas de solución (alternativa las linking rules de la OCDE), 
estableciendo que en caso de disparidad en la calificación de una misma 
entidad jurídica por parte de dos Estado Miembros, la calificación del 
Estado Miembro en la fuente prevalecería. Desafortunadamente, esta regla 
no ha sido incluida en el texto final de la directiva ATAD I (2016), la cual 
ha optado por la recomendación de la OCDE. Sin embargo, recientemente se 
ha propuesto un Articulo 9a en la ATAD II (2017) , que regula los HMA 
con terceros Estados fuera de la UE, y que establece la posibilidad de re-
calificar una entidad considerada como fiscalmente transparente dentro de la 
UE, cuando la mayoría de sus accionistas o socios la trate como una entidad 
opaca o tributable, lo que en cierta medida recuerda lo ya señalado con 
respecto a la norma en Dinamarca.  
Las experiencias antes mencionadas son un precedente muy optimista y que 
permiten a este autor concluir que la coordinación en cuanto a la calificación 






entidades híbridas, en vez de tratar de indirectamente generar una conexión 
entre los resultados tributarios, esto es, generando un link artificial entre 
deducción por una parte e inclusión de renta por la otra.  
6.3. Entidades Híbridas y el acceso a los beneficios de un tratado 
para evitar la doble imposición  
A pesar de que los tratados para evitar la doble imposición no persiguen la 
prevención de la doble no imposición como política general, es indudable 
que la sola diferencia en la calificación de una misma entidad jurídica en dos 
Estados Contratantes podría generar problemas en cuanto a determinar a 
quien se asigna la renta y, por tanto, los beneficios de un tratado. En otras 
palabras, las entidades híbridas son de hecho una preocupación a nivel de 
tratados, ya que los tratados para evitar la doble imposición se aplican a 
personas quienes también son consideradas residentes, es decir, liable to tax 
o sujetas a una tributación comprehensiva o completa, más allá de la 
imposición efectiva de impuestos. El problema es, sin embargo, que la 
mayoría de las entidades no-corporativas gozan de transparencia fiscal total 
o parcial, lo cual contradice una tributación comprehensiva. En principio, 
por lo tanto, las normas que regulan la asignación de rentas recibidas a 
través de entidades transparentes, consideradas como tal por al menos uno 
de los Estados Contratantes, son deseables.  
Una mirada preliminar a los principios establecidos en el Reporte de la 
OCDE sobre entidades transparentes en 1999, los cuales se reconocen en el 
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Articulo 1(6) del Modelo de los Estados Unidos, el cual sirve a su vez como 
precedente del Articulo 1(2) Modelo OCDE y Articulo 3(1) del Convenio 
Multilateral, nos entrega la impresión de una solución práctica, puesto que el 
Estado de la fuente debería seguir los principios de atribución de renta en el 
Estado de residencia y atribuir la renta de esa manera. En otras palabras, la 
calificación jurídico-tributaria de la entidad en el Estado de residencia 
prevalece a la del Estado de la fuente, aún cuando el texto de la norma no lo 
señale expresamente. 
La solución pragmática ofrecida por las normas analizadas en el Capitulo 
IV, especialmente en relación al Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE y del 
Articulo 3(1) del Convenio Multilateral tiene, sin embargo, importantes 
inconsistencias. Una de las más notorias es la completa ausencia a la 
conexión entre la solución adoptada para el caso de rentas recibidas a través 
de una entidad transparente y otras normas dentro del Modelo de tratado, en 
particular, respecto al requisito de beneficiario efectivo de los Artículos 10, 
11 y 12 del Modelo OCDE. Curiosamente esta cuestión no fue analizada ni 
en el reporte de la OCDE en 1999, ni en lo relativo al Articulo 1(6) del 
Modelo de los Estados Unidos, el cual es el precedente directo de la 
propuesta actual de un Articulo 1(2) en el Modelo OCDE. A pesar de lo 
anterior, es posible encontrar algunos ejemplos aislados en la practica 
tributaria. El primer ejemplo se puede encontrar en el tratado entre los 
Estados Unidos y Polonia, en donde indirectamente se soluciona la 
dicotomía sobre la base de la no aplicación del Articulo 1(6) bajo ciertas 






atiende al problema en si mismo estableciendo una especie de “ficción de 
beneficiario efectivo” cuando las normas del Articulo 1(6) y 10, 11 y 12 del 
Modelo de los Estados Unidos lleva a diferentes resultados. Esta norma se 
encuentra específicamente en el tratado entre los Estados Unidos y Canadá y 
ha sido “relanzada” recientemente como una propuesta al amparo de una 
serie de académicos (deemed beneficial owner), la cual podría aplicarse de 
manera global. Si bien este autor reconoce que en principio la regla 
propuesta atiende al hecho de que la entidad bajo análisis no es un agente, 
asignatario o intermediario (agent, nominee or intermediary), lo cual se 
determina desde el punto de vista del Estado de la fuente, la regla 
rápidamente se torna a favor del Estado de residencia, dando prevalencia a 
la calificación de la entidad en dicho Estado como manera de solucionar la 
dicotomía. En otras palabras, el conflicto entre la norma sobre entidades 
transparentes y el concepto de beneficiario efectivo depende finalmente en 
asumir que un residente en el Estado de residencia sea el beneficiario 
efectivo. En términos simples, el Estado de la fuente, una vez más, debe 
limitar su derecho a determinar sobre la base de su ley doméstica quién es el 
beneficiario efectivo del pago de dividendos, intereses y cánones. Como tal, 
este autor ve serias dificultades para muchos Estados que descansan en una 
tributación basada mayormente en la fuente de la renta acepten tal solución.  
Otro hecho en relación al Articulo 1(2) del Modelo OCDE y al Articulo 3(1) 
del Convenio Multilateral es la interacción entre dichas normas y la norma 
“saving clause”, que asegura que los Estados Contratantes puedan gravar a 
sus residentes más allá de lo que señale el tratado. En este sentido, la 
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solución adoptada por el párrafo 64 del proyecto BEPS de la OCDE (Acción 
6), el cual introduce el párrafo 11.1. a los Comentarios de los Artículos 23 A 
y 23 B Modelo OCDE, es bastante claro y directo en cuanto a señalar que 
los Estados Contratantes no están recíprocamente obligados a mitigar la 
doble imposición causada exclusivamente por la carga tributaria que el 
contribuyente sufre sobre la base de su residencia. En otras palabras, la 
mitigación de la doble imposición es una opción disponible solamente en la 
medida en que la tributación realizada por el otro Estado Contratante se 
permite por las normas del tratado como Estado de la fuente o como Estado 
donde exista un EP al cual se le atribuye renta. La solución se replica 3(2) y 
Articulo 5–Opción C del Convenio Multilateral. Ambas normas se refieren 
al párrafo 64 de la Acción 6 de BEPS. Sin embargo, cuando se trata de la 
saving claus opcionales dentro del Convenio Multilateral, pareciera ser que 
optar por una u otra no genera los mismo resultados. Por ejemplo, mientras 
la saving clause detallada del Articulo 11 del Convenio Multilateral 
pareciera retener la obligación de mitigar la doble imposición fundada en los 
artículos 7(3), 9, 19, 20, 23 A, 23 B, 24, 25 y 28 Modelo OCDE, la versión 
simplificada del Articulo 3(3) del Convenio Multilateral no preserva dicha 
obligación con respecto a esos artículos. De la misma manera, una solución 
tal como la propuesta en el párrafo 64 de la Acción 6 del proyecto BEPS, 
podría aún generar problemas en algunos Estados donde, basados en 
clausulas especificas en los tratados bilaterales, mitigan la doble imposición 
en esos casos y otro análogos, pero por extensión de la interpretación del 
Artículo 23 del Modelo OCDE. En otras palabras, quizás la inclusión de una 






Como se concluye en el Capítulo IV, por lo tanto, el Articulo 1(2) Modelo 
OCDE y el Articulo 3(1) del Convenio Multilateral, en conjunto con la 
propuesta de una saving clauses, podría no ser necesariamente la manera 
más adecuada de direccionar la discusión relativa a las entidades híbridas en 
el contexto de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición. En 
este sentido, la idea de una solución alternativa, tal como la reactive 
coordination rule, toma fuerza.  
6.4. Evitando la conexión artificial entre la doble no imposición y el 
uso de entidades híbridas 
El intento de crear una conexión directa entre la doble no imposición y el 
uso de entidades híbridas ha derivado en el resbaladizo concepto de HMA. 
Esta noción, cuya construcción se basa en el supuesto de que toda renta 
transfronteriza debe tributar alguna vez, sin importar dónde, no solamente se 
desvía del verdadero problema respecto a las entidades híbridas, esto es, la 
calificación dispar de una misma entidad jurídica por dos Estados distintos, 
sino que también crea nuevas presunciones de erosión de bases y practicas 
abusivas por el sólo hecho de la concurrencia del resultado de doble no 
imposición o deducción/no inclusión. De la misma manera, linking rules, 
esto es reglas creadas con el objeto de contrarrestar HMA, siguen la misma 
tendencia, aun cuando dichas normas son completamente ineficaces para 
solucionar el verdadero mismatch que es la calificación jurídico-tributaria 
dispar de una misma entidad. 
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La atendencia adoptada en el diseño de normas anti-híbridos, tal como se 
demuestra en el Capitulo V, genera importantes cuestionamientos tanto 
desde un punto de vista de política fiscal como desde un punto de vista 
legal. Desde una perspectiva de política fiscal, linking rules tienden a ser 
circulares, es decir, si son implementadas por todos los Estados, no tendrán 
otro efecto que anularse una a la otra, incluso si una regla de tie-break se 
establece. Aún más importante, una aplicación descordinada de una primary 
response y una defensive rule , esto es, una aplicación circular, podría 
generar nuevos problemas de doble imposición económica, los cuales no 
existían antes de la implementación de dichas normas. De la misma manera, 
no debería dejarse de lado el hecho de que estas normas son 
extremadamente dependientes de la aplicación de la legislación foránea, la 
cual, a menos que exista un acceso a información más eficaz, especialmente 
entre países en desarrollo, podría generar serias dudas con respecto a su 
verdadera efectividad. En el mismo orden de ideas, y aunque las linking 
rules no generan mayores preocupaciones con respecto al Articulo 24 del 
Modelo OECD mayormente debido a la aplicación restrictiva de dicha 
norma, existen aún dudas con respecto a su compatibilidad con la 
legislación tributaria de la UE, especialmente con la legislación primaria. 
Desafortunadamente, sin embargo, la jurisprudencia de la Corte de Justicia 
de la UE no es inequívoca ni menos consistente para entregar una respuesta 
concreta al respecto. 
Por todo lo anterior, este autor concluye que una aproximación diferente es 






directa para solucionar los problemas relativos a entidades híbridas, y por la 
otra, una regla mas simple y fácil de administrar en comparación con la 
actual propuesta de la OCDE. 
6.5. La Alternativa: Reactive Coordination Rule 
Contrariamente a aquellos que argumentan por una conexión entre el 
resultado de doble no imposición y el uso de entidades híbridas, este trabajo 
propone un camino distinto, el cual se basa en alguna ideas bases. En primer 
lugar, es proponer una regla simple que evite las complejidades de las 
linking rules propuestas por la OCDE y que sirva como una propuesta valida 
y administrable tanto a nivel doméstico como a nivel de tratados bilaterales 
para evitar la doble imposición. Por otra parte, es proponer una regla que 
verdaderamente se enfoque en resolver la única real cuestión con respecto a 
la entidades híbridas, esto es, la calificación dispar de una misma entidad 
por parte de dos o más Estados. 
El Capitulo VI ha presentado en detalle la propuesta de implementación de 
una reactive coordination rule, cuyo mecanismo de aplicación es simple y 
consiste en alinear la calificación jurídica de una entidad extranjera para 
efectos domésticos de acuerdo a la calificación jurídica que ésta reciba en el 
país donde se encuentra organizada legal y formalmente, esto es, el “home 
country”. La utilización del “home country” como factor de alineación se 
justifica, ya que aunque muchas veces el “home country” y “source 
country” coinciden, por ejemplo, en todos los casos en que un pago se 
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realiza desde una entidad híbrida, no coincidirán en todos aquellos casos en 
donde un pago se recibe por parte de una entidad híbrida reversa, esto eso, 
una entidad considerada como fiscalmente transparente en el Estado donde 
se constituye, mientras que se le considera por el otro Estado como una 
entidad tributable. Por lo tanto, teniendo en cuenta la simplicidad que esta 
propuesta busca, este autor opta por utilizar una conexión más apropiada, 
esto es, el “home country”. Asimismo, este hecho se relaciona a la 
coherencia que la propuesta también persigue. De hecho, HMA son el 
resultado de la calificación dispar de una entidad cuando ésta se le compara 
con la calificación jurídica-tributaria entregada en el Estado en donde dicha 
entidad se ha organizado legalmente. Por lo tanto, y al menos desde un 
punto de vista estrictamente de política fiscal, el diseño de una regla que 
alinea la calificación jurídico-tributaria de una entidad de acuerdo a la 
entregada en el país de su organización legal es al menos más coherente en 
términos de forzar al país que genera el la desalienación (mismatch) a seguir 
la calificación del otro Estado. En el mismo sentido, la reactive coordination 
rule  asume una aproximación más honesta en su alcance. De hecho, aplica a 
todos los casos en donde exista una disparidad entre dos Estados en cuanto a 
calificar jurídica-tributariamente una misma entidad. Lo anterior, por una 
parte, se encuentra coordinado con las razones de política fiscal que 
subyacen la propuesta, esto es, simplicidad, coherencia y adminitrabilidad, 
y, por la otra, cumple con el propósito de contrarrestar el verdadero motivo 
de la existencia de entidades híbridas, cual es la calificación jurídica dispar 






Tal y como se señaló en el Capítulo VI, la propuesta tiene un impacto 
positivo resolviendo la desalineación en la calificación de la entidad (el 
verdadero mismatch), y evitando las contingencias innecesarias asociadas a 
los resultados de las transacciones que envuelven entidades híbridas, 
reduciendo así también su complejidad. Más importante aún, ubica a las 
disparidades en la calificación de entidades de vuelta en el frente de la 
discusión respecto a las entidades híbridas. A pesar de lo anterior, la regla 
no es perfecta ni está exenta de perfeccionamiento. De hecho, el diseño 
propuesto a la regla deja abierta cuestiones relativas a su aplicación, lo cual 
se relaciona mayormente con efectos indeseados a la misma. Estos casos se 
refieren específicamente a la potencial doble imposición en aquellos casos 
en que la entidad híbrida reciba un pago y los casos en los cuales se genera 
un beneficio fiscal por el sólo hecho de aplicar la regla propuesta, y el cual 
no existía con anterioridad. Sin embargo, y con el objeto de mitigar dichos 
resultados, el autor ha propuesto, por una parte, la coordinación de la norma 
propuesta con otra normas, tales como reglas anti-diferimiento (CFC), con 
respecto a los potenciales casos de doble imposición, y, por otra parte, un 
“switch-off” de la norma propuesta en aquellos casos en que se generen 
beneficios tributarios indebidos derivados exclusivamente de la aplicación 
de la norma. Con todo, una implementación a nivel global y uniforme de la 
presente propuesta sigue siendo una cuestión fundamental para asegurar su 
verdadero impacto práctico.  
Es interesante destacar que la reactive coordination rule podría generar 
también un impacto positivo desde un punto de vista del uso de entidades 
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híbridas en el contexto de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble 
imposición. De hecho, la coordinación en la calificación de entidades a nivel 
doméstico asegura una aplicación más restringida del Articulo 1(2) del 
Modelo OCDE, el cual se limitaría a los casos en que el “home country” 
trata a la entidad como una entidad transparente. Dicha restricción 
indirectamente asegura resultados más justos para Estados cuya tributación 
descansa principalmente en la fuente de la renta. A pesar de lo anterior, y tal 
como se señaló en los casos de estudio del Capitulo IV, la aplicación de la 
reactive coordination rule no siempre deriva en resultados más positivos 
para los Estados de la fuente. Sin embargo, lo anterior está lejos de 
considerarse como una característica negativa de la regla, sino más bien es 
la mejor demostración de que la regla propuesta tiene por objeto eliminar las 
disparidades en la calificación de entidades a nivel doméstico, 
indirectamente generando resultados más coherentes desde un punto de vista 
de los tratados bilaterales para evitar la doble imposición, pero en ningún 
caso se trata de un regla creada para inclinar la balanza a favor del Estado de 
la fuente en relación al Estado de la residencia en un contexto bilateral.  
En consideración a todo lo anterior, el uso y mal uso de las entidades 
híbridas es un desafío que debiera direccionarse adecuadamente, 
comenzando por el hecho de asumir una posición menos consecuencialista. 
Hoy por hoy, hemos sido testigos de la intención de presentar los problemas 
en un traje distinto, cuyo pragmatismo es en algunas veces difícil de contra-
argumentar también. Sin embargo, lo anterior no debiera limitarnos en 






entidades híbridas. Este desafío debería asumirse antes que todos los países 
se convenzan de quién es realmente el enemigo y de que el camino de 
generar conexiones artificiales entre resultados es preferible. Como este 
trabajo ha demostrado, las alternativas son aún posibles. 
 
